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Abstract
The British army in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was 
maintained through a system that could trace its roots back to the fifteenth century. It 
was a system that had been shaped in the preceding periods and was significantly 
influenced by the administrative revolution of the eighteenth century. This situation 
had arisen due to events at the end of the seventeenth century and the start of the 
eighteenth, when the relationship between army and state had been redefined. This 
relationship was to have significant implications for how the army was maintained as 
maintaining the army was in many ways central to this relationship.
Traditionally historians have considered how the army was maintained from 
the perspective of either the fighting arms in the field or how the state maintained the 
army as an institution. This study focuses upon the intermediate organizations tasked 
with maintaining the army, departments such as the Commissariat and Royal Wagon 
Train that bridged the gap between the policies and practices of the state and the 
fighting elements. They illustrate the impact of the relationship between the state and 
army on the force, as well as how army had some autonomy within the boundaries and 
responsibilities imposed on it by its relationship with the state. This study also 
considers how far the state was willing to alter this important relationship in response 
to military necessity. Maintaining the army went to the heart of the relationship 
between the force and the state in the period, but it was the question of how best to 
maintain the army in the event of invasion that most threatened to fray, if not destroy, 
this defining relationship.
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Introduction
The maintenance of armed forces is an under researched subject. This can 
create a significant gap in our understanding of history as it is a subject concerned 
with a variety of issues, not merely the effectiveness of armed forces. The existence of 
a gap in our knowledge is demonstrated by the maintenance of the British army at the 
end of the eighteenth century. It is incorrect to believe that the subject of how the 
army was maintained in the period is concerned solely with wagon counting. It was 
entwined with economics, politics, stability and military power, and remains an under 
considered area. This has arisen due to a polarisation in the canon of literature relating 
to Britain's military in the period. Historians including Clive Emsley, Jeremy Black 
and Lawrence Stone have written extensively on how the British state sought to 
support the army. Other historians, including Paddy Griffiths, lan Fletcher and Philip 
Haythornthwaite, have described the army in the field. The gap in our knowledge of 
the period exists because there is little consideration of how the resources provided by 
the state were translated into a form that could be utilised by the army in the field. It is 
through this process that an army is maintained, and it is also through this process that 
the consequences of the relationship between an army and state become apparent.
In his influential study of the subject, Martin van Creveld has described 
military logistics as being 'the practical art of moving armies and keeping them 
supplied'. 1 He notes that this was a key element of strategy that relates not only to 
requirements such as food but also organisation, administration and transportation. An 
important refinement of this argument has been made by Damon Schechter and 
Gordon Sander, who highlight that military logistics has since the Age of 
Enlightenment ceased to be 'just a uniformed matter', that is to say one concerned
1 M. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (CUP, 2004), p.l.
exclusively with the military.2 They argue instead that military logistics are often 
based on the ability of a nation, including its manufacturing base and infrastructure, to 
support its armed forces. There is thus a close relationship between the state and 
military logistics, as demonstrated by the relationship between the British army and 
the state during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The implications of the close relationship between state and army in the period 
could be significant. The force was contained by the state, which imposed political 
and economic boundaries on the army that restricted its influence and size. This was 
achieved through the intermeshing of the military structure with that of civilian 
government, the army being unable to act without the support of the latter. This 
intermeshing occurred not only at the higher levels, with half of the army controlled 
by a civilian (the Master of the Ordnance), but also in the field, where commissaries 
working alongside the army were employed by the Treasury. The consequences of the 
intermeshing of military and civil were to have an impact at a variety of levels, the 
extent of which has yet to be fully considered by historians.
The relationship between the state and army had considerable implications for 
both defence policy and the nature of the military power that stemmed from it. Jeremy 
Black states that the keystones of British military power in the period were four 
fundamental capabilities: suppression of revolt, a small but effective army, naval 
dominance and an ability to wage transoceanic warfare.3 This study, however, takes 
the view that British military power was instead based on three pillars: the navy, 
subsidy of foreign allies and the army. That this policy existed has often been used by 
historians as evidence of Britain's industrial strength. This study demonstrates that this
2 D. Schechter and G. Sander, Delivering the Goods: The Art of Managing Your Supply Chain (New 
Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 2002), p.21.
3 J. Black, The British Sea Borne Empire, (London, YUP, 2004), p. 170.
strength was fragile, and that the three tier policy was only practical because the army 
was given a low priority.
The lower priority given to the army did not prevent the state from at times 
ruthlessly utilising the force to pursue its own aims, a fact particularly apparent in 
regard to Empire. The global deployment of the army arose as a direct consequence of 
it being a tool of an Imperial power and it was expected to police the Empire, a 
keystone of the British state in the period, despite itself occupying the third tier of 
British defence policy. Thus the state frequently expected a return in excess of its 
sometimes-miserly investment in the army, and the disparity between resources and 
expected function was to continually hinder the army.
The relationship between army and state not only influenced the force's 
deployment and resources available but also had a significant impact on its structure. 
Through the intermeshing of civil and military, and the dominance of the former, the 
army adopted many of the characteristics of civilian administration in the period, 
including bureaucratic practices and departmentalisation, along with the benefits and 
drawbacks of each. The organizations tasked with maintaining the army exhibited 
such traits to a high degree and they were heavily departmentalised, various bodies 
having specific roles, albeit on occasion overlapping jurisdictions. The advantage of 
the departmentalisation for the historian is that the administrative structures provide a 
framework around which a study of how the army was maintained can be structured. 
This study differs from many works relating to the maintenance of the army as it does 
not focus on a single department but instead focuses on several. 4
In some cases the organizations upon which this study is based were large and 
their role significant, so they are considered in their own chapters. The first to be
4See for example J. Sutton (ed.), Wait for the Wagon (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1998); Lieutenant Colonel 
J. H. Plumridge, Hospital Ships and Ambulance Trains (London, Seeley, 1975).
considered will be Commissariat (chapter 2). This department is one of the few 
involved in maintaining the army that receives any attention of note from historians, 
who are often critical of the organization. The Commissariat had various roles, 
including storekeeper, supplying food and book keeping. It was a civil-military hybrid 
and a study of this organization is effectively a study of the relationship between army 
and state in the field, while its bureaucratic practices ensure it is also a case study of 
military administration hi the period. As this study will demonstrate it was neither the 
complete failure that it is often portrayed, nor wholly responsible for many of the 
failings in the logistics system. The only other organization to be allocated its own 
chapter is Royal Wagon Train (chapter 4). Thisorganization is almost entirely ignored 
by historians but warrants a much a higher profile than it is commonly given. Through 
an extensive consideration of the Royal Wagon Train's structure and evolution, this 
study demonstrates how the army was able to display some structural autonomy and 
had an ability to adapt to new challenges, despite the constraints placed on it by the 
state.
Organizations that fulfilled less important roles are grouped on a thematic 
basis. The first group to be considered form the basis of chapter 3, and are 
organizations tasked with procurement for the army. This group includes the Barrack 
Master General and Quarter Master General, the role of which was providing 
accommodation; the Clothing Board, that co-ordinated uniform provision; and the 
Ordnance Board, that supplied munitions. The attitude of historians towards these 
organizations and the items that they supplied has often been apathetic. Furthermore, 
when these issues have been considered it has tended to be from a limited perspective. 
Often little consideration has been given to how these items were supplied. Much has 
be written, for example, about the appearance of uniform and regulations concerning
it but not how it was regulated. The situation regarding accommodation is particularly 
interesting as historians have tended to focus on the political significance of barracks, 
rather than their importance for soldiers. As chapter 3 will demonstrate, there is much 
to be learned by examining these organizations in a wider context. In particular it will 
challenge common perceptions of Britain's industrial strength through illustrating 
fundamental shortcomings in production.
Traditionally, studies concerned with the maintenance of the army have 
focused on the consequences of production, that is to say physical items such as guns. 
The view taken in this study, however, is that not everything required by an army can 
be carried on a wagon. To be maintained an armed force requires a diverse range of 
services. Thus chapter 5 is concerned with the second group of organizations, 
specifically the Medical and Chaplain General's Departments, as well as various 
policies adopted by the army. The final group of organizations to be considered are 
those that were tasked with county governance and defence. This group forms the 
basis of chapter 6, a chapter that demonstrates the involvement of civilian bodies in 
the maintenance of the army. This is arguably the most important chapter in the entire 
work. Through utilising rarely used sources chapter 6 highlights the willingness of the 
state to drastically alter its relationship with the army to aid national defence.
The objective of the above chapters is not to provide a complete overview of 
how the army was maintained in the period, but rather to examine key features in the 
context of the relationship between state and army and the consequences of this. One 
aspect that could warrant consideration in a study of this nature is soldiers' pay. While 
an important consideration, however, it is apparent that it was something that soldiers 
could and, importantly, did do with out for many months and this study instead
focuses on more necessary items.5 Other important aspects that could have warranted 
consideration include cartography and intelligence gathering. The two issues could be 
closely linked but data concerning them tends to be either scarce or fragmentary. 
Another issue absent from this work is how foreign armies were maintained. This is 
because frequently the system utilised by Britain was by far the most comprehensive, 
the organizations utilised by other nations being smaller, not so well organised, 
crippled by corruption or even non-existent. There is also the question of doctrine: 
that of living off the land as used by the French compared to that of supplying items 
from markets at home and abroad as used by the British. The distinction between 
these two doctrines, however, was not always clear. In 1805, for example, French 
forces marching through neutral Hesse-Kassel were expected to exist on rations rather 
than plunder.6 There is also the difficulty of comparing the military capability of states 
due to their diverse circumstances and practices. 7
Although using the departmentalisation of the force as a structure, the study is 
not solely concerned with how individual departments operated. Instead it 
demonstrates that while the army is traditionally seen as a conservative institution, it 
could be innovative and flexible. Although confined within certain boundaries by its 
relationship with the state the army had some autonomy and utilised this to good 
effect. The force not only modified its structure and practices to better suit its 
requirements but also implemented policies concerned with aspects such as welfare 
and regulations to limit corruption. The army was not unique in addressing such issues
6 For a consideration of the difficulties of supplying the monetary requirements of the Peninsular army, 
see C.D. Hall, Wellington's Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807 to 1814 (London, 
Chatham, 2004), pp. 129-136. Andre Corvisier stated that following the military revolution armies 
without pay had a tendency to mutiny but the British army demonstrated this was not always the case. 
A. Corvisier (trans. A. T. Siddall), Armies and Societies in Europe 1494 -1789 (London, Indiana 
University Press, 1979), p.61.
6 Creveld, Supplying War, p.45.
7 For a consideration of systems utilised by other armies see Corvisier, Armies and Societies; J. R. 
Elting, Swords Around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee (London, Phoenix Grant, 1998); 
Creveld, Supplying War.
and in many cases, particularly welfare, the army lagged behind the Royal Navy.8 Yet 
this does not detract from the fact that many of the policies adopted by or in regard to 
the army would not be implemented outside of the British military for several 
decades, by which time many would become important social issues.
The factor that made the army distinct from the navy was its relationship to the 
state as it was often the third pillar of national defence, after the Royal Navy and 
subsidy of foreign allies. Because of this for much of the period the army would 
remain under funded and thus under resourced. How the army contended with this 
situation, which for the most part originated in the system of safeguards intended to 
limit the power of the army in the seventeenth century, is also reflected in a study of 
the organisations tasked with maintaining the force.
The organizations tasked with maintaining the British army in the period are 
frequently been overlooked by historians, who are often critical of the systems used to 
maintain the army. Yet these organizations faced many difficulties that hindered their 
activities. Some difficulties were the result of problems created by the practices of 
these organizations, some were attributable to the limits of contemporary knowledge, 
while factors as diverse as sleepy muleteers or heavy snowfalls could also have a 
significant impact. One of the most fundamental difficulties, however, was the 
relationship between the state and army in the period, and-it is the nature and origins 
of this relationship that is the focus of the chapter 1.
8 The personnel of the Royal Navy enjoyed benefits such as more efficient medical provision, a 
subsidised postal service and a system of pension some years ahead of that in the army. C. Emsley, 
British Society and the French Wars 1793 -1815 (London, Macmillan, 1979), p.55; M. Duffy, 'The 
Foundations of British Naval Power', in M. Duffy (ed), The Military Revolution and State, 1500 to 
1800 (Exeter University, 1980), pp.49-84.
Chapter 1 
The relationship between state and army
It is generally accepted that the changes that occurred in British politics and 
society due to the political turmoil of the seventeenth century brought with them many 
advantages for the nation's armed forces. It is a commonly held view that the 
administrative and financial revolutions enabled the state to channel to its military the 
resources provided by Britain's industrialisation. This chapter challenges this 
somewhat cosy picture by demonstrating how the state inhibited the army as much as 
it facilitated the army's success and expansion. Andre Corvisier wrote that the military 
revolution created obstacles for states to overcome. 9 A study of eighteenth-century 
Britain demonstrates how a state contended with these obstacles. This was to be 
achieved through the maintenance of the army becoming driven by political and 
economic concerns rather than military ones.
John Brewer has described the relationship between the British state and its 
army in the period as the fiscal-military state. 10 This somewhat over-simplifies the 
situation through accommodating diverse strands within one neat theory. In particular 
it downplays the importance of the military revolution as a distinct event, even though 
this revolution was in some ways a pre-requisite for the creation of the fiscal-military 
state." While the concept of'the fiscal-military state' maybe flawed, it is apparent that 
a fiscal-military state existed. That is to say a state in which fiscal policy and the 
military were closely linked, with implications for aspects such as defence and 
taxation policies. In any case, the fiscal-military state is a useful term to describe the 
British state at the end of the eighteenth century.
9 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.61.
10 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, passim.
11 M. Duffy, The Military Revolution and State', in Duffy(ed), The Military Revolution and State, p.l.
Since the publication of Sinews of Power, historians such as Lawrence Stone 
have discussed and expanded Brewer's arguments and theories. 12 In both Sinews and 
subsequent works historians have tended to shy away from defining the boundaries of 
the fiscal-military state and the implications such boundaries may have had. Brewer 
touched on the subject in his consideration of British sensibilities regarding enforced 
service in the military, but the boundaries still remain an under-considered area. 13 A 
concept central to Brewer's model of the fiscal-military state is that the nation 
underwent significant political, economic and social modifications to accommodate 
the needs of its armed forces. Taken to a logical conclusion this dictates that the 
armed forces would be able to expand perpetually to meet operational requirements 
but this was not to occur. During the eighteenth century the demands of Britain's 
growing military power had been met through the expansion of central government's 
ability to raise finances (and the willingness of British subjects to fund this through 
paying their taxes). By the end of the century it was apparent that this expansion could 
not continue indefinitely and the ability of the state to raise revenue was stretched to 
the limit by the Napoloenic Wars. This arose because there are limits to the 
concessions a state is able or willing to make to meet the needs of its armed forces. 
Once these limits are reached, the needs of the armed forces can no longer shape the 
state. In such a situation the armed forces are contained by the boundaries imposed by 
the state. Thus the military is tailored to the needs of the state, not the state modified 
to meet the needs of the military. 14
Historians generally agree that the power of the state was confined within 
certain boundaries but have failed to address a fundamental issue: the state could have 
ridden roughshod over the sensibilities of British citizens. Asking why the state did
12 See L. Stone (ed), An Imperial State At War: Britain From 1689 - 1815 (London, Routledge, 1994).
13 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 63.
14 This was the situation in a civilian state. In a military state, such as Prussia, the state was more likely 
to adapt to meet the needs of the military. Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.61.
not do so is important as the answer addresses important issues that are central to 
understanding Britain in the period. The first issue was that the state could only 
operate through a consensus across the various socio-economic and political groups 
and could ill afford to upset the proverbial apple cart. The system of tax collection, for 
example, would have been redundant if citizens had refused to pay their taxes en 
masse. l5 The second reason for the inability (or failure, depending on perspective) of 
the British state to ignore the concerns of its citizenry in favour of the armed forces 
was that those in power often shared similar concerns to those same citizens, thereby 
lacking the will or, for that matter, any interest in disturbing the status quo. The 
acquisition of wealth was a common goal across most sections of British society, from 
the landed gentry to the newly emerging industrialists and the growing ranks of the 
'middling sort', and growing militarism would threaten this activity. 16 As Julian 
Hoppit states, the economic consequences of larger armies - higher taxes, diversion of 
resources, disruption to markets and reductions in available labour - were far-ranging 
and, most importantly, had already been experienced in Britain to varying degrees 
during the early eighteenth century. 17
The existence of a large army would have struck at the key element of British 
economic growth, specifically the existence of a large pool of labour that was readily 
available to be transferred between economic sectors and industries (an oft-quoted 
example being from agriculture to weaving). 18 The relatively high productivity levels 
of the British workforce, particularly in agriculture, worsened the problem because
each individual removed from industry or agriculture resulted in a greater drop in
15While there is no reason to believe such a move was mooted, it was feasible. The rise of the anti-corn
law movement could be seen as evidence of a national protest movement.
16 B. Harris, 'Praising the Middling Sort: Social Identity in Eighteenth Century British Newspapers', in
A. Kidd andD. Nicols (eds.), The Making of the British Middle Classes (Stroud, Sutton, 1998), p6; F.
M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London, Routledge and Kegan,
1963), p.7.
17 1 Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? England 1689 -1782 (Oxford, Clarendon, 2000), pp. 128-9.
18 N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, Clarendon. 1985),
pp. 115-116.
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production. Wrigley estimates, for example, that British agricultural labourers 
produced enough food for three families (including their own), compared to those in 
France who produced sufficient to support only one and a half families. 19
Historians have overlooked the irony of a situation whereby Britain's military 
expansion in the eighteenth century was financed by and utilised institutions that were 
originally envisaged as means to limit the armed forces in general, and the army in 
particular. To appreciate this argument it is necessary to consider when a fiscal- 
military state began to emerge in Britain. One of the main weaknesses of Brewer's 
hypothesis on the existence of the fiscal-military state is that its origin is not clearly 
defined. Brewer's argument is that the fiscal-military state was created in the 
aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, as the relationship between monarch, 
parliament and the nation was redefined following decades of political turmoil. 20 It is 
clear, however, that the processes involved commenced much earlier than this. 
Lawrence Stone cites the mid-seventeenth century (approximately 1640 to 1660) as 
the starting point. 21 During this era Britain experienced several traumatic events, 
including the civil wars, the rise and fall of a republic, dictatorship, restoration of the 
monarchy and foreign invasion in the form of William ffl's accession to the throne in 
1689. 22 These events had a significant impact on the psyche of many Britons that 
persisted into the nineteenth century, creating an aversion to military power in the 
country that no amount of administrative reform could counter. This was to have 
significant implications for the army in the eighteenth century and helped define the 
boundaries within which its growth was contained.
Is> E. A. Wrigley, 'Society and the economy in the eighteenth century', in L. Stone (ed), An Imperial
State At War: Britain From 1689 - 1815 (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 76-77.
-° Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.xiii.
21 L. Stone, 'Introduction', in Stone (ed), An Imperial State At War,, p.46.
22While William Ill's arrival was generally welcomed as a liberation, it was effectively an invasion.
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To state that there was a fear of a powerful army in Britain is an 
oversimplification of an important issue that went deeper than questions relating to 
the armed forces alone. Certainly the dictatorship of Cromwell's generals in the 1650s 
had created a fear and distrust of the army, a fear so deep rooted that it shocked many 
soldiers into eventually supporting the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in 1660. 23 The 
hatred of soldiers and the army in which they served was, however, only part of the 
equation, just as military rule was only a part of the widespread and longer-lasting 
upheaval in seventeenth-century Britain. Significantly, it was not the existence of a 
powerful standing army that had triggered the events that led to the eventual collapse 
of the Commonwealth, but rather the role of the army in politics. Thus, in 1660 efforts 
were made to depoliticise the army and in 1661 a new type of standing army was 
created, described by John Childs as being 'a non-political body, concerned solely 
with the execution of the civil authority's wishes regarding national defence and 
preservation of internal law and order'. 24 This enabled the army to undo some of the 
damage done to its reputation by its actions in the aftermath of the civil war but its 
standing was further damaged by events in the reigns of Charles n and James JJ, 
events that created a fear of the army being used as a tool, rather than an instigator, of 
tyranny. Such fears had appeared to gain most credibility in the reign of James JJ, 
when the perceived threat was not only of an army used as an instrument of power but 
also as a Catholic and even foreign one (troops being introduced from Ireland was a 
persistent fear of James' opponents). 25
To counter the threat posed by the army, two policies were adopted that were 
to become keystones of British military policy during the eighteenth century. The first 
was the maintenance of only a small standing army, which during the reign of Charles
23 R. Hainsworth, The Swordsmen in Power (Stroui Sutton, 1997), pp.250-269.
24 J. Childs, The Army of Charles II (London, Routledge, 1976), p.l.
-5 P. Seward, The Restoration, 1660-1688 (London, Macmillan, 1991), pp. 127-130.
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II was restricted to six regiments and a garrison in the North African port of Tangier. 26 
Such was the mistrust of the army that this policy was to persist even when it was 
clearly detrimental to Britain's security, such as when Jacobite unrest was at its height 
during the early eighteenth century. 27 The second policy to contain the power of the 
army was that the force was to swear an oath to the monarch but be funded through 
parliament.28 Both policies were refined and developed during the reign of William IE, 
the Bill of Rights in 1689 establishing that a standing army required the consent of 
parliament, while the Disbanding Act of 1699 established the number of troops that 
could be maintained. 29
Of the two policies adopted to contain the army the most significant was that 
its relationship with the state was a dual one: with the crown and parliament, the 
former commanding and the latter paying for its upkeep. This concept was introduced 
in the Militia Act of 1661 and then reinforced in the 1689 Bill of Rights. 30 This 
relationship between army and state was unusual, as armed forces in Europe tended to 
be appendages of the crown. 31 The dual relationship was to have an impact on the 
structure, organisation and effectiveness of the army. It was also crucial to the 
financial and administrative revolutions that occurred during the eighteenth century, 
as the state would seek to expand and improve its ability to raise the revenue required 
to support the army. To finance the wars fought in the 1690s a system based on 
taxation was adopted, while from the Wars of the Spanish Succession the precedent 
was set of funding wars through credit. 32 These practices remained keystones of
26 Quids, The Army of Charles II, p. 30
- 1 G.C. Gibbs, The Revolution in Foreign Policy', in G. Holmes (ed), Britain After the Glorious 
Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1980), p.66.
-* Childs, We Army of Charles II, pp.30 and 218.
29 J. Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', in G. Holmes (ed), Britain After the Glorious 
Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1980), pp.43 to 44.
30 Childs, The Army oj"Charles'II, p.218; Carter, The Revolution and the Constitution', p.43.
31 Brewer. The Sinews of Power, pp. 43-4.
32 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.48; W.A. Speck, 'Conflict in Society', in Holmes 
(ed), Britain After the Glorious Revolution, p. 142.
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Britain's wartime finance until the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 33 
These policies were to have two main impacts. The first was that the system of 
procurement utilised by the army was also to become based on credit. 34 The second 
consequence was more indirect but arose as a result of the growing number of 
government departments such as the excise, departments created to raise or allocate 
taxation. 35 The creation of such departments had implications for administrative 
practices throughout the state, eventually influencing the way in which the army itself 
was administered.
Although the dual-relationship continued to exist by the end of the eighteenth 
century its role had changed. Fears concerning militarism persisted, it being a subject 
frequently addressed by the cartoonists, caricaturists and pamphleteers. 36 Militarism 
was seen to threaten the relationship between the centre and periphery in British 
politics, opening the way for the former to attain more power at the expense of 
individuals. Because of this, fear of militarism was also linked to the notion of liberty 
that existed in Britain, which was based on the preservation of parliamentary 
democracy and rights of subjects. 3? It is apparent, however, that fear of militarism was 
not the only factor that sustained the dual-relationship: the tendency to applaud the 
success and capability of the fleet was, after all, militarism.
By the late eighteenth century the real fear of military expansion was as much 
economic as political; a large army would have tied down resources seen by many to 
be better spent on industrial expansion at home and imperial expansion overseas.
33 E.L. Ellis, 'William m and the Politicians', in Holmes (ed), Britain After the Glorious Revolution, 
p. 126.
34 See below p.40
35 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.67, 102-112.
36 R. J. White, Waterloo to Peterloo (London, Mercury Books, 1963), pp. 7-8. See also J. Brewer, The 
English Satirical Print, 1600-1832: The Common People and Politics, 1750-1790s (Cambridge, 
Chadwyck, 1986).
37 S. Caunce, 'Not Sprang from Princes: Middling Society in Eighteenth Century West Yorkshire', in 
Kidd andNicolls (eds.), The Making of the British Middle Classes, pp.26-29. True liberty was seen to 
be as dangerous as militarism. E. Royle, Revolutionary Britannia: Reflections on the Tlveat of 
Revolution in Britain, 1789 to 1848 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 14.
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Conversely, through safeguarding mercantile interests, the Royal Navy was seen to 
contribute directly to British economic growth, while the exploits of explorers such as 
Cook had further focused public attention on the importance of maritime affairs. 38 
Although such reasoning does not give due credit the part played by the army in the 
growth and maintenance of the Empire in this and the preceding period, it is fair to say 
that the importance of the army to British ambitions was considerably less than in the 
late nineteenth century. Crucially, the protection of India was not the responsibility of 
the British army but rather the army of the Honourable East India Company, and 
remained so until the mutiny of 1857. 39
Besides economic and colonial concerns (the two could become inseparable 
during this period) there were sound strategic reasons for successive governments to 
support the navy over the army. As an island nation it made more sense for Britain to 
maintain a strong fleet to prevent an invasion, rather than a strong army to repulse 
one, and there was what Jeremy Black describes as a belief in Britain's 'maritime 
destiny'. 40 In this regard the policy of the government was a success, and through an 
unequal allocation of resources the navy was able to take a lead over its rivals in the 
fields of armament and hull design, while through installations such as rope works 
and government dockyards the navy had considerably more control over production of 
its own material than did the army (including facilities overseas such as the rope 
works in Malta).41 Even when the latter maintained its own facilities, such as the 
Woolwich arsenal, a certain proportion of output would be allocated to the navy.42 The
infrastructure allocated to support the navy was far greater than that allocated to the
38 D. A. Baugh, The Maritime State and Atlantic Commerce', in Stone (ed), An Imperial State At War, 
pp. 185-223; Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 127.
39 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.88-90. The company's army was of further 
importance to Britain's militarj power as, through acting in conjvmction with other British forces, it was 
able to seize and garrison enemy colonies in the Indian Ocean region (notably Java and Madagascar) 
and supplied troops for the Egyptian campaign during the wars with France.
40 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 125.
41 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 161.
42 Baugh, The Maritime State and Atlantic Commerce', p. 186.
15
army, and John Brewer estimates the cost of supporting a sailor was double that for a 
soldier. 43 Part of this cost included certain benefits for sailors that were not enjoyed by 
soldiers, a particularly contentious one being the availability of wine to naval officers 
free of duty, while army officers had to pay all such charges.44
The difficulty that faced the government by the time of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars was the success of the policy that gave priority to the navy over the 
army. It is apparent that this led to a situation in which the expansion of the navy 
continued to be tolerated while the army was allowed to stagnate.45 The success of the 
Royal Navy, which, it must be stated, came about as a result of a defence policy that 
enabled the fleet to take a qualitative and quantitative lead over its rivals, was a fragile 
one. The crucial issue to appreciate is that despite the emphasis placed on the Royal 
Navy in British defence policy it also lacked sufficient resources. While politicians 
may have approved funding for the fleet to expand, in practice the effects of this were 
limited. Manpower, in particular, was in short supply, despite the use of enforced 
service through the press gang.46 Press gangs were selective and not a significant 
benefit for recruitment to the navy. In 1808 and 1809, for example, recruitment to the 
navy suffered a shortfall of 16,000 men and even as early as 1800, failure to meet 
recruitment targets was hampering operations. By the time of the Battle of Trafalgar 
British warships regularly sailed undermanned, Nelson's flagship Victory sailing with 
only 703 of her 837-man crew in 1805. Added to the Royal Navy's recruitment 
shortfall should also be that of the marines, who were 7,000 below establishment by 
1803. 47 By 1812 the fleet was even showing signs of problems in quality, when U.S.
43 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 31.
44 See Lieutenant Fairman, A Letter on the Expediency of Allowing Wine to the Army Free of Duty as in 
the Navy (London, Carpenter, 1803).
45 C. Emsley, British Society, p.52.
46 P. Woodfine, "Proper Objects of the Press': Naval Impressment and Habeas Corpus in the French 
Revolutionary Wars', in K. Dockray and K. Laybourn (eds), The Representation and Reality of War: 
the British Experience (Stroud, Sutton, 1999), pp.39-60.
47 Hall, British Strategy, pp. 11-13. For a full consideration of the navy in this period see N. Rodger, 
The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, Collins, 1986).
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warships of a similar size outgunned British frigates. 48
The impact of the policy favouring the navy over the army was not entirely 
detrimental to the force. Sea power was utilised to significant effect to maintain the 
army, being used to move supplies and protect lines of communication. Traditionally 
historians considering the latter, such as Christopher Hall and Piers Mackesy, have 
focused on sea borne lines of communication but the importance of sea power to the 
protection of those on land should not be overlooked. Piers Mackesy notes that 
Britain's naval power enabled her to harass the enemy's coasts but this argument 
should be extended to include the fact that Britain's own coastal flanks were secure, 
preventing similar raids on British supply lines. 49 Disadvantages of the policy placing 
the navy first not only included inevitable budget deficiencies for the land based force 
but also influenced its deployment. The Royal Navy could only project its power with 
secure bases and in consequence large garrisons were deployed for the defence of 
locations that included Sicily, Minorca, Greece and Alexandria. 30
Whatever its impact on the army, the policy favouring the Royal Navy 
continued, allowing it to continue to defend the home nation, expand the Empire and 
safeguard commerce. This preference for the navy existed not just in government but 
also society in general, despite the fact that the navy could be as disruptive as the 
army. The presence of large dockyards and fleets, for example, inflated food prices in 
the locality and in 1795 this led to riots in certain regions/ 1 The unfavourable attitude 
of the population exasperated soldiers such as Ensign John Aitchinson, serving in the 
3 ld Regiment of Guards, who complained that until late in the Napoleonic Wars, when 
success in the Peninsular War finally elevated the prestige of the army, 'the navy had 
been the darling of the people, the likes of Nelson and Hood having looked down on
4S P. J. Haythornthwaite, Napoleon 's Military Machine (Staplehurst, Spellmont, 1988), pp.186-187.
49 P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, 1803 to 1810 (London, Longmans, 1957). p.7.
50 Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, 1803 to 1810, p. 16.
51 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 162.
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the army'/2 There are a variety of reasons why Britons continued to have an aversion 
to the army. As suggested above fear of overt militarism was not necessarily a factor 
as it existed in regard to the navy and, furthermore, was eventually fully embraced 
during the Peninsular War as the nation celebrated victories such as Salamanca and 
Vittoria with peals of church bells, special edition newspapers and other revelry. 53 
Neither were economic arguments concerning the value of the fleet as opposed to the 
army necessarily significant, this being a concern primarily of the wealthy or those 
educated enough to read about the markets and other financial affairs in newspapers, 
an activity that was increasingly popular amongst the middling sort in the provinces 
but less so among poorly educated labourers. 54
The factor that united many elements of society against the army was the 
disruption it could cause at a local level, directly affecting the lives of individuals. 
Fights between soldiers, which were often fuelled by alcohol, were a feature of life in 
garrison towns, and particular those that contained depots at which new recruits would 
arrive. This was the situation facing Private William Wheeler of the 51 st Regiment of 
Foot when he arrived at Maidstone in April 1809, when he described scenes of 
'drunkenness and riot' amongst the newly arrived troops in the town/5 Such disorder 
could be dangerous to inhabitants and on occasion required the deployment of other 
military forces to restore order. The memoirist Benjamin Harris recorded such an 
incident, which occurred while he was travelling from Ireland to depots in 
southeastern England and accompanied by fellow recruits to the 95th Rifles. Trouble
53 W. F. K. Thompson (ed), An Ensign in the Peninsular War: The Letters of John Aitchinson (London, 
Michael Joseph, 1981), p.230.
53 Hugh Marendes to Privy Council, Edinburgh, 25th July 1813, PRO PC 1/4011, Privy Council 
Miscellaneous Unbound Papers, July 1813; Salisbury Journal, 24th August 1812, p.4.
54 Harris, 'Praising the Middling Sort', p5; J. Brewer, 'Commercialisation and Polities', in 
N.McKendrick, J Brewer and J.H. Plumb (eds.), The Birth of a Consumer Society: The 
Commercialisation of Eighteenth Century England (London, Europa, 1982), p.216.
55 B. H. Liddell - Hart (ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809 - J828 (London, Michael Joseph, 
1951), pp.17-18. Such disorder could involve sailors but they tended to spend more time isolated from 
the population aboard ship.
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began shortly after the party left Ireland, when fights broke out between Irish Roman 
Catholics and Protestants in the group. Harris noted how the recruits, drawn mainly 
from rural backgrounds, were too overawed by the cities of Bristol (the port at which 
they disembarked) and Bath to cause more trouble. This situation continued until the 
group reached Salisbury Plain, at which point a sectarian fight broke out and violence 
continued when the group reached the town of Andover. At this point the local 
Volunteers were called out to restore order with loaded muskets and calm was 
restored/6
A more serious outbreak of disorder occurred amongst troops billeted in Cork 
during September 1795. Troops of the 105th and 113 th Regiments of Foot, en route to 
the West Indies, mutinied, marching through the city with bayonets fixed and 
releasing prisoners from the jail.^7 Needless to say the scenes caused considerable 
concern amongst the inhabitants of the city, although control was restored relatively 
bloodlessly following the imposition of a curfew and arrival of troops from the 7th 
Dragoon Guards. 58 In this case the disorder had gone beyond drunken or rowdy troops 
and was a mutiny but, while one of the more extreme examples of what could happen 
in a garrison town or city, it was a realistic threat and ample reason for civilians to 
oppose the presence of soldiers in a locality, even if they were not opposed to the 
army as an institution of the state.
Mutinies and drunken brawls were not the only reasons for hostility between 
citizens and soldiers. Indeed, while instances such as those noted above could 
potentially create conflict between soldiers and civilians, it was often the use of the 
army to restore control that caused hostility (a role that determined the locations of
56 E. Hathaway (ed), A Dorset Rifleman: Tfie Recollections of Benjamin Harris (Swanage, 
Shinglepicker, 1995), pp.20-21.
57 Deployment to the West Indies also initiated a mutiny amongst sailors in 1801. Black, Sea Borne 
Empire, p. 161.
58 John Travers to Lord Lismore, Cork, 4* September 1795, NAM 6807/370/44; Notices Announcing a 
Curfew in Cork, 4th September 1795, NAM 6807/370/43.
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their peace time deployments).'9 It is apparent, therefore, that for civilians contact with 
soldiers could be disruptive, unpleasant and dangerous. Appreciating that citizens 
were sometimes opposed to the army at a local level, whether it was due to disruption 
to markets, drunken brawls or its role as a police force, but not opposed to the army as 
an institution per se is vital for understanding the relationship of the army with the 
state and the continued existence of the dual relationship with crown and parliament. 
The attitude of the population in general is perhaps best described as 'not in my back 
yard': the army was necessary but citizens preferred it not to disrupt their lives. 60 The 
fear essentially was of disruption (be it social, political or economic), not of the force 
being used as an instrument of tyranny. Even when fears of mutiny and revolution 
were at their height following the French Revolution and Irish Rebellion of 1798 fears 
related not to the army itself but the actions of individual soldiers. By the time of the 
unrest in the post-war period the army was seen as reliable and called on by the 
government to suppress disorder in the capital. 61 Thus, in regard to the situation at the 
time of the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars, it is an oversimplification to state that 
the dual relationship the army had with crown and parliament existed as a means to 
control the force. Such a concept no doubt provided comfort to liberty minded liberals 
but more importantly the dual relationship had shaped and become embedded in the 
British state. It was the dual relationship that provided the driving force for the 
administrative and financial reforms of the eighteenth century, creating the need for 
parliament to expand and even create its own financial apparatus so that it, rather than 
the monarch, could support the armed forces. 62 Safeguards that restricted and
5" Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.51.
60 Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?, p. 157.
61 Mr. Wood, Mayor of London, to Major Elington of the Tower Garrison, Mansion House, December
1816 (undated), PRO WO 94/15, Tower of London Constables Office: Letters and Orders 1816-3 L f.4;
M.I. Thomis and P. Holt, Threats of Revolution in Britain 1789 - 1848 (Archon Books, 1977), pp.39-
75.
62 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.48.
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controlled the army were in some respects redundant by the end of the eighteenth 
century but were nevertheless an integral part of the state, one example being the 
policy that placed the Royal Navy before the army. Effectively the dual relationship 
continued to exist not for its original purpose - that of controlling the army - but 
because it enabled Britain to sustain its economic growth and social stability. A key 
factor in the relative stability enjoyed by Britain compared to other nations in the 
period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was that this suited both the 
government and large sections of the population alike.
Although the reasons for the dual relationship had changed from that initially 
envisaged (as a means of controlling the army and preventing it from becoming 
involved in politics), its impact on the army remained and should not be 
underestimated as it characterised the organisation of the force into the nineteenth 
century. Because of the dual relationship, civilian authorities governed Britain's 
armed forces to an unprecedented degree when compared to the situation elsewhere in 
Europe, particularly in Prussia, Russia and Austria. 63 This created an increasingly 
significant role for government, with the result that the army was administered 
through what can be considered a combination of old and new departments. The old 
departments predated the reign of William in and in the eighteenth century existed in 
forms quite different to those originally envisaged, in terms of both role and structure. 
Some, such as the Ordnance Board, had evolved over centuries while others, such as 
the War Office, had began to emerge in the 1640s. 64 Conversely, the new departments 
were created during or after the reign of William HI, and included the Home Office. 
Another group of departments of note were those that predated the reign of William 
in but lost significance in relation to the army, an example being the Privy Council,
63 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, pp.76, 116-122.
64 For the various stages in the evolution of the Ordnance Board from its creation in the fifteenth 
century to its decline in the nineteenth, see F. Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery (2 vols, London, 
John Murray, 1879), passim.
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the roles of which in the affairs of the army were largely absorbed by the Cabinet 
during the eighteenth century.65
The dual relationship and subsequent administrative revolution created 
changes at the heart of civilian administration that, while not directly affecting the 
army, were to influence indirectly its own administration and effectiveness. The rise in 
the number of new departments and increasing prestige of existing ones served in part 
to undermine traditional patterns of patronage. The patronage of royalty and the 
aristocracy continued to dominate most departments, especially those that pre-dated 
the reign of William m, but the creation of newer departments opened the door for 
new elites, those whose power stemmed from politics and administration, to exercise 
their own patronage. It would be incorrect to assume that these appointments were 
free of the patronage of either royalty or the aristocracy as the new breed of politicians 
and administrators frequently owed their own positions to such patronage networks, 
but by the end of the eighteenth century there was evidence that the traditional 
patterns of patronage were beginning to break down, with the influence of traditional 
families being exercised rather more indirectly. This was to have implications for 
administration in both the military and civilian spheres, and enabled the gradual rise 
of professional administrators.66
As the army swore an oath to the Crown the ultimate authority in the army 
was, in theory, the monarch. This was the case during the reign of William HI but 
royal influence declined thereafter, as did the role of bodies such as the Privy Council, 
the role of which gradually became one of gathering information for enquiries, such 
those conducted regarding outbreaks of disease in the West Indies garrisons, 67 The
65 ]. limes, "The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military State: Government and Society in Eighteenth 
Century Britain', in L. Stone (ed),An Imperial State At War: Britain From 1689 - 1815 (London, 
Routledge, 1994), p!03.
66 Brewer, Tlie English Satirical Print p.74-87.
67 Cailer, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.52: Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military 
State', p!05; for an example of such an inquiry see PRO PC 1/13/149, Sickness in the West Indies
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result of these changes was that by the time of the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
Wars, the army was, in practice, a tool of parliament or, more specifically, whatever 
government was in power as it was this body that decided where and when the army 
would deploy. Thus, in some respects, the army was subordinated to the civilian 
administration, which had the Prime Minister at its head. 68 The power of this office 
over the army was limited due to the nature of British politics. In particular, the Prime 
Minister did not necessarily lead the largest political group in parliament, or even 
draw members of the government from his party. As a consequence the role of the 
Prime Minister more often became one of performing a political balancing act rather 
than direct involvement in every aspect of policy. Of the Prime Ministers in the early 
nineteenth century, only Pitt and Grenville became seriously involved in the affairs of 
the army. Pitt was one of the instigators of the army's involvement in operations 
against enemy colonies and reformed the national command structure through creating 
the post of Secretary for War and the Colonies, while Grenville's Foxite Ministry of 
Talents fell following attempts to reform the army. 69
The principal means through which a Prime Minister was able to influence the 
actions and structure of the army was through the appointment of his Cabinet, a body 
that had risen to prominence during the reign of William HI to meet the need for 
wartime planning. 70 Although attempts were made to run the affairs of government 
through consensus the personality of those individuals appointed to lead ministries 
and departments could be significant. It has been suggested, for example, that
Raised at Privy Council.
68 For a consideration of the relevant departments and how they operated in regard to the armed forces, 
see Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.5-9; Haythomthwaite, Tlie Napoleonic- 
Source Book, pp. 195-6.
69 Emsley British Society, pp!28-9. For a consideration of how the varjing domestic political situation 
could have an impact on a military campaign and the army, see R. Muir, "Britain and the Peninsular 
War', in P. Griffiths (ed), A History of the Peninsular War Vol IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain 
and Portugal 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999), pp.335-372.
70 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.50; Innes, "The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military 
State', p.103.
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differing preferences expressed in Cabinet concerning who should lead the British 
army dispatched to Portugal in 1808 caused the confused situation that resulted in the 
Convention of Cintra and subsequent recall of the officers concerned (Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, Sir Hew Darlymple and Sir Harry Burrard). 7 ' Of particular importance to 
the army were the following government departments and their heads: the Foreign 
Office, the policies of which could dictate where and when the army was deployed; 
the Home Office, which had jurisdiction over militia, fencible and volunteer forces; 
and the Treasury. The latter was possibly one of the largest and most important 
government departments and, amongst other roles, was responsible for the 
Commissariat. 72 This organisation was effectively part of the army and the principal 
organisation tasked with supplying the force.
Two Cabinet posts had more direct control of the army. These were the Master 
General of the Ordnance and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. The 
former was head of the Ordnance Board, which had responsibility for the engineers 
and artillery, but had only an advisory role in Cabinet. Conversely, the Secretary of 
State for War and the Colonies was a government post and had more influence over 
policy. This post was a development of the Council of War, formed in 1620, and the 
office the Secretary of War, which had emerged in the reign of Charles II. John 
Brewer describes this latter post as being only a minor one and suggests that its 
holders were generally unimportant government officials who only rarely sat in 
Cabinet and thus had little impact on policy. 73 While such a view is to an extent true, 
it is excessively dismissive of a post that was to evolve into an important government 
department. The office of the Secretary of War rose to prominence largely due to the 
efforts and ability of the first holder of the post in the reign of Charles, Sir William
71 C. J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War, (London, Alien Lane, 2002), p.95.
72 Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military State', p. 103. For a consideration of the 
Commissariat, see chapter 2.
73 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 44.
24
Clarke, and his close co-operation with the Commander-in-Chief, General Monck. 
The next significant stage in the evolution of the office of the Secretary at War 
occurred in 1678 when parliament declared that it, rather than the Secretary of State, 
was to sign commissions. From 1683, following the appointment of William 
Bluthwayt as Secretary of War (first from 1683 to 1688 and then from 1690 to 1704), 
further powers were gained and the office began to maintain its own copies of 
warrants, entry books and letters, thereby creating a War Office and junior ministry. 74 
By 1685 the duties of the War Office included the issuing of marching orders, 
deciding regimental seniority and creating military codes of conduct. 75
The importance of the War Office continued to increase during the eighteenth 
century and in 1798 it was merged with the Colonial Office, to form the office of the 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Appointments to this post operated 
through traditional patronage networks and it changed hands seven times in the period 
1800 to 1815. Amongst the six holders of the post (Castlereagh being in office twice), 
there were no fewer than four lords and one viscount. These were Lord Hobart (1801 
to 1804), Lord Camden (1804 to 1805), Viscount Castlereagh (1805 to 1806, 1807 to 
1809), Lord Liverpool (1809 to 1812) and Lord Bathurst (1812 to the end of the war). 
The only non-titled holder of the position in the period was William Windham (1806 
to 1807). 76 That the post frequently changed hands was a consequence of its being a 
political appointment and thus vulnerable to fluctuations in political fortunes and 
changing ministries. Another characteristic of this post was that, being a civilian, the 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies had only a directional and administrative 
role in the structure of the army. The office was perhaps best utilised to co-ordinate 
the activities of the various departments concerned with the operation and
74 Carter. "The Revolution and the Constitution', p.53.
*s Childs, The Army of Charles II, pp.92-100.
76 Partridge and Oliver, TTit? British Army and Her Allies, p.9.
25
maintenance of the army. It was rarely fully effective in fulfilling even this limited 
task, however, and could be so ineffective that Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver 
describe its creation as being little more than a 'political fudge' by Pitt the Younger to 
strengthen his control over government. 77
Despite the powers over the army granted to it by the Act of Settlement, 
parliament, through the Cabinet and then the Secretary of War, could do little more 
than order the army into a theatre of war and issue guidance, such as on the need to 
avoid casualties or to aid an allied nation. On occasion politicians did intervene more 
directly, as in the case of the Walcheren fiasco, but in such circumstances the army 
rarely met with success. It is important to note, however, that the support and 
guidance of politicians was not without value to the army. One of the few occasions 
when the army did act largely on its own initiative was the expedition to Buenos Aires 
in 1806, which proved a complete military disaster and resulted in the surrender of the 
force involved. 78 This event was also to have political repercussions as it gave the 
Spanish colonists a new self belief and increased their determination to achieve 
independence from Spanish colonial rule, an event British foreign policy makers 
sought to avoid or delay for as long as possible.
Below the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies the national command 
structure of the army became more complex, leading Andre Corvisier to state that one 
characteristic of the system was confusion, although this is perhaps excessively harsh 
about administrative practices that could prove effective. 79 The combat elements of 
the army were divided between those of Horse Guards (regular infantry and cavalry), 
the Ordnance Board (regular artillery and engineers) and the Home Office (militia, 
yeomanry, fencibles and volunteers). It is apparent that there was no single military
77 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.8.
78 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 163.
7sl Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.76.
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department with responsibility for the entire army, and of the three departments, Horse 
Guards was unique in having a military man in charge, known as the Commander-in- 
Chief. 80 The control exercised by the Home Office over auxiliary forces was only 
nominal with the result that the British army was effectively divided into two 
departments. A similar situation existed in the French army but differed in that the 
separation was based on function rather than type of arm. 81
Although only having direct control over the cavalry and infantry, the 
Commander-in-Chief was the senior military figure in the British army. Furthermore, 
the importance of the arms under Horse Guards enabled the Commander-in-Chief to 
exercise a degree of operational control over the army as whole. The Ordnance Board 
may have collated the returns of its own forces and maintained them, but it was with 
the forces under Horse Guards that they marched and relied on for their protection. It 
would be incorrect to view the importance of the infantry and cavalry arms as 
enabling the Commander-in-Chief to circumvent the national command structure and 
the checks in place to curb the power of the army, although they did permit him more 
influence than was allowed on paper. Despite this the Commander-in-Chief remained 
powerless without the co-operation of certain civilian-led departments.
The office of Commander-in-Chief for much of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars was held by Frederick, Duke of York, George Ill's second son. York 
temporarily left office in 1809 due to his affair with Mary Clarke and, although 
cleared by Parliament of any wrongdoing, he resigned as a matter of honour. York 
returned in 1811 and it has been argued that during his brief time out of office he was 
still effectively in control, as interim Commander-in-Chief General David Dundas
"° S. J. Park and G. F. Nafziger, Ttie British Military: Its System and Organisation 1803 - 1815 
(Cambridge (Canada), Rafei, 1983), pp.5 -11.
*' In the French army the combat arms were under the chief of staff while the general staff tended to 
fulfil logistical duties. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London, Methuen, 1961), p.53.
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continued his policies. 82 That York held the post of Commander-in-Chief almost 
continually from 1796 to 1827 would suggest a stagnant and conservative 
administration, in an era that would begin to require a gradually more educated rank 
and file, along with increasingly complex equipment. Fortunately for the army York, 
while a poor field general, was unafraid of innovation and was a first class 
administrator. Reforms implemented during his time in office included regimental 
schools, a staff college, published rules and regulations for non-commissioned officers 
and a subsidised mail service." Such reforms helped drag the army from its nadir of 
the previous decade, thereby directly improving morale. This was noted by fighting 
soldiers and in 1805 Captain Thomas Browne of the 23'd Foot wrote of 'a rejuvenated 
British army, whose spirit had been rejuvenated by internal reform and 
improvements'. M
Under the Commander-in-Chief was a secretary, who enabled him to 
communicate with other departments. Initially this was a civilian post but from 1811 
became a military appointment, a demonstration of increasing professionalism within 
the military hierarchy. 10 Besides this secretary, infantry and cavalry, Horse Guards 
contained two departments. These were the Quartermaster General, who was 
responsible for troop movements, information gathering and the supply of camping 
equipment, and the Adjutant-General, who was responsible for drill and discipline.
The combat arms not under Horse Guards - the artillery and engineers - were 
the responsibility of the Ordnance Board. The two organisations had developed along 
markedly different lines, this being apparent by the fact that while the Horse Guards
s2 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.6.
*3 Such a mail service already existed for the sailors of the Royal Navy. J. Bartlett, The Development of
the British Army During the Wars with France 1793 -1815 (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of
Durham, 1997), p. 184; Partridge and Oliver Army Handbook p.7.
u R. N. Buckley (ed), The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne 1807 -1816
(London, Army Records Society, 1987), p.xi.
85 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.7.
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had at its head a soldier and, until 1811, a civilian secretary, the situation in the 
Ordnance was reversed. The head of the Ordnance was a civilian with a seat in the 
Cabinet but below him was an army officer, known as the Deputy Adjutant General. 
The Deputy Adjutant General's department was created to rectify a peculiarity of the 
Royal Artillery, specifically that despite being granted the title of 'regiment' it lacked 
many of the administrative organs associated with such a formation. Prior to the 
creation of the department it had been the responsibility of the individual company 
and battalion officers deployed around the globe to transmit inspection returns to the 
Ordnance Board and make requests concerning supplies. It is possible to draw 
parallels between the creation of the Deputy Adjutant General's department and the 
administrative revolution in general, particularly in the field of data collection and 
compilation of statistics, activities that saw the growth of government departments to 
achieve this.*6 How far the formation of the Deputy Adjutant General's department 
was linked to this trend is, however, questionable. Far more influential was the poor 
performance of the army in North America, which triggered several reforms of the 
army in its aftermath.
When the Deputy Adjutant General's department was formed in 1783 the post 
carried the rank of Brigadier General, although in 1795 this was elevated to the status 
of a staff appointment. 87 The department was to fulfil many of the administrative roles 
of the Commissariat but in relation to the artillery and engineers. 88 Significantly, 
despite its name, the Deputy Adjutant General's department was a quite separate 
entity from the Adjutant General's department under the Commander-in-Chief at 
Horse Guards, the role of that organisation being primarily to ensure discipline and
86 Brewer, We Sinews of Power, p.222-225.
" Deputy Adjutant General, 8to April 1795, PRO WO 55/3045, Board of Ordnance Orders and
Regulations foot Artillery Order Book c!790 to c!846, p.73.
"* See Chapter 3.
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the movement of troops. 89 The first holder of the office was Brigadier General 
Macleod, who remained in the post throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. As stated by John Brewer, the systems of patronage utilised to fill positions 
such as the Deputy Adjutant General's department did not necessarily result in poor 
administrators and Macleod is proof of this. 90 On several occasions Macleod 
demonstrated that he possessed a good understanding of the difficulties experienced 
by the artillery in the field, and not only gathered data on these difficulties but also 
proposed effective solutions. 91
An important factor that contributed to the persistent inefficiency within the 
departments under the Board of Ordnance was the nature and structure of the board 
itself. Many of the departments responsible for the administration of the army had 
been created during the seventeenth century. In contrast the Ordnance Board had 
existed in various forms for several centuries and despite reforms was a product of a 
previous period, a situation that had implications for its structure and efficiency. 
Although the role of the Ordnance had changed over the centuries it continued to have 
at its head the Master General of the Ordnance, a post perceived as being one of the 
most important and prestigious in the United Kingdom. Its responsibilities included 
supplying the Royal Navy and army with munitions, although it was the latter that 
virtually monopolised the board's time, and, unlike the post of Commander-in-Chief, 
the post of Master General also entitled its holder to a seat in the Cabinet. 92 The 
individuals who held the office during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars were the Duke of Richmond (1784 to 1795), Marquis Cornwallis (1795 to
89 Park and Nafziger, The British Military, p.5.
* Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. 75-81.
" For his efforts relating to straw yards see Brigadier General Macleod to R.H. Crew, Woolwich, 3 rd
April 1807, PRO WO 55/1314, Letters to Board of Ordnance from Adjutant General, February 1807 to
July 1809.
92 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery, Volume 2, p!4; Park and Nafziger, The British Military, pp.7-
8.
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1801), the Earl of Chatham (1801 to 1806 and again from 1807 to 1810), Lord Moira 
(1806 to 1807) and Lord Mulgrave (1810 to 1819). 93 John Brewer notes that the armed 
forces were well represented in parliament but that the politicians concerned only 
rarely promoted the interests of the armed forces (or even safeguarded them). 94 
Examples of such individuals include the Masters General of the Ordnance.
It was common for the Masters General to hold other posts and they were 
frequently active in the House of Lords, but their activities tended to focus not on their 
duties in regard to the Ordnance but rather their own careers and interests. This was 
particularly so in the case of Lord Mulgrave, whose activities and other commitments 
interfered with the efficient running of the Ordnance Board to such an extent that 
Brigadier-General Macleod at times found it almost impossible to arrange meetings. 
On occasion important decisions were delayed because Lord Mulgrave was 
unavailable; for example, in 1811 an urgent decision concerning the deployment of 
draught animals to the artillery in Portugal was delayed due to his being in 
parliament. 9 ^ The situation so frustrated Brigadier-General Macleod that he remarked 
in one letter to Lord Mulgrave 'I shall be in town today, if your Lordship happens to 
be at the Ordnance'. 96
The difficulties caused by Mulgrave's absence from the Ordnance at crucial 
times was an example of how practices that were deemed acceptable could prove 
detrimental to the efficiency of the army. In this case difficulties arose due to the close 
relationship between the civilian and military spheres in the British state. This 
relationship was to significantly influence the structure of another department, the 
Commissariat, the organization that is the focus of the following chapter.
93 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery, Vol. 2, p.34.
94 Brewer. The Sinews of Power, p.44.
95 MacLeod to Major Chapman, Woolwhich, 8th June 1811, PRO W055/1369, Adjutant General's 
Confidential Letters (Outward), September 1810 to February 1816.
96 MacLeod to Lord Mulgrave, Woolwhich, 17th February 1812, PRO WO55/1369.
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Chapter 2 
The Commissariat and associated organizations
Of the organizations associated with the maintenance of the British army in the 
period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Commissariat was the most 
significant. It was an organization that has attained a degree of notoriety for its 
failings, being described by Mark Adkin in his analysis of the 1815 Waterloo 
campaign as 'a much maligned body'.97 As this chapter will demonstrate, however, it 
was also an organization that achieved a rarely credited degree of success through the 
adoption of new policies. This success was notable as it was achieved despite the 
constraints placed upon the organization by the practices of the period and policies of 
British governments, such as an at times labyrinthine bureaucracy, the need to manage 
finance carefully and the need to operate throughout the Empire. Through the latter 
the Commissariat would also demonstrate that many of the advantages supposedly 
provided by the fiscal-military state were only effective within certain geographical 
boundaries.
The Commissariat exemplified many aspects of administration and 
government that had developed in the eighteenth century, although the whole logistics 
network of the British army (and navy) demonstrated one characteristic in particular, a 
multitude of departments and organizations with overlapping jurisdictions, many of 
which were created in the turmoil and administrative reforms of the later Stuarts.98 
None of these departments matched the Commissariat in terms of either size or 
capability. For example, logistics in the Alexandria garrison in 1807 were the 
responsibility of four organizations. The smallest to maintain stores was the Royal
97M. Adkin, The Waterloo Companion (London, Aurum, 2001), p.325.
98 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, The Army of'Charles //, pp.96-105. Fora consideration 
of the similar system that operated in the navy see Duffy, 'The Foundations of British Naval Power', 
pp.49_84; Black, Sea Borne Empire, pp. 171 -208.
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Corps of Engineers, which employed only one clerk in the garrison. Marginally larger 
was the stores organization of the Royal Artillery, which employed a clerk and two 
keepers of stores, and the Quartermaster General's Department, which employed a 
deputy quartermaster, and assistant quartermaster and one servant. The Commissariat 
overshadowed these organizations, the department employing a deputy commissary 
general, an assistant commissary, fourteen storekeepers and clerks, nine labourers and 
seven servants, almost five times the size of the other organizations in Alexandria 
combined." Of note is the fact that the personnel of the Commissariat were not only 
employed on administrative tasks, demonstrating that the size of the organization was 
not merely the result of the need to meet the demands of increasing bureaucracy, 
unlike the situation regarding certain governmental departments. 100 The high 
proportion of storekeepers and clerks indicates that bureaucracy was a feature in the 
growth of the organization in the period but, to use a physiological analogy, labourers 
represented muscle rather than the mere fat that administrators represented. The 
Commissariat was not just an administrative body, but also one capable of performing 
functions such as moving and storing supplies.
In Alexandria the organization that most closely replicated the function and 
role of the Commissariat was the Quartermaster General. The primary role of the 
latter organization was the distribution of items designated camping equipment, 
which, in addition to items such as tents, included corn sacks for the cavalry, 
associated forage, entrenching tools for the infantry and slack lime to dispose of 
animal carcasses. 101 It is apparent that in Alexandria the ability of the Quartermaster
99 PRO WO 164/525, Royal Hospital Chelsea Prize Records, Alexandria Garrison 1807.
100 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 102.
101 General Order No. 188, by Order of the Commander of the Forces; 'Rules and Regulations Under 
Which the Foraging of the Horses of the Cavalry in Ireland is to be Conducted', PRO WO 63/91, Entry 
Book of Letters Received at Commissariat Headquarters, Dublin, 1810 - 1812, p.49; Extracts from 
General Orders, Quinta, 16th June 1811, Porta Legre, 28* July 1811, NAM 6807/221, Books of 
Commissary General N. Jackson, c!814, pp. 16 and 22.
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General to distribute such items was limited and to a large degree depended upon the 
infrastructure of the Commissariat. Thus the definition of many items as being the 
responsibility of the Quartermaster General rather than the Commissariat was 
administrative and had little bearing on practice, in effect, the Quartermaster General 
was required to ensure an adequate supply of certain items, while the Commissariat 
would distribute them. Such anomalies in regard to corn sacks and forage would 
persist until 1810, when the Commissariat was finally made responsible for their 
provision. 102
Another organization that duplicated some of the Commissariat's duties was 
the office of the Store Master General, which was created in 1808. Primarily based in 
Britain, and not present in Alexandria, its tasks included making accounts of all goods 
held in depots and the packing of military stores (prior to 1808 this had been carried 
out by civilians). The organization maintained a small number of personnel and in 
1808 its entire staff consisted of fewer than forty personnel, including ten porters, 
nineteen clerks, an accountant, a storekeeper and his deputy. The Store Master 
General's department did not have a role in the field but due to its specialist function 
the significance of the department was greater than its size alone would suggest. 103 
The Store Master General's department reflected a trend towards greater 
professionalism that was occurring in both the armed forces and administration, 
because specialist organizations were created to meet specific needs. Despite the 
existence of such departments the Commissariat remained the premier organization 
involved in the maintenance of the army. It was a cog in the logistical machine 
without which the others could not rum, not least because other departments were to 
rely on the Commissariat, whether as a store keeper, distributor or administrator.
102 General Order No. 188, PRO WO 63/91, p.49.
103 Eighth Report of Military Enquiry (London, Office of the Secretary at War, 1809), pp. 161-2.
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Reasons for the Commissariat's rise to prominence can be traced back to the 
military revolution. This had created a need for accurate pay and muster records, a 
task allocated to the Commissary General by the reforms of Charles II. 104 This 
function would later devolve to other departments but the organization had become an 
important part of military administration, although even at this early stage it was an 
organization characterised by its shortcomings, particularly corruption. 105 The 
Commissariat was a civil-military hybrid as its personnel wore military uniforms and 
held commissions but were employed by the Treasury and addressed as 'Mister'. 106
The Commissariat was the principal logistical organisation in the army and to 
a degree this enabled it to cut the across boundaries created by the division of the 
force into those arms under Horse Guards and those under the Board of Ordnance. 107 
The Ordnance maintained its own stores and supply organizations such as the Field 
Train of the Ordnance, that included the Ordnance Commissary. The logistical 
organizations of the ordnance, however, had only limited capabilities compared to the 
Commissariat or Royal Wagon Train due to the smaller scale of their task, the 
majority of the army being concentrated in the arms under Horse Guards. 108 
Procurement for the arms under the Ordnance was the responsibility of the Surveyor 
General's Department, in conjunction with the Clerk of Deliveries and Store 
Keeper. 109 Another department of the Ordnance that possessed capabilities similar to 
the Commissariat was the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, which conducted 
administrative tasks such as the collation of returns and co-ordination of requests for 
supplies. 110
104 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.65; Childs, The Army of Charles II, pp. 104-105.
105 J. Kinross, The Boyne andAughrim: the War of the Two Kings (Gloucester, Windrush Press, 1998), 
p.34.
106 See PRO Tl/1061, Instructions to His Majesty's Deputy Commissary of Accounts; PRO WO 63/43- 
49, Letters to Commissariat Officers 1808-1815.
107 See above p.24.
108 See Chapter 4.
109 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery. Vol. 2, pp.14 - 17.
110 See PRO WO 55/1314.
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Generally, whether forces were administered from Horse Guards or by the 
Board of Ordnance was of little consequence for logistical operations, and while slight 
variation in procedures existed the organizations concerned tended to work along 
similar lines. That the officers of the artillery and engineers were recruited from the 
Royal Military College at Woolwich, for example, made little difference; neither did 
the alternative system of bounty payments in the artillery nor the fact that rules 
governing women accompanying the regiments were more relaxed. 1 " Gunners and 
artillery drivers required munitions, food and uniform just as infantry and cavalrymen 
did. Even if uniform was of a different colour, or ammunition larger, such items were 
generally purchased from similar sources, requiring similar standards of 
transportation, storage and distribution.
The role of the Commissariat can best be described as logistics in its broadest 
sense. Frequently the term logistics is used purely in relation to the movement of 
supplies, although in the case of the Commissariat this included the procurement, 
storage and distribution of such items. The numerous aspects of the Commissariat's 
task become apparent through a study of Commissariat accounts from the period. 
Figure 1 illustrates the diverse roles of the Commissariat through the thirty-three 
different accounting categories, along with their relevant codes, to be found in the 
Commissariat ledgers used in the Peninsular War. Figure 1 demonstrates that 
ultimately every individual employed by the army, from the common soldiers to chief 
surgeons, would in some way rely on the Commissariat, while there was even special 
provision in its administrative practices for temporary organizations such as recruiting 
parties."2
111 Macleod et al to Mulgrave, Woolwich, 2nd January 1811, PRO WO55/1369, Adjutant General's 
Confidential Letters, Out letters, September 1810 to February 1816; Macleod to R.H. Crew, Woolwich, 
17* June 1807, Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 25th July 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
112 Wellesley-Pole to Commissary General Handfield, Dublin Castle, 2nd October 1810, PRO WO 
63/91, p.159.
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A Imprests T Portuguese Government
B Bat and Forage U Spanish Government
C Staff Payment V Loss on Bills Negotiated
D Military Contingencies W Property Tax
E Secret Service X Pay of Commissariat Department
F Clothing and Field Equipment Y Treasury Bills
G Ordnance Department Z Sums received from accounts
H Engineer Department AA Stores and Provisions Sold by
I Supplies Authority
J Purchase of Horses, Mules BB Prroperty Tax Charged Upon
K Labourers Incomes
L Transport by Land CC Bills from the Ordnance
M transport by Water Commissary and Paymaster
N Indemnifications DD Sums received, no particular
O POWs abstract allocated
P Stationery and Printing EE Balance Paid
Q Commissariat Contingencies FF Bill received upon Paymaster in
R Medical Department England
S Deputy Paymaster General
Figure 1: Commissariat Accounting Categories." 3
While the information in figure 1 is evidence of the diversity of the Commissariat's 
responsibilities, it reveals little about the organization's activities at the various stages 
of the supply chain. Indeed, when considered in isolation, there is little in the above to 
suggest that the Commissariat was in fact the army's premier logistical organization, 
and such accounting practices may appear to be little more than an example of 
bureaucracy run amok in the military. Of particular note in figure 1 is the fact that 
supplies are referred to in a single category, although it will become apparent that the 
significance of the other categories to logistics are masked by the language of 
administration in the period.
A more detailed and revealing overview of the activities actually conducted by 
the Commissariat in relation to logistics can be found in the account books of 
Assistant Commissary General George Grellier. Grellier was responsible for 
maintaining the accounts of the Commissariat in Sicily, which was one of the larger 
overseas deployments of the organization and as a result serves as a useful case study. 
The accounts for the months of September to November 1813 are summarised below:
113 Detailed Instructions to Commissariat Accountants, Cash Accounts, NAM 6807/221, p!2.
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Date Service Payment
16 September
25 September
9 October
24 October
27 October
8d
28 October
29 October
30 October
31 October
5 November
6 November
7 November
Hire of 153 pairs of bullocks
Artificers and labourers employed
for making gun carriages
For shoeing the mules of the train
Arrears of pay to Corporals and
Muleteers
Labourers employed in loading
wheat
Pay to coopers and labourers
Hire of magazine to contain forage
Pay of Corporals and Muleteers
Balance of hospital stoppages due
75 th regiment
For hire of boats, labourers and 100
planks for use by the King's bakery
Sundry articles furnished to the
Ordnance department
Grinding wheat to make biscuit
Pay of artificers and labourers
employed by the engineers department
Ditto
Pay of officers and labourers in service
of the Barrack Department
Pay of Capo Master of the engineer works
Pay of artificers and labourers
employed by the engineers department
Hire of boats labour
Allowance for hired servants
£40
£5
£1
£15
£1
£12
£12
£15
£22
£28
£75
£7
£7
£1
£5
£5
£2
£13
Os
18s
4s
9s
12s
18s
13s
9s
8s
£12
13s
15s
10s
Is
3s
14s
18s
2s
11s
lOd
lid
9d
9d
4d
lid
lOd
8s
7d
6d
Id
3d
lid
4d
9d
8d
Id J
Figure 2: The account books of Assistant Commissary General George Grellier, September-
November 1813." 4
In the three months covered by figure 2 the Commissariat was involved in the 
activities of procurement (the hire of 153 pairs of bullocks on 16 September), 
manufacturing (the grinding of wheat to make biscuit on 28 October), storage (the hire 
of a magazine to contain forage on 24 October), and transport (the hire of boats on 27 
October). 115 Besides demonstrating the extent of Commissariat involvement in the full 
range of activities associated with logistics, both figures 1 and 2 are of note as they 
illustrate the wide range of tasks associated with maintaining an army, from simple 
accountancy to construction projects.
114 NAM 7902/36, Account Book of Assistant Commissary General George Grellier.
115 All are key components of logistics. Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.22.
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The involvement of the Commissariat in the supply chain often began at the 
point at which items were procured. In Britain and Ireland this involvement primarily 
took the form of administering and awarding contracts to civilians. 116 It was, however, 
on campaign that the Commissariat's activities had the most impact. When there was 
no existing infrastructure of barracks and stores, a situation that faced the army when 
it first arrived on the continent in 1808 but also as it advanced across the Iberian 
Peninsula, the purchasing agents of the Commissariat, frequently supported by British 
diplomats, would precede the army, roaming the country for supplies and sites for 
depots. 117 The importance of this activity was such that it featured in the planning of 
campaigns, as was demonstrated by the fact that upon his arrival in northern Spain in 
1808 Sir John Moore was informed that 'it will be necessary to concert with the 
Commissary General, W. Erskine, who will be attached to your army, the best means 
of assembling an adequate supply of horses and mules for rendering your army 
mobile'. At the same time a group of agents was travelling to Asturias to procure 
'such horses and mules as that country can furnish'. 118 Such activities frequently 
required close co-operation between commissaries, especially when newly arrived 
commissaries liased with their more established colleagues, the latter possessing 
useful knowledge of the local economy and practices. As a result, Arthur Wellesley in 
1808 informed General Burrard that T will desire the commissary to let your 
commissary know, the price of the hire of carts and mules, and of other items 
purchased by him'."9
116 See below p.87.
117 Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was particularly active in preparing the army 
for the campaign in Egypt. P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 1801 (London, Routledge, 1995),
p.18.
118 To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 26* September 1808, PRO WO 1/236, War 
Department in Letters: Sir John Moore and General Baird, September 1808 to January 1809, p.9. For a 
further discussion of this mission, see p. 164.
119 A. Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard, Aeyria, 11* August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, War Department in 
Letters and Papers, June to August 1808, p. 191.
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The goods acquired by the roving commissaries would be purchased with 
either cash or credit. The former was most preferred by the vendors but was not 
always available, particularly during the prolonged campaign in Spain and Portugal 
when shortages of specie were common. 120 In 1810, for example, £5,382,166 in 
treasury notes was shipped to the Peninsula, as well £679,069 in hard cash, but the 
Commissariat was to be only one recipient for this, along with army wages and cash 
earmarked for foreign governments and other political goals. 121 As a result of the 
shortage of specie items were frequently purchased using promissory notes at home 
and abroad. The use of credit to support the army became an increasingly common 
practice from the 1690s. 122 As well as credit raised by government from institutions, 
the system of credit in Britain operated through the issuing of bills drawn on a third 
party, a system frequently utilised by the Commissariat to fund its own transactions. 123
Whether supplied by contractors or procured locally, paid for with credit or 
cash, goods were commonly stored in depots overseen by Commissariat storekeepers 
(the principal exceptions being those stores manned by organizations under the 
Ordnance). Depots could be separated by many miles, or concentrated in small areas, 
depending on the items stored in them and the requirements of the locality concerned, 
In Dublin, for example, there initially existed no fewer than four depots located at 
various buildings, all of which were rented by the Commissariat. Figure 3 shows the
locations and costs of annual rental for these depots.
Address Rent per annum Address Rent per annum
Queen Street £391 5s Rogerson's Quay £120
Lime Street £200 Cardiff Street £120
Total £831 5s
Figure 3: Commissariat depots in Dublin, 1806. 124
Muir, 'Britain and the Peninsular War', p.350.
Hall, Wellington's Navy, p. 131.
Speck, 'Conflict in Society', p. 142.
Brewer, 'Commercialisation and Polities', p. 205. 
124 W. Elliot to Commissary General Handfield, Dublin Castle, 27* July 1806, PRO WO 63/88, Entry 
Book of Letters Received at Commissariat Headquarters, Dublin, 1805 - 1806.
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In 1806 it was the possibility of relocating the four Dublin depots into a single, 
specially constructed building was considered. This was to cost £6,713 for five storeys 
but it was discovered that if reduced to four storeys the cost would amount to only 
£5,609. Besides saving £831 paid for rent each year, the single depot would require 
only one assistant storekeeper rather than the four then employed. This represented a 
total saving (in rent and wages) of £1037 17s per annum. The scheme proved 
successful and the policy of amalgamating depots was implemented across Ireland. By 
1811, of the sixteen towns and cities in which Commissariat depots were located, only 
one, Enniskillen, was listed as having two. 125
The amalgamation of the depots in Ireland demonstrated that financial 
administration in the Commissariat during the period was not concerned solely with 
allocating revenue, and that an element of economy was involved. This reflected a 
boundary imposed by the state, a boundary created by the need to monitor 
expenditure. It was economics that restricted the number of depots available and 
although the amalgamations ultimately proved beneficial by increasing efficiency, the 
situation may have been different if the fear of large-scale unrest in Ireland had been 
proved true. In such a scenario single depots may have been unable to cope with 
demands for various supplies, while the loss of a single amalgamated depot would 
have caused greater disruption than if the stores it contained had been split between 
several sites.
Much of the pressure for economies in the Commissariat was due to 
parliamentary scrutiny. The cost of supplying the army (as opposed to paying soldiers' 
wages) had traditionally been a contentious issue for parliament and it was not until 
1691 that parliament was willing to provide a single annual budget for supply. Prior to 
this a distinction had been made between ordinary (peace time) supply and
125 Elliot to Handfield, Dublin Castle, 27* July 1806, PRO WO 63/88.
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extraordinary supply (that required in wartime), a situation that had enabled an army 
to be maintained while having its activities curtailed. 126 During the eighteenth century, 
the Committee for Public Accounts ensured that expenditure remained under scrutiny, 
while detailed investigations were conducted for Reports of Military Enquiry.' 27 Such 
scrutiny encouraged efficiency but potentially made finance, rather than capability, a 
priority.
While at a depot the primary role of Commissariat personnel was ensuring the 
distribution of supplies, monitoring stock levels and keeping accounts. To assist this 
task a number of special aids, including branding irons and stamps, were employed by 
storekeepers to identify Commissariat property. Various weights and measures were 
also utilised. A typical Commissariat store, for example, contained scales and weights 
for candles ranging from ten ounces to eight pounds and coal measures in quarter, half 
and whole bushels. 128 hi addition to keeping records and monitoring stores 
commissaries were also authorised to sell certain items. Generally these items were 
damaged and judged too costly to repair but in some cases were simply no longer 
required. The nature of these sales, and the commissaries' role in them, is 
demonstrated in the clear instructions given to Commissary Healy of Cork concerning 
the selling of camping equipment in December 1805:
The list of camping equipment in the Cork store now being recorded you will 
please to advertise and sell by public auction the entire of that under the head 
unserviceable be particularly careful that nothing is disposed of but what truly 
comes under that description and that nothing is preserved under the head of 
serviceable adverting to repair the doing of which may almost amount to the 
original value of the article. Your particular attention will be required during 
the sale to this point - the unserviceable camp equipage in those stores are at 
present selling and to much advantage which I trust will be the case at Cork 
and that every publicity will be given which may tend to ensure it. 1  129
126 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.47.
127 Eighth Report of Military Enquiry, passim; Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?, p. 147.
128 Letter from Barrak [sic] Master General to Barrak Masters (Barracks Office, 1797), appendix.
129 Punctuation as in original. P. Singer to Mr Healy, Commissary General's Office, 30* December 
1805, PRO WO 63/40, Letters to Commissariat Officers 1803 - 1807.
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Items sold did not merely include camping equipment but also ammunition pouches 
and bayonet holders. 130 That the latter items were sold to civilians is somewhat 
surprising, particularly in Ireland where fears of rebellion persisted. Other items that 
could be sold included unwanted mules and horses, along with the offal and hides of 
cattle slaughtered while on campaign. 131 Items sold by commissaries included those 
required by soldiers to replace lost or damaged uniforms and equipment (although this 
was not strictly selling, as costs were deducted from soldiers' pay). The sums of 
money involved could be considerable and, following regulations introduced in 1810, 
cavalrymen were expected to pay 7s 6V2d for new water decks and 4s 2d for corn 
sacks. Of note is the fact that soldiers would only be expected to pay for repairs if the 
object was slightly damaged, at a rate 3s 9%d and 2s Id for decks and sacks 
respectively, giving some indication of the condition equipment had to be in for the
army to consider it unserviceable. 132
The storage of items was not without difficulty as many required special
consideration. A seemingly obvious example is meat, although extensive cold stores 
were not utilised as livestock would be slaughtered as required or meat preserved by 
salting, smoking or similar methods. The storage of fodder was surprisingly complex 
and caused difficulties: old straw, for example, could not be mixed with new but new 
and old hay could be mixed freely. 133 Such difficulties were often resolved through the 
use of various containers, barrels being a common type of storage vessel used for 
certain liquids, fodder, food and gunpowder. Several Commissariat stations - 
including Heligoland and New South Wales - employed coopers permanently, while
130 Major B. Woodward to Major Ramsey, Royal Barracks, 17th September 1810, PRO WO 63/91, 
p.148.
131 Standing Orders, Order No. 17, NAM 6807/221, p.3.
132 General Order No. 188, PRO WO 63/91, p.49.
133 Commissary General Handfield to Sir W. Berdett, Commissary General's Office, 31 SI August 1810, 
PRO WO 63/45, Letters to Commissariat Officers 1810-1811.
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others - such as Malta and Sicily - employed them on a regular basis as required. 134 
The storage of bread required more consideration than that of many other items, as 
there were optimal ways to store bread depending on how fresh it was. 135 As a result 
two vessels were employed specifically for this purpose - a wooden basket and a more 
robust version braced by iron. The former was intended for distribution to units in the 
field, while the more costly braced version was intended for use solely in 
Commissariat stores. There were strict rules concerning the proper use of each type 
and a misallocation of bread containers during 1811 resulted in a severe reprimand for 
a Commissary Dunne. 136
In addition to various tools and items required to administer maintenance, the 
Commissariat's personnel were responsible for considerable sums of money that were 
either held in pay chests or used to pay for goods and services. Such money was paid 
out using a system open to fraud, in which payments were made (as either cash, 
cheques or promissory notes) and subsequent expenses claimed by the commissary 
concerned. That fraud occurred was well known and Captain Thomas Browne of the 
23 rd Foot complained that commissaries could make considerable sums of money from 
illegal activity, a situation that damaged the reputation of the Commissariat 
irreparably in the eyes of contemporaries and historians alike. 137 Common examples of 
fraud included claiming the pay of deserted muleteers, buying bills at half face value 
from illiterate soldiers and fraudulently drawing expenses for cheques that were never 
issued or should have been destroyed. 138
134 PRO WO 61/25, Commissariat Department 1816 - 17; NAM 7902/36, Account Book of Assistant 
Commissary General George Grellier.
135PRO WO 30/141, Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the General 
Defence, saving their property, and distressing the enemy, by removing the means of subsistence, from 
threatened parts of the country. Published by authority, p.30.
136 N. Malissis to Mr. Dunne, Commissary General's Office, 12* January 1810, PRO WO 63/45.
137 Buckley (ed), Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, p.203.
138 Court Martial, Cartaxo, 30th January 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221.
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The existence of fraud in the Commissariat can be attributed to a variety of 
factors. Administration in the period is generally perceived to have been corrupt and 
the Commissariat frequently sought to recruit personnel from occupations that were 
particularly associated with the practice, including professionals such as lawyers and 
estate agents. 139 Despite these factors it is incorrect to dismiss corruption in the 
Commissariat as being solely a symptom of administration in the period, as such 
organizations have traditionally attracted corruption throughout the world. In 1835, 
for example, the logistical organization of the Mexican army in Texas was rendered 
ineffective by corruption, despite the fact that Mexico exhibited few characteristics 
that we would associate with Britain at the end of eighteenth century. 140
Pressure to limit fraud within the Commissariat appears to have originated
internally as much as from pressure from parliament, and it was clearly in the 
organization's interests to optimise its financial resources by reducing fraud. The 
Commissariat's method of achieving this, through introducing new procedures, was in 
some respects typical of a trend towards increased regulation in the period. Regulation 
was not, however, the traditional approach to combating corruption. In the Excise, for 
example, corruption in the 1780s had been controlled through the introduction of new 
personnel to supervise tax collectors, thereby adding a new tier of administration 
rather than extra regulation. 141 Thus, the Commissariat was utilising its own approach 
to resolving problems and not necessarily following trends in administrative practice. 
Indeed, the Commissariat was prevented from introducing a new tier of administration 
due to restrictions on manpower, either though none being available or unwillingness 
on the part of the state to fund it.
139 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.72-73, 211; G.E. Mingey, 'The Eighteenth Century Land Steward', 
in B.C. Jones and G.E. Mingay (eds.), Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution 
(London, Edward Arnold, 1987), p.8.
140 A.A. Nofi, The Alamo and the Texas War of Independence (New York, Da Capo, 1994), p. 195.
141 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. 102-110.
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The regulations introduced by the Commissariat to limit corruption (which 
primarily took the form of fraud) were mainly directed at those responsible for stores. 
Instructions were issued in July 1812, intended to prevent the 'losses which have in 
some instances been occasioned to the department, in consequence of the store 
keepers on foreign stations obtaining more monies on account of the ordnance 
military corps than the services required'. 142 Measures included requirements for 
receipts, a second signature on bills and monthly reports. Shortfalls in the delivery of 
supplies to units, whether due to shortages in the depot or their not being required, 
were to be regularly reported to prevent them being sold on illegally. Additional 
instructions, issued in July 1815, prevented commissaries claiming funds on behalf of 
other departments, such as the artillery and engineers. 143 Equipment could only be 
removed from stores at the request of authorised personnel and a commissary in 
Ireland was reminded of the rules in 1811 following the removal of items by the Royal 
Wagon Train: 'the Commissary General directs that you should be appraised that so 
far from granting such articles on the requisition of the officer in command at your 
station you ought not to grant them at all without special permission from 
headquarters'. 144 Thus, rank alone was not sufficient to authorise the removal of 
stores. The reforms introduced in the late war period reveal that, prior to this period, 
great trust was placed in the integrity of individual personnel.
To reduce fraud further Commissariat accounts were carefully controlled and 
administered, with the result that the organization became increasingly bureaucratic. 
There were, for example, 23 separate articles, which required seven different forms
142 PRO WO 55/635, Miscellaneous Orders to Commissariat.
143 June 1808, PRO T1/1061, Instructions to His Majesty's Deputy Commissary of Accounts; Standing 
Orders, Order No. 19, NAM 6807/221, p4; Circular of July 1815 Issued to all Commissaries, PRO WO 
55/635, Miscellaneous Orders to Commissariat.
144 H. Webb to J. Jones, Commissary General's Office, 23 rd February 1811, PRO WO 63/45.
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that governed expenditure on forage for cavalry units in Ireland. 145 Such bureaucracy 
was not without difficulties and at times it appears completing paperwork threatened 
to surpass logistics as the primary aim of the organization. This was demonstrated in 
1811 when Commissary Hagan faced disciplinary action for incorrectly listing shirts 
after shoes in a list of expenses, the reprimand being more severe than that received 
by a fellow commissary known to have 'misplaced' militia stores (including 
ordnance) but who was not guilty of filling out forms incorrectly. 146 The most 
significant consequence of increasing bureaucracy was its impact on the structure of 
the Commissariat itself. The organization was effectively split into two branches, 
designated stores and accounts, with the latter becoming so large that it accounted for 
half of Commissariat personnel employed in garrisons such as that of Gibraltar in 
December 1816. 14? Thus the organization had evolved administratively, an evolution 
that went hand-in-hand with increased professionalism created by the need for skilled 
accountants and administrators.
There was a trend in the period towards the gathering of precise information, 
whether it was statistical, tabular or mathematical. 148 This was apparent in 
Commissariat practices and perhaps the most important elements in its bureaucracy 
were the ledgers and account books. The information contained within them 
ultimately formed the basis of returns utilised by the Commissariat to maintain the 
army, by generals to formulate strategy, by government to formulate policy and by 
parliamentary and Privy Council enquiries to draw conclusions on the efficiency of 
the armed forces. Commissariat accountants were issued four ledgers and instructed to
145 'Rules and Regulations Under Which the Foraging of the Horses of the Cavalry in Ireland is to be 
Conducted', PRO WO 63/91.
146 Commissary General to Mr Hagan, Cork, 17 th April 1811, PRO WO 63/46, letters to Commissariat 
Officers 1811-1812.
147 See below p.58.
148 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.222.
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carry them at all times, 'on every march and change of station'. 149 To aid efficiency 
each ledger was colour coded according to its intended use - brown for income and 
expenditures, green for provisions, blue for transfers of stores and red for provisions 
issued to troops. Returns were to reach the Commissary General by a given day of 
each month or week:
Date in Month
I Pay estimates
II Abstract of bills to the Portuguese 
15 Costs of hired vessels
24 Beginning of monthly cash and store accounts for month
25 Return of provisions supplied to regiments 
Abstract of bills to the Spanish 
Returns of forage 
Reports of shortfalls in delivery of supplies
Figure 4: Schedule for Commissariat reports and returns in Spain. 150
Weekly returns were normally expected to have arrived by Monday morning (or in 
some cases, Thursday). Serviceable and unserviceable items were only distinguished 
in the monthly, rather than weekly, returns. 151 Practices such as these failed to 
eradicate fraud completely, although the regular monitoring of accounts ensured that 
perpetrators were more likely to be apprehended and that damage done by inefficient
administrators limited.
Fraud was not the only problem faced by the Commissariat. Many of its
personnel were guilty of inefficiency rather than corruption and practices intended to 
detect fraud also served to highlight irregularities caused by errors on the part of 
commissaries. During the winter of 1810, for example, it was noted that although no 
deceit was involved certain regiments were still waiting to pay for uniforms six 
months after being issued them. 152 Occasionally, commissaries were guilty of neither
149 Cartaxo, 16th January 1811, from Extracts of General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p. 1.
150 Detailed instructions to Commissariat Accountants, Cash Accounts, NAM 6807/221, Books of 
Commissary General N. Jackson, c!814, passim.
isi 4* Article of the 9* Section of General Instructions to Resident Store Keepers, PRO WO 63/45. 
152 16* January 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p. 1.
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fraud nor error but outright incompetence. Personnel found guilty of this could be 
dismissed, although a written warning or reprimand was more common and was 
frequently sufficient to resolve the situation. A typical example of a warning was that 
issued to Commissary O. Timms in March 1806. The following extract reflects the 
way in which such matters were approached, the practices that could cause 
disciplinary action and what constituted 'incompetence':
complaints having been made by Mr Heathy, which also he has been under the 
necessity of repeating of the extreme inconvenience to which he is constantly 
subjected by the irregular transmissal [sic] and altogether inadmissible form in 
which your vouchers are made up, I beg in the first instance to put you on your 
guard against a repetition of errors which they can (thus persisted in) be 
accounted for on the ground of incompetence for the situation of a public 
accountant... must end if the matter is brought before the Commissary General 
as it quickly must - in the summary measure of removing you from your
present station. 153
Of particular note in the above extract is the structure of the disciplinary process: a 
complaint was made by a fellow commissary, which was handled by the office of the 
Commissary General and then only passed to the Commissary General himself if the 
situation remained unresolved. Furthermore, the complaint only arose after Timms 
persistently failed to complete and return paperwork satisfactorily, indicating that the 
Commissariat tolerated a degree of incompetence amongst its personnel. Finally, it 
must be noted that the warning worked as Timms evidently continued in his post. Just 
as advances in administration enabled efficient administrators to rise to prominence, 
so too did they allow less competent individuals to remain in post. 154
As noted previously, not all cases of inefficiency could be attributed to the 
incompetence described above. Genuine mistakes were made, which was inevitable 
when the sheer scale of the task facing the organization is considered: the
153 Punctuation as in original. W. Webb to O. Timms, Commissary General's Office, 25* March 1806, 
PRO WO 63/40.
154 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.77.
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Commissariat was a global organization. Our perception of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars is often Eurocentric, shaped by the writings of historians such as 
John Keegan, David Chandler and Charles Esdaile, all of whom emphasise conflict in 
the European theatre. Thus, there is a tendency to overlook the extent of Britain's 
imperial commitments in the period. Even when these are considered they usually 
involve the expeditions sent against French colonies or rebellious Indian princes. For 
the Commissariat, the reality was quite different to this Eurocentric perception and the 
organization found itself attempting to supply garrisons dispersed across the empire 
and beyond, which often included remote and militarily quiet regions of Africa or 
Asia, proving Daniel Baugh's assertion that despite their economic advantages 
colonies could be a strategic burden. 155 Supplying the more isolated outposts could be 
amongst the most difficult tasks faced by the Commissariat and the situation was such 
that Charles Greenwood estimated it could take as long as two years for items arriving 
in a colony to reach the most distant outposts. The isolation of certain garrisons also 
hampered communications, which disrupted the normal pattern of Commissariat 
activities and therefore disrupted the delivery and monitoring of stores. Greenwood 
wrote of regiments in foreign stations that they 'may be, and frequently, are so divided 
and dispersed as to make it extremely difficult to ascertain the quantity of clothing 
delivered [or required]'. 156
The numbers of items to be supplied posed further problems for the 
Commissariat, the scale of the task being demonstrated by the request of the Duke of 
Wellington in 1811 for the delivery of 150,000 pairs of shoes to the River Tagus by
155 Baugh, 'The Maritime State', p. 186. Historians including Jeremy Black have argued the converse: 
that colonial expansion contributed to success in warfare. Such views, however, are often based solely 
on the economic contribution of colonies, with little reference to their strategic consequences. Black, 
Sea Borne Empire, p. 170.
156 C. Greenwood to Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, Craig's Court, 30* March 1811, PRO WO 377/2, 
Various Papers, 1809 upon the System of Clothing and Off Reckonings for the Army.
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sea. Added to the burden of the Commissariat in each locality was the requirement 
to procure supplies for forces in other regions. Ireland, for example, was to become a 
significant source of food and clothing for the Peninsula army. 158 Sicily fulfilled a 
similar role, and is described by Piers Mackesy as being 'the granary' for the large 
British military presence in the central Mediterranean. 159
Corruption, incompetence and the scale of its task were not the only factors 
that served to undermine the effectiveness of the Commissariat and efforts to increase 
the organization's efficiency. As is often the case in any situation involving military 
organizations there was competition for resources and like the Royal Wagon Train, 
the Commissariat found itself in competition with the artillery for draught animals. 160 
In 1811, for example, it was proposed that the Royal Artillery acquire mules from the 
Commissariat to transport mobile forges. 161 In addition there was a myriad of other 
difficulties with which the Commissariat had to contend. These included clashes of 
jurisdiction with other organizations and the practice of employing civilians in 
overseas postings. The latter caused difficulties due to the requirement that payments 
be made in their local currency: in Sicily, for example, the pay chest included pounds 
sterling, Spanish dollars and Sicilian dollars. 162 The need to make payments in foreign 
currency was one of the greatest challenges faced by an army due to the need not only
to acquire but also exchange specie. 163
Organizations upon which the Commissariat relied made errors that
compounded its own inefficiency. The transfer of horses required record keeping by 
both the receiving and transferring organization, and it was frequently the case that the
157 Wellington to Liverpool, Cartaxo, 3 1 st March 1811, PRO WO 1/248, War Department in Letters: 
Wellington, January to March 1811.
158 Treasury Minute, 8th January 1811, PRO WO 63/91, p.256.
159 P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, pp. 14-15.
160 See below pp.156-157.
161 PRO WO 37/10/26, Papers Relating to Provision of Portable Forges, 1810-12, paragraph 17,
162 Statement of Money Remaining in the Military Chest, 1 st January 1814, NAM 7902/36/
163 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.67.
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parent formation rather than the Commissariat made mistakes. Horses were identified 
by name, distinguishing marks and a code (consisting of a letter and number) but in 
July 1806, for example, two horses transferred from the Dragoon Guards were 
wrongly reported as being E31 and F77 by the regiment. The numbers should have 
actually been G31 and G77, and for a time it appeared that the correct horses were not 
present. 164 This was only a minor administrative error as the correct number of 
animals was received, although this was not always the case. In April 1810, for 
example, fifteen horses were supposed to be transferred from the 2nd German Heavy 
Dragoons, but thirty-six were delivered. 165
Despite a growing dependency on, not to mention an apparent obsession with, 
data collection and related paperwork in the administrative organizations during the 
period, bureaucracy alone could not guarantee the availability of supplies. 
Improvements in administrative efficiency, measures to reduce fraud in the 
Commissariat and even the economic strength of the British state were futile if the 
required goods could not be procured. Frequently the efforts of the Commissariat were 
hindered, if not thwarted, by the simple fact that the supplies it required did not exist. 
During the Peninsular War providing grain proved to be particularly problematic due 
to the scarcity of that commodity in the theatre. Due to the Continental System this 
could only be rectified by importing great quantities directly from the United States, 
Canada and Brazil. 166
Of the difficulties encountered regarding the supply of grain to the Peninsular 
army Arthur Wellesley noted that:
in the present season of the year [summer] you cannot depend upon the 
country for bread. Portugal never fed itself during more than seven months out 
of twelve, the common consumption of the country is Indian corn; and the
164 Return of the Horses of 7th Dragoon Guard to be Transferred to the Commissariat in Half Yearly 
Inspection in July 1806, Major General Affleck, 1 st August 1806, PRO WO 63/88.
165 Adjutant General's Office to Commissary General, Dublin, 9"1 April 1810, PRO WO 63/91, p.63.
166 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p.6; Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean , p. 10.
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little wheat there is in the country cannot be ground at this season of the year 
as the mills are generally turned by water and there is now no water in the mill ponds. 167
Wellesley's comments not only highlight the difficulties of procuring sufficient 
supplies but also the difficulties that could be encountered when processing them (in 
this case, milling). Added to these problems was the difficulty of transporting the 
required items, whether in raw (such as harvested crops) or refined (such as flour) 
forms. The Commissariat was hampered hi this activity by the inefficient tasking and 
utilisation of the wheeled conveyances operated by the army. Not only were these 
vehicles split between various organizations, including the Royal Wagon Train and 
Commissariat, there were also pools of vehicles held by individual regiments. 168 As a 
result the only means through which a deficiency of transport could be rectified was 
by utilising assets otherwise allotted to other duties, thus Commissariat carts that 
could have been moving supplies were frequently used to move wounded personnel 
between hospitals (the situation could of course be reversed, with serious 
consequences for the medical services). 169 Significantly, even if these duties were 
conducted on return journeys, that is to say after carts had delivered supplies and were 
empty en route to the depot, their journey was still slowed.
Even if available, many of the carts operated by the Commissariat were often 
unsuited to the task, and a report on wagons was sceptical about their use over the 
rough terrain encountered in Spain and Portugal, a region noted for its poor roads. In 
Spain there existed Royal Roads, constructed using the latest building techniques and 
30 to 60 feet wide but these were few in number, linked only major cities and were 
badly maintained. The most common types of roads were known as caminos and
167 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 1 I th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p. 191.
168 See below pp.133-134.
169 Thomar, 8* March 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p.8.
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carrils, both types being essentially dirt tracks, although the latter had two rows of 
paving stones that, only in theory, eased the passage of wheeled vehicles. 170 As a result 
travel could be treacherous and it was noted that 'accidents are continuously 
occurring... carts seldom make a march without the occurrence of such accidents... 
no wheeled carriage can, with any degree of security, travel over mountains'. 171 
Significantly, wagons were easily hindered by bad weather, a shortcoming that was 
apparent during the winter of 1810 - 1811, when parts of the United Kingdom 
experienced heavy snowfalls that closed many roads and caused chaos for logistical 
organizations such as the Commissariat. Despite the mobilisation of the nation's 
resources, nature could not be overcome.
hi a letter to Commissary James Gilchrist, who was located in a badly affected 
area, the Commissary General in Ireland stated 'I presume the roads are so much 
injured from the late fall of snow, that you will have suspended drawing oats from 
[your usual source] or any other distant quarter'. 172 Of note is the fact that no attempt 
was made by the Commissary General to ascertain the situation regarding roads as it 
was assumed they were impassable to wagons. Interestingly, it appears that in such 
circumstances it was not common practice for Commissariat personnel to determine 
which roads, if any, were passable. This was demonstrated in another letter from the 
Commissary General's office, this time to Commissary Colvill, who was instructed
that:
as the very heavy fall of snow may have rendered the roads in a certain degree 
impassable... the Commissary General wishes you would carefully ascertain 
and report on the state of the road leading from Fermoy to Clonell [sic] and 
Cork, it would not be inadvisable also to inquire as to the other... roads 
branching from your station. 173
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That it was not standard practice for commissaries to inspect roads automatically in 
such circumstances is somewhat surprising when it is considered that the organization 
relied on the movement of wagons by road to undertake its duties. In part this could be 
explained by the structure of the British army, specifically that the movement of 
troops was the responsibility of the Quartermaster General, although this applied 
mainly at a strategic level and responsibility inevitably devolved to local officers. 174 
Even if local roads were found to be open, however, there was then the problem of 
snow in other areas forcing significant detours. The drivers of one group of wagons 
were instructed that 'the weather and state of the roads must govern the departure of 
the detachment; and it will march through Limerick (the crossroads at Cashel being 
reported impassable) and Birr, where fresh horses will be supplied'. 175
The snowfalls experienced in the United Kingdom that winter were unusually 
heavy, but, while accompanying a wagon train to Almeida during the winter of 
1812, Conductor of Stores W. Morris recorded in his diary the difficulties that 
could be encountered when moving convoys even in relatively good weather:
Wednesday 18 November 1812
We were very unfortunate this day with our mules falling down particularly in
passing over the water... some of them fell with our boxes but nothing of very
serious consequence... the road [to Almeida] was wholly lined with sick and
convalescing troops - marching for different villages in the neighbourhood of
Almeida.
Friday 20 November 1812
We could scarcely make any way in consequence of the road being crowded
with bullock cars conveying the sick and wounded baggage.
Added to Morris' problems was that on Sunday 22 November the column did not 
move at all because it was still awaiting orders concerning the route that it was to
174 Park and Nafziger, The British Military, p6; see also Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 17* June 1807, 
PRO WO 55/1314..
175 Brackets in original. N. Malasses to Robert Colvill [sic], Commissary General's Office, 4* February 
1811, PRO WO 63/45.
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take. 176 This is significant as it demonstrates that the routes of supply columns were 
not planned in advance. As highlighted by Morris, however, this could prove 
detrimental and delay the delivery of supplies. In contrast the French army operated 
with sometimes-strict traffic regulations, with certain bridges open to only specific 
traffic, such as troops, wounded or supplies. 177
Another factor that hindered the activities of the Commissariat was the 
allocation of its personnel, which could at times appear to be chaotic. This was 
particularly apparent in 1808 when elements of the army were deployed for action in 
Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar. Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, for example, was 
instructed to lead to the Peninsula a sizeable contingent of reinforcements that 
consisted of seven infantry battalions and two companies of artillery. The force was to 
travel from Cork to Falmouth but was delayed for three weeks by the late arrival of 
transport vessels. Eventually arriving in Falmouth and already several weeks late, 
Baird discovered that several key personnel were not awaiting his arrival. This was 
reported to the War Office, the general informing Castlereagh that 'I think it necessary 
to appraise your Lordship also that I have not as yet heard of any paymaster or 
commissary being appointed to this army'. 178 Thus, even after a three-week delay, the 
commissary (and paymaster) had not arrived. Two days later there was some 
confusion when an officer from the Commissariat reported to the general, who 
promptly informed the War Office that he would take matters into his own hands if
the situation was not resolved soon:
I beg leave to state that an assistant Commissary of accounts, I. Dickson Esq. - 
has just reported to me his arrival from Portsmouth, but does not appear to 
know whether he should consider himself part of the army, as he has received 
no instructions upon the subject. I understand some under Commissaries are
176 NAM 7508/24, Notebook of W. Morris, Conductor of Stores, 1812.
177 Creveld, Supplying War, p.53.
178 Lieutenant-General Baird, to Castlereagh, Falmouth, I st October 1808, PRO WO 1/236, War 
Department in Letters: Sir John Moore and General Baird, September 1808 to January 1809, p.337.
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also here in similar circumstances -1 intend taking the whole with me, unless I 
should receive any particular instructions respecting them. 1179
The force left Falmouth on 9 October, over a month late, but with its full complement 
of Commissariat personnel. That the force embarked late was bad enough, but that a 
general had been forced to consider acting on his own accord to ensure a commissary 
sailed with him says much about the system through which commissaries were 
assigned to individual forces. The concern expressed by Baird at the absence of a 
commissary is also significant, as it reflects the importance attached to the 
Commissariat, although much more may perhaps be inferred by the placing of the 
missing paymaster before the commissary in his letter of 1 st October. More significant 
is how the episode highlights that, despite improvements in administration, the system 
struggled to co-ordinate the various departments and organizations that had been 
created, even for a small force such as that commanded by Baird. 180
Despite its obvious importance to the operational capability of the army, the 
Commissariat took second place to the manpower requirements of the front line 
formations. This was inevitable when it is considered that a fully manned 
Commissariat would have been of no value to an under-strength army (although that 
neither the army nor the Commissariat were ever at full strength is evidence of the 
state's inability to sustain the army). Some manpower could be made available 
through centralising depots but, while the centralisation of depots in a city such as 
Dublin was feasible, the policy could not be implemented across an organization 
operating in war zones or far-flung colonial outposts. 181 This was one of the features 
of the Commissariat that set it apart from other supporting organizations, as its
179 Lieutenant-General Baird, to Castlereagh, Falmouth, 3 rd October September 1808, PRO WO 1/236,
p.340.
180 Baird's force would face further delays due to lack of shipping and chaotic Spanish organisation 
before disembarking in Galicia. Hall, Wellington's Navy, p.66.
181 See W. Elliot to Handfield, Dublin Castle, 27* July 1806, PRO WO 63/88.
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deployment was truly global; other organizations deployed personnel overseas but 
none to the extent of the Commissariat. 182 Of the organizations that comprised the 
British army only the fighting arms were as widely dispersed as the Commissariat. 
The global deployment of Commissariat personnel in December 1816 is illustrated in 
figure 5. The postings cited in the table are based on the definitions used in 
Commissariat documents and, although seemingly straightforward, they require some 
explanation. Such names were not universal in the army, different departments and 
organizations using various names to describe the same geographical area. 
Interestingly, it seems that there existed standardised forms for submitting returns of 
strength, but not standard terminology for describing Britain's colonial possessions.
Region
Africa
Cape Colony 
Mauritius
Africa
Total
Caribbean
Bahamas
Bermuda
Honduras
West Indies
Windward &
Leeward Is.
Total
Number
30
24
15
69
5
12
2
10
98
127
Region
Europe
France 
Gibraltar
Number
150
21
Mediterranean 97 
Portugal
UK 52 
Heligoland 3 
Total 402
North America
Canada 137 
Newfoundland 16 
Nova Scotia 46 
Total 199
Australia (New S. Wales) 44
79
Figure 5: The Global Deployment of the Commissariat, December 1816.' 83
hi the above table the term Mediterranean refers to garrisons in Sicily, Malta, Corfu 
and the Ionian Islands. 'Africa' is a reference to the various colonies scattered across 
this continent, sometimes referred to as West Africa or Gorre in general army 
returns. 184 Of note is the absence of Commissariat personnel in regions such as the
182 See chapter 4 and chapter 5.
183 PRO WO 61/25.
184 See PRO WO 17/2814, Monthly Returns of the Army at Home and Abroad.
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Indian subcontinent, a region that was the responsibility of the Honourable East India 
Company.
Figure 5 reveals little about the roles of personnel and in some respects the 
data in the original source is fragmentary. This is especially so in regard to the 
respective branches of the Commissariat in which individuals were employed. Some 
regions were defined as having distinct stores and accounts departments (such as 
Canada) while others did not (such as Africa) or were listed as having stores only 
(such as Heligoland). Figure 6 illustrates how personnel were divided between stores 
and accounts in the relevant countries or regions:
Posting
Canada
Cape Good Hope 
Gibraltar
Mauritius
Mediterranean
Nova Scotia
Portugal
Stores
125
26 
11
18
85
41
60
Accounts
12
4 
10
6
12
5
19
% Employed in
8.7%
13.3% 
47.6%
25%
12.4%
10.9%
24.1%
Accounts
Figure 6: Commissariat stores and accounts departments, December 1816. 185
Where the two branches of stores and accounts were listed separately, it is apparent 
that the latter could account for 30% of the personnel.
Administration was not solely the domain of the accounts branch, and stores 
employed a considerable number of administrators. Of the 125 personnel employed in 
stores in Canada, fifty-three were clerks, which, along with the two office runners, 
amounted to approximately 42% of the branch's manpower. In Britain the manpower 
of the Commissariat at this point appears to have been almost entirely administrative 
and among its fifty-two personnel there were four chief clerks, thirty-eight clerks, 
three messengers and one office keeper. Unusually on the strength in Britain there 
were also five domestic staff consisting of two housekeepers and three housemaids. 186
185 PRO WO 61/25, Commissariat Department 1816 - 17.
186 PRO WO 61/25.
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The system utilised to support the Commissariat was cumbersome but it was in some 
respects efficient and in particular it appears that its administrative apparatus would 
have been able to cope with a significantly expanded organization without itself 
expanding. Returns and finances were handled efficiently and there were few signs of 
strain in an administrative system co-ordinating a globally deployed organization, 
evidence that Commissariat administration could have shouldered an additional 
burden with the resources that already existed.
There was no typical structure of a Commissariat station and there was much 
variation due to individual circumstances and the nature of certain postings. Personnel 
were employed to fulfil a wide range of tasks depending on local requirements, while 
it is apparent that there was also some variation in which the role of personnel was 
recorded. In Bermuda and Malta, for example, boatmen were employed, the 
Commissariat in New South Wales was unusual in having a bookbinder on its 
strength, Nova Scotia was the only station to record the specific roles of its issuers 
(either fuel or food) and in 1816 Mauritius was the sole location in which a store 
serjeant (sic.) was present. 187 Figure 7 is based on a single and relatively small 
Commissariat station (in this case Calais) in February 1816. Of note is its very 
conventional structure, with only storekeepers and clerks employed, and neither 
labourers nor specialists, such as coopers and boatmen.
Deputy Commissary 
Deputy Assistant Commissary
ADMINISTRATION STORES
2 Clerks 2 Storekeepers
Figure 7: Personnel of the Commissariat serving in Calais, February 1816.
187 PRO WO 61/25.
188 Commissary General J. Drummond to Quarter Master General Murray, Paris, 1 st February 1816, 
PRO WO 28/14, Letters from Quarter Master General's Department, 1816 January to June.
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During 1816 the senior Commissariat officer in France (with 150 personnel), Portugal 
(with 79) and Canada (with 137) was a Commissary General. Although larger than the 
department in Portugal, that in the Windward and Leeward Islands, along with the 
Mediterranean, were split between several locations and in consequence three 
Assistant Commissaries General in each region shared command, hi Honduras the 
senior Commissariat officer was only a temporary clerk, the affairs of the department 
being overseen by a committee that was collectively granted the rank of Deputy 
Assistant Commissary General, demonstrating that the Commissariat was on occasion 
able to modify its practices to accommodate certain local situations. 189
As the Napoleonic Wars progressed the Commissariat frequently found itself 
hamstrung by global deployments and the need to expand despite already having 
insufficient manpower. As a result the organization employed a large number of 
foreigners, particularly locals in Italy, Spain and Portugal. The contribution of foreign 
personnel to the British armed forces as mercenaries has long been recognised, E.A. 
Wrigley citing them as a tangible way in which the financial strength of a state could 
be applied to its army. 190 By the time of the Napoleonic Wars the use of true 
mercenaries in the British army had declined and foreign troops tended to be either 
exiles from occupied countries, prisoners of war, or motivated by ideology or 
patriotism rather than financial gain, examples being the forces of the Duke of 
Brunswick and the King's German Legion. 191 More significant to the British army in 
this period were the foreigners employed in organizations to support the army, of 
which the Commissariat was perhaps the largest employer.
189 PRO WO 61/25.
190 Wrigley, 'Society and the economy in the eighteenth century', p.73. The Royal Navy also used a 
considerabie number of foreigners and it is estimated that in 1812, 9% of trained seamen serving in the 
royal Navy were not of British origin. Duffy, 'British Naval Power', p.9.
191 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.86-88.
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The Commissariat's reliance on foreign personnel in certain stations was 
reflected in the garrison of Sicily in 1813, the returns for which note that the personnel 
employed by the organisation consisted of eight Italians, five Sicilians, four English 
(with no reference to Scots, Irish or Welsh) and one Swiss. 192 The differing 
nationalities present were concentrated in certain occupations and, significantly, 
Englishmen did not hold all of the senior positions. This says much about the structure 
of the Commissariat overseas, as British personnel would be expected to dominate by 
rank, if not numerically. This was the case in the Sicilian garrison itself, which was 
supported by British troops and advisors. Those listed as English were concentrated in 
the bakery, occupying three of the four positions there: they were the master baker 
John Henderson and the two head bakers Robert Witlaw [sic] and Thomas 
Richardson, while the overseer of bakery was a Swiss named Fran9ois Solincy. The 
remaining Englishman, John Mitchel, was the senior Commissariat administrator in 
Sicily and held the post of clerk. Mitchel's office also consisted of five under clerks, 
all of whom were listed as Italians: Dominico Agedo, Parlo Averia, Antonio Grosso, 
Fransico Scullina, Giuseppe Bruno. Of the remaining posts, Italians also occupied 
those of storekeeper and under storekeeper, these being held by Pasquale de Gaelano 
and Puolo Chilleme respectively, while the Sicilian Andrea Caravello oversaw the 
officers' mess. All three posts were positions of responsibility and required 
trustworthy individuals as they involved the handling of money and management of 
stores. Finally the labourers and craftsmen were all Sicilian. These were the coopers 
Alberto Castelli and Antonio Caiopardo, along with Gioachine Crisalli and Antonio 
Pioro, both of whom were labourers. It is apparent that other than Andrea Caravello hi 
the officers' mess, Sicilians held few positions of trust.
192 Monthly returns of those employed in the Commissariat Department under the control of Assistant 
Commissary General Grellier at Milazzo, 25 th October 1813 to 24th November 1813, NAM 7902/36.
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The example of the Sicilian garrison demonstrates that personnel from various 
nations occupied the ranks of the Commissariat and overseas it could be a 
cosmopolitan organization. If the financial power of the state did provide the British 
army an advantage by giving it a capability to employ foreigners it was these 
personnel, rather than mercenaries, that proved most crucial to the war effort. The role 
of foreign personnel in the Commissariat is highlighted by the fact that, due to the 
publication of his memoirs, the German A.L.F. Schauman is arguably the most 
famous commissary of the period. 193 As a serving officer, however, Schauman was not 
a typical example of the majority of foreigners employed by the Commissariat. More 
common were the local civilians employed under contract to support the army 
overseas, the most significant group of such persons being the Spanish and Portuguese 
muleteers who transported supplies in the Peninsula.
Initially, little thought was given to the utilisation of drivers indigenous to the 
nation in which the army was operating, despite the fact that such a policy had proved 
successful for Napoleon during his campaign of 1805. 194 It was believed that the 
vehicles and personnel of the Royal Wagon Train, in conjunction with the logistical 
organizations of allied armies, would be sufficient to meet the logistical needs of the 
army. 195 This was reflected in the orders issued when the army first arrived in the 
Peninsula, where the only mention of the region's indigenous transport capability is in 
relation to the purchase of mules, horses and oxen. 196 John Brewer writes that a major 
advantage provided by the fiscal-military state was one of the most advanced transport 
infrastructures of the era. 197 This infrastructure, however, terminated at Britain's 
borders and was of little relevance to the army operating overseas. The initial
193 See A. L. F. Schauman, On the Road with Wellington (London, William Heinemann, 1924).
194 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.38.
195 See chapter 4.
196 To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 26* September 1808, PRO WO 1/236, p.9.
197 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 183.
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experiences of the army soon proved that its existing transport capability was 
inadequate and in a letter dated 11 August 1808, Arthur Wellesley informed General 
Burrard that 'you must therefore depend on the carriage of the country drawn by 
bullocks... each of these [animals] will carry about 6001bs and travel in a day about 
12 miles'. 198
It was fitting that a significant number of these locally procured oxen found 
themselves drawing local carts. These carts did not benefit from the advances made in 
transport technology in Britain and were poorly produced using square axles. This 
gave them a distinctive sound which Grenville-Eliot of the Royal Artillery, writing to 
his wife hi August 1808, described as a 'voice that could be heard a mile off, 199 Those 
who drove these carts were Portuguese and Spanish muleteers, individuals who 
performed a vital role but who have been virtually written out of the history of the 
British army. At no point in the works of P.L. Isemonger or I. Fletcher, which 
examine the personnel of the British army, are the muleteers mentioned.200 They have 
fallen victim to both the general apathy shown by historians towards the logistical 
elements of the army and the unwillingness to acknowledge the contribution of the 
Spanish and Portuguese to the successful outcome of the Peninsula War, an attitude 
criticised in the works of Charles Esdaile.201 As Christopher Hall states, their 
existence was fortunate for the Peninsula army as it is likely that without them the 
British transport system would not have been able to achieve the success that it did.202
198 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11* August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p.191.
199 Grenville Eliot to Wife, Llavos, 7* August 1808, NAM 5903/127/6, letters of William Grenville 
Eliot, R.A.
200 See P. L. Isemonger, Wellington's War: A Living History (Stroud, Sutton, 1998); I. Fletcher, 
Wellington's Regiments (Staplehurst, Spellmont, 1994).
201 C. Esdaile, 'The Peninsular War: a Review of Recent Literature', in The Historian, No.6, (Winter 
1999), pp.9-13; Esdaile, The Peninsular War, passim. 
202 Hall, Wellington's Navy, pp.130-131.
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The existence of the muleteers rests uneasily with John Brewer's model of the 
fiscal-military state, discussions about which tend to be Anglocentric. 203 The emphasis 
of historians has, to date, been on the domestic implications of the fiscal-military 
state, particularly in the fields of politics and economics, rather than a broader 
consideration of its impact on the army and the reach of the fiscal-military state 
overseas. This has led to a somewhat over-optimistic appraisal of the situation 
regarding logistics, it being assumed that as the fiscal-military state successfully 
encouraged the development of an efficient domestic transport infrastructure a similar 
situation also existed in the army. Improvements to the road and canal network in 
Britain, however, were in many respects irrelevant to the army serving in Spain and 
Portugal. The cornerstone of the fiscal-military state was control, whether it was of 
state apparatus or resources, but this control was effectively limited to geographical 
boundaries (Britain's borders and certain parts of the Empire) and was seriously 
weakened beyond them. 204 Despite the backing of the British Empire and state, 
military strategy could start to fall apart due to the tendency of Portuguese drivers to 
take siestas at awkward times, due to the use of out dated wagons or because narrow 
Spanish roads were easily congested.
Spanish and Portuguese muleteers could be as important to the success of the 
British army in the field as the soldiers themselves and, by implication, the success of 
the state in supporting the army. The initial impression of the muleteers was often less 
than favourable and they soon gained a reputation for laziness and desertion. After 
only a few weeks of employing these individuals Arthur Wellesley informed General 
Burrard that 'I don't believe any power you exert over them... would induce the
203 See for example Wrigley, 'Society and the economy', pp.72-95; Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the 
Fiscal-Military State', pp.96-127.
204 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.251.
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owners of the carts to go from their horses a greater distance, than to the nearest place 
you could get carts to relieve them'.205
Despite the obvious failings of the muleteers many contemporaries 
sympathised with their plight. W. Morris, leading a wagon train through Spain in 
November 1812, regarded them as equals and the officers of Morris' unit shared 
accommodation with them while in the field.206 Time was also spent attending to the 
needs of the muleteers and concerning preparations for a march Morris wrote: 'this 
morning was all bustle and confusion. In looking after the stores [and] muleteers we 
had no time to get any refreshment ourselves'.207 At times even Arthur Wellesley 
sympathised with the difficulties faced by the muleteers, and once tempered his 
criticism of them by explaining that they were exhausted after having 'made an 
exertion against the enemy by the assistance which they have given to me'. 208 Perhaps 
most significant was the attitude of the army to the muleteers, as they were allowed 
relative autonomy and normal military protocols relating to rank were followed. They 
were not second-class personnel and a muleteer occupied the same position in the 
military hierarchy as an English fighting soldier of that rank. Muleteers were divided 
into sections under their own corporals (known as capatrasses) who were responsible 
for distributing rations, while orders issued in 1811 instructed that soldiers escorting 
mules to the rear were there purely as escorts (it being advised to select 'one steady 
man' for each column) and were told to 'not force them to march faster or further than 
the capatraz is inclined to go'. 209
The reputation of muleteers rapidly improved following 1808 and they came to 
be acknowledged as an important element of the logistics system. A report on forge
205 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p.191.
206 Wednesday 4* November 1812, NAM 7508/24, Notebook of W. Morris, Conductor of Stores, 1812.
207 Saturday 7* November 1812, NAM 7508/24.
208 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p.191.
209 Standing Orders, Order No. 37, NAM 6807/221, p.8; Villa Formosa, 10th December 1811, Extracts 
from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, pp. 12-13.
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wagons in 1811 highlighted the advantages of using muleteers, although it also 
stressed the differences between the army's official practices and the opinions of an 
individual experienced in their successful employment. The report stated that a 
significant advantage of employing local drivers, besides releasing military personnel 
for other duties, was that 'by this means you place the beasts... under the charge of 
people of the country, who are more capable of doing it well'. 210 It was advised that 
the ideal ratio of muleteers to mules should be one to four, rather than the standard 
practice in the army of one to three. This suggests the report's anonymous author had 
greater faith in the abilities of muleteers than did his superiors. 211 His most surprising 
recommendation, however, was the following as it was concerned with the ownership 
of the mules:
it is most strongly to be recommended however that these mules be the 
property of the muleteer, and not of the government for from the circumstance 
of it being proposed to place them entirely under the charge of the muleteer 
himself, not allowing the farriers to interfere with them at all, they are most 
likely to be well treated, and kept in readiness to march if the private property 
of the individual.212
This would have been a considerable departure from previous policy, in which the 
mule occupied an ambiguous position, being the property of the army but only for the 
duration of the muleteer's employment. 213
An important element in the relationship between the British army and state 
was the legislation that prevented the army from requisitioning civilian property. 
Issues relating to the relationship between the British army and civilians tend to be 
seen in the context of England, but this policy was to have implications not only
210 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 14. ,
211 Standing Orders, Order No. 37, NAM 6807/221, p.S
212 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 17.
213 Standing Orders, Order No. 36, NAM 6807/22, p.7.
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throughout the British Isles but also overseas.214 One way this manifested itself in the 
Peninsular War was through an ambiguous approach regarding the employment and, 
indeed, ownership of the mules utilised by the respective logistical organizations of 
Horse Guards and Ordnance Board. Those employed by each arm of service had a 
distinct brand (see figure 8) and Commissariat personnel were under strict instructions 
not to operate unmarked animals.
Brand Arm of Service Branch
A Foot Artillery Ordnance
C Cavalry Horse Guards
D Infantry Horse Guards
HA Horse Artillery Ordnance
Figure 8: Marks denoting the ownership of mules operated by each arm. 215
Despite such marks, however, mules hired by these organizations were not included in 
separate returns, but instead counted under a single heading. This suggests different 
policies existed regarding the operation of mules at strategic and operational levels. 216 
The report of 1811 raised issues relating not only to the ownership of the 
mules themselves, but also items required for their effective operation. Its author 
recommended that 'the pack saddle should be the property of the muleteer and the 
shoeing of the mules his own private concern'. 217 The proposals might appear to be an 
overwhelming vote of confidence in the muleteers, but their appeal to a budget- 
conscious military establishment should not be overlooked. By 1811 the financial 
position of the Peninsular Army was, to say the least, uncertain and if implemented
214 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.49.
215 Standing Orders, Order No. 39, NAM 6807/221, p.8.
216 Standing Orders, Order No. 40, NAM 6807/221, p.9.
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the system would have removed almost all the expenses associated with the operation 
of mules. The Commissariat was the first organization to adopt a similar system for its 
muleteers and it soon discovered that muleteers were indeed more effective when 
employed in this way.218
An organization with diverse personnel, with diverse roles fulfilled with 
mixed success is perhaps a suitable description of the Commissariat. Its scope, in 
terms of both brief and geographical area of operations, was indeed large but it has 
come to be most associated with one item in particular: food. When hungry, soldiers 
had little doubt upon whom to heap the blame. Private James Gunn of the Black 
Watch Regiment noted that 'I never complained but when the Commissariat was at 
fault (and that was not seldom)', while a Rifleman of the 95th Rifles declared to his 
colleagues 'damme, boys, if the commissary don't show his front we must find a 
potato field or have a killing a day', this being a reference to the practice of looting 
dead French soldiers for food. 219 Criticisms concerning the role of the Commissariat in 
the supply of food were justified, as the organization was involved in the procurement 
and supply of this commodity to such an extent that it was almost solely responsible 
for its provision. This was unlike the situation regarding other items, such as uniform, 
which were frequently the responsibility of other departments and the role of the 
Commissariat in their provision tended to be one of distribution or storage rather than
procurement.
Although food may simply be seen as the bread, meat and biscuit supplied to
the troops, there is a broader definition, one that includes drinking water, alcohol and 
the fodder for the numerous animals utilised by the army. It is also important that the 
significance of regular supplies of food should not be underestimated. If the
218 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 17.
219 Brackets in original. R. H. Roy (ed), 'The Memoirs of Private James Gunn', in JSAHR, Vol 49 
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Commissariat failed to ensure adequate supplies of food troops would be required to 
spend more time foraging, while generals could not plan future operations with any 
certainty. The Duke of Wellington demonstrated an awareness of these difficulties and 
their importance throughout the Peninsular campaign, declaring in 1809 that 'the 
foundation of all military plans is compounded of the situations of one's own troops, 
those of the allies, and those of the enemy; but if I cannot be certain even of my own, 
it is impossible for me to form, much less execute, any military plan'.220 hi the worst 
case scenario an army deprived of food may collapse into a starving rabble, looting 
friend and foe alike in an effort to survive. Park and Nafziger state that British soldiers 
were particularly susceptible to this weakness, noting that they 'tended to fall apart 
faster than the French when deprived of regular rations [or] subjected to hardship'.221 
Such a conclusion is contentious considering the fate that befell Napoleon's Grand 
Annee in 1812 but it clearly highlights the potential consequences of an army's failure 
to provide food. 222
An insight into the type and quantity of food supplied by the army to its troops 
can be gained from a return of the supplies available to the army in December 1813. 
Those available to three divisions are shown in figure 9:
Division
3 rd
4*
7th
Days of
Bread/Biscuit
5
1
None
Days of
Meat
13
13
11
Days of
Wine/Spirit
2
2
3
Figure 9: Availability of supplies in the centre army corps, December 1813. 223
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Despite occupying an approximately similar geographical position in the same time 
frame, it is apparent that the level of supply to the three divisions was somewhat 
inconsistent: the 3 rd division possessed only two days of full supply and the 4th one, 
while the 7th did not have sufficient quantities of each commodity for a single day. The 
situation for the 3 rd is improved significantly (to five days) by discarding alcohol. The 
importance of this commodity should not, however, be discounted, due to its influence 
on morale and discipline.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the data in figure 9 is the disparity between 
reserves of meat when compared to those of bread and biscuit. This situation was 
primarily due to the differences in how meat, bread and biscuit were supplied. Meat 
marched on the hoof with the army, was available regardless of season and could be 
slaughtered as required on the spot. Conversely bread and biscuits required some 
effort to produce and their manufacture was a relatively long process. To begin with, 
baking required wheat, which was not always available and also required 
processing.224 Another difficulty was procuring or manufacturing sufficient yeast for 
the baking process, great efforts being made by army bakers throughout the period to 
increase both the quality and cost effectiveness of this important ingredient. 225 Finally, 
even if these difficulties could be overcome the baking of bread was time 
consuming. 226 This affected strategy and planning at the highest levels and was 
apparent in the orders issued to Lieutenant General Sir John Moore concerning his 
expedition to northern Spain in 1808: 'a large proportion of biscuit has been sent in 
the victuallers [sic] that you may be relieved from the inconvenience of baking when 
the troops are in motion'.227
More easily stored and preserved, biscuit was generally seen as an emergency
224 p.54.
225 PRO WO 30/141, pp.30-32.
226 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
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ration that could take the place of bread when required, but such characteristics also 
made it preferable for an army wishing to remain on the march, hence its inclusion in 
the same category as bread in returns. Despite the advantages of biscuit, however, 
bread was more easily digestible and thus popular with the troops, especially if 
consumed fresh. Regular stops to bake bread would have hindered an army on the 
march but there was no such difficulty when encamped. In consequence, units on 
occasion produced bread independently of the Commissariat. Following the Battle of 
Talavera, when supplies became short due to the large number of troops present in the 
region, Lieutenant Bingham of the 53 rd Regiment of Foot wrote that 'we were living at 
Talavera from hand to mouth, that is we were obliged to thrash the corn ourselves, 
grind the flour and make the bread'.228 The duty was clearly unpopular with the 
lieutenant and he was relieved to write in a letter home the following month that 'we 
are, however, plentifully supplied, having an excellent market'.229 On other occasions 
the bread ration was issued as grain to speed up the supply process. 230
Bingham's account of bread production after Talavera reveals two important 
issues. Firstly it says something about the composition of his unit, which contained 
personnel able to harvest wheat, mill it and then bake bread. The personnel need not 
have been professional farmers, millers or bakers before enlisting but it is likely they 
had some experience in such backgrounds. More important than the composition of 
Bingham's unit, however, is the fact that the situation after Talavera demonstrates the 
relationship between strategic and local supply. In 1809 stores of flour in Lisbon were 
so full that vessels allocated to transport the commodity were reassigned to other 
tasks, yet soldiers in the field, such as Bingham, had to find their own sources of
228 Bingham to mother, Delatosa, 10* August 1809, Vol. 1, NAM 6807/163, p.62.
229 Bingham to mother, Badajoz 13* September 1809, Vol. 1, NAM 6807/163, p.68.
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the Peninsula, vol 3 (London, Richard Bentley, 1853), p.6.
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flour.231 The stocks held in Lisbon no doubt enabled markets to recover rapidly, but it 
remains apparent that the existence of such extensive stocks did not always benefit the 
army in the field. This gives rise to a situation in which there is a considerable 
disparity between anecdotal evidence and official records regarding the supply of food 
to troops in the field.
Whatever the type, the food supplied by the Commissariat was sometimes of 
questionable quality and its nutritional value was clearly in some doubt, indicating a 
preference for quantity rather than quality. In his melancholy 'Subaltern's Elergy' 
Ensign Meade described his pitiful rations thus: 'see in camp kettles all we have to 
dine, yielding soup meagre to frighten swine', and there was also a tinge of envy and 
longing for the comforts of Britain when he wrote of 'ye fat rich citizens of London... 
snug over claret... Blest be the land of rich turtle soup - glamorous venison 
haunches'. 232 The poor quality of rations was not merely a complaint of troops in the 
field. Judge Advocate Larpent, based at army headquarters, complained that ration 
beef 'cooked up like Indian rubber', while a letter written concerning the 
Commissariat depot in Longford described a sample of biscuits containing 'dust and
dirt and bad bits'233 .
The poor diet of the army was a source of some concern for several soldiers,
although it is apparent that the food available to soldiers may have been of a superior 
quality and more plentiful than that available to civilians. A study based on scientific 
data such as the average calories consumed by civilians and soldiers would be of 
interest, although the lack of suitable information concerning their respective diets 
precludes an accurate comparison from being made. Despite the scarcity of data, 
general conclusions can be drawn concerning the diet of soldiers compared to that of
231 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p. 115.
232 NAM 7505/10, J. R. Meade, 'The Subaltern's Elegy' (Spain, 1 st July 1813).
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civilians. The period from 1790 to 1820 was in general characterised by declining 
food consumption across much of the civilian population, a decline triggered by rising 
prices and falling wages, factors from which soldiers were relatively isolated due to 
the impact of long-term government contracts.234 The potential differences between 
the diets of soldiers and civilians were not only quantitative. Meat was only a small 
part of the diet for many labourers and when available tended to be lamb or bacon, 
while there was a growing reliance on potatoes. 235 Conversely, for soldiers, 
approximately half of the diet consisted of meat, which was most commonly beef.236
Although a consideration of trends in the availability of food suggests that the 
diets of soldiers were indeed superior, it is necessary to appreciate that there existed a 
considerable difference between the prescribed diet of soldiers and that which they 
actually consumed. Furthermore, while superior in some respects to that of civilians, 
the diet of soldiers was not always adequate for their needs. William Dent, then 
serving as a hospital mate, attributed an outbreak of typhus amongst the Colchester 
garrison in April 1809 to the poor quality of rations. He believed that 'it was brought 
on from the soldiers being exposed to the cold and being weakened from not having 
sufficient quantity of nutritive food proportionable [sic] to the quantity of fatigue and 
exercise they had daily to undergo'.237 Whether or not poor diet did indeed 
significantly contribute to the spread of typhus at Colchester is unknown. More likely 
culprits included poor living conditions in barracks and cramped medical facilities but 
that Dent, a future surgeon, noted the poor state of army rations is noteworthy as it
displays a level of competence rarely attributed to military surgeons in the period. 238
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A disease more easy to attribute to poor diet than typhus was dysentery, 
outbreaks of which were common. Lieutenant Bingham believed 'a total want of 
vegetables and salt, introduced dysentery amongst both officers and men to rather an 
alarming degree', although in many cases dysentery may well have been due to the 
poor quality of drinking water.239 Conductor of Stores W. Morris attributed a period of 
ill health to the effects of poor quality water, stating that 'I was taken vehemently ill 
this day with a pain in my bowels, accompanied by a flux. The water in this country is 
very bad'. 240 The following particularly unpleasant event, recorded by Surgeon Henry, 
also relates to the safety of drinking water. A thirsty group of soldiers stopped to drink 
from an old fountain and subsequently 150 of them were rushed to hospital with
leeches in their mouths, nostrils, throats, gullets and stomachs. 241
Concerns about the safety of drinking water led to the widespread 
consumption of alcohol, hence the inclusion in the return of food available in 
December 1813 a listing for wines and spirits but none for potable water. Such was 
the importance attached to ensuring supplies of good quality alcohol that brewers, 
unlike other contractors, were required to take an oath guaranteeing its quality. 242 Such 
measures, however, were seen by certain soldiers to be insufficient, and they requested 
that to ensure adequate supplies army officers be exempted from paying duties on 
alcohol so that they could purchase their own stocks more easily. Lieutenant Fairman 
was such an individual and he described wine as being among 'the heaviest, if not the 
most necessary, articles of expenditure', estimating that one-quarter of a subaltern's 
pay would be spent on alcohol. 243 He went on to state that 'its moderate use proves
239 Bingham to mother, Badajoz 13* September 1809, Vol.1, NAM 6807/163, p.68.
240 Saturday 31 st October 1812, NAM 7508/24.
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very essential towards the preservation and recovery of health, and not infrequently 
operates as a preventative against epidemic disease'.244 Such views permeated the 
upper ranks of society and the army itself, General Wetherall recommending that 
regimental canteens be set up to guarantee the supply 'of good and wholesome 
liquor'.245 Considering that such policies and attitudes concerning alcohol existed it is 
perhaps unsurprising that, in the words of Lieutenant John Ford of 79th Cameron 
Highlanders, drunkenness became 'the bane of the British army'.246
Even if the Commissariat could have ensured adequate supplies of food there 
were numerous problems associated with its provision. As the army marched through 
the Pyrenees in 1813, for example, Rifleman Costello stated that his daily ration 
consisted of a single biscuit per day, while Private Howell of 71 st Regiment of Foot 
confessed to stealing the dog biscuits that he was preparing for the Duke of 
Wellington's hounds to relieve his hunger.247 There was a variety of factors that could 
lead to such a desperate situation. Simply cooking the meat ration could be a problem 
due to either a shortage of cooking implements or lack of time caused by rapid 
marches, the latter being a significant cause of hunger on the retreat from Burgos. 248 
The problem of scarce cooking implements was partly rectified following the 
widespread issue of tents later in the war - a unit's mules being tasked to carry these, 
while utensils were carried by the men and thus available as soon as the unit 
encamped. Carriage by the unit, however, did not always ensure the safe and timely 
arrival of the required equipment, as troops carrying utensils could get delayed,
244 Fairman, A Letter on the Expediency of Allowing Wine to the Army Free of Duty as in the Navy, 
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redirected or even lost (another example of how factors outside of its control could 
bring the best efforts of a state to support its military grinding to a halt). Due to these 
risks, units tasked to carry items such as camp kettles received an armed escort, 
initially of mounted dragoons although this task was eventually allocated to soldiers 
on foot. 249
No matter what escort was provided, utensils could only arrive if they had 
been issued. Although supplied with an adequate number of camp kettles in 1815 (157 
- approximately one per four men), the 1 st battalion of the 88th had an insufficient 
number of billy hooks (94) to support them over fires. In 1809 the ratios had been 
even worse, at one kettle per 6 men and one hook per 10 men. 250 The actions of 
soldiers themselves also served to undermine the efforts of the Commissariat. 
Lieutenant Bingham was critical of the actions of fellow officers, noting that supplies 
went 'but little way with young gentlemen who have been used to gorge themselves at 
a regimental mess'.251 Judge Advocate Larpent's criticisms were aimed at the actions 
of common soldiers upon receiving their rations. He wrote that:
the poor soldiers, having three days rations served out at once, consume all the 
drink on the first day, sell the meat to save carriage and the trouble of cooking 
it, and live upon bread and grapes and water, till their next supply comes. 252
In consequence of such actions the Commissariat sought to issue rations only on a 
daily basis but this was rarely achieved and the policy could only ever be feasible if 
the units in question were in close proximity to permanent depots, a situation that 
rarely arose due to the centralisation of stores or the need to avoid their proximity to 
the enemy.253
249 Qunita, 2nd July 1811, NAM 6807/221, p. 15.
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253 Villa Formosa, 15 th April 1811, NAM 6807/221, p. 13.
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Of the arms of service in the army the cavalry was to cause the most problems 
for the Commissariat - although the number of animals used by the infantry divisions 
should not be underestimated. In the 7th Infantry Division, serving in Spain in 1813 
and consisting of 5,876 men, there were 244 horses, 268 mules operated by the 
regiments and 246 mules operated by the Commissariat, giving a total of 758 animals, 
which was the equivalent to a full-strength cavalry regiment.254 Added to the animals 
already consuming forage could be those that were not officially on the strength of the 
regiment or even in the army. General Cole, for example, maintained a menagerie 
consisting often goats, a cow and thirty-six sheep to supplement his rations, and even 
if the animals did not consume army fodder, their grazing would have consumed local 
supplies that could potentially have been utilised by the army. 255
For units stationed in Britain a common difficulty relating to the maintenance 
of animals was not a shortage of fodder so much as an excess of this commodity. The 
seasonal production of forage inevitably resulted in gluts at certain times of year, the 
results of which were noted by P. Singer of the Commissary General's Office when he 
declared that 'the straw in Commissariat Depots throughout the kingdom is rather 
decayed' as it remained in storage too long.256 Storage was less of a problem in the 
case of hay, as old and new hay could be mixed, while different deliveries of straw 
had to be kept separately. 257 Forces in Spain and Portugal faced the opposite problem 
to those in Britain, and the difficulty was procuring sufficient fodder to start with. The 
quantity required by the Peninsular army was considerable and in 1809 the cavalry 
ration was defined as being 141b of hay, 121b of oats or lOlb of barley per horse, while
254 NAM 7512/124, Supplies to the Divisions of the Centre Army Corps in the Peninsula, December
1813; Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies (London, Constable, 1999), p.28.
233 G.'Larpent (ed), The Private Journal ofF S Larpent, Vol 2, (London, Richard Bentley, 1853), p.65.
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that of mules employed on supply operations was SOlbs corn per week. 258 Demand 
could in part be met by importing forage from Britain, 4.5 million pounds of straw 
and oats being requested in 1809.259 Other than this the Commissariat had little choice 
except to make do with what it could find in each region, often with serious 
consequences for the local economy and the cavalry itself. The latter was particularly 
true when the only fodder available was green corn and, due to the potential risks to 
horses, commissaries were instructed to use it only as a last resort. 260 The difficulty of 
supplying the cavalry with fodder was a source of consternation for Commissary 
Schauman, who was critical of the practices employed by cavalrymen. In particular he 
complained that they preferred hay instead of straw to feed their horses, although it 
must be noted that in some cases this is a preferable food source for horses so 
Schauman may have been displaying a lack of knowledge regarding this. Schauman 
also complained that cavalrymen frequently swapped their forage ration for alcohol, 
but noted that following the introduction of regulations to prevent this British horses
soon became fatter and those of the locals thinner.261
Any failure by the Commissariat to supply food adequately for either man or 
beast is highly visible to the historian, such situations being enthusiastically recorded 
by letter writers, diarists and memoirists alike. Frequently these individuals aimed 
their criticisms directly at the organization. Rifleman Costello, for example, 
complained that throughout the Peninsular War 'we suffered much from a deficiency 
of supplies from the Commissariat', while Private Gunn wrote of the campaign that it 
was 'not seldom' at fault. 262 It is clear that criticisms of this nature were not 
unjustified, even though it is apparent that many of the difficulties encountered by the
258 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/238; Standing Orders, Order No. 37, 
NAM 6807/22 l,p.8.
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Commissariat were beyond its control, and a study of the organization's efforts to 
supply food highlights what was possibly its greatest weakness regarding operations 
in the field: specifically a reflexive doctrine that aimed to react to situations rather 
than prepare for them.
Creveld states that the first requisite of any logistics system is an exact 
definition of requirements.263 This was clearly lacking in the Commissariat's doctrine 
and from the very start of a campaign the resulting limitations were apparent. As 
noted above, the first personnel from the organization to arrive in a region were 
purchasing agents. The task of these individuals was not one of ascertaining the ability 
of a province to sustain a force in the long term but rather to purchase the supplies 
required by army when it arrived. This was to be achieved regardless of long-term 
consequences for the local economy and, by implication, future procurement 
activities. This was demonstrated in August 1808, when commissaries in the force 
under the command of Arthur Wellesley procured so many mules that subsequent 
forces were compelled to purchase other draught animals. 264 Further evidence is 
provided by the disastrous effect of procurement activities on local markets and 
commodity prices. Captain Bragge of the 3 rd Dragoons noted of the vicinity of Belem 
in 1811 that 'the English have ruined this market as they do all others, and at this 
moment everything from a hen's egg to a mule is dearer than in England', while Judge 
Advocate Larpent complained in May 1813 that 'we cannot buy anything to eat except
honey, sugar, bacon, bread and cheese'.265
The depletion of markets alone was not sufficient to end the activities of the 
Commissariat in a region and its personnel were expected to utilise any means
263 Creveld, Supplying War, p. 18.
264 Wellesley to Bmrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p. 191.
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necessary to acquire supplies. This was achieved through the employment of 
occasionally brutal tactics that could literally be those of an occupying army: to 
counter local attempts to conceal stores underground, for example, commissaries 
resorted to the French practice of pouring water on the ground to locate areas of 
recently disturbed soil (where it drained away quicker). 266 Some of the other methods 
used by commissaries were little more than terrorism and in 1813 a commissary was 
found guilty of burning down a Spanish house.267 It is also interesting to note that 
commissaries co-operated with guerrillas, Lieutenant John Ford recording in his diary 
that 'the inhabitants of Amaraz were very much alarmed by the arrival of a 
commissary and a company of guerrillas... to search the houses for provisions'. 268
The plundering of supplies in this way was dramatically at odds with a concept 
that was crucial in defining the relationship between the British army and state, 
specifically that the army should cause as little disruption to civilians as possible. 269 
Although primarily a domestic policy, it would be incorrect to view the tactics utilised 
by the Commissariat overseas as evidence that the concept of limiting disruption to 
civilians was applied only in the home nation or its colonies. The British government 
was anxious not only to avoid upsetting its allies but also the population of France, 
therefore an extension of a policy that inflicted minimum disruption to civilians was 
thus required on the continent270 . Ultimately, however, operational requirements 
would on occasion take precedence over political expediency and the practices 
normally utilised to placate civilians were ignored. 271 Thus the Commissariat 
continued to utilise all means at its disposal when the situation warranted.
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The ruthlessness of commissaries in the field was to have implications for the 
organization. In a country already devastated and left, in the words of Henry Booth, 
'wretched in the extreme from the French occupation', it was inevitable that the 
inhabitants of towns and villages would react with hostility to the arrival of a 
commissary intent on plundering what remained of local stocks. 272 On occasion this 
led to violence and in 1810 Spanish civilians set upon two members of a foraging 
party, one receiving seven gunshot wounds and the other being shot through the 
lung. 273 This was a consequence of a policy that sought to provide supplies through 
legalised plunder; an unbalanced policy that, instead of maximising the potential of a 
region to sustain a force, could provide only a short-term solution to the problem of 
maintaining the army.
The plundering of supplies was a crucial element of the reflexive doctrine in 
the field, although this doctrine was also to have an influence on other aspects of the 
Commissariat, including its bureaucracy and administration. General J.F.C. Fuller 
cites planning as a key element of warfare in the period, noting that Napoleon himself 
said that 'nothing is gained in war except by calculation' and that 'it is only when 
plans are deeply thought out that one succeeds in war'. 274 Yet planning was noticeably 
absent in the Commissariat. The many volumes of paperwork tended to be concerned 
primarily with returns relating to the situation at the time of writing, rather than what 
was required in a week, a month or a year (data collection, rather than estimation and 
projection appears to have been the objective of such bureaucracy). Information of 
this nature was vital if shortages caused by the mismanagement of local resources 
were to be rectified through imports, yet it was rarely collated. There is little evidence 
that the Commissariat sought to understand what was required by a body of men such
272 Henry Booth to wife, nr Vittoria, 20* June 1813, NAM 6702/33/102, Booth Letters.
273 W. Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer 1809 -1815 (Staplehurst, Spellmont, 1999), p.35.
274 Fuller, The Conduct of War, p.47.
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as a regiment over a period of time and returns were rarely accompanied by estimates 
of how long the listed stores would last. Thus, the activities of the Commissariat were 
based on the supply situation as it had been up to a year earlier: estimates of the 
fodder required in the Peninsula, for example, were based on the previous year's 
consumption.275 Such practice was sound but only when force levels were stable; in 
particular, they did not take into account increases in the number of personnel and 
animals in the theatre. This doctrine of response rather than preparation was possibly 
the greatest failing of the Commissariat, although it was a doctrine forced on it by 
circumstance, not least being the limitations imposed on the army by the state's desire 
to limit its size and cost.
When considering the Commissariat it is necessary to note that it met many of 
the criteria stated by P.D, Foxton in the twentieth century to be essential for a sound 
logistical system. The five key elements were foresight, flexibility, simplicity, 
economy and co-operation. Only in the case of foresight (the ability to plan ahead) 
was the Commissariat lacking, its doctrine making up for this in flexibility, economy 
(forced upon it by the demands of the state) and co-operation (the utilisation of
resources in the host nation, such as muleteers).276
When considering how the relationship between state and army influenced the 
Commissariat, it is apparent that it facilitated the creation of a relatively effective 
system to support the force, but it was a system constrained by geography. In the 
United Kingdom a policy based on purchase rather than plunder was feasible due to 
continuing improvements in the national transport network and proximity to both 
markets and sources.277 Overseas, however, this situation did not always exist and the
275 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/23 8/
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278flexibility of secure naval transport was only of benefit in proximity to the coast. 
Thus the Commissariat was forced to rely on the local infrastructure to carry out its 
task, a situation that hindered the distribution of supplies be they purchased or attained 
through plunder. The result was that troops in Britain were well maintained and 
provisioned but those overseas less so. The Commissariat therefore represents both 
the worst and the best aspects of British defence policy.
Besides the geographical boundaries of the state, the Commissariat also had to 
contend with an increasingly bureaucratic and regulated system. This proved to be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand bureaucracy hampered activities and was not 
always as comprehensive as it could and should have been, a situation that contributed 
to the reflexive doctrine, but in other respects bureaucracy was beneficial. Regulations 
gave the Commissariat structure and a framework in which its personnel could act, a 
situation that did not exist to a significant degree in the French army until the 
bureaucratisation of its own logistics system from 1805.279 When the systems used to 
govern the Commissariat worked, the organization proved a success but outside of 
sometimes-limited boundaries and constrained by regulation it could prove a notable 
failure at worst and, at best, barely able to match the effectiveness of methods utilised 
to maintain the armies of continental states. The Commissariat, however, was not the 
only organization employed to achieve this aim and it is the organizations with which 
the Commissariat shared responsibility that form the basis of the following chapters, 
beginning with those involved at the start of the logistical process: procurement.
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Chapter 3 
Procurement for the British Army
Procurement for the British army in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
relates in particular to one aspect of the relationship between the army and the state, 
this being the extent to which the force benefited from Britain's growing economic 
and industrial power. By the time of the Revolutionary Wars Britain's armed forces 
were to become not only a means to promote the nation's diplomatic ambitions but 
also economic, colonial, industrial and even technological growth. Initially a reason 
for the financial revolution, the armed forces had rapidly become a means to sustain it 
through their role in the economy, providing employment, possessing considerable 
purchasing power and safeguarding the Empire. 280 Such was the importance of the 
armed forces that an increasingly broad section of society shared a common interest in 
their development and maintenance.
In coastal areas in particular the state had become the largest purchaser of 
food, clothing and metal ware, while also providing the biggest source of employment 
in the construction industry due to the building of dockyards and barracks. 2" 1 Members 
of the public took an increasing interest in military affairs. During the eighteenth 
century it was to become ever more fashionable to read about the exploits of Britain's 
soldiers and sailors, while during the Nine Years War days of public thanks were 
introduced to celebrate important victories, a practice that persisted into the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 21* 2 When these factors are added to Britain's 
expanding industrial and economic potential it would appear that the scene was set for 
the army to be supported to an unprecedented level. 283
2SO Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.27, 59.
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It is estimated that in 1811 Britain's expenditure on war amounted to sixteen 
percent of gross national product, the same as that expended in 1915. 2M It would thus 
appear that the army had reaped the rewards from a financial revolution that it had 
helped to create, but this was not the case. Due to the policies implemented by 
successive British governments, figures concerning expenditure on the war are 
relatively meaningless in the context of the army. Indeed, figures of this nature in 
general should be avoided, as they can overawe as much as inform. Because of the 
army's bureaucratic practices the historian can learn, for example, that the cost of the 
army maintained in Britain and Ireland during 1803 amounted to £2,322,700. 
Compared to the figures for the previous year or peacetime, this impressive total 
would show an increase that, while improving the capability of the force, also masked 
its deficiencies. 285 As Jeremy Black notes, a thriving economy and effective public 
finances were useful, but the war still had to be fought. 286 The state would prove 
unable to maintain the army to its maximum potential, in part due to its own policies 
but also certain economic and industrial practices that developed alongside it, the 
allocation of labour being one of them.
The British economy dealt a double blow to the army because while it 
effectively limited the manpower available to the army by encouraging the 
concentration of human resources in key sectors, the extra output this allowed did not 
fully benefit the army either. 2" Another difficulty was that a defining feature of the 
British state in the period was that economics and social stability were persistently 
fiven priority over military effectiveness. 2SS Because of these factors the armed forces 
would remain unable to capitalise fully on the benefits offered by Britain's growing
-*A A D. Harvey. Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century (London, Batsford, 1978), p.334. 
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manufacturing capability. It is incorrect to dismiss the role of Britain's growing 
economic strength in aiding the procurement activities of the army, however, and it 
will become apparent during this chapter that the army was able to exploit certain 
advantages but not to utilize them to their full potential.
Almost all of the numerous organisations and departments in the army would 
be involved at various stages of procurement, whether it was through actually 
purchasing goods or issuing a specification for requirements. In addition to the 
Commissariat, four departments in particular stand out and form the focus of this 
chapter, as they were concerned with specialised items. These were the Quarter 
Master General (one concern of which was the supply of camping equipment), the 
Barrack Master General (who oversaw barracks), the Clothing board (which set the 
standards for uniform and oversaw its supply) and Ordnance Board (munitions 
production). A fifth department with specialist requirements was that concerned with 
medical provision but this is considered in the subsequent chapter. Of the 
aforementioned organisations, only the Ordnance Board possessed its own production 
facilities, and in most cases procurement was conducted through civilian contractors.
The utilisation of contractors intermeshed military organisations with private 
companies, making the army an important element in the British economy, while 
contracts also enabled the army to exist without the need maintain its own extensive 
production facilities. The terms of individual contracts could vary, but generally 
contractors would produce goods, which were then transported to army depots by 
either themselves or a different contractor. Distribution to the troops would then be 
conducted through the appropriate army organisation. Local laws could have an 
impact on how contracts could work, and this was particularly so in Portugal where a 
royal warrant was required to sell soap, tobacco and snuff. So as not to contravene
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these regulations the army itself was unable to supply these items to its troops and 
fourteen suppliers were contracted to supply the divisions of the British army in 
Portugal. As supplying these items without a contract was effectively a breach of 
Portuguese law, the Provost Marshal was given responsibility for enforcing and 
monitoring the relevant contracts. 289 Through the involvement of an organisation that 
had little else to do with procurement other than through monitoring its own logistical 
requirements, the situation regarding the supply of soap and tobacco in Portugal 
highlighted how the structures and procedures put in place by the state could have 
little relevance outside of the United Kingdom. This was a significant limitation that 
was to have implications for the effectiveness of the army and its supply organisation. 
The details of contracts varied according to the nature of the items supplied, 
although an example of how a contract may have operated can be found in that for 
supplying fodder to the Norwich garrison in 1797. The terms of the contract were 
explained to the commanding officer of the garrison in a letter from the Barrack 
Office:
Sir,
It has been found expedient to enter into a contract for the supply of 
forage to the troops stationed in the barracks at Norwich, from the 1 st day of 
October 1797, to the 30th day of September 1798, a copy where of is in the 
hands of the Barrack Master, who is directed to communicate its contents to 
you as well as my instructions with regard to the receipt and delivery of the 
forage, to which I am to desire you will confirm whatever is required from you 
as commanding the troops in the said barracks; and that a regular succession in 
the supply of forage may be kept up, you will be pleased to make a requisition 
in writing, fourteen days before the quantity to be delivered is wanted, to the 
Barrack Master, who will call upon the contractor to furnish it accordingly; 
and you will, on each delivery, give a receipt for the quantity, for which you 
are to remain accountable: and that at such periods as the contractor, in 
conformity to the terms of his agreement, is entitled to be paid for the quantity 
of forage issued, you will give him a draft upon the agent of your regiment, at 
ten days sight, for the amount of the stoppages; and for the amount exceeding 
the stoppages, you will give him a draft upon me, at ten days sight; and as the 
General Return and Certificate required by the 18th article of His Majesty's 
Regulations for the Government of Barracks, is the only voucher money can
2S" Extracts from General Orders, Cartaxo 28th February 1811, NAM 6807/221, pp.5-7.
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be paid for the purchase of forage, you will be pleased, when you give the draft 
to the contractor, to furnish to the Barrack Master / who is responsible for the 
due transmission thereof / a General Return and Certificate of the quantities of 
each species of forage that have been issued in conformity to the before 
mentioned article of the King's regulations: to which necessary forms are 
annexed. And you are also, in compliance with the said article, to give the 
Barrack Master every Monday morning, the customary return of the horses 
belonging to the officers, Quarter Masters, and soldiers, which have been 
foraged the preceding seven days, specifying the names of the said officers and 
quartermasters. 290
The letter reveals several key points about the operation of such contracts. They were 
of twelve months' duration (in this case September to August inclusive), responsibility 
for administering the contract locally rested not with personnel from the Commissariat 
or Barrack Master General's office but the commanding officer, requests for supply- 
were made through the Barrack Master's Department, a degree of estimation was 
required on the part of the officer - requests having to be made fourteen days in 
advance of forage being required, bills were to be paid within ten days, and anti-fraud 
measures (including receipts, returns of horses on the unit's strength and payment of 
excess bills by Barrack Master's department) were in place.
There was some flexibility in contracts, which could work to the advantage of 
either the contractor or the army. Those supplying forage, as in the above example, 
were sometimes able to negotiate clauses that allowed them to buy back, borrow or 
otherwise acquire excess fodder from the army. 291 The terms of such an agreement, 
operating in 1806, were explained as follows:
it has been considered an object of advantage to permit the forage contractors 
to have the use of a part of it [excess forage] under the personal responsibility 
of the Assistant Commissary of the District, you will therefore please on the 
requisition of Mr. Joseph Webb forage contractor... to cause such a proportion 
to be issued to him as may he may want under stipulation of his returning it 
into store when called on for that purpose. 292
290 Punctuation as in original. NAM 7211/58/1, Barrack Office to Officer Commanding in Barracks at
Norwich, 20th September 1797.
-" This situation was particularly common at harvest time. p. 80.
2W Singer to Heathy, Commissary General's office, 25th March 1806, PRO WO 63/45.
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Such arrangements were only temporary (effectively only while there was excess 
forage available) and by June 1810 the situation was such that personnel were 
informed 'it is not expedient just now to part with the hay and straw in any depot. 293 
While the clause had operated, however, Mr. Webb the forage merchant had 
effectively been allowed to use the forage store as an extension of his own at no extra 
cost. Furthermore the arrangement had benefited the army, the Commissary being 
informed that it was 'an object of advantage'. The reasons for this were not explained 
in the letter, although difficulties were frequently experienced regarding the storage of 
excess fodder. 294
Contracts were monitored and would be lost if the contractor was found to be 
in breach of the terms. Particularly large contracts came under the scrutiny of 
Parliament itself, and in 1809 a contractor named John Trotter was called to give 
evidence to a parliamentary enquiry. Mr. Trotter had a contract to supply camping 
equipment to the army and was the nephew of the individual (also called John Trotter) 
awarded the same contract in 1775. While the inquiry lasted several days, and the 
minutes are therefore too long to reproduce in their entirety, it is of value to consider 
some of the questions and responses as they reflect how such a contract operated. Of 
particular interest were the following extracts:
Question 13: In what manner have you made your charges on the current 
articles?
Answer: The charge to government is made on the same principles in 
both; the cost of the materials is brought to the money price, as 
I have before stated, to which we add the price of labour, and 
these two form the net ready money cost on which all other 
percentages are calculated.
Question 14: What expenses and outgoings are covered by the ten percent 
charge?
-9? Malisses to G. Bimiy. Commissary General's Office, 9* June 1810, PRO WO 63/45.
-'* See above p.78.
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Answer: It is intended to be a clear profit for the services we perform, 
which are not confined to the provision of the articles simply, 
but include excessive labour and anxiety in the subsequent 
management.
It is apparent that there was some confusion concerning the charges made by the 
contractor. After total costs including labour and raw materials were calculated an 
additional ten percent was added and the commissioners clearly believed this was 
intended to cover additional costs. Conversely Mr. Trotter, despite a somewhat vague 
answer to the second question, primarily viewed it as profit. The second issue raised 
in the above extract is that of how contracts could encourage inefficiency. In this case, 
for example, the contractor's profits effectively increased with costs: whether or not 
the ten percent was wholly profit, the percentage was of more value when costs were 
higher. Thus, a contractor seeking to increase profits could potentially benefit from 
inefficiency and would have made false reporting of costs particularly lucrative, such 
practices being relatively common in the period. 295 The enquiry convened and on the 
following day questioned Mr. Trotter about who authorised him to deliver items:
Question 19: On what requisitions or authority do you issue the supplies of the 
articles?
Answer: The camp necessities are issued by authority of the 
Quartermaster General, and hospital stores by that of the 
Surgeon General; occasionally they are issued by order of the 
Commander-in-Chief [or] the Secretary at War.
It is apparent that orders for the items produced by Mr. Trotter could come from no 
fewer than four separate departments, one of which was the civilian War Office. 
Utilising a single manufacturer maximised the potential economic benefits of such a 
contract and ensured that the equipment used by the various organisations was 
compatible. Both advantages, however, would have been greatly enhanced had a 
central store of camping equipment existed in the British army. This would have 
allowed a rationalisation of the stores held by each department, improving efficiency,
-^ Brewer, •Commercialisation and Polities', p. 197.
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while folly exploiting the compatibility of equipment derived from a single source. 
The next question concerned the delivery of items:
Question 20: Are you responsible for the safe delivery of the articles at the 
places in Great Britain to which they are ordered?
Answer: Certainly not. At the same time permit me to add, that I know 
not of any instance of loss by miscarriage, one alone excepted.
At the point of leaving the source of production, therefore, the items concerned ceased 
to be the responsibility of that particular contractor, a different contract being awarded 
for their transportation. Evidently Mr. Trotter satisfied the enquiry as he continued to 
supply camping equipment to the army following his interview. 296
Contracts were of benefit to the military for a variety of reasons. Not least was 
the fact that they could fix prices for a length of time that could not be guaranteed in a 
wartime economy. Furthermore, the already limited manpower of organisations such 
as the Royal Wagon Train and Commissariat muleteers was not employed in 
transporting large quantities of goods from their source but more usefully in supplying 
the troops. The contractors themselves, however, also benefited and this went beyond 
merely earning a steady income and reliable payments. Dealing with the military 
allowed them to operate under special rules, exempt from certain regulations. In 1805, 
for example, it was ruled that the Russian, Danish and Swedish vessels chartered by 
Turnball, Forbes & Co. to deliver wine to the garrison in Gibraltar could not be seized 
by the Royal Navy, which was the common practice regarding vessels of this type.-97 
Similarly exports of arms to Africa were exempt from certain customs inspections to 
avoid 'an unnecessary delay in carrying on this trade'. 298
Despite contracts to supply the army being put out to tender, the system had
2"6 Eighth Report of Military Enquiry, pp.22 7-8.
-*1 Draft of Instructions to the High Court of Admiralty Respecting Vessels Belonging to Russia, 
Denmark or Sweden, 2ml February, 1805, PRO PC 1/3643, Privy Council Miscellaneous Unbound
Papers, February 1805.
-m Privy Council to (Illegible), 17th August 1813, PRO PC 1/4013, Privy Council Miscellaneous 
Unbound Papers, August 1813.
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only a fa?ade of fair competition, a characteristic of contracts in general during the 
period. 2" Consider, for example, the tender put out by the Barracks Department in 
1802 for the supply of coal to certain barracks. Adverts were placed in the relevant 
local press and on 5th April 1802 it was announced that the contract would run for 
twelve months, from 25 th June that year. Proposals for the contract were to be 
delivered in sealed envelopes to the Barrack Master General on or before 12th April 
(seven days after the announcement). The terms of the contract were not advertised at 
this time but were available from either local barrack masters or the barrack office 
itself. An insight into early-nineteenth century British bureaucracy is provided by the 
fact that the latter was open for such enquiries only between 12pm and 3pm each day, 
except for Sundays. Proposals were required to specify the pits from which the coal 
was to originate, to be supported by 'adequate security' and to include the names of 
two referees willing to confirm these details. Clearly the requirement for securities 
gave some protection to the army but the time period of seven days was too short for 
many potential contractors to respond, particularly considering that little would 
happen on the Sunday and that the terms of the contract first needed to be acquired. 300 
In short, only a supplier aware of the contract in advance would have been able to 
meet the terms of the tender, and this could only have been achieved through inside 
knowledge.
The utilisation of contractors by the army was to be both beneficial and 
detrimental. The state benefited as contracts, if properly managed were economical 
and prevented the need for the army to acquire its own manufacturing capability, a 
situation that would have undermined the state as it would have enabled the army to 
obtain a greater degree of autonomy. John Bartlett states that the greatest advantage,
2^ Brewer. -Commercialisation and Polities', p. 199. 
300 Salisbury Journal. 5 th April 1802, p.3.
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however, was that contracts isolated the army, and consequently its troops from the 
price rises and fluctuations of the wartime economy. 301 Such a statement overlooks 
more fundamental benefits of contracts, specifically that they prevented the need for 
the army to maintain its own extensive production facilities and therefore freed 
manpower for military duties. This itself brought disadvantages, especially that of the 
army being dependent on outside agencies.
By their nature contracts were inflexible and it was one thing to maintain a 
garrison in this way as it represented a military presence that would remain in a single 
location for a long period, even though its constituent military units may have 
changed, but it was quite a different matter for specific formations as they could 
potentially be redeployed within a short period of time. An unexpected movement 
could take place before supplies were delivered, and while a unit may have taken 
several days to reach a port of embarkation, the logistical system and communications 
also moved at a slow speed. Such a situation, involving several companies of artillery 
from the King's German Legion, arose in 1807. Initially concern was expressed that 
the contractor had failed to supply the units in question with feathers, but a subsequent 
investigation by Brigadier General Macleod revealed that the contract had had another 
eight weeks to run when the units had embarked and the contractor had intended 
fulfilling the contract in this final period. Of note is the fact that Macleod warned that 
several other companies would leave Britain without this item, indicating that no 
attempt would be made to rectify the situation and that any deficiencies would only be 
remedied at their eventual destination. 302
It is important to note that the army's controlling of production may not have 
resolved the problems caused by relying on civilian producers. Evidence of this may
301 Bartlett The Development of the British Army, p. 136.
302 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 1* May 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
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be found in the manufacture and supply of munitions, which was primarily the 
responsibility of the Ordnance Board. The organisation controlled several locations 
concerned with the production of armaments, the most important being the Woolwich 
Arsenal in London. This site included a sizeable garrison to provide both defence and 
a workforce, while non-military personnel were also employed. 303 Despite such 
facilities, however, the army enjoyed only limited success in meeting demand for 
munitions. During the summer of 1810, for example, the Duke of Wellington was 
compelled to request ordnance form Portuguese stores, including 2,000 barrels of 
powder, 1,000 rounds of canister and 1,000 rounds of howitzer ammunition, to rectify 
deficiencies of British arms. 304 Significantly, these stores were ammunition rather than 
actual weapons, items with which British formations on the continent were normally 
adequately supplied, unlike their counterparts dispersed across the Empire.
It is apparent that the success of the British army in the campaigns on the 
European continent may have masked deficiencies in other theatres. Even units 
deployed in the defence of Britain and Ireland suffered from shortages of munitions, 
and auxiliary units raised specifically for home defence could be particularly 
deficient. 305 The armament returns for three regular regiments stationed in Britain 
during 1808 are shown in figure 10.
Unit
4th Dragoons
20th Light Drg.
51 Jl Foot
Date Location
7* May Canterbury
4* May Chichester
23'a April Unknown
Weapon Required
Carbine 844
Carbine 513
Musket 624
Short-
fall
56
146
57
Deficit as % of
Requirement
7%
28%
9%
Figure 10: Weapon deficiencies amongst three units deployed in Britain. 1808. 30'
303 Council Chamber, Whitehall, 2nd March 1816, PRO PC 1/4087, Privy Council Miscellaneous 
Unbound Papers, March 1816; J MacLeod to Mulgrave, Woolwhich, 17* February 1812, PRO 
WO55/1369.
304 Wellington to Liverpool, Alvera, 22ml August 1810, PRO WO 1/245.
305 See below p.247.
306 p^Q y/Q 27/92/1, Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and Army
Council Inspections, 1808.
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The above data has certain characteristics that warrant consideration before discussing 
its implications for the regiments concerned. Of particular note is the fact that, unlike 
returns of available stores of food submitted by the Commissariat, inspection reports 
made by the department of the Adjutant-General highlight deficiencies as well as what 
was available. 307 This allowed the army to estimate what items were required to bring 
units to strength, a crucial element that was lacking in Commissariat record 
keeping. 301* Secondly, it is apparent that deficiencies are based on the actual strength of 
the units concerned, not their authorised or paper strength. John Brewer states that the 
collection of such comprehensive data was characteristic of administration in the 
period, especially in the tabular form utilised in inspection returns. 309 Such practices, 
however, were not typical in the army because departments such as the Commissariat 
could be less meticulous in their collation of data. Pressures caused by operational 
requirements and the breakdown of peacetime practices in wartime overrode, or at 
least eroded, advances in administrative practice.
That the data was based on actual strength rather than paper strength is 
demonstrated by the disparity between the requirements of the 4th Dragoons and 20th 
Light Dragoons, the theoretical strengths of the two units being the same 
(approximately 900 to 1,000 men). Thus, a considerable number of personnel (over 
one quarter of the 20th Dragoons) did not possess a firearm or, in the case of the 
cavalry who carried a mixture of swords, carbines and pistols, a full complement of 
such items. This is clear evidence that the army was unable to supply its troops with 
the small arms they required, whether through its own output or contractors, and that 
this applied to even under strength regiments That the regiments concerned were
307 The original listed the number of items that the regiments were deficient, while the percentages were
calculated for comparative purposes in this study.
m See above p. 80.
30" Brewer, Tlw Sinews of Power, pp.222-225.
96
deployed in Britain, however, raises the question of whether such shortages were 
significant if troops were not deployed in war zones.
As these units were not in the frontline equipment shortages maybe considered 
to be insignificant, but there was a realistic possibility of them becoming involved in 
action. Britain appeared to be enjoying a period of stability, the threat of revolution 
having declined considerably since the 1790s and early 1800s. 310 This stability, 
however, was fragile as there was continuous unrest across Britain during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, including food riots, enclosure protests and 
industrial unrest. 311 1812 was a particularly turbulent year as large numbers of troops 
were deployed to suppress disorder in northern England, more troops in fact than were 
sent to Portugal in 1808, while Prime Minister Spencer Perceival was assassinated in 
the lobby of the House of Commons. 312 The unrest continued into the post-war period 
and included the Spa Fields Rally (1816), the March of the Blanketeers (1817) and the 
Cato Street Conspiracy (1820). 313 There is little reason to doubt that if the economic 
conditions that forced the Luddites onto the streets in 1811 had taken hold a few years 
earlier, perhaps due to a premature outbreak of war with the United States of America 
or successful French occupation of Portugal, similar unrest could have occurred in 
1808 and the army may have been called upon to suppress disorder. As it was the 
army did on occasion become involved in suppressing disorder in 1808, but only on a
small scale.
While it is apparent that there was a realistic possibility of widespread disorder 
at any point of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, a successful landing by
310 E Royle. Revolutionary Britannia: Reflections on the Threat of Revolution in Britain. 1789 to 1848 
(Manchester. Manchester University Press, 2000), passim.
311 A. Charlesworth (ed), An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain, 1548 - 1900 (London, Croom Helm). 
pp.51.97,104.
312 Emsley. British Society, p. 158; D. Read, Tlie English Provinces c.1760- I960: a Study in Influence 
(London, Edward Arnold, 1964), p. 63.
313 Thomis and Holt, Ttireats of Revolution, pp.39-75; Read, The English Provinces, p.70.
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enemy forces appears to have been so unlikely that it was almost fantastical. By 1808, 
the year in which these inspections occurred, the threat of French invasion was 
virtually non-existent, due to a combination of Britain's almost insurmountable naval 
supremacy and Napoleon's own strategic aims, the latter ensuring that French 
attention would be focused almost exclusively on the continent (and increasingly on 
the Iberian Peninsular).314 Yet, there was a threat, albeit slight, and that the 
government recognised this is demonstrated by the continued existence of coastal 
artillery and similar defences against amphibious attack. As Jeremy Black highlights, 
the importance of British naval success after 1805 was just as important as Trafalgar if 
French ambitions were to remain contained.315 Since 1796 and 1798, when French 
forces had reached Ireland, French naval power had been substantially reduced but it 
still remained capable of conducting operations. Of note is that the French fleet had 
been blockaded in 1798, just as it was in 1811 and 1812 when the Toulon fleet 
sortied. 316 In short, it was not beyond possibility that the French could have made a 
landing of some form on the British coast, particularly in an area such as the South 
East; an area, which, according to John Brewer, would have been a tempting target for 
a raid designed to cause maximum panic and economic disruption. 317 That the French 
never attempted such a raid, choosing instead to attack the peripheries of British 
power, brings this assumption into doubt but considering its proximity to French ports 
and those of the Low Countries, it would have been a viable option in the event of a 
plan based on a rapid dash across the Channel.
There clearly existed the potential for units on home defence to become 
embroiled in action so the effectiveness of such units must be considered. Regarding
314 N Tracy, Nelson's Battles (London. Caxton, 2001), p.217; C. J. Esdaile, ne Wars of Napoleon 
(Addison Wesley, 1995), passim.
315 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 157.
316 Tracy, Nelson's Battles, pp.36-37, 215-216; Black, Sea Borne Empire, p.159.
317 Brewer, We Sinews of Power, p. 191.
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civil disorder it appears that cavalry armed merely with sabres would be sufficient, as 
demonstrated bloodily at Peterloo. An insurrection or landing would, however, have 
been a different matter and the experiences of the army in suppressing the Irish 
rebellion demonstrates that enthusiastic rebels could, in the right circumstances, inflict 
a reverse on an ill-prepared force of regulars, as could a small force of regular troops 
landed to either support such a rebellion or act independently. 318 Despite the relative 
security of Britain, therefore, it is apparent that a deficiency of munitions could have 
had potentially serious consequences for units deployed on home defence duties. 
Added to this should also be the fact that insufficiently armed units could not be sent 
to fight on the continent and thus had only limited utility until deficiencies could be 
rectified. Depriving units on home defence was thus a way of maximising the 
potential of the field army but was nonetheless a dangerous gambit.
Shortages of weapons could be serious enough, but the effective strength of 
units may have been even lower when other factors are considered. In particular it is 
important to appreciate the ergonomic aspects of infantry weapons, as equipment of 
this nature required items such as rifle straps, pistol holsters and sword scabbards to 
be properly utilised. That the army acknowledged the significance of such items was 
demonstrated by their inclusion in the section of inspection returns concerned not with 
aesthetics (such as uniform) but armaments. This was illustrated by a return of the 
weapons present in the 4th battalion, Royal Artillery in Canada, during May 1808, the 
following items being listed: muskets, bayonets, rammers, musket slings and 
ammunition pouches. Besides indicating the items required to utilise a musket fully, 
the return is of further note because it was made as part of the 'demand of arms and 
accoutrements for four companies of the 4th Battalion, Royal Artillery in Canada, in
318 T. Pakenham, The Year of Liberty: The History of the Great Irish Rebellion ofl 798 (Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1992), pp.95-105.
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lieu of those in possessions [sic] of the companies, being rendered totally unfit for any 
further service, having been in use for twenty-two years'. il ''
It is apparent that the small arms of the 4th battalion were in desperate need of 
replacement. Even though they were not technologically obsolete (as few advances 
had been made in musketry technology during the intervening decades) they would 
have been subjected to considerable wear and weathering. 320 Black powder weapons 
employed only basic mechanisms but were susceptible to both factors and even a 
heavy shower of rain could degrade effectiveness. During 1798 Captain Jennings of 
the 14th Regiment recorded that following a march in such weather 'the 14* were 
mostly employed repairing the injury done to our arms and ammunition'. 321 That the 
4th battalion had to wait so long for replacements may be attributed to its deployment 
in a colonial garrison, as British units deployed on the continent tended to receive the 
pick of equipment. As demonstrated by the Canadian garrison in 1808, however, 
formations deployed to relatively quiet postings could soon find themselves in a war 
zone, with Canada becoming a front line in the war against the United States four 
years later.
Weaknesses in the infantry and cavalry could have been rectified through 
artillery but this was an arm in which the British army was notoriously weak. Again 
the forces deployed in defence of Britain suffered from deficiencies, the situation 
regarding coastal artillery in the county of Dorset during 1798 being shown below in 
figure 11.
"" Major-General Stead to Crew, Woolwich, 9th May 1808. PRO WO 55/1314.
320 A. Hannan,' "They decide not nor are they chiefly relied upon in battle" : British Rifles and Light 
Infantry in the Peninsular War', in P Griffiths (ed), A History of the Peninsular War Vol IX: Modem 
Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999), p.273.
321 NAM 8301/102, Memoirs of Captain Peter Jennings, p. 7.
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-  
Serviceability
Serviceable
Unserviceable
Deficient
Total
61b
2
12
-
14
91b
18
4
14
36
Calibre 
121b
-
-
2
2
18lb
11
7
3
21
241b Total
12 43
23
19
12 85
Figure 11: Artillery allocated to coastal defence in the count) of Dorset, 1798. 3"
Taking into account guns that were unserviceable (not useable) and deficient (not 
present) the county lacked almost half of the artillery required for defence against 
French landings. This was a shocking situation considering that the survey was 
conducted five years after the start of hostilities and, most significantly, when there 
existed a real threat of French invasion: the French fleet was still strong in northern 
waters, while Dorset's geographical position made it vulnerable to French amphibious 
operations be they full-scale invasions or large-scale raids.
It is often said that the devil is in the detail and the state of coastal artillery was 
no exception. As noted by the survey's author, many of the guns available were too 
small a calibre for the task of coastal defence, indicating that deficiencies existed in 
terms of both quantity and quality. 6-pound artillery pieces in particular were of 
questionable value and they were to be slowly replaced by 9-pound calibres in the 
field artillery units of the British army, their use largely being confined to the horse 
artillery where weight and thus speed of movement were as important as lethality. The 
trend towards 9-pounders in the field artillery is in part reflected by the limited 
availability of this calibre for coastal defence, while the large number of unserviceable 
6-pounders reflects pieces of this calibre being removed from field duties and
3" PRO WO 30/116, Report on the Coast of Dorsetshire, 1798, p. 17.
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reallocated to other roles. The reason for the scarcity of 12-pounders was similar to 
that for 9-pounders, 12-pounder artillery being considered the highest practical calibre 
for field artillery. Of all the calibres, only the 18- and 24-pounders approached 
authorised strength. These calibres were too large for field use and classed as either 
siege or garrison artillery (the latter being their role in coastal defence).-' 23
The army failed to meet the demand for munitions due to a variety of reasons. 
One factor was the constant attrition to which weapons were subjected in the field: 
during 1808 the Royal Artillery alone in Spain lost or had rendered unusable 355 
swords, along with 375 items of associated equipment. 324 Such attrition, however, 
should have been easily absorbed by an industrialising nation such as Britain. 325 That 
this was the case was demonstrated by the fact that, for the most part, the level of 
munitions supplied to the army remained relatively consistent throughout the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. There is no evidence that soldiers serving in 
Flanders in the 1790s, for example, were significantly less well armed than those 
serving in the Low Countries in 1815. 32S
More significant than attrition in limiting the nation's ability to supply the 
army with munitions were factors that underpinned the British state itself. These were 
the guiding principles of foreign policy, specifically the pre-eminence of the Royal 
Navy and the subsidising of Britain's continental allies. 327 There existed, for example, 
a fundamental imbalance in British artillery production that favoured the Royal Navy 
in terms of quantity and quality that was to have a direct influence on the composition 
of the field army and its operational capability. 328 It is of note that during the siege
323 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.28-9.
324 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 22nJ May 1809. PRO WO 55/1314.
325 Crafts, British Economic Growth, passim.
326 Although the latter forces were better maintained in other ways. See M. Adkin, Tlie Waterloo 
Companion (London, Aurum, 2001). 
27 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 178. 
2tl The Board of Ordnance supplied both the army and navy. Duff), 'British Naval Power', p. 78.
102
327 
32H
actions of 1812 the army was compelled to rely on ordnance temporarily transferred 
from the fleet, and captured Russian pieces, to provide guns of the necessary calibre to 
pound enemy fortifications. 329 Piers Mackesy states that often this arose not due to a 
shortage of army guns (a contentious point) but due to a preference for the greater 
mobility of naval guns. This, however, further highlights the technological lead 
enjoyed by the navy. 330 More significant than the navy in drawing munitions away 
from the army (not least because the former had its own production facilities such as 
those at Carron) was the policy of supporting allied nations. This was a policy that 
both exploited and maximised Britain's economic potential. The former was achieved 
through supplies of cash and material to allied nations, while the latter was facilitated 
by Britain maintaining a small army and letting its proxies do the fighting. 331
The extent of Britain's military contribution to the successive coalitions 
created to counter French power during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is 
open to some doubt and it was perhaps Austria that deserved the title of Napoleon's 
most resolute enemy. There can be little question, however, regarding the important 
role played by Britain as both financier and arsenal for the major European nations. 33 ' 
In the first three years of the Peninsular War, British vessels alone delivered 200,000 
muskets and 155 artillery pieces to Spanish and Portuguese forces, and initially 
individual ships captains in the Royal Navy were given free reign as to who they 
supplied muskets too, often several hundred at a time, in an attempt to raise bands of 
guerrillas. 333 Historians such as Christopher Hall see this in the context of Britain's 
contribution to the Allied war effort and evidence of Britain's industrial strength, yet
'^ Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.49; C. W. C. Oman, A History of the 
Peninsular War, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1930), V, pp.257-61.
330 P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 1801 (London, Routledge, 1995), p.27.
331 And the supply of munitions to allied forces was not always cost effective. By 1808 many of Sicily's 
fortresses remained unarmed and the army was ill equipped. P. Mackesy, Tfie War in the 
Mediterranean, p. 108.
332 See R. Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon (Yale, YUP, 1996). 
"3 Hall, Wellington 'sNavy, p. 13 7.
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this was only achieved at the expense of the British army. In 1810, for example, a 
consignment consisting of 20,000 stands of arms (a stand consisting of a musket and 
associated equipment such as ammunition pouches) was despatched to Portugal. 
16,000 of these, and other 'corresponding equipment', were subsequently sent to 
Cadiz for allocation to Spanish forces, with only 4,000 held in reserve for British, or 
other allied forces, at the Tagus. 334 This is significant because within months the Duke 
of Wellington would be requesting the transfer of munitions from Portuguese stores, 
demonstrating that items supplied to allied armies were also required by British 
forces. 335 It appears that the shortages rectified by the transfer of Portuguese stores in 
August 1810 may in part have been caused by their allocation to Portugal to begin 
with.
The supply of arms to allied nations was evidence of the army's role as one of 
three elements of British defence policy, along with the Royal Navy and support of 
coalition partners. It is apparent that in some cases, due to the supply of munitions to 
foreign powers, the army was third place in this relationship, although that the army 
was not adequately supplied may also indicate the limitations of British manufacturing 
output. There is a tendency to focus on the achievements and capabilities of British 
manufacturing, although the fact that the army was not adequately supplied may 
indicate an inability on the part of British industry to produce sufficient munitions for 
both the army and foreign powers. The question is not merely one of manufacturing 
capacity and relates to the fact that industry operates in sectors and that deficiencies in 
one sector may not always be rectified up by reallocating capacity from another. 336
While a consideration of munitions is fundamental to any study concerning the 
effectiveness and capability of an armed force, it is a subject that, on occasion, has
3J4 Wellington to Liverpool, Cartaxo, 12th January 1811. PRO WO 1/248.
335 Wellington to Liverpool, Alvera, 221"1 August 18KIPRO WO 1/245.
336 P. Kenned)', The Rise and Fall of the Great Pavers (London, Fontanna, 1988), passim.
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been given too much attention by historians. The most famous example of this is 
Charles Oman's theory on the role of British firepower in countering French infantry 
tactics. This theory is now discredited due to the work of historians such as Brent 
Nosworthy, who have sought to consider how various factors, including firepower and 
discipline, combined to cause events on the battlefield. 337 While the significance of 
munitions has been overemphasised, the converse is true regarding uniform in debates 
concerning the army in the period. It is often overlooked, for example, that soldiers in 
many allied armies were clothed as well as armed by British manufacturers. 33*
When considering uniform it is necessary to appreciate that, while the canon of 
literature concerned with the subject is of both considerable quantity and quality, it 
has traditionally been confined within relatively restricted boundaries. In particular 
studies related to uniform have tended to focus on uniform as defined in the 
regulations laid down by Horse Guards, with little consideration of the actual state of 
uniform. While common sense compelled historians to consider that dress was not 
always immaculate and often patched or torn, the image portrayed by them (and 
artists) was still at times far removed from that of reality. Recently there has been a 
trend towards a more realistic appraisal of uniform, a trend apparent in the 
illustrations accompanying Mark Adkin's work regarding the Battle of Waterloo, 
illustrations that show how soldiers would probably have appeared on campaign, not 
how regulations instructed them to dress. 339 There remains, however, a gulf between 
how the uniform worn in the field is portrayed by historians and by contemporaries.
3377 B. Nosworthy, 'Charles Oman on Line versus Column', in P Griffiths (ed), A History of the 
Peninsular War VolLX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal 1808 -1814 (London. 
Greenhill Books, 1999), pp.231-264. 
338 Hall, Wellington 'sNavy, P-137.
Adkin, Tlie Waterloo Companion, plates 1 - 16.339
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Interestingly there is some evidence that, regarding uniform, twentieth century popular 
culture may have overtaken historians in terms of accuracy. 340
Historians may have struggled to address fully issues relating to uniform, as 
military dress is rarely seen outside its role as a means of battlefield identity. Besides 
preventing a full understanding of the significance of uniform to soldiers and the 
army, this can also limit attempts to understand its provision and issues surrounding 
this. In consequence a certain degree of complacency has risen regarding uniform, 
leading to a tendency to accept the regulations laid down by Horse Guards at face 
value and assume that this was how soldiers appeared on campaign. 341 Only by fully 
appreciating the importance of an item such as uniform, however, can there be a 
consideration of the wider issues that surround it.
Central to a broader perception of uniform is its relationship to British society 
and perceptions of the army in the period. Military uniform came to symbolise many 
things; masculinity in portraits, military glory in art and national pride in 
propaganda. 342 Dress and appearance very much represented the public face of the 
army and its condition was seen as a measure of how tough fighting had been during a 
specific campaign. This was apparent in a newspaper article that recorded the return 
of troops from the Mediterranean to Southampton during February 1802. It reported 
that 'different detachments of the 10th and 22nd Light Dragoons have... lately landed
""Although largely derided by Charles Esdaile in his survey of Peninsular War literature, the television 
series Sharpe is to be commended for promoting the image of vagabond soldiers. The main protagonist 
has a French pack and sword, his sergeant carries a non-regulation firearm and his other troops wear a 
mixture of headgear. While precise details may indeed be of dubious accuracy it is an image concurrent 
with that given by memoirists such as Private Wheeler and Lieutenant Grattan. C. Esdaile, 'The 
Peninsular War: aReview of Recent Literature', in The Historian, No. 6, (Winter 1999), p.9; B. H. 
Liddell - Hail (ed), Tlw Letters of Private Wheeler 1809 -1828 (London, Michael Joseph, 1951), p.74; 
W. Grattan, Adventures with the ConnaughtRangers, 1809 - 1814 (London, Greenhill, 1989), p. 135. 
The issue of captured equipment is well highlighted in the episode entitled Sharpe's Gold, Carlton 
DVD, 2002.
341 See for example Park and Nafziger, Tlie British Military, passim: R. M. Bames, A History of the 
Regiments and Uniforms of the British Army (London. Seeley Service & Co), passim: P. J. 
Haythornthwaite, Uniforms of Waterloo (London, Anns and Armour. 1974), passim.
342 L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London, Vintage, 1996), p. 303; J. Brewer, The 
Sinews of Power, (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1989), p.58.
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from Egypt, and their appearance testifies the hardships and fatigue they have 
undergone since they embarked at this port nearly 18 months ago'. 343 The state of a 
uniform could also be used to signify military effectiveness, or lack thereof. The latter 
was apparent in the sometimes-comical depiction of Irish rebels and French soldiers 
by caricaturists, who frequently over-emphasised their patched and battered clothing 
or mixture of badly fitting civilian and military apparel. 344
One of the most intriguing aspects of British uniform in the period is the 
ambiguous attitude of the population towards it. As well as being a symbol of national 
pride military uniform also made the population uneasy, being associated with overt 
militarism. 34^ The Duke of Wellington wrote that 'we are not naturally a military 
people; the whole business of an army upon service is foreign to our habits', and it is 
interesting to note that a suspicion of those in uniform not only existed in civilians. 346 
Many Auxiliary units did not always muster in uniform, and the dress code for a 
particular event was posted along with its announcement in the local press. In 1803, 
for example, troopers of the Hampshire and Fawley Light Dragoons were informed 
that 'the corps will meet out of uniform' for a meeting to discuss new recruits. 347 It is 
thus apparent that there existed two divergent perceptions of military uniform in 
Britain. They would appear to be diametrically opposed but coexisted in the British 
mindset because, as John Brewer notes, 'they [the British] wanted military glory 
without what they saw as European militarism'. 34* The two views of uniform 
demonstrated this notion in practice.
343 Salisbury Journal, 15th February 1802, p.2.
344 Brewer, The English Satirical Print, passim; A. M. Broadley, Napoleon in Caricature, 2 volumes. 
(London, John Lane, 1911), passim.
345 p.9.
346 Wellington to Right Honourable J. Villiers, 30 May 1809, Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General
Orders, p.263.
347 Salisbury Journal, iTJuly 1803, pi. 
3411 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 60.
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When considering both contemporary and modern attitudes towards the 
uniform of the British army in the period, it is apparent that ambiguity existed. This 
ambivalence, however, existed not only in attitudes but also the administration of 
uniform. There existed over 100 volumes relating to the regulation and administration 
of uniform, while being improperly dressed on parade was a court-martial offence, yet 
on campaign certain officers appeared to be particularly lax. 349 Of the Duke of 
Wellington, an individual known for conservatism, Lieutenant Grattan noted that:
[he] was a most indulgent commander... provided we brought our men into the 
field, well appointed, and with sixty rounds of good ammunition each, he 
never looked to see whether their trousers were black, blue or grey; and as 
ourselves, we might be rigged out in all the colours of the rainbow if we 
fancied it. 350
The provision of uniform was unusual, as, unlike many other items required by the 
army, it was overseen not by a single department but various sub-organisations. This 
was unusual because the trend in the period was for increasing regulation, and in 
many respects the regulation and provision of uniform had changed little since the late 
seventeenth century despite the administrative revolution. Although the reasons for 
this are unclear, and may possibly be found in the structure and interdepartmental 
power struggles of the eighteenth century, a logical answer is simply that uniform had 
changed relatively little in the era other than to conform to fashion and thus its 
administration remained relatively unaltered. The bodies responsible for regulating the 
provision of uniform, including the style and material to be used, were the Clothing 
Board, commissions of military enquiry and various 'Boards of General Officers'. The 
latter were created to consider specific matters, such as proposals to modify items of
uniform or appropriate regulations. These boards were primarily drawn from a single
w Draft Wan-ant 1816, PRO WO43/296, Amalgamation of Boards of General Officers with 
Inspectorate of Clothing to form the Consolidated Board; PRO WO 90/1, General Courts Martial 
Abroad, 1796 -1825. 
350 Grattan, Adventures with the ConnaughtRangers, p.50.
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body, which consisted of seven generals, ten lieutenant generals and two major 
generals. 3' 1 Such boards were not always well attended and during one such meeting 
only two generals and three lieutenant generals were present, the absentees including 
the chairman, General Grenville. 352 Following the Napoleonic Wars the various boards 
were merged into a single body known as 'the Consolidated Board of General 
Officers', a study of which reveals much about the functions and procedures of both 
itself and predecessors. Its role was described as 'the inspection and sealing of pattern 
articles of clothing and appointments for the army', a task for which it inherited a vast 
number of associated records.3^3 The records included:
44 Assignment books. 
14 General Officers' Letter Books. 
8 General Officers' Minute Books. 
8 Computations of Off Reckonings.
2 Books of General Entries.
3 Establishment Books. 
3 Warrant Books. 
1 Computation of Musters.
1 Regulations of Clothing Appointments for Regiments of Cavalry and 
Infantry, 1 st July 1751.
1 Regimental Memoranda.
2 Agents' Accounts.
2 Abstracts of Assignments.
1 Regulations for Clothing Appointments for Regiments of Cavalry and
Infantry, 19th December 1768. 
6 Books of Pattern Looping for Regiments of Infantry of the Line from
1 st Foot to 101 st .
2 Books of Pattern Looping for Regiments of Cavalry. 
6 Books of Pattern Looping for English and Scottish Militia, Lettered A
toY. 
2 Books of Pattern Looping for Foreign Corps, and others on the British
Establishment. 
1 Invalid Clothing. 
1 The book now in use for entering abstracts of assignments on an
improved plan.
351 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, 13 th March 1811, PRO WO 377/2. 
Various Papers, 1809 upon the System of Clothing and Off Reckonings for the Army.
352 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, Great George Street, Westminster, 15th 
April 1811. PRO WO 377/2.
353 Draft Warrant, 1816, PRO WO43/296.
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This was a total of 108 books and these volumes say much about the administration of 
the provision of clothing: books relating to regulations in 1751 and 1768 were 
superfluous considering that more up to date books existed from 1798, while the 
reference to invalid clothing serves as a useful reminder that uniform was not only 
issued to fighting soldiers.
The ten pattern books reflect the scale of the task facing the Consolidated 
Board and its predecessors; while the existence of books concerned with particulars as 
specific as looping demonstrates the level of detail involved in the regulation of 
uniform. 3 - 4 The image is of a highly regulated and bureaucratic system, both of which 
were characteristics of administration in the period. Yet the extent of the bureaucracy 
surrounding uniform should not be entirely attributed to contemporary administrative 
practices. Of note is the fact that, through relying not on a major department but minor 
organisations, the system of uniform provision was not typical of military 
administration. There is also the issue of military uniform itself, which has 
traditionally been a complex subject requiring its own administration. In the French 
army of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, uniform was dictated 
by convention, particularly following the reforms of the Marquis de Louyois. 355
It would be incorrect to infer that uniform provision operated entirely outside 
of normal administrative practices. Rather it functioned within the system to a lesser 
degree than was the case regarding munitions and similar items, due to the way in 
which responsibility was shared amongst various boards. In December 1816 this 
situation changed when the Consolidated Board of General Officers came into being. 
It consisted of eighteen Generals, twenty Lieutenant Generals and seventeen Major
Generals, the senior officer being the Earl of Harcourt, while R. Barry was appointed
334 R. Bany, Secretary Consolidated Board of General Officers, to Secretary at War, Office of Military 
Board. 23"' January 1817, PRO WO43/296.
355 C. S. Grant, From Pike to Shot, 1685-1720: Armies and Battles of Western Europe (Devizes. 
Wargames Research Group, 1986), p. 59.
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secretary.3- 6 This new board was to work in close co-operation with the Inspectors of 
Army Clothing while it could, in addition, call upon other organisations, as made clear 
in its instructions:
His Royal Highness thinks it highly necessary that the committee shall, in 
addition be allowed at their discretion the occasional assistance of two quarter 
masters, or other persons experienced in the nature and quality of army 
clothing, to inspect and examine materials in the presence, and under the 
personal direction of the committee... the two quarter masters or other 
persons... should receive an allowance of 5s for every day their attendance is 
required [and officers] the staff pay of their respective ranks. 357
The recommendation that the board call upon the services of experts was significant, 
being tacit acknowledgement that a group of such high-ranking officers may not 
themselves have possessed sufficient knowledge to conduct their duties. The pride of 
these officers was preserved by instructions that the experts could only 'examine 
materials in the presence, and under the personal direction of the committee'. Despite 
this clause, the introduction of experts was evidence that the provision of clothing was 
adopting more characteristics of administration in the period, in this case the use of 
professionals or specialists. 358
Despite the efforts of the various boards and commissions that existed to set 
the standards of army uniform, it is apparent that the dress of soldiers in the field was 
frequently far removed from that laid down in regulations. As Piers Mackesy writes, 
regulations were only relevant if they were enforced, and it is apparent that those 
relating to uniform were frequently not. 3;>y Lieutenant Ford, for example, wrote that in 
the 79th the coats of its officers were 'black or blue of various forms', not the
356 'Warrantfor consolidating into one establishment from 25* December 1816 inclusive, the Clothing 
Board and all other boards of General Officers usually held in London'; Heylehurst to Secretary of 
State for War, Horse Guards, 2nd October 1816, PRO WO43/296.
357 Illegible to Secretary of State for War, Horse Guards, 21 st June 1816, PRO WO43/296.
358 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, TlieArmy of Charles II, p.81; Mingey, The Eighteenth
Century Land Steward', p.8.
3Sy P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p.30.
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regulation red, while top hats became popular with officers serving in Egypt due to the 
greater protection they offered against the sun. 360 That such dress was the norm, and 
not merely a practice in the field or on informal occasions, was demonstrated in Major 
General Cartwright's report on the uniform of the 4th Queen's Own Dragoons. He 
concluded that the standard of uniform in the regiment was good even though many of 
the pairs of breeches worn were not regulation issue and were purchased from several 
sources. 361 This last point is significant as the state was clearly unable to provide the 
items of clothing that officers required, which led to individuals purchasing their own 
items. Besides being more colourful than often thought (and allowed in Kings 
Regulations) uniform may in some cases have been torn, patched or even ragged. 
Lieutenant Meade, complaining as usual, wrote of his uniform: 'see the crimson coat 
beseamed with stitches. The torn degenerate regimental breeches'; Captain 
Tomkinson described the cavalry helmets issued to his unit as 'completely worn out, 
and so warped... that the men could scarcely wear them'; and Private Wheeler wrote 
of his unit: 'it was difficult to tell to what regiment we belonged, for each man's coat 
was like Joseph's "a coat of many colours'". 362
The sometimes-shocking state of soldiers' clothing could be attributed to a 
variety of factors. Uniforms were subjected to constant attrition caused by weathering 
and other wear and tear on campaign. Both Wheeler and Tomkinson attributed their 
complaints to this but the situation was worsened by the provision of poor quality 
items. Particular difficulties were encountered in regard to equipment and clothing 
made from leather. From 1807, for example, the spur leathers of artillery drivers were 
to be replaced annually, rather than every two years, due to 'many [spurs] being lost
360
361
NAM 6807/71, p. 133; P. Mackesy, British Victory/ in Egypt, 1801, p.29.
Major General Caitwright's confidential report on the actual state of the 4th Queen's Own Dragoons, 
7th May 1808, PRO WO 27/92/1, Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and 
Army Council Inspections, 1808.
362 NAM 7505/10; TomMnsoa The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p.34; Liddell - Hart (ed), The Letters of 
Private Wlieder, p. 74.
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due to the spur leather perishing'. 363 More significant were the doubts expressed 
concerning the durability of footwear. Of that issued to cavalry it was noted the 
contractor 'instead of jacking them by boiling them and beating them in the proper 
methods, barely stiffens them by means of some gummy substance'. iM Similarly 
Captain Jennings noted of infantry boots issued to his unit that 'the shoes finished by 
the contractors were so bad that in twenty four hours they were useless, the soles were 
very little thicker than the uppers and had paper between the soles to make them 
stronger. Most of the men carried their shoes in their hands' 365 . It is interesting to note 
that both of the above criticisms extended not from flaws inherent in the design of the 
specified items, but the fact that contractors sought to limit costs. This is evidence of 
competition for contracts, with consequences for troops in the field and, by 
implication, the effectiveness of the army itself. Through encouraging such practices 
the system was contributing to the army's problems rather than resolving them: when 
supplying the army in this way the imperative was economics as much as 
effectiveness.
Supplies of good quality footwear were important both aesthetically and for 
speed during marches, although these were not the only issues. The Duke of 
Wellington, for example, believed that 'as the soldiers pay for the shoes they receive, 
it is but fair towards them that they should be of the best quality for their purpose and 
should fit them' (this is also further evidence of the inability of the state to supply 
soldiers as their footwear was only subsidised, not purchased for them). 366 Good 
quality boots were required both to improve the effectiveness of troops and for safety. 
This was particularly true of the cavalry arm, which, while not requiring boots
363 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 19th July 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
364 Duke of Northumberland to Lieutenant Colonel Hill, Alnwick Castle 4th February 1812. NAM 
6309/138, Various Letters from the Duke of Northumberland.
365 NAM 8301/102, no page number or other reference and the passage is included on a separate, 
undated, sheet.
366 Wellington to Liverpool, 31 st March, 1811, PRO WO 1/248.
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designed for long marches, had other requirements. Thus in 1812 the Duke of 
Northumberland felt compelled to complain about the standard of boots supplied to 
the cavalry. In particular he highlighted that:
Jack boots properly made are the most advantageous to troopers under service, 
they not only save the man's legs and knees from that most severe pressure, 
occasioned by such horses in a charge, which I have known attended by 
various injurious consequences but in case of the horse falling upon his side, 
they are certain to save the trooper's leg being broken. 367
Considering the potential implications of poor quality uniform, it is surprising that 
when defective or poor quality items were returned to the depot they were not 
destroyed but merely re-issued, often without modification. In 1807, for example, a 
consignment of greatcoats intended to be issued to the Royal Artillery in Malta were 
returned as defective, but were then re-issued to new recruits in Britain. This situation 
was seen as unsatisfactory by Brigadier-General Macleod, and his subsequent 
communication with the Board of Ordnance on the subject demonstrated that the 
defects were not minor: 'I am sorry to add, that it would have been better if they had 
been destroyed at Malta, as they are so bad, that battalions will not be able to profit by 
any of them'. 368 Issuing clothing already acknowledged to be defective was further 
evidence that the state lacked the ability to supply the army adequately. This was 
despite the fact that the British armed forces were, in 1807, below strength and that 
the challenges of the Peninsular War had yet to be faced.
Even if the clothing available was of sufficient quality there were other factors. 
Some deficiencies could be attributed to the actions of soldiers themselves, who 
discarded clothing to make their packs lighter or during sieges threw shakos into the
367 Duke of Northumberland to Lieutenant Colonel Hill, Alnwick Castle 4th February 1812. NAM
6309/138.
36* Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 5th March 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
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air to give the defenders a target and waste ammunition. 369 Soldiers, however, had 
ample incentive to respect their uniform: being improperly dressed on parade was 
potentially punishable by court-martial and they were charged for replacement 
clothing, soldiers in the Peninsula paying 6d for a pair of boots and 6d 7s for shirts. 370 
In many cases uniform deficiencies were caused not by destruction of the item (be it 
through wear, weathering or misuse) but rather the fact that items were not available, 
as noted by General Wetherall in his report concerning the 83' d Foot. Describing the 
regiment's great coats as 'entirely worn out', he blamed not misuse by the men but the 
poor provision of replacement clothing.371 Brigadier-General Macleod noted a similar 
situation existed in relation to the state of the artillery of the King's German Legion in 
May 1807, informing the Board of Ordnance that:
I also take this opportunity of observing, that a very small portion for the 
King's German Artillery has as yet been delivered into store and that 
consisting of incomplete suits; I have directed a survey to be immediately held 
upon what has been delivered in.
As the German artillery are now under orders for foreign service, I am very 
apprehensive that they will not be supplied with their clothing (of which they 
are in extreme want). 372
Even the 4th Dragoons (850 all ranks), a unit noted as being well attired, was deficient 
of 154 pairs of breeches, 46 pairs of gloves, 46 hats, 3 cloaks and 32 saddles and 
bridles. 373
A significant reason for the shortages experienced by units newly arrived or 
awaiting deployment overseas was that the provision of uniform in such cases 
depended on an at times confusing combination of items received upon arrival and
36V Grattan, Adventures with the Connanght Rangers, pp.87, 104; J. Green, The Vicissitudes of a 
Soldier's Life (Cambridge, Ken Trotman, 1996), p.p.80,149.
370 Standing Orders, Order No 27, NAM 6807/221, p.5.
371 Half Yearly Report of 83ld Regiment, Cape of Good Hope, NAM 6112/78, p. 15.
372 Under lining and brackets as in original. Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 1 s May 1807. PRO WO 
55/1314.
373 Returns of clothing and accoutrements of the 4ft Queen's Own Dragoons, 7th May 1808, PRO WO 
27/92/1. Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and Army Council 
Inspections, 1808.
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items taken with them. This was demonstrated by the orders issued concerning the 
embarkation of several militia units in August 1811:
the commander of the forces for the time being having been pleased to direct 
that the several regiments of Irish militia under orders for embarkation should 
take with them their canteens and haversacks, I have the honour to inform you 
that the necessary directions have been given to officers commanding the 
several corps to retain these articles in their possession, delivering in the 
remaining articles of field equipment into store as at first intended. 374
The practice of militia units taking some items of equipment and uniform with them 
was to prove a double-edged sword. It was often the case that the militia concerned 
were not merely redeploying but joining a different regiment. This meant the parent 
formation would need to be brought back to strength, requiring the replacement of 
items taken by those personnel deploying overseas (in the case of the units in the 
above example this meant canteens and haversacks). The extent of losses is illustrated 
by those incurred during 1805, 2,927 watch coats being lost from a total of twenty- 
five Irish militia regiments due to deployments overseas. Of these units six (Carlow, 
Kings County, Louth, Tipperary, Tyrone and Westmeath) each lost more than 150 
such coats. 375
Inconsistencies in what units took with them when deploying overseas could 
not always be put right from stores at the destination and in consequence newly 
arrived units often lacked even basic equipment. For example, in November 1808 
Brigadier Taylor complained that the 2nd battalion of the 72nd Foot arrived in South 
Africa fresh from the Isle of Wight depot 'with a short compliment of necessities'. 376 
While the arrival of a unit in such a state in a distant colony may be excused due to
374Assistant Quarter Master General to Lieutenant Colonel John French, Quarter Master General's
Office. ^August 1811. PRO WO 63/91.
rs E.B, Littlehales to Commissary General Hanfield, Dublin Castle, 13 th September, 1805, PRO WO
63/88.
376 Letter from Brigadier General J. Taylor to Adjutant General Horse Guards, Isle of wight Aim)
Depot, 8th November 1808, NAM 6112/78, p.76.
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more pressing needs in Europe, even units deploying to this theatre did not always 
arrive correctly attired. In a complaint forwarded to the Earl of Liverpool by the Duke 
of Wellington, General Peacock expressed concern at 'the improper state in which 
some detachments sent from England'. 377 This was not a new occurrence and in the 
previous October Wellington himself had written to the War Office concerning 1 3,500 
accoutrements of those lately arrived from England... which it appears are not new 
[and] too small'. 378
While regulations concerning the clothing of units deploying overseas could 
be confusing enough, there were other factors that complicated the issuing of uniform. 
Not least in this regard was that the attire of some units could be modified by the 
whim of commanding officers. This was a practice that primarily occurred in the 
auxiliary forces, and was demonstrated by the request made in September 1810 by 
Major B. Woodward of the Cavan Militia for 150 bayonet belts to be supplied to the 
unit. This purchase was to be made at Woodward's own expense (Woodward offering 
to pay 5d per belt) 'for the purpose of fastening by the accoutrements in the quick 
movements of the light infantry'. 379 The request was refused because according to 
Commissary General Handfield 'only an order from the Lord Lieutenant [can allow] 
any article of store to be disposed of m This did not end the matter, however, and 
Handfield advised Woodward that he could purchase the items he requested at the 
next sale of surplus equipment. It is necessary to note that Woodward's initial request 
was denied not on grounds of military regulations relating to uniform conventions but 
rather due to regulations concerning stock control as the items could not be supplied 
directly from army stores. That Woodward sought to improve the effectiveness of the
377 Wellington to Earl of Liverpool, Cartaxo, 19th January 1811, PRO WO 1/248.
!:" Wellington to Earl of Liverpool, Alvera, 9th July 1810, PRO WO 1/245.
3  Major B. Woodward to Major Rarnsey; Royal Barracks, 17th September 1810. PRO WO 63/91,
Entry Book of Letters Received at Commissariat Headquarters, Dublin, 1810 - 12.
380 Commissary General Charles Handfield to Major B. Woodward, Commissary General's Office, 19th
September 1810, PRO WO 63/91.
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unit is commendable, and it must be noted that the only factor hindering the 
implementation of the scheme was bureaucratic regulation. A unit of the British army 
could not obtain equipment from stores, but through the auction of surplus equipment 
such items were available to civilians in Ireland, a country in which armed 
insurrection was perceived as a near constant threat.
There existed other conventions and rules governing uniform to hinder its 
effective supply. Although items were referred to with catchall terms, such as tunics, 
those required by various units or personnel were not always the same and there were 
variations in style and colour stipulated in regulations. 381 A company's designation as 
line, light or grenadier dictated the arrangement of its lace and shoulder decoration. 
Tunic colours were broadly divided into red for the infantry, blue or red for cavalry 
and blue for the supporting arms, although there were variations (most famously the 
green of the Rifle Brigade) and the facing colour of regiments also varied (basically 
this was the colouring of the cuffs and collar). Furthermore, details concerning colours 
could be confused and in the 4th Dragoons, for example, the commanding officer was 
unsure whether the holsters should have been black or bearskin. 3 *2
Uniforms were expensive, a parliamentary report of 1807 revealing that of 319 
articles waiting to be settled, approximately one-third (98) related to uniform or 
similar items including horse furniture. 3"3 An average price for uniforms being £1 17s 
lOd for a private soldier's, £3 12s lOd for a drummer's and £5 Is 3d for a sergeant's. 3 "4 
Interestingly David Dundas (the Commander-in-Chief in 1809) believed that there 
was little variation in these costs when uniforms were purchased overseas, noting that
m See for example E. Littlehales to Commissary General, Dublin Castle, 1 st March 1811, PRO WO
63/91.
™- Major General Cartwright's confidential report on the actual state of the 4Ul Queen's Own Dragoons.
7th May 1808, PRO WO 27/92/1.
3a Statement of the Number of Unsettled Accounts in The Miscellaneous Department, in Eighth Report
of Military Enquiry.
M*A Treatise on Military Finance (Whitehall, Egerton, 1796), pp. 113-5.
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'the expense of clothing in Europe, Africa and America is nearly the same'. 31*5 A more 
significant factor than cost was the scale of the task required to guarantee an adequate 
supply of replacement clothing, the Peninsular army requiring 30,000 pairs of shoes in 
1809, rising to 150,000 in 1810.386 The problem of supplying new uniform was only 
partly rectified by recycling old ones - such as cutting down the previous year's tunics 
to make waistcoats.
In the case of munitions the army was involved in procurement through 
issuing specifications and production orders (the War Office) and manufacture 
(arsenals), while the production of uniforms was merely directed by the army. The 
situation regarding accommodation and shelter was decidedly different and the 
organisations concerned not only issued specifications (be they for the construction of 
structures or supply of associated items) but were also actively involved in both 
maintenance and administration: it was the task of the Adjutant-General's department 
and commanding officers, rather than the clothing boards, to compile returns of 
uniform, while barrack masters themselves reported on the condition of barracks 
maintained by the Barrack Master General's department.
Accommodation and shelter in the army during the period can be divided in to 
the categories of permanent (barracks), temporary (tents and shelter provided by the 
army) and field (any shelter considered expedient). Responsibility for providing the 
latter frequently rested with commissaries, individuals who were expected to be 
familiar with all the resources required by the army in their area. Troops, however, 
also relied on their own ingenuity for such shelter and Captain Bragge wrote how his 
unit had resided in 'very indifferent huts built of boughs and open at each end, without
385 Memo from David Dundas, Commander in Chief, PRO WO 377/2, Various Papers, 1809 upon the 
System of Clothing and Off Reckonings for the Army, paragraphs 1 to 2 and 9. 
™ Wellington to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/238; Wellington to Liverpool 31 st March, 
1811. PRO WO 1/248.
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any straw, palliasses or things of that nature to lie on' for several days. 387 To construct 
such shelters units were compelled to utilise whatever building materials were at 
hand, with the result that frequently whole villages could be stripped to provide 
building materials for makeshift shelters and, more commonly, fuel. The practice was 
to become so widespread that in 1811 general orders were issued in an attempt to limit 
such activity:
The commander of the forces requests the general officer commanding 
divisions will place safeguards in the villages in the neighbourhood of 
encampments to prevent the soldiers from carrying off furniture, poles of the 
vines, and other property of the inhabitants. 381*
Away from the frontline, when troops tended to be less mobile, the allocation of 
shelter and associated items, such as fuel, could be better controlled. Indeed, troops 
were less likely to be given a crude shelter and instead find themselves billeted in the 
home of a local civilian (a policy that was in theory the responsibility of the Quarter 
Master General but practicalities in the field dictated that it was executed by the 
Commissariat).
In Spain and Portugal the practice was popular amongst many locals as those 
most commonly accommodated in this way were officers, the presence of whom were 
believed to deter looting. The validity of such a belief was seemingly demonstrated 
during the storming of Badajoz. Lieutenant Grattan was invited to dine in a house at 
this time and he wrote, 'all outside was noise and pillage [but] affairs within went on 
agreeably enough'. iw Despite protection from looting, however, the arrival of an 
officer was not always "welcome and they could prove to be less than gracious guests. 
Captain Browne, for example, instructed his servant to steal clothing from his Spanish
387 Cassels (ed), Tlie Letters of Captain William Bragge, p. 75.
3 *s Poimbera, 18th March 1811, Extracts of General Orders, NAM 6807/221, pp.8-9.
m Grattan, Adventures with the ConnaughtRangers, p!61.
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host.390 The rank and file rarely had the luxury of being billeted with a family, 
although Private Thomas Howell of the 71 sl Regiment of Foot experienced this during 
the winter of 1812-13. This was a learning experience for both parties and 
demonstrated the ignorance each had of the other's culture - Howell was surprised to 
find Spanish children so well treated and the local priest amazed to discover the 
'heretical' English knew the Lord's Prayer.391 Despite the example of Howell, for 
most of the rank and file local accommodation tended to be a crowded barn or peasant 
dwelling. This could be an unpleasant experience for owner and occupier alike, as 
demonstrated by the fact that Commissary Schauman deliberately billeted troops in 
the properties of locals he disliked. 392
The billeting of troops in local properties was not unique to overseas 
deployments, and during the early stages of the Revolutionary Wars it had been 
common practice in Britain to billet troops at local inns and even in local homes. This 
latter practice went against a concept central to British policy in the period: that the 
existence of the army should cause minimum inconvenience to civilians. 393 The 
billeting of troops in homes continued as a result of a loophole in seventeenth century 
legislation that had allowed the practice to continue in certain parts of Edinburgh. 
Furthermore the owners were only eligible for compensation if the property was 
located in certain suburbs of the city, going against another concept that characterised 
the relationship between he army and society: that the army had to pay its way and not 
requisition items. 394 This did not stop officers from renting rooms but merely 
prevented them from being forced on homeowners, although even the leasing of 
rooms could be unpopular. This was particularly so in 1809, when large numbers of
3VO Buckley (ed), Tlw Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Tliomas Henry Browne, p. 181.
391 Hibbert (ed),A Soldier of the 71st, pp. 80-2.
39- Schauman, On the Road with Wellington, p. 76. See also Hibbert (ed), A Soldier of the, p.57.
m Brewer, Hie Sinews of Power, p.49.
3M Anon, A Treatise on Military Finance, p.66; Brewer, Tlie Sinews of Power, p.36.
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officers suffering from fever contracted in Walcheren were understandably but cold- 
heartedly refused accommodation by the citizens of Harwich. 395 The billeting of troops 
at inns was another unpopular practice, drunkenness amongst soldiers being 
common. 395 The blow to innkeepers was partly softened by the payment of generous 
financial compensation, which amounted to 12d to 16d per cavalryman with horse, 6d 
if without a horse, 10s 6d per chaplain and his horse and 4d per infantryman. 397 In 
addition to these payments for accommodation, innkeepers also received money 
described as being 'in lieu of beer' directly from the War Office. 39"
It was one thing for soldiers to participate in an occasional fracas while drunk, 
but the billeting of troops in inns also significantly increased the danger of them 
becoming involved in more serious politically motivated, even revolutionary, 
disorder. Partly in response to this threat, but also in response to the growth of the 
army during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the government of 
Prime Minister William Pitt instigated a barrack-building programme. 399 The concept 
of barracks was not new, but rather their widespread introduction to Britain was. 
Barracks had long existed in Britain and overseas, frequently earning a reputation for 
poor conditions. Captain Jennings, for instance, described the Picket Yard barracks of 
Gibraltar as 'this cursed garrison' during a brief visit in 1799. 400
The expansion of available barracks brought with it significant improvements 
to living conditions, including schools and hospitals. 401 As was usual in the period this
3 "5 Dent to Mother, Colchester, 12th September 1809, NAM 7008/11/2. The fact that they had to seek
accommodation of this nature is further evidence of the limitations of the barrack-building programme
discussed below.
3 "6 NAM 6807/71, p.111.
-w PRO WO 55/3045,, p44; Anon, A Treatise on Military Finance. pp.66-9.
398 PRO WO 12/1522, Royal Wagon Train 1799-1801.
3W C. Emsley, The Military and Popular' Disorder in England 1790-1801' Part 1, in Journal of Army
Historical Research, Volume LXI, (Spring 1983), pplO-21 and Part 2, (Summer 1983). pp!06-112.
400 NAM 8301/102, p. 14.
401 Few historians consider barracks beyond their role in isolating soldiers from the population. For an 
exception see C. Jones, "The Military Revolution and the Professionalism of the French Army under the 
Ancien Regime', inDuffy (ed). Die Military Revolution and State , p.42.
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also created extra regulation but this bureaucracy generally benefited soldiers by going 
some way to ensure their barrack accommodation was of a reasonable standard. 
Barracks were the responsibility of the Barrack Department, which in 1812 consisted 
of three inspectors general; twelve assistant inspectors general and one hundred and 
fifty barrack masters (approximately one for each barrack, although some postings had 
two). Other personnel employed included varying numbers of artificers (for example 
six in 1806, none in 1812)402 . Barrack masters oversaw individual barracks and their 
role was to ensure the blocks were properly equipped, maintained and run in 
accordance with a bureaucratic system of regular returns, including monthly, four- 
monthly and six-monthly reports. 403
In barracks the rooms of officers were equipped almost solely as a place to 
sleep, containing few items other than those for bedding, washing and heating, a desk 
and a chair (with a variety of 'luxury' options, including rosewood inlays). Even these 
basics were not always available, however, as Judge Advocate Larpent complained 
that he lacked even a stool. 404 Captains were allocated individual rooms, while two 
subalterns or staff officers shared a single room. An inventory of the differing items in 
the rooms of officers and the other ranks, compiled from a list of requirements written 
in 1797, is shown in figure 12. It can be seen that one of the primary differences 
between the rooms of officers and other ranks was the provision of cooking 
implements, including a wide variety of pots and pans. Conspicuous by its absence 
from the list of officers' furniture is bedding, although other sources indicate its 
presence. The rooms of the other ranks were clearly intended for use by far greater 
numbers of men, and the rooms also contained lower-quality bedding materials - 
primarily straw and sacking.
4(i- Army List, 1806 to 1812 (London, War Office, 1806), passim.
403 See Letter from Barrak [sic] Master General to Barrak Masters (Barraks Office. 1797).
404 Larpent (ed). The Private Journal of FSLarpent, Vol. I (London, Richard Bentley. 1853). p.66.
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Officers
tables
Chairs
Other Ranks I I
Fire Irons J Wooden Ladles |
Fenders f Large Bowls f
iFire Irons [iron Pots ] Large Platters j
Fenders Iron Boilers f Small Bowls
______ __________j Pot Covers__ j Trenchers_____|
iB'ellpwsJ___________ rBoiler Covers "[Spoons j
Coal Trays, _ ^  ^ ijlron ^°^^^^^^"e^"^3i^s~~l
.Mops'"™"' ' I_ZII "IIII^ Po^^^S-^^^~^^^^^^^^^ 
' Hai£ Brboms __ ____ ^^^~^—^~- ^^^g.^^^.—|
^itih'ieri'Js'altjHgJPal^^ Cc?pp^e^^^TI^y^1ter '^j^^ I 
Urine Tubs [Trivsts 1 Blankets 1
j Chamber Pots^ ^ __ . j F [?.?.!? F?rj<s ,  J sj!£.k..i."f ___ _ i
ICM[_Baskets_________|Frying Pans Jc^dlaT "_____I
1 ~ " ~"~'______ __j Grid Irons iRound Towels |^ (™___^ |_
Figure 12: An inventory of furniture and utensils in a barracks. c!797. 405
There was little variation between the barracks of the cavalry and infantry other than 
extra candles for the stables of the former.
Despite the increased number of barracks and the benefits that they brought, 
the success of the barrack-building programme in the period is easy to overestimate. 
The pace of construction was slowed by the outbreak of peace in 1802, during which 
period certain barracks were sold-off at public auctions, one example being the almost 
new 900 man barrack block near the Backwater at Weymouth.406 As a result, even as 
the Napoleonic Wars reached their final stages, there was less barrack accommodation 
available in Britain than required. This was demonstrated in the following letter, 
written in 1812 and concerning the militia billeted at Woolwich artillery barracks:
for tho' [sic] the number of our recruits in the country exceed the space we 
have left the space we have left for their accommodation... we are always 
more or less, but particularly at this time sending off drilled parties to fill 
deficiencies abroad. 407
Letter from Barrak [sic] Masrer General to Barrak Masters (Barraks Office. 1797), Appendix. 
  Salisbury Journal. 15th February 1802, p.2. 
407 Underlining in original. MacLeod to Mulgrave, Woolwhich, 17th February 1812, PRO W0?3/1369.
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In effect, there was only sufficient barracks space for the artillery while large numbers 
of its personnel were deployed abroad. The experience of the Royal Artillery at 
Woolwich suggests, therefore, that the success of the barrack-building programme in 
terms of accommodating troops may not have been due to an impressive rate of 
construction so much as extensive commitments on the continent and in the colonies.
Barracks were to play an increasingly important role in accommodating the 
army. It was apparent, however, that the needs of the force could not be met through 
the utilisation of barracks and civilian properties alone; in particular the army needed 
to expand its capability to house troops in the field. The solution was to make greater 
use of camping equipment. As demonstrated by the contract awarded to the uncle of 
John Trotter in 1775, the concept itself was not new, although its use to accommodate 
troops grew during the course of the Napoleonic Wars. The provision of camping 
equipment was theoretically the responsibility of the Quarter Master General's 
department, although as noted in the previous chapter some of its tasks were in 
practice conducted by the Commissariat.
Initially the provision of camping equipment was such that, according to 
Lieutenant Grattan, the only cover for many troops was 'the canopy of heaven'. 40S 
Sleeping in the open in this way could be particularly ruinous to health and Private 
Howell wrote of awaking one morning that 'we were up, an hour before day, and 
wrung out our blankets, emptied our shoes of the water, each man trembling like the 
leaf of a tree'. 409 The first (and on occasion only) line of defence for a soldier against 
the elements was his blanket. This could be used either conventionally or as part of a 
crude shelter, supported by muskets. The latter role was facilitated by the introduction 
of a reinforced ring in the corner of army blankets. 410 Not all soldiers, however,
tm Grattan, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, p.292.
40" Hibbert (ed),^ Soldier of the 71st, pp.7922.
410 L. C. Gurwood (ed), General Orders of the Duke of Wellington in the Campaigns of 1809-14
(London, Clowes and Son, 1837), p.35.
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enjoyed even this basic protection from the elements: until 1810 only half to three 
quarters of infantry serving in the Peninsula had been issued with these special 
blankets, and of those received many were lost or, as in the case of Private Wheeler's, 
illegally sold or traded by soldiers for food, alcohol or clothing. 411 In addition, the 
erection of the makeshift shelter was noted as being unpopular by Quarter Master 
Surtees because it provided little protection during cold nights. 412 A more substantial 
solution than the blanket shelter was the round tent, which was initially developed for 
use in Flanders but officially issued to all British forces from 18U.4U In practice many 
units received them much later than this or not at all, and Judge Advocate Larpent 
noted that there were sufficient tents available only if absentees, servants and sentries 
were discounted. 414
The procurement of tents, like other items, for the British army reflects an 
important factor in the relationship between the force and the state - the extent to 
which the state was willing to allocate resources to sustain the force. When 
considering the procurement activities of the army it is clear that Britain's economic 
and industrial capability was not fully exploited. This was because the machinery of 
the British state was created not to pander to the needs of the army but to contain its 
power. There is no evidence that there was a concerted policy to keep the army in 
check through deliberately failing to meet its needs. Rather it was a question of 
priority. The first hurdle confronting the army was the attitude of both the state and 
society towards the military and war, conflict being seen as disruptive to the economy. 
The proportion of output allocated to fighting the Napoleonic Wars, however, 
demonstrates a willingness on the part of the state to meet the challenge of war. The 
difficulty facing the army was thus not one of resources committed to the war in
411 Liddell - Hail (ed), Tlie Letters of Private Wheeler, p.70.
4U W. Surtees. Twenty Five Years in the Rifle Brigade (London, GreenhilL 1996), p. 189.
413 Bartlett, The Development of the British Army, p. 136.
414 Laipent (ed), We Private Journal of FSLarpent, Vol. 2, p.63.
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general, but the proportion of these resources that it would receive. Regarding this the 
force faced not only competition with the Royal Navy but also the armies of other 
countries. Therefore, the army did not necessarily receive a fare share of the resources 
allocated to the national war effort and it was often hampered in utilising those that it 
did receive by the policies of the state. The use of contractors, for example, was not 
always an efficient way to meet the needs of the force, while the need to comply with 
regulations was not neccesarily compatible with operational necessity. These 
regulations could be overridden when required but the rise of the professional 
administrator in the period, at the expense of less able but more military minded 
counterparts, ensured that administrative concerns would increasingly take precedence 
over military issues.
Regulation and bureaucracy were to have an increasing (and often detrimental) 
influence on the army but the force remained able to maintain a certain amount of 
autonomy in its structure if not its administration and prove able to adapt despite the 
limitations imposed on it due to the nature its relationship with the state. This is 
demonstrated in the following chapter, which is concerned with the Royal Wagon 
Train.
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Chapter 4 
Transport in the British Army415
Transport is a central but often overlooked part of logistics.416 One might 
assume that the British army was almost certain to possess a sound transport 
infrastructure due to the support of the state yet as in the case of manufacturing this 
support was neither total nor adequate. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars Britain lay 
between the end of the canal building boom and on the brink of railway mania, 
possessing national canal and road networks that were unrivalled. The significance of 
such advances for the army, however, was far less than that for industry and, as noted 
in the previous chapter, the resulting industrial and economic benefits of canals and 
roads could not be fully exploited by the army. The simple fact was that while 
operating in its home country the British army had internal lines of communication 
unlike any other force in Europe but, while this may have been a factor if an invasion 
had occurred, in the event had little significant impact in the main theatres of war. 
Roads and turnpikes may have enhanced the mobility of British forces travelling to 
and from ports of embarkation but this then depended on shipping schedules to be of 
value.
For the army, shipping was to be the most reliable aspect of Britain's transport 
infrastructure. Between 1808 and 1814 404 convoys sailed from Britain to the Iberian 
Peninsular, a total of 13,427 voyages in a system that proved secure from any 
action.417 British naval supremacy was such that its merchant ships no longer had to be 
designed with defensive armament in mind, allowing increases in cargo capacity and
415 Some of this research has been published. C. Chilcott, 'The Royal Wagon Train (notes and 
documents)', in JSAHR, volume 82, number 330, Summer 2004, pp. 175-177.
416 Creveld, Supplying War, p.l.
417 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p. 113.
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stowage capability.418 Such naval transport was not infallible, as demonstrated in 1808 
when delays relating to shipping impeded the embarkation of units bound for Spain 
and Portugal, but was nonetheless a significant factor in the successes of the army. 419 
The land-based infrastructure of Britain was too remote from the battlefields of 
Europe to influence the army's operational capability significantly, and its 
significance to the force even in Britain was limited by regulations. These regulations 
related to a concept that characterised the relationship between army and state in the 
period - that the force should cause as little inconvenience to the population as 
possible.
The goal of minimal inconvenience was to be achieved through several means. 
One of the most fundamental was that when arriving in a new area, troops were to 
present a warrant authorising their entry, which was then to be signed by a magistrate 
who would subsequently direct them along the quickest route to their next destination 
or billet. 420 The system ensured troops arriving in unfamiliar territory would receive 
the benefit of local knowledge, as well as minimising the time spent transiting an area 
and ensuring that military forces remained under the close supervision of the civil 
power, in this case magistrates. The weakness of the system was that it could only 
operate if the correct papers were presented. If this did not occur magistrates were 
able to refuse a force entry to their area, as was the case in June 1807 when a column 
of wagons carrying supplies for the artillery arrived unexpectedly at the Sussex town 
of Winchelsea. As he had not been informed of their pending arrival the local 
magistrate refused them passage and sent the column on a detour around the town, 
resulting hi a four hour delay.421 Such incidents were rare but highlighted the problems
418 Black, Sea Borne Empire, (London, YUP, 2004), p. 155.
419 Baird, to Castlereagh, Falmouth, 1 st October 1808, PRO WO 1/236, p.337.
420 Minutes of 2nd February 1808, WSRO B18/100/7, Salisbury Division, Justices Minute Books, 
January 1808 to January 1809.
421 Macleodto Crew, Woolwich, 17* June 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
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that could potentially occur when the army was required to co-operate with the local 
authorities.
The concept of minimal inconvenience further restricted the mobility of the 
army by limiting the manpower and vehicles that were available for general transport 
duties. Until 1795 the army had little integral transport capability of note and instead 
relied on civilian contractors. This practice had came to the fore in Europe during the 
Thirty Years War and has been defined as effectively marking the start of modern 
logistics.422 Yet it was a system with drawbacks and such contractors were not always 
reliable. This was illustrated by the case of James Maton, who was called before 
Wiltshire magistrates in November 1808 'for not attending with a wagon and five 
horses in the market place [of] Sarum to receive the arms, clothes and accoutrements 
of the 5 th Dragoon Guards and then convey the same to Stockbridge', despite being 
contracted to do so.423 Another feature of the employment of civilian drivers, and one 
not typical of British politics in the period, was a lack of regulation from central 
government regarding their employment. 424 Instead these contracts were administered 
at county level, and local magistrates were allowed to determine payments to be made 
based on mileage and transport supplied, hi October 1803, for example, it was agreed 
that contractors in Wiltshire would receive 1 s per mile for wagons, with an additional 
3d if towed by four horses or six oxen, while payments for carts were to be 9d per 
mile, with an additional 2d for four horses or oxen. 425 It is apparent, therefore, that due 
to their role as guides, allowing entry to convoys and establishing rates for 
contractors, magistrates fulfilled a vital role in military transport within Britain.
Considering the inefficiency of a transport system utilising only civilian 
drivers, the reluctance of the state to allow the army control of civilian property and a
422 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.35.
423 Minutes of meeting held at Fisherton Anger, 8 November 1808, WSRO B18/100/7.
424 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 102.
425 Salisbury Journal, 31 October 1803, p.l.
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growing tendency towards professionalism and specialisation in society in general, it 
is surprising that no dedicated corps dedicated to transport in the army existed until 
1795. Known as the Corps of Royal Waggoners, this formation soon proved 
inadequate and was disbanded.426 Subsequently, in 1799 the Royal Wagon Train was 
formed from a cadre of cavalry personnel to meet the transport requirements of the 
British army in the Netherlands.427 Like its predecessor, the Royal Wagon Train would 
prove incapable of carrying out its task and the Commissariat would be forced to rely 
upon civilian drivers to maintain the majority of the supply network. Despite its 
shortcomings, however, the train provided a professional core around which the 
transport network could operate, reflecting the increasing professionalism of the army 
in general during the period.
The employment of military drivers rather than civilians gave the Royal 
Wagon Train flexibility, as it was not hindered through operational constraints 
imposed by contracts. Military drivers could be called on to deliver supplies under 
fire, for example, and were thus more effectively utilised if assigned to such tasks, 
rather than transporting manure from barracks, a role, amongst others, for which 
civilian contractors continued to be employed. 428 The employment of military 
personnel as drivers also enabled the army to resolve difficulties more rapidly as its 
personnel could be subject to action far sooner than civilians could through the courts. 
Besides being able to use military discipline officers on occasion resorted to their own 
initiative to get convoys moving, as was the case when Major Dickson found six of 
his drivers drunk. He noted that 'previous to moving from Torquemada I ducked [in a 
water barrel] drivers Henderson, Mitchell, Ash, Farmer, O'Neal... and driver Doran
426 Even prior to its employment in Flanders senior British officers had expressed doubts about its 
effectiveness. P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p. 10.
427 The designation of this organization from 1799 to 1802 was the Royal Wagon Corps, but for clarity 
the later designation of Royal Wagon Train is adhered to in this work.
428 Singer to Boyes, Commissary General's office, 24 March 1806, PRO WO 63/45.
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was so completely inebriated that he was left behind'. 429 Inevitably there were 
difficulties involved in employing civilian or military drivers, but it is the 
consequences for the individuals involved that underline the value of the latter. 
Dickson was able to resort to instant (not to mention dramatic) measures to resolve his 
difficulties, while in the case of civilians such as James Maton (above) there were few 
sanctions beyond any penalty clauses, revoking the contract and a fine (in this case 
40s) imposed by a civilian court days or weeks after the event. 430 A footnote to 
Dickson's actions, and one that puts the issues into perspective, is that if he had 
ducked contractors he would have effectively been guilty of assault as British soldiers 
were bound by civil law even when carrying out their duty.431
Besides illustrating the benefits offered by the employment of military 
personnel, the Royal Wagon Train is important to a study concerned with the 
maintenance of the British army for a variety of reasons. One of the most fundamental 
is that it was an organization that played a significant role in logistics but a detailed 
study of the train also reveals much about the relationship between state and the army. 
The Royal Wagon Train perhaps reflects this relationship more than any other 
formation because it was a product of the contemporary state. The train had no real 
roots in an earlier period, unlike the Commissariat, which had slowly evolved, with 
each new development or practice, be it administrative, social, military or 
technological, being added to and eventually absorbed by the organization (as was to 
occur in many institutions in the period).432 Conversely the Royal Wagon Train was 
created at the end of the eighteenth century, when many of these developments had 
occurred or were underway and were incorporated into the organization from its 
conception. Thus the Royal Wagon Train warrants a detailed consideration, not only
429 Leslie, The Dickson Manuscripts, Vol. 4, p.712.
430 Minutes of meeting held at Fisherton Anger, 8 November 1808, WSRO B18/100/7.
431 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.48.
432 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.69.
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to reveal the relationship between the state and army but also to demonstrate a product 
of this system. In addition a study of the Royal Wagon Train will bring together issues 
previously raised in this study, particularly in regard to the reflexive or pragmatic 
policies that characterised the methods used to maintain the army.
The Royal Wagon Train performed a crucial role for the army but is one of the 
least studied units of the British army. The train is frequently overlooked in works by 
informed contemporaries such as Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, J. MacDonald and the 
anonymous writer of A Treatise on Military Finance, all of whom paid scant attention 
to the organization and its role in logistics. 433 The train was a relatively anonymous 
organization in the Napoleonic British army, a situation that has often worked to its 
advantage as criticism is deflected to the much more prominent Commissariat. This 
was apparent in Arthur Wellesley's letter of 16 August 1808, in which he informed 
Castlereagh that 'I have found the British Commissariat to be so ill composed as to be 
incapable of distributing even to the British troops the ample supplies which have 
been procured for them'. 434 Wellesley made no mention of the pathetically small, and 
totally inadequate detachment of the train then operating in the theatre.435 This was 
despite the fact that Wellesley was well aware of the limitations of the Royal Wagon 
Train, believing that no effective wagon train had existed in the British army until the 
absorption of the Irish Wagon Train.436
The operation of wagons in the army was not exclusive to the Royal Wagon 
Train and regiments held a limited number. These were utilised for duties including 
the distributing supplies from regimental depots, carrying wounded and administrative 
tasks. Commissaries accompanying units used a wagon for the carriage of ledgers,
433 See L. T. Wilson, An Enquiry into the state of the Forces of the British Empire (London, 1804); J. 
MacDonald, Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry in Actual Service (London, 1807); Anon, A 
Treatise on Military Finance.
434 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 16 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
435 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, August 1808, PRO WO 17/54/1, Wagon Train 1805 - 12.
436 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
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while Paymasters often commandeered vehicles against regulations to ease the 
carriage of pay books.437 This latter practice frequently utilised wagons that were 
otherwise allocated for medical duties (an extreme example of bureaucracy interfering 
in military operations!) and prompted the Duke of Wellington to condemn the practice 
in a general order of 11 September 1809.438
The difference between the train and other wagon using organisations was not 
so much the ability to operate wagons but a capability to maintain them. Organisations 
such as the Quartermaster's Department and Commissariat hired civilians, on 
contracts of varying length, to maintain their wagons; the train employed its own 
specialist personnel.439 Personnel employed by the Royal Wagon Train on 
maintenance duties included blacksmiths, cotton weavers, wheelwrights, collar- 
makers and farriers. An interesting feature of administration in this period is that, 
while in many respects comprehensive, its lexicon could vary and these individuals 
were variously referred to using either the blanket term of artificers or identified by 
their speciality.440 The importance of such personnel was highlighted in a report of 
October 1811, which outlined the difficulties encountered when untrained personnel, 
specifically cavalry farriers, attempted to repair carts and wagons:
[they] are able to perform the smallest repair on the cart but in clumsiest 
manner, and are wholly ignorant how to refit it, in case of serious accident - 
the very repairs thus made by [them], from being so clumsily performed, prove 
a means of tearing to pieces and ultimately demolishing a cart... in the event 
of a wheel being broken, these carts remain totally unserviceable unless a 
wheel man can be obtained. 441
437 Standing orders, order number 2, NAM 6807/221, Books of Commissary General N. Jackson, 1814.
438 Gurwood (ed), General Orders of the Duke of Wellington, p.49. Logisiticians refer to the practice of 
improperly holding on to utilising resources in this way as 'hoarding', a practice that continues into the 
twenty-first century and remains a drain on resources in any combat zone. Schechter and Sander, 
Delivering the Goods, p.84.
439 Monthly returns of those employed in the Commissariat department under the control of assistant 
Commissary General George Grellier at Milazzo, NAM 7902/36.
440 See PRO WO 12/1522, Royal Wagon Train 1799 - 1801.
441 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraphs 5 to 6.
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It is necessary to appreciate that employing specialist personnel was not itself unusual 
as the cavalry employed farriers, but employing them to maintain wagons was. 
Furthermore those employed by the train covered a range of trades.
An additional specialist appointment, although not one unique to the Royal 
Wagon Train, was the post of Veterinary Surgeon (who was, in theory, also assigned a 
deputy). Interestingly, the train went for three years (1803 - 1806) without a 
veterinary surgeon and the deputy filled the role, although this occurred during a 
relatively quiet period for the army and does not appear to have unduly affected the 
operational capabilities of the organization.442 Finally, the skills of the drivers 
themselves should not be underestimated. The report of October 1811 stated that 'no 
wheeled carriage can be securely drawn over an [sic] hilly country for even one 
march, especially when drawn by horses little accustomed to draught, and under the 
charge of men wholly ignorant of governing horses'.443
The specialisation of the Royal Wagon Train was significant as it 
demonstrated the future of military logistics and maintenance. The organization would 
evolve throughout the nineteenth century, leading to the formation of the Army 
Service Corps in 1889, and the Royal Army Service Corps (R.A.S.C.) in 1918.444 As a 
predecessor of the R.A.S.C., the Royal Wagon Train must thus be considered as 
representing the British army at its most progressive. It is incorrect to view the Royal 
Wagon Train as merely an ancestor of the R.A.S.C., in the way in which, for example, 
the guards regiments raised during the Restoration were forerunners of modern 
formations bearing the same name. 445 The concepts that lay at the heart of the Royal 
Wagon Train - specialist military personnel and the concentration of assets (in this
PRO WO 17/54/1, Monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train.
PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 9.
J. Sutton (ed), Wait for the Wagon (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1998), pp.33-37; R.H. Beadon, The 
Royal Army Service Corp, (Cambridge, CUP, 1931), passim. 
445 Childs, The Army of Charles II, p.233.
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case transportation) - represented a new way of maintaining the army and ultimately 
waging war.
The employment of specialists also reflected the trend towards professionalism 
that was occurring in both the army and society. While that of society increasingly 
relied on education through the use of examinations, however, the army was adopting 
both an academic approach and one emphasising practical skills.446 The latter is 
important as it demonstrates that the army was starting to appreciate the importance of 
experience, a crucial step towards undermining the worst aspects of the purchase 
system. This is apparent when it is considered that in the period increasing numbers of 
officers were indeed promoted based on this principle, rather than through purchase, 
patronage or other privileges. 447
Despite the fact that the concept of the Royal Wagon Train was progressive, 
its structure reveals origins rooted in contemporary military thinking. At the heart of 
train's organization lay the troops, which approximately equated to companies or 
squadrons in the regiments of the combat arms, and reflected the fact that the 
organization shared many of its administrative practices with the cavalry. The number 
and composition of these troops were not constant, as shown in figure 13. The number 
of troops on the strength of the train fluctuated due to a variety of factors. These 
include the absorption of the Irish Wagon Train following the Act of Union (reflected 
by the increase from three troops in September 1799 to eight by 1801); the reductions 
in defence expenditure caused by the Peace of Amiens; the restructuring of the troops 
in 1804; the invasion scare of 1805 which promoted an increase in Britain's military 
readiness; the peak of the organization's efficiency in 1813-14; and the dispersal of
446 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 88.
447 P. J. Haythomthwaite, 'The British Army, Wellington and Moore: Some Aspects of Service in the 
Peninsular War' in P. Griffiths (ed) A History of the Peninsular War Vol. IX: Modern Studies of the 
War in Spain and Portugal 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999) pp.90-100. For a wider 
consideration of purchase and its demise see also A. Bruce, The Purchase System in the British Army 
1660 -1871 (London, RHS, 1980), passim.
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the force in 1814 - 15 to maintain forces in Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Hanover. Figure 13, therefore, reveals how decisions made at state level could 
directly influence the composition and thus capabilities of an organization such as the 
Royal Wagon Tram.
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Figure 13: Active Troops in the Royal Wagon Train 1799 - 1817.***
Upon its formation in 1799 the train was based at Canterbury and consisted of six 
troops. Officially, no 1 st Troop existed and its place in the returns of the Royal Wagon 
Train was filled by a list of staff appointments, hi August 1799 this consisted 
primarily of the regiment's commanding officer, Colonel Digby Hamilton (who would 
remain in command of the regiment for the duration of the war), Surgeon John Oxley, 
Assistant Surgeon John Geddes, Veterinary Surgeon John Burke and Pay Master 
William Pettigrew. The remaining troops were numbered two to six although they 
were sometimes identified by the name of their commanding officer, a practice that 
had been discontinued in the combat arms during the early eighteenth century. That 
this practice occurred in the Royal Wagon Train is intriguing as it was a new
448 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay lists, PRO WO 12/1522 to WO 12/1526, Royal Wagon Train 1799 
-1809.
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formation in the British army, with no real roots in an earlier period (although it could 
claim some cavalry heritage). Only three of the six troops (3 rd, 4th and 5th) conformed 
to a normal structure, the second was in the process of forming, while the 1 st and 6th 
each had a special function and organization. Of note is that, while the structure of the 
Royal Wagon Train was, due to its role, unconventional it remained a recognizable 
part of the British army. Commanded by a colonel, and with each troop commanded 
by a major or captain, in terms of organization it was effectively a six-company 
regiment. For comparison purposes, infantry regiments had ten companies and cavalry 
had ten troops.
The 2nd Troop was building up its strength during 1799 and contained only a 
small cadre of essential personnel. Consequentially it had no wagons on strength but 
had a headquarters that consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, a comet and a 
quartermaster, all of whom were unpaid until the troop became active. The 6th Troop 
contained personnel categorised as reduced troops and was principally a reserve of 
manpower. The 3 rd, 4th and 5th troops followed a standard model and were commanded 
by either a major (the 3 rd) or captain (the 4th and 5 th). The officers commanding each 
troop of the train in August 1799 are illustrated in figure 14:
Commanding Officer, Royal Wagon Train Colonel Hamilton
2nd Troop Captain J. W. Whittle
3rd Troop Major W. Langley
4th Troop Captain Steele
5th Troop Captain Cunningham
6th Troop Lieutenant Wishens
Figure 14: Troop commanders of the Royal Wagon Train, August 1799. 449
Other personnel in each troop typically consisted of two lieutenants, three sergeants, 
two corporals, three artificers and 55 privates. Occasionally a trumpeter may have
449 PRO WO 12/1522.
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been present in a troop although this was an exception rather than the rule. The 
artificers included a mixture of wheelwrights, farriers, blacksmiths and collar- 
makers. 450
This was the organization of the Royal Wagon Train that went to war in the 
Netherlands. The logistical services were singled out for harsh criticism after this war 
but the performance of the army in general was unsatisfactory, it being in this 
campaign that Wellington famously learned 'what one ought not to do' in war.451 
Following the campaign in Flanders the train avoided the fate of its predecessor and 
instead of disbanding was restructured. By June 1800 the headquarters formation, 
renamed the Commandant's Troop, was brought up to the strength of a troop, a 
process that had began the previous December with the addition of four non- 
commissioned officers. The following personnel were employed in the troop at this 
time: Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, Adjutant Walford, Surgeon Oxley, Assistant 
Surgeon Geddes, Veterinary Surgeon Burke, Paymaster Pettigrew, four sergeants, 
three corporals, two artificers and forty-five privates. 452 The Commandant's troop 
would remain active until April 1804, when it was again removed from the list of 
troops. The troop was reduced to a command formation and consisted of the following 
officers: Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel Langley, Adjutant Purvis, Surgeon 
Oxley, Veterinary Surgeon Baker and Paymaster Pettigrew. Of note is that the 
regiment was still commanded by Digby Hamilton but he had now been promoted to a 
full colonel, while a new officer, Lieutenant Colonel Langley, had arrived to fill the 
vacancy created by Hamilton's promotion. The newly awarded colonelcy, therefore, 
was not merely a sop to the vanity of the Royal Wagon Train's commanding officer,
but a reflection of the train's increasing status and importance to the army. 453 The
450 Ibid.
451 C. Hibbert, Wellington: A Personnel History (London, Harper Collins, 1997), p. 14.
452 PRO WO 12/1522.
453 Royal wagon train monthly pay list, April 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
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addition of a lieutenant colonel was also to prove of considerable value operationally 
and ensured that a senior officer was available to remain with the units of the Royal 
Wagon Train that were deployed to Spain and Portugal. 454
By 1800 the Royal Wagon Train had expanded to five full troops and one of 
reduced personnel. Its manpower and capabilities were further increased by the 
absorption of the Irish Wagon Train as a result of the 1801 Act of Union. The 
consequences of this are noteworthy for two primary reasons. The first is that it was 
the only major logistical organization of the Dish army to be fully absorbed into the 
British army immediately after the union, unlike the Irish Commissariat and barracks 
departments, both of which retained a degree of independence until 1822 (although in 
practice the Commissariat was unified). 455 The second fact of note is that the 
absorption of the Irish Wagon Train resulted in a seemingly dramatic increase in the 
manpower of the train, and the number of active troops more than doubled from three 
to eight. Arthur Wellesley noted the importance of Irish wagons in a letter to 
Castlereagh as late as 1808, while historians such as Jac Weller and A.E.C. Bredin 
have highlighted the significant role played by the personnel transferred to the Royal 
Wagon Train following the act the Act of Union. 456 It is apparent that the Royal 
Wagon Train may only have become effective because of the absorption of the Irish 
train.
As noted in the previous chapter the state proved unable to meet fully the 
demands of the army regarding procurement and so its capability to support the Royal 
Wagon Train should also be considered. Put another way, did the Royal Wagon Train 
achieve what it was later to do because of the absorption of the Irish train or the
454 PRO WO 17/54/2, Return of the Royal Wagon Train in Spain and Portugal, March 1810.
455 R. B. McDowell, Irish Administration 1801 - 1914 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp!6-
19.
456Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8* August 1808, Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General Orders, p.204;
Weller, Wellington in the Peninsula, p.29; A. E. C. Bredin, History of the Irish Soldier (Belfast,
Century Books, 1987),p.234.
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support of the state? While the number of personnel involved was considerable, 
approximately 300, the long-term significance of the absorption of the Irish Wagon 
Train may be overestimated. Not least is the fact that by 1803 the personnel of the 
Royal Wagon Train had been drastically cut back and in effect a new force, based on a 
cadre of former personnel, was raised to support the army in the Peninsular War. The 
importance attached to the Irish train has no doubt arose in part from the timing of its 
absorption - between the failure of the Royal Wagon Train in Flanders and its success 
(or rather improved performance) in the Peninsular War. Based on this it would 
appear that the Irish train had indeed been a catalyst for the success of the train in the 
Peninsula but other factors should also be considered. In particular the Royal Wagon 
Train had been in its infancy in 1799 and had gone to war below strength and in the 
process of forming. It will also become apparent that by 1808 the lessons of the first 
campaign had been learned and that the organisation, structure and composition of the 
train were significantly modified in the based on this. Crucially the organization 
would also receive more resources, a factor that can be attributed solely to the 
economic strength of the British state.
On 1 July 1802 the Wagon Train was organised as follows: commanding 
officer Colonel Digby Hamilton, the 1 st Troop under Major William Langley, the 2nd 
Troop under Captain A. Robuy, the 3 rd Troop under Captain Charles Tudor, the 4th 
Troop under Captain William Horton, the 5th Troop under Captain Thomas Shields, 
and the 6th Troop, which had no permanent commander assigned. The typical strength 
of the troops numbered 1 through to 5 was as follows: one captain (a major in the 1 st 
troop), one lieutenant, one comet, one quartermaster, three sergeants, three corporals, 
one trumpeter, one wheelwright, one collar maker, one blacksmith, two farriers and 
forty-nine privates.457
457 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, July 1802, PRO WO 17/53/2.
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The Wagon Train was to remain based at Canterbury until 1803, when its 
headquarters were moved to Croydon Barracks.458 The 1802 Peace of Amiens was to 
cause a dramatic reduction in the personnel employed in the Royal Wagon Train, 
which was reduced to four troops, each with an average strength of 65 non- 
commissioned officers, privates and artificers. The command structure of the Royal 
Wagon Train in the aftermath of this restructuring, is illustrated in figure 15:
Troop Commanding Officer
Commandant's Troop Colonel Digby Hamilton
2nd Troop Captain Tudor
3'd Troop Captain Hart
4th Troop Captain Aird
Figure 15: The structure of the Royal Wagon Train after the Peace of Amiens.459
Following the resumption of hostilities in 1803 the number of active troops was 
increased from four to the pre-1802 strength of eight. This was later increased to 
twelve in consequence of a modification to the structure of the Royal Wagon Train, 
specifically the introduction in 1804 of Depot Troops.
The formation of Depot Troops was an indication of the flexibility of the 
Royal Wagon Train, a trait that could rarely be attributed to other formations in the 
British army of the period. The Depot Troops not only represented a reallocation of 
resources but a new approach to a situation, demonstrating the organization was 
capable of adapting its structure to meet new challenges. The creation of the Depot 
Troops allowed the Royal Wagon Train to deploy smaller, self-contained troops to 
support units and garrisons, rather than the system of detachments that had 
characterised the earlier deployments. This was significant as it maintained the 
integrity of formations, a practice perceived to be vital for both morale and 
efficiency.460 ___
458 See monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train, PRO WO 17/53/2.
459 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, July 1803, PRO WO 12/1522.
460 Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p. 143.
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The Depot Troops first formed as cadres in December 1803 and, while starting 
as under strength formations, they were soon to expand. This ability to expand (and 
contract) was a notable feature of the Royal Wagon Train and demonstrated that it 
could benefit from and utilise additional resources more rapidly than other 
organizations. Clearly there is a question of scale as it was easier to raise the 
manpower required for a troop for train consisting of approximately 60 personnel 
rather than a 100 strong infantry company, yet taking into account the equipment and 
animals required this was still a considerable achievement and one that gave the 
formation flexibility.
While the organization was relatively flexible, it is necessary to appreciate that 
any significant expansion of the Royal Wagon Train (one that involved the creation of 
new troops) would take time and could not necessarily occur as an immediate 
response to a crisis. The processes involved in the forming of new troops were 
demonstrated by the raising of the Depot Troops in 1803. In December of that year 
there existed four such troops, all of which were assigned a skeleton staff, as shown in 
figure 16:
1 s' Depot Troop Captain Turner, one Quarter Master, one sergeant and three 
corporals.
2nd Depot Troop Captain Green, one Quarter Master and two corporals.
3 rd Depot Troop Captain Ewing, one Quarter Master and two corporals.
4th Depot Troop Captain Ravenscroft, one Quarter Master and two corporals
Figure 16: The Depot Troops of the Royal Wagon Train, December 1803.46 '
hi the months of January to March 1804 the process of enlarging the troops began but 
they remained well below operational strength (as shown in figure 17). Even the full 
complement of trumpeters (one per troop) was not attained until March.
461 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, December 1803, PRO WO 12/1523.
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Figure 17: The Depot Troops of the Royal Wagon Train, March 1804.462
In addition to the above personnel there were eleven artificers shared between the 
troops. The 1 st to 3 rd Depot Troops each had a blacksmith, collar maker and 
wheelwright on strength, the 4th Depot Troop having only a blacksmith and 
wheelwright. The three artificers were temporarily removed from the 1 st Depot Troop 
in March 1804 but returned the following month.463 hi the subsequent twelve months 
the Depot Troops slowly increased their strength and Captain Green's troop was 
included in the returns as a regular troop, while Captain Turner's troop was 
approaching full strength. The number of privates in the 3 rd and 4th Depot Troops 
languished at seventeen and eighteen respectively, although it is interesting to note 
that all four troops maintained a complement of four artificers.464
The employment of full complements of artificers and officers (both 
commissioned and non-commissioned) in otherwise under strength troops was 
important as it enabled them to form the core around which a new active troop could 
be raised. This reflected forward planning in the organization and structure of the 
Royal Wagon Train, a feature that set it apart not only from the Commissariat but also 
eighteenth-century administrative practices in general. The Commissariat utilised a
462 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, March 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
463 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay lists, April to March 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
464 Ibid.
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reflexive policy and this in many ways was a characteristic of the British way of 
waging war in the period, as demonstrated by the raising of credit to finance conflict 
rather than maintaining a large cash reserve. 465 Pragmatism in this field had existed in 
the financing of war since the seventeenth century, with annual budgets tending to be 
set according to the tempo of current, rather than anticipated, operations. 466
Another factor that increased the flexibility of the train was the addition in 
1804 of a Lieutenant Colonel. 467 This was to prove vital because, in response to the 
Peninsular War, the organization would effectively be split into two - the Royal 
Wagon Train at Croydon and the Royal Wagon Train in the Peninsula. 468 This 
administrative division was significant and set a precedent for the future overseas 
deployments of the organization. Despite being split between Britain and Flanders 
during the campaigns of 1793 to 1799, the train had functioned as an administrative 
whole: there was one headquarters (at Canterbury) that collated the returns of all the 
troops. This practice continued when the detachments of the Royal Wagon Train first 
arrived in Spain and Portugal during the course of 1808 and the returns of the relevant 
units were listed as footnotes in returns of total strength. By 1809, however, the force 
had grown from a number of detachments to complete troops and returns for the 
Royal Wagon Train in the Iberian Peninsula were collated by a headquarters 
established at Lisbon. This practice continued and the Royal Wagon Train would 
eventually be administered through what amounted to theatre commands, even though 
the forces concerned continued to be referred to as detachments. The most important 
overseas detachments of the organization in the period were located in the Peninsula, 
France (including the army of occupation) and Hanover.
465 Speck, 'Conflict in Society', p. 142.
466 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', pp.41, 47.
467 Royal wagon train monthly pay list, April 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
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Initially the deployment to the Peninsula was regarded as only a minor one, so 
the officers assigned were listed as a footnote at the bottom of the main return. This 
deployment included only two troops, each led by a captain, lieutenant and two 
sergeants in April 1809. 469 The force despatched soon proved inadequate for the task 
and in 1808 Arthur Wellesley complained to Castlereagh that he was forced to leave 
behind heavy equipment at the beach after landing.470 Wellesley also noted that the 
inadequate provision of transport was worsened due to the poor Spanish logistical 
system.471 The situation had arisen as a direct result of British policy because initially 
the force despatched to the Peninsula was seen as only expeditionary in nature and 
upgraded to 'the theatre of Spain, Portugal and the Mediterranean' only in 1809. The 
initial reluctance to commit Britain fully to the Peninsula venture can be attributed to 
a variety of factors. Charles Esdaile cites instability in British domestic politics as the 
major reason although involvement in the Peninsular War would also have conflicted 
with what John Brewer states to have been an element central to British attitudes 
towards war and foreign policy, specifically a reluctance to become embroiled in 
prolonged military operations on the continent. 472 In the event it seems that Esdaile's 
theory was correct as the initial objections were soon overcome and the British 
commitment to the Peninsula accelerated, a situation that would not have arisen if 
such a campaign had indeed conflicted with ideas fundamental to the British state.
The increase in the status of the force operating in Spain and Portugal that 
occurred during 1809 was reflected in the introduction of separate returns for the 
troops of the Royal Wagon Train deployed to the Iberian Peninsula in this period.473 It 
was an example, however, of how bureaucracy and terminology could have little
469 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1809, PRO WO 17/54/2.
470 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8* August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
471 Wellesley to Marquis Welleley KP, 30* October 1809, Gurwood (ed.), Despatches and General
Orders, p.308.
472 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, pp.87-91; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.178.
473 Orders for June and August, PRO Tl/1061.
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bearing on the actual situation, and it was not until March 1810 that the Royal Wagon 
Train deployed a significant amount of manpower to the theatre: of the organization's 
nine troops, five were deployed to the Iberian Peninsula. The manpower of the force 
in that theatre consisted of the following: one colonel, one major, three captains, seven 
lieutenants, four cornets, one paymaster, one adjutant, one assistant surgeon, two 
quartermasters, six sergeant majors, twenty sergeants, four trumpeters and 293 rank 
and file. The presence of only four troop commanders (one major and three captains) 
indicates that one troop of reduced personnel operated in the Peninsula. Of the troops, 
four were based at Leira and one at Rio Mayor, while a small detachment was 
deployed to Belem. The number of officers was subject to some fluctuation and both 
Colonel Hamilton and Major Tudor, among others, were in the theatre for varying 
periods of time.
In September 1810 the 'Detachment of the Royal Wagon Train in Spain and 
Portugal', as the force became known, reached the peak at which it was to remain 
until 1814. Its principal officers were Lieutenant Colonel W. Langley, Quartermaster 
C. Carter, Quartermaster W. Newman, Adjutant J. Backer, Assistant Surgeon T. Noye, 
Paymaster J. Harrison, Major T. Aird, Captain F. Bloeme, Captain B. Jaimy, Captain 
G. Lenon, Captain S. Watson and Captain J. Whittle. Of note is the presence of the 
two quartermasters with the organization in the Peninsula, as typically only one such 
officer had been on the strength of the Royal Wagon Train in Britain. The presence of 
two with the organization in the Peninsula is perhaps indicative of that detachment's 
greater mobility and dispersal across the theatre.474 Additionally, this force provided 
the core of the 'Detachment Royal Wagon Train in France' that served in that country
during 1814, where it was then commanded by Major Aird.475 That the strength of the
474 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, Leira, March 1810, PRO WO 12/1527, Royal Wagon Train
1810- 11.
475 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, France, April 1814, PRO WO 12/1529, Royal Wagon Train
1814-15.
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Royal Wagon Train in Spain and Portugal effectively peaked in 1810 should not be 
taken as evidence that optimum capability had been reached. Transport shortages 
continued, demonstrating that like other military organizations the Royal Wagon Train 
did not benefit from the full extent of the state's capabilities even when operating in a 
major theatre of war.476
By necessity the elements of the Royal Wagon Train based in Britain were 
seen as being of secondary importance to the force deployed in the Peninsula, and 
their capability reflected this. The Royal Wagon Train in Britain during this period 
was split between depots in Hythe, Canterbury, the Isle of White and Portsmouth. 
This deployment is interesting as none was based at Croydon, which remained the 
headquarters, demonstrating a split had occurred between operations and 
administration. By this stage of the conflict the majority of the organization's 
formations operating in Britain were Depot Troops, as opposed to the better-equipped 
and more mobile marching troops deployed to the Peninsula. 477 Manpower present in 
Britain consisted of one colonel, three captains, six lieutenants, three cornets, one 
paymaster, one veterinary surgeon, one adjutant, one assistant surgeon, one 
quartermaster, twenty-one sergeants, three trumpeters and 186 rank and file. As in 
Spain, the number of captains (three) and the lack of a major indicates that one of the 
four troops was a battalion of reduced personnel.478 Thus, taking into consideration the 
number of Depot Troops deployed in Britain, it is apparent that the force deployed to 
Spain and Portugal represented the cream of the organization in terms of both quantity 
and quality. In March 1810 the organization was effectively at full stretch, with its 
marn operational elements serving in the Iberian Peninsula and only a reserve existing
476 For a consideration of transport capabilities in the later phases of the Peninsular War, see Weller, 
Wellington in the Peninsula, passim.
477 Return of officers, non-commissioned officers, men and horses detached from headquarters of the 
Royal Wagon Train, Croydon, March 1810, PRO WO 17/54/1.
478 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, Croydon, March 1810, PRO WO 17/54/2.
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in Britain. If necessary the Depot Troops could have formed a core around which 
additional troops could be raised in an emergency, but not without weakening the 
units deployed at home. This is significant because it must be borne in mind that the 
Royal Wagon Train based in Britain, while maintaining a similar number of troops, 
was actually weaker than during the peace of Amiens when it had been drastically 
reduced (a strength of approximately 200 in 1810 compared to 250 in 1802).
There were several differences between the Royal Wagon Train as it deployed 
to Spain in 1809 and the Netherlands in 1799. By the time of the Peninsular War 
command and control in the train had improved dramatically and reflected trends 
elsewhere in the army due to the addition of an extra sergeant, sergeant major and 
lieutenant to each troop, while trumpeters were also more common.479 The 
introduction of such personnel related not only to discipline, however, but also 
reflected changes intended to improve the attractiveness of the army as a career 
through increasing opportunity for promotion.480 More significant for improving the 
operational capability of the Royal Wagon Train than the introduction of additional 
personnel was a slight increase in the number of wagons available in each troop 
(rising from 27 to 30). Besides a marginal increase in strength the Royal Wagon Train 
also benefited from improvements to transport technology in the period. This was an 
indirect consequence of the agricultural and industrial revolutions and arose due to 
improvements in agricultural practices.481 The three types of wagon employed by the 
train during the Napoleonic Wars were designated as bread, sprung and forage wagons 
respectively. The regulation number of wagons per troop in April 1805 is shown in 
figure 18. Of note is the smaller number of wagons employed by the Depot Troops.
479 The addition of non-commissioned and lower ranked commissioned officers being an important 
reform of the British army operationally. Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle, p.55.
480 Bartlett, The Development of the British Army, p. 137; Haythomthwaite, 'The British Army, 
Wellington and Moore', p.91.
481 John, 'Farming in Wartime, 1793 to 1815', p.35; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.183.
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Type of Wagon:
Bread______Sprung______Forage 
Depot troops 15 3 
Marching troops 21 3 6
Figure 18: Wagon allocation by type in 1805. 482
By December 1812 wagons consisted almost entirely of the superior sprung type, with 
only four bread wagons and none of the forage type being on the strength of the train 
in either Spain or Britain.483 This demonstrates that the expansion of the Royal Wagon 
Train in the period occurred in conjunction with a corresponding upgrading of 
equipment. Thus improvements to the organization were both qualitative and 
quantitative, meaning that its capabilities increased further than the growing number 
of troops alone would suggest. This progressive upgrading of equipment was unusual 
in the army as for most of the period the technology remained relatively static, 
particularly regarding firearms, and even uniform, other than headwear, changed little. 
The existence of superior technology, and an ability to upgrade its assets 
correspondingly, was a direct benefit of the financial power of the British state 
enjoyed by the Royal Wagon Train and enabled the small organization to maintain a 
capability unmatched by continental counterparts. 484
The increase in the number of wagons brought with it greater demand for 
draught animals. Traditionally these had been horses and such was the Royal Wagon 
Train's reliance on this animal that its administration shared much in common with 
the cavalry. This was to have surprising implications for the bureaucracy of the 
organization because, despite increasing professionalism and standardisation in 
bureaucratic practices in the period, the Royal Wagon Train was forced to adopt a
482 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1805, PRO WO 17/54/1.
483 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, December 1812, PRO WO 17/54/2.
484 Haythomthwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, pp. 109-110, 199-209.
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relatively inefficient administrative system. 485 Ironically, while the operational 
capability of the Royal Wagon Train in the field was characterised by specialisation, 
the converse was true of its administration. An important consequence of the 
administrative revolution had been the increasing use of specialised stationery for 
administrative purposes, such as pre-printed forms designed for specific purposes. 
Despite its unusual role and composition, however, the Royal Wagon Train possessed 
little pro-forma designed specifically for the organisations and instead relied upon 
documentation intended for use by the cavalry. The impact of the failure to give the 
Royal Wagon Train its own pro-forma was only minor, creating headaches for 
administrators rather than full-blown administrative problems. Yet the situation is 
worthy of consideration as it highlights an often under considered aspect of 
maintaining the army in the period: paperwork, the tool of a bureaucratic system.
The administrative practices of organisations followed a standard pattern, with 
slight variations in the format of paper work. The pre-printed forms upon which the 
organization supplied returns to Horse Guards were the same as those used by the 
cavalry, often being titled 'for the Regiments of Cavalry at Home', while its returns 
were sometimes grouped with those of cavalry regiments (such as returns of the 15 th to 
25* Dragoons, Brunswick Hussars and Wagon Train in 1814). 486 A similar situation 
existed regarding pre-printed forms submitted to the paymaster. An example of such a 
form is the affidavit signed by the paymaster, sworn before a local justice of the peace 
and witnessed by the adjutant and commanding officer of the regiment in accordance 
with standard army practice:
I _______________^_ do swear, that on ____ of ______ I 
mustered His Majesty's ___________________ Regiment of 
_________
__ at which time I saw such Commissioned Officers, Non 
Commissioned Officers and Private Men, as are borne on the foregoing Muster Roll
485 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, The Army of Charles H, pp.77-81.
486 For examples, see monthly pay lists of the Royal Wagon Train, PRO WO 17/53/1 and WO 17/53/2.
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and Paylist (sic), excepting those for whom Certificates signed by the Commanding 
Officer and Adjutant of the said Regiment as given above, specifying the respective 
Reasons for their Absence, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the same are 
the true and the actual reasons thereof.
I likewise saw_________________ Troop Horses, and believe the 
Number stated and certified as absent to be just, and their absence truly accounted for.
I do further swear, that all the sums set down in the said Roll, have been paid 
by me to the respective persons, and for the respective persons, and for the respective 
services therein specified, in strict conformity to the King's regulations. 487
It is immediately apparent that the form is designed to record the pay of a regiment, 
not an organization such as the Royal Wagon Train. This is also of note as it is 
indicative of the Royal Wagon Train's status relative to other units, the organization 
being seen as the equivalent of a regimental formation. The fact that it had no 
regimental number would, however, place it at the bottom of the British army's list of 
regimental seniority (it was designated as being one of the 'Miscellaneous Regiments' 
and placed between the West Indies regiments and the overseas garrison battalions).488 
Secondly, although not so apparent, is the reference to troop horses. This was intended 
for cavalry regiments but served the Royal Wagon Train just as well.
Two other forms were also submitted with the paymaster's affidavit, a 
certificate from the commanding officer of the regiment and a similar document from 
the adjutant, both confirming the authenticity of the paymaster's statements:
I do hereby Certify, upon my Word and Honour, as an Officer and a 
Gentleman, that I have carefully examined the particulars of the foregoing Muster 
Roll and Accounts of Sums paid by the Pay Master within the period commencing the 
25th of ________ and ending the 24th of _______ following, and that to the 
best of my Knowledge, Information and Belief, I find, and declare them to be truly 
and justly stated, as to Names, Returns, Times and Payments.
I do further certify in like manner, that to the best of my Knowledge, 
Information and Belief, all those, who were not present, have the true Reasons of their 
Absence assigned against their names on the said Muster roll.
Commanding Officer
of the ________. Regiment
487 Affidavit of Regimental Paymaster Pettigrew, April 1800, PRO WO 12/1522.
488 War Office, Army List, (London, 1814), table of contents.
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At first glance there is little to suggest that the intended user of the certificate 
was not the Royal Wagon Train. The location intended for the signature of the 
commanding officer, however, betrays the document as being intended for the fighting 
regiments of the army, hi the case of a cavalry regiment, for example, this was 
intended to read:
Commanding Officer
of the _J6'h Regiment
of Light Dragoons.
For the Royal Wagon Train, however, this section of the form was amended by hand, 
with the appropriate wording crossed out or added, to read (italics indicating added 
text):
Commanding Officer
of the Regiment-
of- : - the Royal Wagon Train.
The forms used by the army were supplied from a variety of sources. Government 
printers working on behalf of His Majesty's Stationery Office provided those intended 
for the summaries of the organization's strength that were returned to Whitehall. 
These included printers T. Egerton of the Military Library Whitehall, Teape of Tower 
Hill, London, and W. Cloves of Northumberland Court, The Strand. Local suppliers 
such as J. Simms of Canterbury typically supplied the forms upon which more 
detailed returns were recorded. An example of such a form is the 'Return of the
489 Certificate of Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Digby Hamilton, April 1802, PRO WO
12/1523.
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Officers, Non Commissioned Officers, men, horses and wagons detached from the 
Headquarters of the Royal Wagon train', printed at Canterbury in 1803.490
It is interesting to note that a solitary contractor did not supply stationery, and 
that contracts were negotiated at both national and local level. This did not prevent the 
pre-printed paper work used by the army from following a standard format, an 
important characteristic of administration hi the period.491 Due to their widespread use 
these forms were printed in large quantities and as a result could be found in 
circulation years later. The strength of the Royal Wagon Train in Britain in December 
1812, for example, was returned on a form printed on 6 February 1809.492 Although 
there was a large reserve of forms, those available were sometimes available in 
insufficient quantities to satisfy the administrative requirements of the organization. In 
the returns for the Royal Wagon Train in France March 1814 two privates were 
recorded per line instead of one due to a shortage of forms, while no pre-printed form 
was available for Paymaster Pettigrew in April 1813, therefore his affidavit was 
written by hand. 493 Manpower, uniforms, food and stationery - the state failed to 
provide them all in sufficient quantities.
The format used by the army for recording returns changed during the period. 
Until the summer of 1807 returns had been recorded on individual forms each month, 
army months being from the 'period commencing the 25 th of [the month] and ending 
the 24th of following'.494 Under the new system, instead of returns being recorded on a 
different form each month, they were to be listed by quarter and the relevant part of 
the quarter (1 st, 2nd or 3 rd). 495 To illustrate this change consider the period of 25
490 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1803, PRO WO 17/53/2.
491 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, The Army of Charles II, pp.222-225.
492 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, December 1812, PRO WO 17/54/2.
493 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, France, March 1814, PRO WO 12/1529; Affidavit of 
Regimental Paymaster Pettigrew, April 1800, PRO WO 12/1528, Royal Wagon Train 1812 - 13.
494 Certificate of Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Digby Hamilton, April 1802, PRO WO 
12/1523.
495 Detailed instructions to Commissariat accountants, cash accounts, NAM 6807/221, pp. 1-3.
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December to 24 of March in a given year. Under the original system a unit's strength 
for the period would have been recorded on three separate returns: 25 December to 24 
January, 25 January to 24 February and 25 February to 24 March. When a new 
system, based on quarterly returns, was adopted the strength of the unit was returned 
on the same sheet, with columns for the 1 st , 2nd and 3 rd periods (25th December to 24 
January, 25 January to 24 February and 25 February to 24 March).496 Although 
perhaps only a minor modification to administration it did have some implications, 
especially for the Royal Wagon Train, as the forms were more compact and had 
marginally less space. The same categories existed on the forms (such as columns for 
sergeants, corporals, privates) but the Royal Wagon Train had traditionally inserted a 
section for artificers at the top of the return for privates, and modified the 
accompanying numbering system accordingly (each row on forms used for returns 
being numbered to ease the task of calculating strength. These numbers commenced 
from 1 at the start of each section. The column concerning sergeants, for example 
would include columns numbered one to eight and trumpeters one to six). With less 
space available on the new format of returns it is apparent that the artificers were 
included in the alphabetical returns for privates, with a brief note added to distinguish 
them (one such system being 'cm' for collar maker, 'bs' for blacksmith and 'ww' for 
wheelwright). Eventually the administrators of the Royal Wagon Train found a way to 
modify the forms to accommodate the artificers better, making the differences 
between them and privates clearer, although this is evidence of the difficulties that 
could be encountered when the specialist needs of an organization such as the Royal 
Wagon Train were not accommodated in general administrative practice.497
496 For an example of both systems in operation, PRO WO 12/1526, Royal Wagon Train 1807 - 09.
497 See monthly returns of Royal Wagon Train, 1816 - 17, PRO WO 12/1530.
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The use of the administrative methods of the cavalry was to a large extent due 
to similarities between this arm and the Royal Wagon Train (specifically their use of 
large numbers of horses).498 At times the needs of the train would even be met by 
transferring animals from fighting units, a practice that was particularly desirable 
given that the cost of purchasing horses in Britain increased continually during the 
period.499 The number of animals transferred could be considerable. For example: 150 
draught animals intended for General Spencer's artillery brigade in Portugal in August 
1808 were reallocated to General Burrard for logistical tasks after their late arrival, 
while a total of 14 animals were transferred from the 16th Light Dragoons to the Royal 
Wagon Train in March 1810. 500 Appreciating that the army possessed the capability to 
transfer horses in this way is important to this study not only because the practice 
increased the strength of the Royal Wagon Train but also because it is one of the few 
examples of different departments and organizations sharing resources in the period. It 
must be highlighted that the transfer of horses need not have occurred at the expense 
of a cavalry unit's strength, and the animals concerned tended to be unsuitable for 
cavalry service. This was made clear hi Major General Mahon's report on horses to be 
transferred from the 7th Light Dragoons during 1810, hi which he stated 'I certify that I 
have examined the above horses minutely and from the reasons there stated find them 
totally unfit for the service of the regiment and recommend them to be transferred'. 501 
The case of horses being unfit for cavalry service but not draught duties was not 
unusual, and when arriving in a new region the army often fell victim to dishonest 
horse dealers. 502 Major General Cartwright noted that some horses employed by the 4th
498 Chilcott, "The Royal Wagon Train', pp. 175-177.
499 John, 'Farming in Wartime', p.28
500 A. Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard, Aeyria, 11 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228; Return of horses 
received by the Royal Wagon Train, March 1810, PRO WO 17/54/2.
501 Return of horses of the 7* Light Dragoons cast by Honourable Major General S. Mahon, Dublin, 16 
September 1810, PRO WO 63/91.
502 p. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p. 19.
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(Queen's Own) Dragoons were too big for cavalry duties (being more suited to pulling 
wagons), while in April 1809 Arthur Wellesley had written to Castelreagh expressing 
concern that even the regiments of guards had on their strength horses that were 
unsuitable for combat duty. 503
It is apparent that the Royal Wagon Train on occasion received the cast-offs of 
the cavalry. This says something about the pecking order in the British military 
establishment and, importantly, reveals that many of the animals it employed were not 
carthorses, but breeds more suited to cavalry use had it not been for their condition. 
Surprisingly this could be an advantage because while carthorses were ideally suited 
to the task of pulling wagons and carts, they were more costly both to purchase and 
maintain, while they also took up more room on naval transport vessels. 504 Often there 
was barely sufficient transportation for the cavalry horses, let alone the animals 
required by the Royal Wagon Train, further evidence that the advances in British 
transportation capacity that occurred during the period were of little significance to the 
army on campaign.505 The difficulties encountered when moving horses to war zones 
was demonstrated by the instructions given to General Sir John Moore upon his 
arrival in Spain during 1808:
the cavalry you will... direct to move by land and if the horses for the artillery 
can take the same route so as to admit the whole of the horse transports being 
returned to England, it will tend much to accelerate the arrival of the cavalry 
from home. 506
The orders make no mention of the animals of the train, indicating that they were 
either not present or too few in numbers to affect the planning of the operation. It is
503 Major General Cartwright's confidential report on the actual state of the 4* Queen's Own Dragoons, 
7 May 1808, PRO WO 27/92/1; Wellesley to Castlereagh, Lisbon, 29 April 1809, PRO WO 1/238.
504 John, 'Fanning in Wartime' p.28; Weller, Wellington in the Peninsula, p.29.
505 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 183. Advances in transport technology directly improved the 
effectiveness of the Royal Wagon Train but due to the small size of the organization and other factors 
the army gained only minor benefits from these advances.
506 To Moore, Downing Street, 26 September 1808, PRO WO 1/236.
157
interesting to note that during the months of July and August 1808 reinforcements 
from Britain were indeed delayed by the shortage of horse transports. Lieutenant- 
General Baird was due to leave Cork for Spain with a force of seven battalions and 
two artillery companies but was delayed for over three weeks due to the non-arrival of 
horse transports. 507 Even by 1810, with the army established in the Peninsula, the 
situation had not been resolved: Colonel Bambury wrote that there were a number of 
'horses waiting for a conveyance to Portugal' and that 'as soon as cavalry transports 
are at our disposal, sufficient tonnage will be allotted to the horses in question; but 
their embarkation has been delayed by the total want of the means of transporting 
them'.508 The Duke of Wellington also complained of transport vessels being 
requisitioned for other duties by the transport board.509 The simple fact of the matter 
was that with three organizations competing for space aboard horse transports (the 
regiments of cavalry, Royal Artillery and Royal Wagon Train) none of them would 
ever have adequate space allocated, but the needs of the cavahy would always be met 
first as it was one of the primary combat arms.
With the provision of horse transports so erratic it was inevitable the animals 
required by the Royal Wagon Tram would not travel with them but would be procured 
at their destination. In some respects this is further evidence of a reflexive or 
pragmatic doctrine in the British army but it was due as much to strategic limitations 
as a lack of forward planning or reserves, hi a letter intended to brief Sir Harry 
Burrard upon his arrival in August 1808, Arthur Wellesley stated:
I conclude that you will have come equipped with horses to draw your 
artillery; you will want therefore mules to draw the carriages of your reserve 
musket ammunition, and some to carry provisions for a few days to march 
with the troops. 510
507 Baird, to Castlereagh, Cork, 8 September 1808; Baird, to Castlereagh, Cork, 1 st October September 
1808, PRO WO 1/236.
508 Colonel Bambury to MacLeod, Downing Street, 6 February 1810, PRO WO55/1369.
509 Wellington to Liverpool, Celario, 18 August 1810, PRO WO 1/245.
510 A. Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard, Aeyria, 11 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
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Prior to the full-scale deployment of the British army in a region of a friendly country 
such as Spain or Portugal, agents would be despatched to ensure an adequate number 
of animals were found. In 1808 the agents for Sir John Moore's expedition to 
Northern Spain were Deputy Commissary Azziotte and Colonel Hamilton of the 
Royal Wagon Train (recognition that a majority of animals purchased would be 
employed by these organizations). Their role was described in a letter from the Prime 
Minister to the General:
Deputy Commissary Azziotte has been despatched with Colonel Hamilton of 
the Wagon Train into the Asturias to procure such horses and mules as that 
country can furnish and he is directed to report the progress of his purchases to 
you - when ascertained the numbers of cattle of different descriptions, that you 
will require for rendering your army movable, which you will feel it important 
to restrict within the narrowest compass consistent with the efficiency of your 
Corps, you will be enabled to regulate the purchases made by the several 
agents, and should you deem it necessary to procure the support of His 
Majesty's Minister... who is now proceeding to the central Government to 
facilitate these purchases - you will address yourself to him on the subject or to 
any of His Majesty's Servants Civil or Military now employed in the 
respective provinces of Spain.511
This part of Sir John's orders reveals much about the Royal Wagon Train and the 
British army's system for the purchase of draught animals in the period. Immediately 
apparent is the fact that while the duties of the Royal Wagon Train included 
procurement, Colonel Hamilton was subordinated to a Deputy Commissary while 
undertaking this role. The importance of this mission is demonstrated by the potential 
involvement of a government minister and that every effort was to be made to ensure 
the required animals were purchased.
The letter is of further importance as it reveals that even at this very early stage 
of the peninsular war, the army was utilising mules and oxen for its mobility. This
Prime Minister Lord Portland to Moore, Downing Street, 26 September 1808, PRO WO 1/236.
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contradicts the popularly held view that credits the Duke of Wellington with the 
widespread introduction of oxen as draught animals to the British army, such animals 
clearly being in use before the then Arthur Wellesley had any influence of note over 
policy.512 Significantly, in his detailed appraisal of the logistical situation facing 
General Burrard in 1808, Wellesley, the supposed instigator of the use of oxen by the 
British army in Spain and Portugal made little mention of draught animals except for 
horses and mules, other than to describe the limitations of oxen. They were certainly 
not Wellesley's draught animal of choice, and he stated:
as for mules for carriage I believe you will find none, for I believe my corps 
has swept the country very handsomely of this animal you must therefore 
depend for the carriage of the country drawn by bullocks. 513
Clearly Wellesley had gone to great lengths to ensure an adequate supply of mules for 
his force, leaving Burrard with what he believed to be animals of limited utility. 
Furthermore, even as Wellington came to appreciate the qualities of oxen as draught 
animals, he remained aware of their limitations. When he requested that a pontoon 
bridge be despatched to Spain, Wellington stated that bullocks would be used as 
draught animals but also requested that horse harness be sent in case the bridge 
needed to be moved more rapidly.514 The Duke of Wellington's supposed faith in the 
value of bullocks as draught animals is often stated to extend from his service in India, 
years that are often seen as his most formative. 515 If the Duke did not in fact possess as 
much faith in these creatures as is often thought, many other aspects of the
512 For an example of this view see Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.41.
513 A. Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
514 Wellington to Liverpool, Cartaxo, 31 March 1811, PRO WO 1/248.
515 Hibbert, Wellington, passim; E. Longford, Wellington: the Years of the Sword (London, Weidenfield 
& Nicolson, 1969), passim.
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historiography (and mythology) surrounding Wellington may be brought into 
question. 516
In some respects the Royal Wagon Train managed its manpower as it 
maintained its animals. This is not a reference to harsh conditions but rather the way 
in which its strength was expanded or contracted to meet operational requirements. 
The variable strength of the Royal Wagon Train emphasises the pragmatic approach 
towards maintaining the army in the period. Peace in 1802, for example, triggered 
contraction, while operations in Spain during 1810 caused expansion. In essence, the 
methods employed by the Royal Wagon Train to recruit personnel were little different 
to those of other organizations in the British army, including the combat arms, 
although there were some differences between the practices employed by these 
organizations and the Royal Wagon Train. The focus of recruitment were the 
recruiting parties but it is apparent that officers played a lesser role in those of the 
Royal Wagon Train. Even during the period of expansion following the Peace of 
Amiens no officers were assigned to this task, but eight sergeants were. 517 The bounty 
offered to recruits by these parties was also different as it was much lower than that of 
these other arms. In 1802 recruits to the Royal Wagon Train would receive only £6 2s, 
compared to £13 5s for infantrymen (a difference of £7 3s), while infantrymen were 
also eligible for an extra bounty if transferring from the militia or volunteers 
(amounting to £7 12s 6d). 518 As the war progressed recruitment bounties for the train 
were significantly reduced, with the result that by January 1814 the Royal Wagon 
Train bounty payment amounted to only £4 4s, while in 1816 it fell to £3 14s. 519
516 See N. Gash, Wellington Anecdotes: a Critical Survey (Southampton, University of Southampton, 
1992).
517 Monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train, June 1803 and October 1804, PRO WO 17/53/2.
518 Bounty payments, 1802, PRO WO 17/2813, Monthly returns of the British army at home and 
abroad, Jan 1803 - Aug 1805, with at front, scale of age and standards for recruits, 1802-1808, and 
scale of bounty, 1802-1823.
519 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, January 1814 to January 1816, PRO WO 12/1529 and WO 
12/1530.
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Historians such as lan Fletcher have cited recruitment bounties as being one of 
the most important elements of recruiting practices in the period, so it may thus be 
expected that a lower bounty would have had a detrimental impact on the quality and 
quantity of recruits.520 For those historians who have equated height to physical 
effectiveness there is ample evidence of this, as the height requirement for the Royal 
Wagon Train was lower than that of fighting arms.521 In 1808 this was only five feet 
one inch for the train, compared to five feet five inches for the infantry and five feet 
seven inches for the cavalry.522 It is contentious whether a link between height and 
effectiveness can be said to exist and a study of the Royal Wagon Train does little to 
aid the argument in either direction. 523 In particular, it is interesting to note that despite 
their reduced height requirement the personnel of the Royal Wagon Train were 
generally fitter than those of other formations. At the headquarters of the Peninsular 
army in October 1810, for example, 276 personnel of the Royal Wagon Train were 
present, of which only 19 (approximately seven percent) were listed as sick, a figure 
that compares favourably with those for the infantry (1,191 sick out of 6,913 or 17%); 
the cavalry (1,451 sick out of 5,850 or 25%); and foot artillery (149 out of 637 or 
24%). 524 These other formations were, however, combat arms, the personnel of which 
were subjected to far more stresses and deprivations than those of the Royal Wagon 
Train, making any comparison of sickness rates in relation to general fitness 
unbalanced.
The strength of the Royal Wagon Train rarely fell below that required by 
regulations. This was particularly apparent regarding specialist personnel, who were
520 Fletcher, Wellington's Regiments, p. 14.
521 J. Mokyr and C. O'Grada, The Heights of the British and Irish cl800-1815: Evidence from Recruits 
to the East India Company's Army (unpublished research paper, University College Dublin, 1990), 
passim.
522 Minimum height requirements, 1808, PRO WO 17/2813.
523 The Ghurkhas and Japanese are ample evidence to disprove the theory that shorter recruits do not 
necessarily equate to worse soldiers.
524 General return, WO 17246, War Department in Letters and Papers 1810, f. 1.
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vital for the successful operation of the train. In part this may be attributed to the pay 
structure of the organization, as special provision was made for such personnel. In 
1799 artisans employed by the train were paid as follows: blacksmiths £4 13s per 
month, wheelwrights £3 9s and collar-makers £2 2s. For comparison privates received 
£1 10s 9d, corporals £2 3s 10 Vi d, sergeants £3 7s 2d and Quarter Masters £4 13s. 525 
During this period, however, a relatively unskilled London journeyman could earn at 
least £4 20d per month, and probably more. 526 It is thus apparent that, despite being 
paid more than common soldiers, wages alone may not have been sufficient to attract 
artisans away from civilian occupations to serve in the Royal Wagon Train. Rather, it 
is likely that if such individuals had decided to serve in the army, they would then 
have been drawn to the Royal Wagon Train due to the extra money paid for their 
skills. The difference in pay between common soldiers and artisans was maintained 
despite successive wage increases and the ratios of pay remained approximately the 
same. By 1813 blacksmiths, wheelwrights and collar-makers were all included as 
artificers on returns and were in a single pay band (£11 7s 6d, compared to £3 8s and 
3d for soldiers). 527
Higher rates of pay for certain personnel were not the only factor that could 
attract recruits to the Royal Wagon Train, hi fact, the overall manpower of the 
organization rarely fell below that of regulation strength, demonstrating that the Royal 
Wagon Train had a broad appeal. In some respects the train was something of a soft 
option compared to other organizations, its personnel being governed by the same 
regulations as those of the Commissariat. 528 Despite this, service in the organization 
was not necessarily easy and its personnel could come under fire, even if not expected 
to take part in combat. Away from the front line, the role of the Royal Wagon Train
525 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, November 1799, PRO WO 12/1522.
526 Emsley, British Society, p. 83.
527 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, January 1816, PRO WO 12/1530.
528 J. Burleigh, Circular letter to Commissaries, 18th February 1807, PRO WO 63/40.
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dictated that it was continually active, and bad weather that forced fighting regiments 
to return to cantonments or remain in barracks was not allowed to hinder its activities. 
This was particularly apparent during the Peninsular War, a campaign in which the 
army pursued a strategy of fighting decisive battles and then withdrawing for long 
periods, a tactic exemplified by the retreat of the army to the lines of Torres Vedras in 
1810.529 Captain Grenville-Eliot of the Royal Artillery believed such periods were 
'very much to the satisfaction of every individual in the army' as they allowed the 
army to recuperate. 530 This, however, could only be achieved if during such periods 
the activities of organizations such as the Royal Wagon Train continued; supplies 
were required not only to maintain forces but also to refit them following the previous 
campaign and prepare them for the next. The situation was worsened by the fact that 
the organization was required to transport not only essentials, such as food, fuel, 
clothing or munitions, but other items as well. In February 1811, for example, when 
Ireland was experiencing some of the worst snow in years, a troop of the Royal 
Wagon Train was still despatched to brave both blocked roads and the elements to 
move the belongings of Major General Beck to his new billet. 531 The result of such 
duties was that the personnel of the Royal Wagon Train were to become amongst the 
most mobile in the British army.
While on campaign the Royal Wagon Train followed the movements of the 
army, but even in Britain the troops of the train were redeployed to meet the 
requirements of the army on both a local and national basis. The latter is illustrated in 
figure 19.
529 W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, Vol 3, (London, John Murray, 1890), pp.39- 
47.
530 Grenville Eliot to wife, Truxillo, 19* August 1809, NAM 5903/127/6.
531 J. Malasses to J. Jones, Commissary General's Office, 4th February 1811, PRO WO 63/45.
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Bexhill
Canterbury
Chelmsford
Croydon
Dover
Dungness
Isle of Wight
Ramsgate
November 1803
None
Headquarters 
Four troops
Two troops
None
Detachment
Detachment
Detachment
Detachment
April 1805
One troop
Three troops
Four Troops
Headquarters 
Four Depot Troops
None
None
None
None
Figure 19: The deployment of the Royal Wagon train, 1803 and 1805. 5U
While the movement of troops may appear unremarkable in a fifteen-month period, it 
demonstrates that the Royal Wagon Train was capable of both concentration and 
dispersal. The relocation of the organization's headquarters from Canterbury to 
Croydon was a significant event; while it is interesting to note that in 1805 the 
greatest concentration of assets was not at headquarters (or even Canterbury) as in 
1803, but at Chelmsford (four troops were present at Croydon in 1805 but these were 
smaller Depot Troops). This is further evidence of the organization's ability to 
concentrate and disperse its assets as necessary, a policy made practical by the 
mobility and frequent movement of the troops, and one that enabled the train to 
support the pragmatic doctrines of the army.
The information in figure 19 demonstrates shifts in the location of troops, or 
rather their centre of gravity as personnel would be detached on various duties, using 
locations such as those listed above as a centre of operations. Due to the requirements
532 Return of officers, non-commissioned officers, men and horses detached from headquarters of the 
Royal Wagon Train, November 1803, PRO WO 17/53/2; Return of officers, non-commissioned 
officers, men and horses detached from headquarters of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1805, PRO WO
17/54/1.
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of the army at certain locations the workload of the Royal Wagon Train was not 
shared equally amongst troops, with the result that in a given period of time certain 
personnel would be more active than others. For example, between August 1799 and 
February 1800 the 2nd Troop of the Royal Wagon Train spent only nine days of the six 
months on the march, and the remainder in billet, hi the same six-month period, the 3 rd 
Troop (which was renumbered as the 5th Troop in January 1800) spent twenty-four 
days on the march, six aboard ship and the remainder in billet. 533 Again, this data 
provides only a limited picture of the activities of the Royal Wagon Train's personnel. 
More informative is the data in figure 20. In addition to highlighting the varying level 
of activity in different troops, figure 20 gives some indication of distances involved, 
the 4th Troop having detachments en route from across England, including the 
southwest, midlands and northern England. Figure 20 also demonstrates the flexibility 
of the Royal Wagon Train, as it was capable of deploying assets en mass (as in the 
case of the 3 rd Troop) or in small detachments (as in the case of the 4th Troop).
3rd Troop
From
Barnet
Enfield
4th Troop
Penrith
Newcastle
Exeter
Hull
Sheffield
Manchester
Dover
Bromley
5th Troop
Newcastle
Exeter
Perth
To
Enfield
Barnet
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Blackwall
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Number of Privates
70
70
13
5
17
10
9
6
4
6
27
4
3
Figure 20: Marches of the Royal Wagon Train, August - September 1799.5
533 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay lists, August 1799 to February 1800, PRO WO 12/1522.
534 Monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train, August to September 1799, PRO WO 12/1522.
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Despite its flexibility, the size of Royal Wagon Train dictated that the organization 
was never adequate to meet the needs of the wartime British army fully. The force 
continued to rely on civilian transport, including muleteers and contractors, for much 
of its needs. Yet the organization was also too large for the peacetime establishment 
of the army. Combined with the fact that, as noted by Commissary Schauman, 
logistical organizations were traditionally amongst the first organizations affected by 
post-war defence reductions, it was inevitable that the Royal Wagon Train was 
significantly reduced in size at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.535 The process of 
demobilisation was rapid and serves as a useful case study not only of how logistical 
units were reduced after a war but also armies in general.
In January 1816 the number of troops in the Royal Wagon Train stood at 
fifteen, three of which were listed as foreign (primarily consisting of Germans). 536 In 
April 1816 there remained three such troops in existence in the train, each led by a 
Captain (see figure 21):
Troop
1
Captains
Lieutenants
Cornet
Sergeant Major
Sergeants
Corporals
Privates
Trumpeters
Artificers
Total
1
1
1
0
1
7
7
56
4
0
77
2
1
2
2
1
7
8
62
0
0
83
3
1
1
2
1
8
7
51
1
8
80
Total
3
5
4
3
22
22
169
5
8
240
Figure 21: Foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1816.5
535 Schauman, On the Road with Wellington, p.415.
536 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, April 1816, PRO WO 12/12017, Royal Wagon Train Foreign 
Corps, 1816.
537 Ibid.
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In May 1816 these three troops were amalgamated into one. Of the forty-four non- 
commissioned officers employed in April, only sixteen remained, the number of 
privates was reduced from 169 to 70, and the artificers were removed from the 
strength of the remaining troop. As in earlier periods the trumpeters were among the 
first personnel removed from the strength of the troops when reductions were 
required, demonstrating the relative lack of importance attached to these individuals. 
Of note is the fact that after the contraction in numbers of May 1816, the overall 
strength of the troop increased following the amalgamation with the other troops. This 
is of note as it demonstrates that the process of demobilisation was not simply 
mobilisation in reverse. The latter had been achieved in the Royal Wagon Train 
through creating an administrative structure (containing a handful of personnel) and 
then progressively adding manpower. Demobilisation removed both manpower and 
administrative structures simultaneously; the same manpower could have been 
maintained in three separate troops but the policy of amalgamation was economical as 
it streamlined administration. This is further evidence of flexibility in the structure 
and administration of the Royal Wagon Train, but was a contrast to fighting 
formations, in which even heavily depleted companies and squadrons were 
maintained. An infantry battalion, for example, consisted of ten companies even if 
reduced to only 240 men from regulation battalion strength of 1,000, while in the train 
the practice was to concentrate strength. 538
The changes in the number of personnel employed in the Royal Wagon Train 
during April and June 1816 are summarised below in figures 22 and 23:
1 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.21 to 28.
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Non-Commissioned 
Officers
Commissioned Of­ 
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O April 
D May
Qjune
~~l——————I——————I—————I——————I—————I——————I—————I——————I 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number on Strength
Figure 22: Officers serving in the foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train, April to June 1816.
Total Strength
———I—————I—————I—————I—————I—————I—————I—————I—————I—————I 
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Number on Strength
NCO
CO
Other Ranks
Total
April May June 
47 17 17 
1164 
182 70 84 
230 94 105
Figure 23: Other ranks and total strength of the foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train, April
to June 1816.539
By June 1816 no captains remained on the strength of the foreign troop and the senior 
officer was a lieutenant, supported by an additional lieutenant, two cornets, a sergeant
major, nine sergeants and seven corporals. Although the number of non- 
539 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, April 1816, PRO WO 12/12017.
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commissioned officers remained the same between May and June, one corporal was 
promoted to sergeant, a response no doubt to the increase in the number of other 
ranks. This increase, however, should not detract from the fact that there was a 55% 
decline in the numbers employed in the foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train 
between April and June. Furthermore no artificers remained with these units. 540 It was 
the presence of these skilled individuals that made the troops of the Royal Wagon 
Train distinct from the other wagon-using units and their loss was indicative that the 
remaining foreign troops' days were numbered.
The hatchet of post-war reductions did not fall solely on the foreign units of 
the Royal Wagon Train. Peace brought with it reductions and re-organization 
throughout the train. In January 1816 the strength of the Royal Wagon Train was 
divided between three regions, as shown in figure 24:
Privates NCOs Horses Farriers Troops
United Kingdom 989 115 310 68 6
France 444 56 561 24 4
Hanover 265 30 157 23 2
Figure 24: The distribution of the Royal Wagon Train, January 1816. 541
Confusingly, each region had evolved its own numbering system, demonstrating an 
emphasis on local rather than centralised administration. Those troops in France were 
numbered 1 st , 2ad, 3 rd and 4th, those in Hannover 4th and 6th, while the six in the United 
Kingdom consisted of the 2nd, 3 rd, 6th, 7th, 8 th and 12 th . In September 1816 the 
Hanoverian force was disbanded and further reductions were made to the force in 
Britain, the strength of the Royal Wagon Train being concentrated in France. The
540 Ibid.
541 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, January 1816, PRO WO 12/1530.
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reduction in the strength of the wagon train in Britain compared to that in France is 
shown in figure 25:
1200 -I
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5 800
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i
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a France 
D Britain
February 1816 November February 1817 November 
1816 1817
Figure 25: The deployment of the NCOs and other ranks of the Royal Wagon Train, 1816 -
17. 542
It is apparent that following the reductions of 1816 the strength of the Royal Wagon 
Train became concentrated in the army of occupation serving in France. This was 
achieved not through significantly increasing the number of personnel in that country, 
but through reductions in the number of personnel deployed in Britain.543 hi fact there 
would appear to have been little increase in the capability of the force operating in 
France with only a marginal increase in manpower between February 1816 and 
November 1817, an increase of only twenty-eighty privates and NCOs.
The elements of the Royal Wagon Train deployed to support the army of 
occupation represented not only a concentration of manpower but also capability. This 
is an issue that cannot be ignored when considering the Royal Wagon Train because it 
was effectively the organization's capability to operate wagons that determined its 
effectiveness. Advances in wagon technology were important but the most significant 
factors remained the organization's artificers and draught animals. Figures 26 and 27 
allow a comparison to be made between those assets deployed in Britain and France.
542 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, February 1816 to November 1817, PRO WO 12/1530.
543 The force assigned to the army of occupation also included elements of the Royal Wagon Train 
despatched to support operations in the Netherlands during 1815.
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February 
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1817
November 
1817
————I——————I——————I——————I——————I————————————I——————I——————I——————
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France Britain
November 1817 711 50
February 1817 726 36
November 1816 750 135
February 1816 561 310
Figure 26: The allocation of the horses of the Royal Wagon Train, 1816-1817.
February 
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November 
1816
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1817
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1817
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 100.00%
France Britain
November 1817 24 68
February 1817 27 21
November 1816 22 13
February 1816 28 11
Figure 27: The allocation of the artificers of the Royal Wagon Train, 1816 - 1817. 5
544 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, February 1816 to November 1817, PRO WO 12/1530.
545 Ibid.
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By November 1816 there was clearly a concentration of capability as well as 
manpower in France. This was reflected in the number of active troops deployed, with 
four in France and only one in Britain. The solitary troop in Britain was, however, 
massively over strength compared to its predecessors earlier in the war. In terms of 
personnel this one troop, 166 strong, was approximately equivalent to the three active 
troops that accounted for the main element of the Royal Wagon Train in the summer 
of 1799, each of which had an average strength of approximately 60 privates. 
Furthermore, the number of artificers - eleven - was actually more than the total 
number employed by all of the troops in that same period. Thus, the operational 
capability of Royal Wagon Train in Britain was at least as good as, if not marginally 
better, than it had been at the turn of the century. That only one troop existed did not 
unduly influence its flexibility either. Although still based at Croydon Barracks, the 
Royal Wagon Train continued to maintain detachments at Hythe, Sandhurst and on 
the Isle of Wight.
The men of the Royal Wagon Train stationed in Britain in 1817 were 
administered differently to their comrades on the continent. Even the way in which 
Waterloo veterans were noted in returns was different, this practice being introduced 
in September 1817. In both cases the veterans were noted in muster rolls by a Union 
Flag symbol (specifically the cross of St. George and St. Patrick in red) next to their 
names. 546 hi Britain this was recorded in the column indicating length of service, 
whereas hi France it was placed directly next to the individual's name. The most 
noticeable difference in the organization and structure of the two forces was the 
respective complements of their specialist sergeants. In Britain the train had on its 
strength a school master sergeant, an armourer sergeant, a saddler sergeant and a 
trumpet major sergeant, but no sergeant majors. In contrast the force in France
1 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, September 1816, PRO WO 12/1530.
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deployed over a dozen of these latter individuals, indicating the emphasis placed on 
command and control over other aspects of army life. If there was no sergeant 
schoolmaster in France, then there was no regimental school, arguably one of the most 
significant additions to army barracks in the period.
The existence of the Royal Wagon Train into the post war period was an 
achievement for the organization and one that is often overlooked. Its survival was 
significant because the train had been created during the war, in response to a wartime 
situation, its continued existence in to peacetime evidence that it had became to be 
considered an essential element of the British army. The majority of transport duties 
for the army continued to be conducted by civilians but these duties tended to be the 
mundane, such as delivering produce from suppliers. It was in a war zone that the 
Royal Wagon Train came to the fore; delivering supplies at key moments in the heat 
of battle or ensuring troops at the very front line of an advance were maintained. The 
Royal Wagon train could easily have been disbanded in 1815, its forte being the 
support of large scale military operations, yet by maintaining the train the army 
demonstrated a reluctance to return to the rather ad hoc policy towards military 
logistics that had existed prior to the Revolutionary Wars. The army would eventually 
return to such a policy in 1833 following the disbandment of the Royal Wagon Train 
but this would be short lived.
The continued existence of the Royal Wagon Train reflected that an evolution 
had occurred in the army regarding logistics. Thus, the creation of the train could be 
considered progressive but it was restricted by the traditional shortcoming of all 
elements of the British military - lack of resources. There can be little doubt that a 
larger train would have achieved more even if it continued to focus on its main role, 
that of operating when civilians may have been less effective. The organization,
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however, had a strength that allowed it in part to circumvent its small size, specifically 
an ability to evolve or adapt to a situation. In particular the train was able to 
restructure itself, contracting and expanding in response to peace and war time 
situations, creating new elements within its structure (the Depot Troops), splitting 
itself between different theatres and incorporating changes adopted by other elements 
of the army (such as new administrative practices). It is apparent that the Royal 
Wagon Train was the most flexible of the organizations tasked with maintaining the 
British army.
Although there were a variety of possible reasons for the flexibility of the train 
compared to other organisations, one of the most important is that it was a new 
organization and thus did not require extensive reform to remove outdated practices or 
to incorporate new ones. This was in contrast to the Commissariat, which was a 
lumbering behemoth compared to the leaner and more efficient Royal Wagon Train 
and was forced to expend its energies trying to improve practices rather than adapt to 
new situations. 547 The Royal Wagon Train also had other advantages over the 
Commissariat and in particular it was one of the few organisations not to deploy assets 
outside of the European theatre in the period. Yet this factor should not be 
overestimated because there is little evidence to suggest that the Commissariat would 
have been significantly more efficient if its activities had been concentrated in Europe. 
The organisation would have been leaner but there is no reason to believe its systems 
would have been less cumbersome as a result.
Comparisons between the Royal Wagon Train and Commissariat are not 
always appropriate. The task of the latter was broad, while the focused on one aspect 
of logistics, transportation. When considering the Commissariat solely in regard to 
this, however, another advantage of the Royal Wagon Train over other organizations
547 See above pp.80 to 84.
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becomes apparent. The Royal Wagon Train was able to benefit from the British state 
in an unusual way as it was able to utilise technology that was, in effect, transferred 
directly from the state and was a consequence of the agricultural and industrial 
revolutions. The period saw subtle but significant improvements to the technology of 
wheeled transport, including suspension and axle designs, and in many respects 
Britain led Europe in such fields. Using this technology made the wagons used by the 
train superior not only to those of continental armies but also superior to those hired 
by other British military organizations on the continent, particularly those utilised by 
muleteers, and upon which the Commissariat relied. The Royal Wagon Train was not 
unique in utilising the superior technology available in Britain during the period but 
that advances were made in its specialist field enabled it to benefit to a significant 
degree.
The state offered the train other advantages, the capability to expand in 
response to a situation being of note only when backed by the resources of the state. 
Yet the fact remains that, like other organisations, the train was constrained by the 
boundaries imposed by financial considerations and the resources that the state was 
willing to allocate. Thus, in many respects, the train reflected the best and worst 
aspects of the army's relationship with the state. The strength of the system was that 
resources (be it money, materiel or technology) could be made available quickly but 
these resources were limited due to the reluctance of the state to support the army to 
the extent that the force wished. Although important, it was not only lack of resources 
that limited the ability of Royal Wagon Train to maintain the army. Some 
commodities that the force required were less tangible than bread or guns and could 
not be carried on the back of a wagon. It is these commodities that are the focus of the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 5 
The provision of sundry necessities
The military revolution had created the need for a state to pay, train and equip 
its soldiers. In consequence military personnel represented an investment and, as 
noted by Colin Jones, one that had to be protected and nurtured, with states taking a 
growing interest in their welfare/41* Issues pertaining to welfare in the army can be 
divided into two categories: those related to specific departments and those that were 
more general issues, managed by either several departments or by government 
legislation. This chapter examines both, the former through the medical and 
chaplain's departments and the latter through a consideration of the army's policies to 
encourage men with families to enlist. In all three areas the army was to demonstrate 
both innovation and conservatism, with policies that had varying degrees of success. 
The common denominator, however, remained a concern for soldiers' welfare and 
while not logistics in a conventional sense this could be as vital to maintaining the 
army as guns or food.
One of the most innovative policies adopted by the army in the period was its 
encouragement of men with families to enlist. Through legislating for families the 
army was to increase its responsibilities, adding extra persons whose welfare the force 
had to consider. Despite such drawbacks, this policy was considered important not 
only to increase manpower but also because men with families were perceived to be 
of a higher standard and more reliable, the Duke of Wellington stating in a letter to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens in 1811 that the army's failure to cater for their needs 
encouraged 'the worst description of men to enter the service'. M9 Such a view was
S4S Jones, "The Military Revolution and the Professionalism of the French Army under the Ancien
Regime', p.41.
54V Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General Orders, p.348.
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progressive as the question of soldiers' families was a concept that led to the creation 
of married quarters in the mid-nineteenth century and has become something of an 
emotive subject and political issue in the twenty-first century due to media coverage 
concerned with the families of serving soldiers.550 The problem of soldiers' families is 
thus still a subject with which the state struggles to contend.
A potentially important reason for men with families not to enlist was 
economics. In civilian life women could make a substantial contribution to a family's 
income, earning an average of 6s per week in an industrial city such as Birmingham 
during the 1790s, which was almost equivalent to a soldier's pay of Is per day. 551 In 
the Midlands during 1795 it was established that a family consisting of a husband, 
wife and two children should receive 15s per week, any shortfall in wages being 
rectified through poor relief."2 Thus, for a man with a family to enlist there was a 
potential loss of income that could not be avoided if the husband was to serve in the 
army. The economic issues related to the recruitment of men with families, however, 
not only concerned incomes. While labourers and their families could earn more than 
soldiers their expenses could also be considerable. The terms 'labourer' and 'poor' 
have been described as being synonymous in this period and labouring families, 
particularly in rural areas, were not so well off as their incomes alone may suggest.^ 
It has been estimated, for example, that early in the nineteenth century a labouring 
married couple could spend £20 per year on food, £3 on rent and £8 on clothing."" 4 By 
enlisting at least these costs would be subsidised by the army, who would clothe, feed 
and provide accommodation for the soldier. Another consideration was the nature of
5SO See for. example, the media coverage concerning the 2004 Invasion of Iraq.
551 1. R. Christie. Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth Century Britain (Oxford Clarendon, 1984),
p.84.
552 M. Blaug, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the Making of the New', in M. W. Flinn and T.C. 
Smout (eds), Essays in Social History (Oxford, Clarendon, 1974), p. 131.
553 R. J. White, Life in Regency England (London, Batsford, 1963), p.22.
534 E.W. Bovill, English Country Life 1780 - 2830 (London, OUP, 1962), p. 18.
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the support offered through local poor rates, which was not always monetary. 
Authorities could be creative in how subsidies were paid, sometimes paying in kind 
through services such as clothing or laundry rather than with cash. 555
Although the economic arguments against men enlisting were not as strong as 
they may first appear, there were other factors that could prevent men with families 
from enlisting. One difficulty was the family remaining together during the soldier's 
various redeployments and at the outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
the army made little provision for them to travel with soldiers. Regulations concerning 
this referred only to wives, it being assumed any children would also accompany 
them. It was relatively easy for wives to follow husbands serving in Britain and, 
despite the fact that married quarters and similar provision for wives did not exist 
until the mid-nineteenth century, families could remain together or at least in 
proximity due to the practice of billeting troops at inns (a practice that became less 
common as more barracks were constructed).556 When travelling overseas the army 
allowed a restricted number of wives (and their children) to follow each regiment. In 
such circumstances the army allowed for only six wives to travel with each infantry 
company or cavalry troop, while in the Royal Artillery the allocation was a more 
generous eight and ten for foot and horse batteries respectively."7 Rations were 
established as being half that of a man's for women and one third for children. 55 "
Only the wives of privates and non-commissioned officers were permitted to 
travel with the regiments to foreign postings at the expense of the army, while
555 Christie. Stress and Stability, p. 106.
556 M. Trustram. Women of the Regiment: Marriage and the Victorian Army (Cambridge, CUP, 1984), 
passim. Colonel N. T. St John Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children: The Story of the Education of 
Army's Children (London, HMSO, 1971), p.6.
557 H. Ton-ens to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 5th November 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.40; 
Brigadier-General Macleod to R.H. Crew, Woolwich, 10th July 1809, PRO WO 55/1314. For the 
expedition to Egjpt the permitted number of wives allowed to follow the force was reduced to three per 
company, a policy that adversely affected morale. P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypi, 1801 (London, 
Routledge, 1995), p. 15. 
ss* Ton-ens Wellington, Horse Guards, 5th November 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.41.
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commissioned officers frequently paid for their wives to travel with them. Grenville- 
Eliot of the Royal Artillery, for example, urged on several occasions that his wife 
travel with him so he could control her financial expenditure. 559 Other men married 
local women while on service (despite the fact that since 1685 permission had been 
required from a soldier's commanding officer for him to marry), with the result that a 
large number of women and children followed regiments while they were deployed 
overseas/60 With the 25 th Light Dragoon Regiment in India during the latter stages of 
the war, for example, there were no less than seventy-two women, forty-one of whom 
were European, the remainder being of local origin. 561
Whether widowed or married there was initially little provision made for the 
women who followed the army abroad. Left to fend for themselves they inevitably 
turned to looting, and in August 1812 the Duke of Wellington remarked that 'the 
followers of the army, the Portuguese women in particular, must be prevented by the 
provosts from plundering the gardens and fields of vegetables'.""62 Thus the army 
found itself on the horns of a dilemma in regard to women and children. They were 
seen to hamper the supply of the army by consuming food and taking up transport, and 
even those authorised to travel with the regiments required special permission to 
travel aboard ship. 563 J. MacDonald, a former army officer writing proposals for 
reforms of the army in 1807, held such a view, stating that 'no woman, who is not by 
profession a washerwoman, will be permitted to follow the battalions'. 564 Wives and 
children were, according to Mary Trustram, 'a millstone around the army's neck, 
affecting mobility, discipline and efficiency'. 565 Despite the difficulties caused by their
S}" NAM 5903/127/6.
560 The practice had been introduced into the regiments of guards in 1671. Trustram, Women of the 
Regiment, p.30.
561 Half Yearly Report on 25th Light Dragoons, Bagalore, 15th February 1813, NAM 6112/78, p.184.
56- Gurwood (ed), General Orders, p.32.
s63 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 17th June 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
564 MacDonald, Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry, p.7.
365 Trustram, Women of the Regiment, p.29
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presence, however, women were not simply a burden on resources and performed 
useful duties such as nursing and foraging. 366 Ultimately the army was forced to 
acknowledge that whatever their overall impact, wives would always follow the army 
and legislation was required to accommodate this fact of life.
In 1811 an act 'for enabling the wives and families of soldiers embarked on 
foreign service' was introduced. This effectively provided an allowance for families to 
return home, being extended to include widows in 1812 and regiments embarking in 
Ireland in 1818. 567 Following the end of the Peninsular Campaign in 1814 it was the 
army's policy to encourage Spanish and Portuguese women to return to their own 
homes rather than follow their husbands back to Britain but this was not strictly 
enforced. In 1814 Adjutant General Edward Packenham successfully argued that a 
limited number of foreign wives, selected with 'the greatest caution', be allowed back 
to Britain. 568 Thus, during 1816 some 44 women and 27 children, who had been 
following the 88th Regiment on the continent, were allowed to return with their 
husbands. 569 First proposed in 1811, wives, widows, children and orphans were 
eventually allowed to draw food from army stockpiles in 1818.570 Until 1846 many of 
these regulations continued to be applied even if the child was born out of wedlock.' 71 
Although rudimentary, the army operated a system of welfare for the families of its 
soldiers.
The legislation introduced to enable the army to provide for the families of its 
soldiers is an example of the force at its most innovative. From virtually ignoring the
5(56 Ensign Wheatley wrote of the of the benefits of women employed on such duties. C. Hibbert (ed),
The Wheatley Diary (London, 1964), pi 8.
567 Letter from War Office to Regimental Colonels, 19* July 181 1, PRO ADM 201/20, Discharges. Pay.
Pensions and Allowances (Royal Marines).
558 Gurwood (ed), General Orders, p.323.
569 Illegible to Lord Bathurst, Paris, 19th March 1816, PRO WO 28/14, Letters from Quarter Master 
General's Department, 1816 January to June.
570 Ton-ens to Wellington, Horse Guards, 5th November 1811, NAM 6807/221, pp. 41-42; Gurwood 
(ed), General Orders, p.324.
571 Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, p.ll; Blaug, 'The Myth of the Old Poor Law', pp.123-53.
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wives and children of its soldiers the army would adopt policies that were in some 
respects ahead of those in civilian society, as evident in regard to education. The 
availability of education, for soldiers and their children alike, was one of the more 
tangible advantageous offered by a career in the army, the education of soldiers' 
children being an offshoot of programmes intended to educate the rank and file. The 
subject of educating soldiers was a source of some debate; one contemporary arguing 
that service in the army alone was sufficient, due to 'the beneficial influence of 
moderate instruction and impressing the mind with a due sense of moral and religious 
duty'/72 Such a view, however, was not common and formal education in the British 
army had a history stretching as far back as 1675, when the first army school was 
created in the Tangiers garrison. The growth in the number of such establishments 
was not rapid but the barrack-building program enabled permanent schools to be 
established in most regiments by 1809. The purpose of these schools was to educate 
soldiers but it was common for their children to be taught in them when the regiment 
was away. 573 Initially the provision of such education was at the whim of regimental 
colonels although a standard structure was soon adopted and General Wetherall noted 
that the school of the 80th Regiment in particular paid great attention to the children of
574the regiment.
The Duke of York was a keen advocate of education in the army, for both 
soldiers and their children alike, and he considered that the cost of schools to be 
'trifling compared to the benefits [of] attending such an establishment'. 575 It is no 
coincidence that during York's tenure as commander-in-chief several notable 
advances in the field of army education were to occur. One of the most significant
5T- MacDonald, Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry, p.cl.
573 Williams, Tommy Atkins'Children, pp3-9.
514 NAM 6112/78, p!55.
575 Duke of York to Viscount Palmerston, Horse Guards, 26th August 1811, Williams, Tommy Atkins'
Children, Appendix B.
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reforms implemented, and one typical of the period, was the formalisation of 
regimental school administration. This structure was explained to Lord Palmerston in 
1811, by which time the scheme had been implemented. York wrote that:
a sergeant-school-master should be appointed to each battalion and... he 
should be paid according to the rate of pay now attached to the paymasters 
clerk. It will also be necessary that the commissioners for the affairs of 
barracks shall be authorised to appropriate one room in each barrack for the 
use of the school... and it will be essential to allow an extra charge upon the 
contingent account of each regiment, for the articles of stationery and books 
which be requisite for the use of the boys and children. 576
The Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea and its sister institution at Dover were both 
clear indications of the army's commitment to a policy that emphasised education, at a 
time when it is estimated that only 15% of the population received any schooling. 577 
The establishment at Chelsea was funded by the state and in 1812 received a grant of 
£20,000, while civilian schools tended to be funded by charities and philanthropists, 
and did not receive significant state funding until 1831 in Ireland and 1833 in 
Britain.' 7 * The army lagged behind the navy in education, as a similar institution for 
the navy had been established at Portsmouth in 1729. Despite this, the army was 
addressing what would later become an important social issue/ 79
Staff at the Chelsea establishment included a chaplain, reading and knitting 
mistresses, a sergeant-major instructor, sergeant master tailors and cobblers and nine 
sergeant assistants. Eighteen corporals and 36 lance corporals were recruited from 
senior pupils to assist the non-commissioned officers. Education was open to both 
genders - boys learning trades such as tailoring and cobbling, girls sewing and
1U1U.
5T ~ E.G. West. Education and the Industrial Revolution (London, Batsford, 1975), p.75. 
57S P. Horn, Education in Rural England, 1800 to 1914 (London, Gill and MacMillan, 1978). pp.33-34: 
J.H. Adamson, English Education 1789 to 1902 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.20. 
5  Although similar establishments had existed for the navy since 1729. Duffy, 'The Military
T) n-.mln+^.n .tnA Ctofo 5 r\ ^Revolution and State', p.5.
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laundry.'*0 This use of apprenticeships was not unique to the army and was similar to 
the system utilised in industrial schools, in which the child's labour contributed to 
running costs. 3 " 1 This should not detract from the fact, however, that the apprentice 
system was further evidence of a shift in army policy that improved the situation of 
soldiers' families. The majority of teaching was to have been conducted by senior 
pupils, this being a characteristic of the monitorial systems adopted in the eighteenth 
century. 582
The education offered at institutions such as Chelsea, Dover and the 
regimental schools was in some respects innovative. Education available to civilians 
was dominated by Sunday schools of various denominations. These establishments 
had became increasingly secular during the 1790s with the result that by 1818 two 
thirds of children attending school in England did so at Sunday School. 5 * 3 
Secularisation in civilian education was such that it even interfered with learning, 
through preventing co-operation with similar establishments of different 
denominations or even by the fact that certain activities, such as writing, were not 
allowed on Sundays. 5 "4 Army schools differed as they were less concerned with 
religious matters and instead focused upon skills considered likely to be of use in 
adult life. 585 In this respect the army occupied a middle ground in its education 
practices, ahead of such practices in the less progressive schools but lagging 
somewhat behind the ideas of educationalists inspired by the works of Rousseau, 
ideas that would remain on the fringes of education until the mid-nineteenth
wo Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, p. 12.
581 W.A.C. Stewart, Progressives and Radicals in English Education, 1750 to 1970 (London,
MacMillan, 1972), p.92.
™- Stewart, Progressives and Radicals, p.27.
5 *3 Horn, Education m Rural England, pp.30-32..
554 A.P. Wadsworth, The First Manchester Sunday Schools', in M.W. Flinn and T.C. Smout (eds). 
Essavs in Social History (Oxford, Clarendon, 1974), pp. 110-114; Horn, Education in Rural England,
p.3L
555 Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, p.13.
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century. This approach - the adopting of current but not necessarily established 
ideas - was to characterise army education and was reflected in the adoption of the 
Bell monitorial system prior to its use nation-wide. 5"
It is apparent that through policies such as those intended to support soldiers' 
families and, as discussed in previous chapters, soldiers themselves, the army was to 
become increasingly involved in welfare. The extent of and motivation for these 
policies is open to some interpretation but it is evident that the army was one of the 
few careers that fed, clothed, sheltered and even educated its employees. With the 
exception of the Royal Navy, other employers provided less comprehensive support, 
factory owners, for example, providing schools, and some farmers housing and 
feeding their labourers out of season/ 81* Another important area of welfare was the 
provision of pensions.
Initially perceived as a means to prevent disgruntled former soldiers becoming 
involved in unrest, pensions had, by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, become linked 
to the appeal of the army as a career and also related to the welfare of soldiers and 
their families. 5 " 9 The army lagged behind the Royal Navy in the field of pensions and 
in 1806 William Windham, then Secretary of State for War and Colonies, proposed 
significant reforms of the system utilised by the army. If fully implemented, these 
reforms would have dramatically improved the status of the regular army as a possible 
career but they became entangled with politics and ultimately proved too ambitious." 90 
Windham recognised that for a career in the army to become viable, there was a need 
to improve pay and, most importantly, increase pensions. Following Windham's 
reforms every soldier was to receive a pension and in an effort to make some postings
M Stewart, Progressives and Radicals, pp.21-22.
5157 Stewart, Progressives and Radicals, pp.92-96; Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, pp.24-26. 
sw J. Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Tliree 
English Towns (London, Widenfield & Nicolson, 1974), p.215; Christie. Stress and Stability, p.209.
589 Jones. 'The Military Revolution', p.41; Corvisier, Annies and Societies, pp.83-83.
590 Emsley British Society, pp. 128-9.
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more acceptable, two years served in the West Indies were to count as three served 
elsewhere. Widows' payments were not increased by Windham, although they were 
raised in 1812. Details are provided in figure 28.
Rank Pension Rank Pension Rank Pension
Colonel £50 Lieutenant £20 Chaplain £16
Major £30 Ensign £16 Surgeon £16
Captain £26 Adjutant £16 QTVtaster £16
Figure 28: Army pensions received by widows, c!796. 5 '"
Windham's crucial pension reform was to ensure that they were available to every 
soldier, along with the widows, children, siblings and even the next of kin of those 
who died in service. Examples of such payments include that of £50 to a barrack 
master in Novia Scotia; £30 to each sister of a staff surgeon; £5 to William Marsden, 
whose three sons were all dead by 1813; and £150 to the widow of Captain William 
Wheatley/92 To claim a pension a widow needed to take an oath and produce a 
certificate signed by an appropriate regimental colonel. 593 To the credit of early 
bureaucracy in the period, cases in which the full pension was not received were 
resolved as swiftly as possible. Examples include the case of a Glasgow widow who 
was proved to be £4 short of her £9 entitlement, the matter being quickly resolved 
through Chelsea Hospital. 594
Many of the pension reforms introduced by Windham would not benefit 
soldiers until later in the century. Sergeant Robert Edwards of the Wiltshire Militia 
was an example of an individual who entered the army during the Napoleonic Wars 
and, although it is pure conjecture as to whether or not his decision to enlist was 
influenced by the prospect of a pension, it is apparent that he did not receive such 
payments until 1834. Sergeant Edwards was typical of many soldiers and represents a
5!" A Treatise on Military Finance (Whitehall Egerton, 1796), p.96.
5" PRO WO 25/3995, Register of Annual Bounty Paid to Deceased Officers Widows.
5" A Treatise on Military Finance (Whitehall, Egerton, 1796), p. 116.
594 PRO WO 245/134, W. Horton to Deputy Treasurer of Chelsea Hospital, Glasgow, 1816.
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case study of how a soldier serving during the early nineteenth century benefited from 
his service in later years. Edwards enlisted in the militia, aged 28, in 1802, serving for 
30 years and 1 month. Due to a condition described by doctors as 'mental imbecility' 
he became an outpatient of Chelsea Hospital at the age of 60, residing at Bishop's 
Canning's near Devizes. His annual pension was £17 6s 83/4d, paid at quarterly 
intervals as illustrated in figure 29.
1 st January
1 st April
1 st July
1 st October
£
4
4
4
4
s
5
6
7
7
d
6
5'/4
43/4
43/4
Figure 29: Quarterly pension payments to Sergeant Robert Edwards, 1834. 5 '5
To collect his pension Edwards, like all other pensioners, was required to prove his 
identity by producing two certificates signed by local magistrates - impersonating a 
Chelsea out-patient being an offence punishable by hanging until 1818. 5% There were 
several ways in which he could have forfeited his pension, including refusal to serve 
again after less than twenty-four years in the cavalry or twenty-one years in the 
infantry; failing to claim in four successive quarters; fraud; and 'violence or outrage 
towards persons employed in paying the pensioners'. Payments received in 'countries 
not forming part of His Majesty's dominions' also required special permission from 
the authorities, but it is credit to the efficiency of nineteenth century bureaucracy that 
pensions could be paid overseas.M7
Pensions, education and providing for the families of soldiers were tasks 
shared by numerous departments. Conversely other areas of soldiers' welfare were
s "5 WSRO 632/134. Certificate(s) of Sergeant R. Edwards, Outpatient of Chelsea Hospital, 1834. 
51)6 Affidavit of Magistrate, WSRO 632/134, Certificate(s) of Sergeant R. Edwards, Out Patient of 
Chelsea Hospital, 1834; E. L. Woodward, The Age ofReforml815~1870 (Oxford, Clarendon. 1938).
p.431.
5VT Rules Governing Payment of Pensions, WSRO 632/134.
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almost the sole responsibility of certain departments, particularly in regard to the 
provision of medical care and religious services. Military medicine in the early 
nineteenth century was possibly most famous for its shortcomings. It is both an under- 
considered and under-appreciated aspect of army life in the period, while its 
availability was a tangible advantage enjoyed by soldiers over civilians. While 
facilities were often rudimentary and unsanitary they were regulated, and, in theory at 
least, staffed by trained personnel with access to up-to-date advances in medicine. At 
this juncture it is necessary to stress that military and battlefield medicine can be 
distinct and separate subjects. Battlefield medicine is concerned almost exclusively 
with wounds and other injuries sustained on the battlefield, in effect the occupational 
hazards of a career as a soldier, such as gunshot wounds. Conversely military 
medicine is much broader subject that encompasses not only battlefield medicine but 
also the provision of more general medical treatment, for those ailments and injuries 
that could be suffered by soldiers had they been civilians, such as fevers and broken 
legs caused by falls. Thus it is military medicine that forms the basis in this chapter as 
it covers the full range of activities conducted by the army's medical personnel.
The organisation with overall responsibility for the provision of medical 
services in the army was the medical board. This body consisted of the Surgeon 
General, Physician General, Inspector-General of Hospitals and a number of advisors, 
persons who were specialists in their fields but who only temporarily sat on the board. 
In 1816, for example, Surgeon James Fellows and Dr. Pym were consulted over the 
outbreak of fever amongst British troops in Spain. 591* In his general overview of the 
army in the period, P.J. Haythornthwaite is critical of the board. In particular he states 
that the individuals who sat on the board possessed their own private practices in
5 '" Army Medical Board to Secretary at War, 28th March 1816, PRO PC 1/4087, Privy Council 
Miscellaneous Unbound Papers. March 1816.
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civilian life and thus devoted little time to their military duties. 599 While there can be 
little doubt that the board frequently failed to address issues with the required vigour, 
the potential benefits of its structure should not be underestimated. In one respect a 
part-time board of this nature went against the trend of increasing professionalism in 
the army during this period, but it was also concurrent with the trend as it utilised 
skilled specialists to meet the needs of the army. By allowing the members of the 
board to continue in their more profitable civilian careers the army gained the benefit 
of their expertise without the expense of paying their full wages. In consequence even 
advisors to the board were frequently individuals of some standing and held in high 
regard. Viscount Palmerston, the future Prime Minister, described Dr Pym as being 
'an excellent man, [about which] I have heard a great deal in his favour'. 600 Due to the 
advice of individuals such as Pym, medical provision for soldiers was more advanced 
than that available to many civilians.
The very existence of the Medical Board was itself evidence of the superior 
medical provision available to soldiers compared to civilians. A similar organisation 
for the civilian population was not proposed by the Royal College of Physicians until 
1805 and, despite consisting of five rather than three permanent members, it was to 
have fewer responsibilities than its military counterpart, its primary role being to 
safeguard Britain from outbreaks of diseases such as the plague."01 The advice of its 
own Medical Board led to the army adopting some of the most up to date medical 
practices available in the early nineteenth century. 602 In particular the army was at the 
forefront of inoculation and while soldiers were not necessarily inoculated as a matter
sw Haythornthwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, p.209.
600 Palmerston to Mr. Wharton, 26th July 1813, PRO PC 1/4011, Privy Council Miscellaneous Unbound 
Papers, July 1813.
601 Royal College of Physicians to Privy Council, 5 th February 1805; Instructions to the Board of Health. 
13 th February 1805, PRO PC 1/3643, Privy Council Miscellaneous Unbound Papers, February 1805.
602 With the exception of the treatment of battlefield wounds, the army was almost always several years 
behind the practices of the Royal Navy. M. Duffy, 'The Foundations of British Naval Power', inM. 
Duff)- (ed), The Military Revolution and State, 1500 to 1800 (Exeter University, 1980), pp.74-75.
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of routine, the army invested considerable resources on the practice. 603 In March 1801, 
for example, the army spent £115 inoculating slave labourers in Jamaica. 604 
Inoculation was one of the few fields in which the army did not lag significantly 
behind the Royal Navy, widespread inoculation not being introduced for sailors until 
1798. 605
Despite the expertise of those who sat on the Medical Board, the Board should 
not be perceived as an overwhelming success and it possessed several limitations. It is 
necessary to appreciate that while those who advised and sat on the board included 
some of the most eminent physicians in Britain, some of their ideas lagged behind 
those of their continental colleagues. This was a view expressed by Thomas 
Chevalier, a surgeon of some note who not only served as Surgeon to the Prince of 
Wales but also wrote a treatise on the treatment of musket wounds that was adopted 
by both the Irish and London Royal Colleges of Surgeons. In particular he urged a 
more modern approach be adopted towards amputation, a practice limited in the 
Prussian army from the mid-eighteenth century but one that remained common in the 
British army. 606 Also apparent is that, even when the ideas of the Medical Board were 
in line with, or even in advance of, continental thinking the practice of medicine was 
further limited by nineteenth century opinions concerning anatomy, physiology and 
disease. 607
An additional factor that inhibited the Medical Board was its role as an 
advisory body. Because of this the skills of its personnel were not directly available to
603 P.E. Razell, 'Population Growth and Economic change in Eighteenth century and Early Nineteenth 
Century England and Ireland', in E.G. Jones and G.E. Mingay (eds.). Land, Labour and Population in 
the Industrial Revolution (London, Edward Arnold, 1987), pp.263.
604 NAM 7508/55/2, Particular Account Number 2. Being for Monies Paid and Advanced by Matthew 
Atkinson, Agent General.
605 Dufly, The Foundations of British Naval Power', p.74.
606 T. Chevalier, A Treatise on Gunshot Wounds (London, Bagster, 1806), pp. 104-122
607 Until the 1840s, for example, there were few advances made in the treatment of tropical diseases. 
P.D. Curtin. Disease and Empire: the Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa (CUP. 
1998), pp.5-11.
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troops in the field and it relied instead upon the personnel of other departments for 
this task. The day-to-day running of medical services in the army was the 
responsibility of the Medical Departments, one existing for each of the army's two 
branches (Horse Guards and the Ordnance). At the head of the Horse Guards Medical 
Department was a director-general and two principal inspectors, both of who were 
qualified doctors, and all three men had joint responsible for employing personnel. 
The number of other personnel employed by the department was subject to some 
variation, and the following figures are based on those of 1812. The Inspectors of 
Hospitals and their deputies oversaw hospitals, a total of eight and twenty-three of 
these personnel respectively being on strength.
The Medical Department exhibited many of the traits of such organisations in 
the period, such as a bureaucratic administration, but differed from similar bodies as 
its structure, while conforming to conventional military practices of hierarchy, was not 
a pyramid. 608 In 1812 the total number of staff employed in army hospitals were, in 
order of seniority, as follows: twenty-four physicians, one hundred and eighteen 
surgeons, ten assistant surgeons, five purveyors, twenty-five deputy purveyors and 
fifteen apothecaries. A total of thirteen personnel (an inspector, a deputy inspector, a 
deputy purveyor and ten surgeons) were noted as being foreign, although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the number of foreigners employed to have been much 
greater. 609 The discrepancy between sources such as surgeons' memoirs and returns 
concerning the number of foreign personnel employed in hospitals may be explained 
by the close co-operation that occurred between the medical services of the British 
army and those of other allied forces; certainly by the end of the peninsular war the 
forces of Britain, Spain and Portugal were co-operating so closely in military
m NAM 6807/441, Appointment of John Webb as hospital mate. 24th December 1811.
609 Army List, 1812 (London, War Office, 1812), p. See P. Hayward (ed). Surgeon Henry's Trifles:
Events of a Military Life (London, Chatto & Windus, 1970).
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operations it was inevitable that supporting services were shared. A feature of medical 
staff was the relatively large number of servants allocated compared to other 
departments, including large Commissariat stations. 610 Physicians, surgeons, 
apothecaries, purveyors and some hospital mates each had a servant assigned, while 
inspectors were each allotted two. Curiously, however, funding for these servants was 
only to be received if they were recruited from amongst the local population. 6 " This 
policy placated medical personnel who wished to have servants, but also prevented the 
employment of soldiers as servants, which was to prove a contentious issue in the
612army.
Inevitably the composition and number of staff present at each hospital varied 
according to the requirements of the army in each region. Those employed at the 
hospital of the Alexandria garrison and their rates of pay are shown below in figure 
30. A notable absence from figure 30 is a purveyor, who would have been present at a 
larger establishment but, as rarely more than half a dozen such persons were employed 
at any one time, the Alexandria hospital remains a typical example of such an 
establishment in the British army.
Rank
Pay
Deputy Inspector
Physician
Staff Surgeon
Apothecary
Deputy Purveyor
Hospital Mate
Hnsnita! Plprk
Number Present
1
1
3
1
1
6
7
£
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
Daily
s
5
-
15
10
10
7
7
Rate of
d
-
-
-
-
-
6
f>
Figure 30: The staff of the British army hospital in Alexandria, 1807. 613 
Some idea of wages relative to expenses can be found in the costs incurred by
610 See NAM 7902/36. Account Book of Assistant Commissary General George Grellier.
611 Quinto de Banos, 8th July 1811, NAM 6807/221, pp. 17-18.
6l - In 1811 orders were issued demanding that soldiers of the Peninsula army employed as servants
without authorisation be returned to their units as the use of soldiers in this role was having a
detrimental impact on manpower. NAM 6807/221, pp.14 -18.
613 NAM 8010/19, Hospital Staff at Alexandria.
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William Dent while serving as a hospital mate at Colchester: lodgings 5s per week, an 
additional charge for the use of sheets at his lodgings (Dent not citing how much this 
cost), a servant from the ranks 2s per week and meals at officers mess: breakfast Is, 
dinner 2s 6d, supper 9d.614 Subtracted from this should also be other expenses 
including the cost of clothing: in October 1810, for example, he spent £1 14s on new 
boots and a coat 6 ' 5
Due to their role surgeons, who comprised almost half the personnel of 
medical departments, were perhaps the most important medical personnel. The status 
of surgeons in the army was ambiguous and somewhat similar to that of 
commissaries. Surgeons wore a uniform (that of the infantry but with a black plume) 
and held a commission, but were not combat soldiers. Despite on occasion serving in 
hospitals that were within earshot of battle, it was not anticipated that surgeons would 
become involved in combat. This was demonstrated by the case of Surgeon Shakelton, 
who was refused compensation for a wound received because, as a surgeon, he was 
not expected to be in the line of fire (although in this case the wound had been caused 
by a stray bullet some distance from the battle). 616 It was not only surgeons serving in 
war zones, however, who had reason to feel aggrieved about their perceived low 
standing in the army: militia surgeons were amongst the lowest paid and in 1804 a 
group serving in Ireland petitioned the Duke of York for an increase in pay. 617 Despite 
such instances it would be incorrect to assume that the army failed to acknowledge the 
contribution of surgeons to the war effort and the sacrifices they could make. An 
interesting example is that of Surgeon Dr. William Irvine, who died of a fever 
contracted whilst treating prisoners of war: his widow received £60 in compensation
614 Dent to Mother, Colchester, 5th March 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
615 Dent to Mother. London, 30th October 1808, NAM 7008/11/2.
616 Sometimes referred to as Shekelton. PRO WO 43/366, Wound gratuity refused to aim) surgeon 
Robert Shakelton.
617 NAM 6801/43, Letter from Irish Militia Surgeons to the Duke of York Expressing Concerns about
Pay, C1804.
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, 618for her husband's death as it was considered to have been in the line of duty. 6
The cases of Shakelton and Irvine demonstrate that the life of an army surgeon 
could be dangerous; while their skills ensured that they would be moved between 
regiments, garrisons or theatres of war as required. Thus, unlike fighting soldiers who 
may well have remained with the same regiment for the duration of their career, 
surgeons had little regimental loyalty. Consider, for example, the career of William 
Dent. His first encounter with military medicine occurred in February 1809 while he 
was still a medical student and continued for several months at Colchester Barracks. &[V 
In May 1810 he qualified as a surgeon but continued to serve as a hospital mate at 
Hilsea Barracks. In August 1810 he arrived at Gibraltar to take up the post of 
Assistant Surgeon to the 9th Regiment but, due to the delay in receiving mail, did not 
receive confirmation of his new role until September. Dent then stayed at Gibraltar 
until March 1811, spending three months treating French prisoners of war at Cadiz. 
Until May he served as acting surgeon at Tarifa and then spent the winter in Portugal. 
In October 1814 he arrived in Canada, returned to England the following August and 
then served in the army of occupation. In 1819 he returned to England before being 
posted to St. Vincents in April. He was subsequently posted to Dominica in October 
1820 and Trinidad in April 1823, after which he was promoted to surgeon."20
Except for those employed as veterinaries (which was in any case a separate 
department), all army surgeons were expected to hold an appropriate qualification. 021 
Thus these individuals comprised a group of qualified persons, a situation reflected in 
a growing professionalism amongst army surgeons. This was evident in a petition 
made by militia surgeons in 1804, which in addition to improved pay, called for staff
appointments to be made available and the allowances of militia surgeons to be
61S PRO WO 25/3995, Register of Annual Bounty Paid to Deceased Officers' Widows.
619 See below p.200
620 See NAM 7008/11, Dent Letters.
621 EighthReport of Military Enquiry (London, Office of the Secretary at War, 1809), p. 150.
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brought into line with those of the regulars (militia surgeons had to serve for fifteen 
years before gaining the same rights as their counterparts in the regulars). Most 
significantly the petition highlighted the fact that a majority of these surgeons already 
had successful careers in civilian life, to which they would return if their situation did 
not improve. 622 Yet, despite possessing qualifications and demonstrating growing 
professionalism, there remained a number of surgeons who were of questionable 
competence.
Surgeon Henry was highly critical of his superior, a German surgeon, and 
noted that he was 'much fonder of schnapps than of surgery; and from keeping late 
hours, not particularly punctual in his morning visits at the hospital; in fact, 
sometimes staying away altogether three or four days'. 623 Interestingly, similar 
comments were made in regard to another surgeon in 1825, who was subsequently 
court-martialled. While falling just outside of the period covered by this work, the 
case of Surgeon Inglis is of significance as it reveals what the army expected of 
competent surgeons and their responsibilities. Inglis faced three charges in relation to 
his conduct at the army hospital on Corfu and it is interesting to note that while 
ostensibly a surgeon of the Ordnance Medical Department, the surgeon operated 
alongside those of Horse Guards. 624 The first charge was of:
Great irregularity in his attendance on Sergeant Reavil of the Royal Artillery 
while in hospital having proscribed for him irregularly, and not having paid 
that attention to his case which it appears to have demanded... [and also] 
conduct tending to aggravate the complaint."25
Surgeons were expected to attend their patients at least twice a day 'to keep regular
622 NAM 6801/43, Letter from Irish Militia Surgeons to the Duke of York Expressing Concerns about 
Pay, c!804.
623 Hayward (ed), Surgeon Henry's Trifles, p.29.
624 PRO WO 71/114, General Courts Martial of Assistant Surgeon Charles Inglis.
625 Charges Preferred Against Assistant Surgeon Charles Inglis of the Ordnance Medical Department 
Office of Ordnance, Corfu 10th November 1825, PRO WO 71/114, General Courts Martial of Assistant 
Surgeon Charles Inglis.
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books of diseases, medicines, diet tables and hospital funds'. 626 Inglis' failure to keep 
adequate records of either the treatment or progress of his patients was raised in the 
second charge:
Negligence as a medical officer in not having regularly recorded or detailed 
the symptoms of Sergeant ReaviPs case, nor the cases of other patients in his 
diary journal or register. 627
The third charge was basically an addition to the first and would no doubt have 
seemed familiar to Surgeon Henry, specifically 'general irregularity in hours of 
visiting his patients in hospital, and for general inattention to those entitled to his 
attendance out of hospital'. 628
The charges demonstrate that surgeons were expected to attend their patients 
regularly and keep records. This is hardly surprising, although the second part of the 
third charge, relating to patients outside of hospital, is revealing. During the hearing it 
was to emerge that Inglis failed to attend at the quarters of a sick officer, and it was 
the opinion of the court that it was the duty of an army surgeon to make house calls of 
this nature. Indeed, this was perceived as being of equal importance to his work in 
hospital. Another important issue raised in the case was the failure of Inglis to treat a 
civilian employed as the servant of an officer. Again the court ruled against the 
surgeon, indicating that servants and non-military personnel were regarded as part of 
the military establishment in regard to eligibility for medical treatment, even though 
they may not have been eligible to draw rations or clothing from the army. 62S
Non-military personnel were referred to in regulations as 'inferior persons' and 
the procedures for the treatment of such persons employed by the Commissariat were 
outlined in the following order:
626 NAM 6807/370/29, Orders For Regimental Hospitals, 1804.
627 PRO WO 71/114, Charges Preferred Against Assistant Surgeon Charles Inglis.
628 PRO WO 71/114.
62y Office of Ordnance, Corfu, 8th November 1825, PRO WO 71/114.
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Whenever any of the inferior persons of the Commissariat department may 
require admission into any field or general hospitals application for that 
purpose must be made by the Commissariat officer under whom such inferior 
person or persons may be serving, to the senior medical officer of the hospital. 
And the Commissariat officer will send the sick person to the hospital with a 
ticket, specifying his name, trade and place of birth. 630
Of note is that admission of 'inferior persons' to hospital, unlike cases involving 
military personnel, required authorisation from both the commanding officer and the 
senior medical officer, not just a sick certificate. The order also addresses the 
difficulty of identifying the large number of persons employed by the Commissariat, 
as the commanding officer was to provide proof of identity. This would have been of 
additional importance overseas, given that the personnel may have been locals unable 
to speak English. 631
The trial of Surgeon Inglis demonstrated that the army would not tolerate 
incompetent surgeons. In addition to doubts about their abilities, however, surgeons 
were also vulnerable to accusations of fraud and embezzlement due to their 
responsibility for medical stores including medicine but also items such as food for 
patients. Such charges were not always correct and in 1815, for example, Surgeon 
Barker, then serving with the 11 th Regiment of foot at Gibraltar, was cleared of 
charges relating to embezzlement and failure to carry out his duty, although it was the 
opinion of the court that he had made some 'dubious decisions'. 632
As a group surgeons were open to criticism but it is important to highlight in 
their defence that their effectiveness could be influenced by other factors. The daily 
running of hospitals effectively rested not with themselves but the sergeants allocated 
to each ward. Possessing at best a rudimentary knowledge of medicine, these
individuals were expected to fulfil a variety of diverse duties within hospitals on a
630 Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
631 See above p.63.
632 PRO WO 17/113, Proceedings Against Surgeon Barker, 1815.
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daily basis. These included ensuring rooms were ventilated and cleaned, that 'no man 
able to sit up is to lie upon his bed during the day', taking responsibility for patients' 
possessions, washing patients, and administering medicine. 633 Thus the success of 
treatments prescribed or administered by surgeons depended to a degree upon the 
abilities of the non-commissioned officers who ran each ward. If, for example, a 
surgeon correctly prescribed a medicine, this could only be effective if the sergeant 
ensured that it was administered.
Besides specialist knowledge to be effective the sergeants appointed to run 
wards also required integrity but this was a trait not always apparent in either 
themselves or their staff. Theft from patients was common, and of his time spent in 
hospital at Wlachern Private Thomas Howell of the 71 st Regiment of Foot noted that:
All the time I was in hospital, my soul was oppressed by the distress of my 
fellow-sufferers, and shocked at the conduct of the hospital men. Often I have 
seen them fighting over the expiring bodies of the patients, their eyes not yet 
closed in death, for articles of apparel that two had seized at once; cursing and 
oaths mingling with the dying groans and prayers of the poor sufferers.634
Besides the limitations of those responsible for the daily running of hospitals, another 
factor that could hinder surgeons was that the system could be stretched beyond 
capacity by a large number of casualties sustained during a single military operation, a 
problem not only in war zones but also Britain itself. This was demonstrated during 
the Walcheren operation, which saw wounded conveyed directly from the war zone to 
hospitals in southern and eastern Britain, and the opening phases of the peninsular 
war, when the required infrastructure to handle large numbers of casualties was not in 
place locally. In such circumstances there was often an insufficient number of 
surgeons available, as the hospitals were prepared to cope with the sick and,
633 NAM 6807/370/29, Orders For Regimental Hospitals, 1804.
634 Hibbert (ed),.4 Soldier of the. 71st, p.45.
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occasionally, wounded soldiers encountered in a garrison, not battlefield casualties, 
while under normal conditions the ratio of the sick to medical personnel in garrison 
hospitals could be as low as eight to one. 635 This resulted in medical students being 
sent into the hospitals at times of crisis and for William Dent this was to be his first 
experience of military medicine. The situation was such that he wrote 'the wounded 
are so numerous and the assistant surgeons so scarce, that the poor men are actually 
lost for want of surgical aid'. 636 Besides being practical training for his future career 
(and enabling him to attain the rank of hospital mate before qualifying as a surgeon) it 
is interesting to note that service in the hospitals at this time gave Dent opportunities 
rarely encountered as he civilian. He recorded that l l am glad that I came here 
[Colchester Barracks] for besides attending the sick and wounded we have the 
privilege of dissecting those who die, and in London we could not get a dead body
> 637under three guineas'.
When a soldier was injured on the battlefield the first stage of his treatment 
was conveyance to a medical post or field hospital. The process of transporting 
wounded away from the field of battle was beset with difficulties. Essential for the 
rapid removal of wounded was the provision of sufficient transport but this was not 
always achieved. Captain John Aitchinson of the 3 rd Regiment of Foot Guards 
highlighted this, when he noted that in the aftermath of the Battle of Salamanca there 
was sufficient transport in the 1 st Division to transport only 42 wounded, despite the 
fact that the formation suffered 300 such casualties. 63" The small number of wagons 
available to remove wounded after a battle was noted by the Duke of Wellington. He 
believed, however, the cause of the problem was not a poor allocation of wagons per
635 Dent to his Mother. Hilsea Barracks, 24th June 1810, NAM 7008/11/2.
636 Dent to his Mother. London. 17th February 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
637 Dent to his Mother, Colchester, 5th March 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
S3S Thompson (ed), An Ensign in the Peninsular War, p.220; Smith, Napoleonic Wars Data Book,
p.381.
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se but rather the utilisation of those allocated to transport items such as regimental 
account books. As a result general orders were issued restricting the practice but this 
did little to improve the process of casualty removal from the battlefield. 639
It is necessary to note that it was not practical for a division to possess a 
number of wagons sufficient to remove all its casualties at the same time, not least 
because casualty rates could vary from battle to battle. At Talavera, for example, 
Aitchinson's division suffered over 1,800 wounded, six times the number sustained at 
Salamanca in the following year. 640 As a result it was inevitable that a number of 
movements would be required to clear casualties but this was hindered by other 
shortcomings. Of major importance was the absence of an effective triage system at 
any point in the process of casualty removal or treatment, with casualties being 
removed from the field as encountered and not according to the seriousness of their 
injuries.
A factor that aggravated the difficulties caused by insufficient transport was 
lack of discipline. Looting would invariably follow victory, while in the aftermath of a 
defeat the wounded would be left to fend for themselves as the army left the field. 
Himself wounded during the Battle of Salamanca, the anonymous author of Life in the 
38th Foot wrote that 'I was so weak that I could not get in [the sick wagon] of myself 
so I was left laying on the ground and was taken prisoner'. 641 Those taken prisoner 
were perhaps fortunate as they were spared the fate of many other injured comrades, 
who, due to the lack of attention paid to the wounded in the aftermath of a battle, fell 
victim to looters, succumbed to their injuries or died of exposure as they lay on the 
battlefield. Immediately after a battle swarms of looters would descend, primarily 
locals but also soldiers and their wives. Captain Browne noted soldiers' wives were
6M Gurwood (ed), General Orders, p.49.
640 Smith. Napoleomc Wars Data Book, p.327.
641 NAM 7912/21, Anon, Life in the 38th Foot, p.52.
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particularly vicious looters, writing that:
They covered in number the ground of the field of battle when the action was 
over, and were seen stripping and plundering friend and foe alike. It is not 
doubted that they gave the finishing blow, to many an officer who was 
struggling with a mortal wound; Major Offley of the 23rd Regiment, who lay 
on the ground, unable to move, but not dead, is said to have fallen victim to 
this unheard of barbarity. 1542
After this looting many bodies were simply left to decompose and following a battle 
the dead were often left on the field in great numbers. During the days following the 
storming of Badajoz Ensign Hennell complained of 'constantly treading on feet or 
heads'. 643 The aftermath of Salamanca was particularly grim, Private Wheeler 
complaining that following the battle 'the smell from a few dead bodies was very 
offensive' and Captain Browne understandably found 'the sight of unburied comrades, 
undergoing the different changes and progress towards putrefaction' particularly 
distressing. 544 Arriving in October 1812, three months after the battle, Conductor of 
Stores W. Morris wrote of the battlefield that 'it still presents a shocking spectacle, 
great numbers remain on the ground, some partly buried with their bones scattered 
about, sculls [sic] and teeth. The effluence arising from it is very offensive'. 64" 
Interestingly, barely a generation later in the late nineteenth-century, the failure to 
bury the dead of either side after a battle would be seen by Europeans as a 
characteristic of so called 'primitive' cultures such as the Zulu. 646
A wounded soldier fortunate enough to be conveyed away from the battlefield 
then had to await treatment in a field hospital, which was often a makeshift
642 R. N. Buckley (ed). The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Tliomas Henry Browne 1807 - 1816 
(London, Army Records Society, 1987). p!74.
643 M. Glover (ed), A Gentleman Volunteer: Tlie Letters of George Hennell From the Peninsular War
1812-13 (London, Heinemann, 1979), p!8;
644 Liddell - Hart (ed). The Letters of Private Wlieeler, p89; Buckley (ed). Journal of Captain Tlwmas
Henry Browne, p232.
643 4th October 1812, NAM 7508/24, Notebook of W. Morris, Conductor of Stores. 1812.
646 During his second invasion of Zululand, Lord Chelmsford avoided the battlefield of Isandlwana due
to the remains of British soldiers that lay on the ground months after the engagement. D. Rattray,
Anglo-Zulu War Battlefields (Bamsley, Leo Cooper, 2003), p. 135.
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establishment in a hastily acquired local building such as a farmhouse. Here, despite 
the best efforts of surgeons, large numbers of casualties would result in a backlog that 
could take days to clear. In 1811 Dent was given the task of caring for wounded 
French prisoners of war, during which time he witnessed the consequences of a 
medical system without triage, and a situation where certain individuals were 
inevitably given a low priority:
We found these unfortunate creatures in a most wretched condition; I think 
without exception the ugliest wounds I ever saw, numbers of them having 
fractured limbs from grape shot, and not being dressed for three days after the 
action (on account of our own wounded being so numerous) they really had a 
frightful appearance, and to crown all, they were laying on the floor, it being 
impossible to procure hospital bedsteads in sufficient numbers. 647
One positive consequence of the lack of triage was that there was little respect of rank 
regarding the treatment of the wounded in hospital. In such situations Surgeon Henry 
claimed to have worked on the principle of'first come, first served; without respect of 
persons [or their rank]'. 64*1
Facilities with resources stretched beyond capacity, poor medical practice and 
a limited understanding of human physiology were not the only factors that restricted 
the effectiveness of surgeons in the British army. The failure of the army to supply 
hospitals adequately with basic medicines and equipment hampered surgeons. The 
Duke of Wellington complained to Lord Castlereagh that even a relatively small 
battle, such as Talavera, would deplete hospital stores. 649 Perhaps the most significant 
difficulty facing surgeons, however, was that one of the most common lethal wounds, 
and therefore the most frequently treated, were those inflicted by musket balls. This 
was unfortunate as musket balls were capable of inflicting horrific and potentially life-
647 Dent to his Mother, Gibraltar, 21 st August 1811, NAM 7008/11/2.
S4S Hayward (ed), Surgeon Henry's Trifles, p82.
649 Wellington to Castlereagh, Talavera, 21 st August 1809, PRO WO 1/228, War Department in Letters
and Papers, 1808-1820.
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threatening injuries. Of such injuries Chevalier wrote that:
a wound of this description must... produce more or less contusion and 
laceration of the wounded parts; will often be accompanied with haemorrhage; 
the fracture of a bone; and, in many instances, with the lodgement of 
extraneous substances. 630
Frequently the velocity of gunshots was sufficient to allow a musket ball to strip 
muscle from bone after entering the body, further adding to the trauma caused by the 
injury. 651
Despite the severe damage inflicted by gunshots even serious wounds could be 
survived. In 1813, for example, Lieutenant Bingham noted how a soldier of his 
regiment survived being shot through both his nose and the roof of his mouth. 652 This 
is remarkable considering that, prior to Chevalier's treatise, the accepted medical 
practice in regard to gunshot wounds was, quite literally, hit and miss. In his treatise 
Chevalier urged surgeons to open wounds prior to operating. This was because such 
practice was perceived to be:
generally safer and better, and often gives much less pain, than poking into a 
narrow and inadequate aperture, or making a random plunge, which may 
include parts that had better be avoided, and perhaps even miss the vessel it 
was intended to secure. 6'3
While primitive by twenty-first-century standards, the advice contained within 
Chevalier's work was a step forwards. Thus, the Royal Colleges of Surgeons adopted 
Chevalier's treatise in 1806 but until this information was disseminated to surgeons 
the wounded continued to suffer the 'random plunge' of medical instruments.
After leaving the field hospital the casualty, depending on the seriousness or 
nature of the injuries sustained, could return straight to his unit, begin a period of
650 T. Chevalier,^ Treatise on Gunshot Wounds (London, Bagster, 1806), p.2.
651 Chevalier, A Treatise on Gunshot Wounds, p. 97.
652 Bingham to his mother, nr Echelar, 3"1 April 1813, NAM 6807/163, p.59.
653 Chevalier. .4 Treatise on Gunshot Wounds, p.75.
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convalescence or be sent to a permanent hospital, such establishments tending to be 
located around six to ten leagues from the lead elements of the army. 654 If transferred 
to another hospital those able to walk made their journey on foot while the others 
were conveyed in wagons or upon mules. Compared to the situation regarding 
transport assigned to remove casualties, transportation for those moving between 
hospitals was relatively well organised: a wagon was assigned to transport the packs 
of the wounded, while mules were allotted to carry either specified personnel or 
medicine. 6^ A column of such troops was placed in the charge of either a surgeon or 
an assistant surgeon and given rations for the required number of days, pre-cooked if 
possible. 6^ Containing large numbers of personnel and slow moving, these columns 
frequently caused heavy congestion on routes used for the transport of supplies and 
other military purposes. In November 1812, for example, Conductor of Stores W. 
Morris noted that 'the road [to Almeida] was wholly lined with sick and convalescing 
troops', making the movement of his supply column impossible. 657
Some personnel did not survive these journeys and William Dent noted of 
casualties arriving in Britain that 'several [officers] have died and the men were 
buried by dozens... the landing at Harwich was truly an awful sight, several men died 
in the landing on the beach'. fo8 For those that did survive, however, the eventual 
destinations varied. Convalescing personnel generally remained at the rear of the 
army, although officers could be allowed to return home. In such cases the period of 
absence was strictly defined and contact was to be made with the appropriate 
headquarters as soon as it ended (commissaries, for example, were expected to report 
to the office of the Commissary General). 659 For the remaining sick and wounded the
654 Quinta, 23tJ June 181L NAM 6807/221, p.16.
655 PortaLegre, 23 rd My 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.21.
656 Thomar. 8th March 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.8.
657 Wednesday 18th November 1812, NAM 7508/24.
S5tl Dent to Mother, Colchester, 12th September 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
S5 " Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
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likely destination would have been either a permanent hospital or hospital ship, either 
of which could have been in the same region as their posting or Britain.
Twenty-six hospital ships were active during the course of the Napoleonic and 
Revolutionary Wars, although the highest number active in a single year was nine in 
1799. The navy had used hospital ships since Tudor times but the army had made little 
use of them and initially viewed such vessels as being little more than transports for 
the sick and wounded, although from 1808 limited use was made of them as floating 
hospitals (such as HMS Charon). Prior to this soldiers had been treated aboard similar 
vessels in colonies, such as HMS Seraphis in Jamaica, where shore-based medical 
facilities were limited. Some craft were designated as stationary hospital ships and 
permanently moored at a single location. Such vessels were not always well placed 
and one was moored a league off the coast of Cornwall, where it was noted that for at 
least one week per year poor weather made it 'almost impossible for a boat to have 
any intercourse [with the shore]'. 660 Hospital ships were often no more than regular 
naval or merchant vessels, converted through the addition of extra bedding, and often 
retained a secondary role as store ships (such has HMS Magnificent). They were 
described as being cramped, dirty and airless. 601
Those soldiers sent to a regimental hospital were in theory better off than their 
comrades afloat. Regimental hospitals were governed by numerous regulations 
concerning ventilation, hygiene and diet but these were frequently circumvented or 
just ignored due to circumstance, lethargy or conftision. Much emphasis, for example, 
was placed on cleanliness but instructions regarding this could be vague. Consider the 
following order, which relates to the cleaning of wards: 'occasionally, in fine weather,
the rugs and blankets [are] to be hung out and well aired, and the bedsteads and
660 Secretary of Customs, Extract on the Report on the Collector and Comptroller of the Customs at 
Sciliy Relative to the Stationary Hospital Ships', 2nd February 1805. PRO PC 1/3643.
661 PRO ADM 102/1, Hospital Ship Musters; Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Plumridge, Hospital Ships and 
Ambulance Trains (London, Seeley, 1975), pp. 16-26.
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canvas to be washed with soap and water, and the plastered walls to be frequently 
whitewashed' 662 . Although the requirement for regular cleaning is note worthy there 
was little real guidance in regard to the frequency of this activity. Is occasionally 
weekly, monthly, six monthly or bi-annually? And what of'frequently whitewashed'? 
Clearly there was a need for the frequencies to be stipulated, although even when this 
occurred it raised further questions: windows, for example, were to be opened daily 
but there is no indication whether this order was rescinded in winter. Often the 
regulations, even if the hospital staff wished to adhere to them, were simply 
impractical or even impossible. It is apparent that the orders were written with ideal 
conditions (such as those encountered in Britain) in mind. It was stated, for example, 
that each man was to be allocated a bed, the linen of which was to be changed 
fortnightly, and 5 feet of space. In practice hospital overcrowding, particularly 
following a large battle or in regions prone to high rates of sickness prevented such 
luxuries. At times the only available bedding was straw on the floor and space, 
especially in the wards of the West Indies, could be as little as 22 inches. 663
There can be little doubt that conditions in military hospitals could be 
unpleasant and even hazardous to health, with death rates ranging from one in sixty- 
seven in Britain to one in twenty-four in the Caribbean. 664 For patients this state of 
affairs was readily, and depressingly, apparent: Private Wheeler of the 51 st Regiment 
of Foot spent five weeks in hospital with a fever and noted that during this time, in a 
bed adjacent to his own, five men died and another left in 'a hopeless state', while the 
anonymous writer of Life in the 38th was convinced he would not survive a prolonged 
stay in hospital665 .
662 NAM 6807/370/29, Orders For Regimental Hospitals, 1804.
663 Statistical Report on the Sickness Mortality and Invaliding Among the Troops of the West Indies 
(London. HMSO, 1838), p.4.
664 Ibid.
665 Liddell - Hart (ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler, p. 153; NAM 7912/21, Anon Life in the 38th 
Foot, p. 24.
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The experience of a period spent in hospital would have been worsened for 
many soldiers by the strict regulations governing them. It is interesting to note that 
these regulations were to be posted in each hospital on a large notice and read out to 
new patients, in a manner similar to modern day health and safety regulations. A 
hospital uniform consisting of white long coat, flannel waist coat, shirt, trousers and 
cap was to be worn at all times and entry to hospitals was strictly controlled so visits 
from colleagues were rare. To ensure these rules were adhered to sentinels were 
appointed:
to prevent all persons from entering the hospital, the staff, or officers in 
uniform, patients and servants of the hospital excepted; to be particularly 
careful in preventing liquor, or anything improper from being carried into the 
hospital. No patients to be allowed to go out without a ticket of leave from the 
surgeon. 666
Ward sergeants were responsible for imposing further restrictions and were instructed 
to 'prevent patients from spitting on the floor, irregularities, gaming [and] swearing', 
as well as preventing the defacing of hospital property. Although perhaps not common 
activities while in the ranks on the parade ground, these would have been common 
amongst soldiers at rest or even on the march, in regimental hospitals, however, 
soldiers were continually under the watchful gaze of the sergeants, who were to report 
any disobedience (although there is little evidence that sergeants did so). In addition to 
these restrictions normal military conventions, such as morning roll call, continued to 
be applied. Then, adding to the misery of a soldier wounded in service of his country, 
was the fact that he was also deducted nine pence per day for the duration of his stay 
in hospital! 667
After several weeks or months in hospital patients would be either sent back to 
their units or allowed a period of convalescing. Some, such as Lieutenant Anderson of
666 Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
667 Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
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the 78th Regiment of Foot, who was wounded at the Battle of Fuentas d'Onoro, were 
granted permission to return home for the period of convalescence. 66" While popular 
with those concerned it was less so with senior army officers, who resented the loss of 
manpower: although required to maintain contact with the army, the personnel could 
still take days or weeks to return to a war zone depending on the movement of 
shipping. 669 The Duke of Wellington in particular was known to be critical of the 
policy allowing troops to return to Britain and Lieutenant Bingham noted 'Lord 
Wellington is very adverse to sparing a man; and the two words "return home" puts 
him into a fury'. 670 Other than officers, however, few soldiers enjoyed the privilege of 
being allowed permission to return home to convalesce. Private Green of the 68th 
Regiment of Foot was typical of soldiers allowed to convalesce by being given light 
duties. Billeted in a makeshift prefabricated hut along with fellow convalescing 
soldiers, he spent his time sweeping the streets of Lisbon until considered able to 
return to his regiment. 671 Even more common than the light duties in which Green was 
engaged while convalescing was an immediate return to the soldier's unit. This policy 
was popular with senior officers as it released manpower but frequently troops 
returned to active duty too early, a situation which brought with it implications for 
their health. Many officers were unsympathetic to the difficulties experienced by such 
men and Major Dickson of the artillery complained that 'our sick increase again, for 
the soldiers that have been cured of agues, from the imprudence in exposing 
themselves unnecessarily to the sun, have had many relapses'. 672
Besides demonstrating a considerable lack of humanity (or, perhaps, a failure 
to understand the processes involved in recovery from an illness), Dickson's
66S J. Anderson, Recollections of a Peninsula Veteran (London, Edward Arnold, 1913), p.70. 
Ms Standing Orders, Order No. 51, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
670 Bingham to his mother Burgos, 3Ili October 1812, NAM 6807/163, p.98.
671 J. Green. The Vicissitudes of a Soldier 'slife (Cambridge, Ken Trotman, 1996), pp.201-202.
67- J. H. Leslie. The Dickson Manuscripts, vol I, (Woolwich, Royal Artillery Institution, 1905), p. 103.
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complaint demonstrates that, in addition to wounds sustained during battle, patients 
were admitted to hospital with other complaints and conditions (in this case described 
as 'agues'). It is important to appreciate that military hospitals were not only filled 
with the wounded as soldiers could find themselves requiring medical attention for a 
variety of reasons. In such instances admittance to hospital was achieved through 
presentation for a sick certificate, applications for which were made through the office 
of the Adjutant-General or, in the case of Commissariat personnel, the Commissary 
General. 673 These applications were assessed by medical boards, which met at selected 
hospitals on the fifth, twelfth and twentieth days of each month. 674
Admittance to hospital for treatment of various ailments was an advantage 
enjoyed by soldiers over civilians because, despite their failings, military 
establishments were relatively well regulated and, while not free, incurred only a 
minor cost. Despite these advantages, however, disease and rigours of service took a 
toll on many soldiers. On 31 st May 1808 Captain Jennings' of the 28th Regiment made 
his decision to retire from the army, stating that:
at this time my health having suffered considerably and finding myself no 
longer fit to encounter the hardship of actual service I resolve to retire... after 
eighteen years service chiefly foreign in which period I completed several hard 
campaigns without ever having experienced any wounds or other corporal 
injury, the usual consequence of field service. 675
During service he had suffered from an occasional liver complaint, in addition to 
'violent and alarming' bleeding from his head towards the end of his career.676 It is 
interesting to note that Jennings, despite the failing health that he attributed to military 
service, regarded himself as fortunate not to have sustained any wounds. Considering
that Jennings avoided the fiercest fighting of the Napoleonic Wars this may at first
673 Standing Orders, Order No. 51, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
674 Cartaxo, 5th December 1810, NAM 6807/221, pp.3-4.
675 NAM 8301/102, Memoirs of Captain Peter Jennings. pp.133-4.
676 Ibid, p. 134.
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appear unremarkable, although the intensity of the fighting prior to the Peninsular War 
should not be underestimated. The significance of Jenning's case is that it 
demonstrates a soldier's health could suffer despite avoiding the trauma of injury on 
the battlefield.
Due to a combination of factors such as the limitations of nineteenth-century 
science, poor living conditions encountered by soldiers on campaign and the 
seriousness of wounds inflicted on the battlefield, death was a feature of military 
medicine during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Many soldiers doubted they 
would survive time in hospital and in such situations turned to religion for comfort. 
Clergy, however, were often notable by their absence and Private Wheeler complained 
that there was 'no minister of religion to cheer the dying sinner' while in hospital. 677 
This was despite the fact that the army had a commitment to provide clergy, and 
associated facilities, to enable religious observance amongst its troops, including those 
in hospital.
The organisation responsible for providing soldiers with access to religion was 
the Chaplain General's Department, whose personnel operated at divisional level. 571* 
Chaplains were exclusively Anglican in this period, and it was not until much later in 
the nineteenth century that those from other faiths were introduced. 679 This was a 
direct result of the relationship between the army and state in the period, and the role 
of religion in the latter. Church and state in Britain were closely linked, the monarch 
being both head of state and head of the Church of England. Ideologically the 
maintenance of Protestantism was perceived as vital to concepts of cultural identity, 
parliamentary democracy and the British way of life. 680 Non-Anglicans were viewed
677 Liddell - Hart, Tlie Letters of Private Wieeler, p. 153.
67S Adjutant General Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811, NAM
6807/221, pp.3 9-40.
679 G. Hanies-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
passim; J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, Johnathan Cape, 1973), p. 137.
6m Co\ley, Britons, p.382.
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with suspicion or hostility and Catholicism in particular was perceived as being 
particularly dangerous, with the fear of 'Popery' sometimes reaching hysteria. This 
manifested itself during the general election of 1807, described by Clive Emsley as 
being one of the most sectarian in British history, and saw Lord Grenville's 
government defeated by the Duke of Portland running on an anti-Popery ticket.6" 
Another faith singled out as the target of suspicion was Methodism, a faith seen as 
subversive as it was non-hierarchical. 6"2 The prejudices inherent in the state were 
transferred directly to the army through regulations that limited the employment of 
non-Anglicans, imposing a glass ceiling on their advancement by restricting them to 
the rank of Captain or lower. 683
Regulations limiting the advancement of non-Anglicans were based on the fear 
of subversion and rebellion, yet it is important to note that even the Anglican faith 
could at times be disruptive and not conducive to good military order. An example of 
a potentially serious conflict between the religious beliefs of an individual and 
military duty arose in 1808, when Private Philip Arthurs of the militia was 
'imprisoned in the gaol of St. Helens for refusing to attend the regimental drills and 
military reviews on Sundays, from scruples of conscience and praying belief 6M 
Arthurs was not a Dissenter but an Anglican, evidence that even adherents of the state 
religion could come into conflict with military authorities. Arthurs appealed against 
his imprisonment, stating that he would be willing to attend on a weekday. The 
military authorities stated that allowing the militia to choose their own day of drill 
would undermine discipline, although the appeal was dismissed by the Privy Council
681 Emsley, British Society, p. 129.
682 Royle, Revolutionary Britannia, p. 14.
683 Cookson, ne British Armed Nation, p. 156.
684 PRO PC 1/3 866, Petition Brought by Philip Arthurs, Private of the South West Regiment of the 
Jersey militia, 11 th April 1809.
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on the grounds that Sunday morning drill was the least disruptive for those employed 
as labourers, farmers and fishermen. 685
The case of the Philip Arthurs was a clear example of how religious beliefs 
could undermine discipline as they resulted in imprisonment. Less apparent, however, 
were the views of soldiers that, while rarely resulting in overt opposition to military 
practices, could potentially undermine discipline and morale. While serving on a court 
martial in 1813, for example, George Hennell wrote that he disproved of the system 
because 'I am accountable to a superior tribunal whose judge has said "Blessed are the 
merciful for they shall obtain mercy'". 686 Another soldier whose views were shaped by 
his religious beliefs was Quarter Master William Surtees, who served with the Rifle 
Brigade and underwent a profound religious conversion while serving in Spain, after 
which he became highly critical of his fellow officers. 687 Soldiers who sought to 
convert their comrades to their views often met with abuse and even threats of 
violence, as discovered by the anonymous author of Life in the 38!h Foot who admitted 
his constant preaching made him unpopular. 688
It is apparent that in regard to religion the army was perceived as a bulwark of 
the Protestant state, yet was itself was not excessively Protestant. 689 Regulations such 
as the Mutiny Act served to limit the role of non-Anglicans, and Catholics in 
particular, but did not prevent them from serving and pursuing a worthwhile career.690 
Not only did the ranks contain non-Anglicans but also the army co-operated with large 
numbers of such personnel. Examples include the personnel employed by the 
Commissariat in regions such as Spain and Italy, and the armies of Allied nations that
s*5 PRO PC 1/3866. Response of John de Veulle Griffith, Jersey, 16th August 1809. 
6SS Glover (ed), ,4 Gentleman Volunteer, p. 113.
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were predominantly Catholic. 691 Protestantism was a principle that the state was 
willing to sacrifice in the face of military necessity, whether it was overriding the 
rights of an individual to worship on a Sunday or accepting Catholics and Dissenters 
into its ranks if not the hierarchy. The latter in particular was to be significant, leading 
to reforms that had implications for society in general. 692
Despite high-minded principles such as defending the Church of England, the 
actual policy towards religion in the army can be best described as lethargic. This was 
apparent at the most basic level, specifically the allocation of chaplains. While 
divisional chaplains were, in theory at least, present in regular formations, there was 
no such provision in the auxiliary formations. This was caused by the structure of 
militia, volunteer and fencible units, formations that were often administered outside 
of a divisional structure and thus unable to benefit from the existence of associated 
personnel. In consequence chaplains were assigned to certain auxiliary formations, but 
were rarely on the active strength of such units. This was demonstrated by the case of 
Reverend Samuel Wells, who was appointed as chaplain to the Coleridge Volunteer 
Artillery in 1804. Despite the formation conducting drills and meeting on a regular 
basis, he was instructed not take up the full responsibilities of his post and 'not to take 
rank in the army except during the time of the said corps being called out into actual
service'. 693
By failing to integrate chaplains fully into the structure of auxiliary formations, 
the effectiveness of such individuals could have been undermined by lack of 
familiarity with those under their care. In part this could have been avoided due to the 
nature of auxiliary units, which tended to be drawn from a single locality, but it is
possible that such a chaplain would have known few individuals originating from
SV1 See above p.62.
Gn Cookson. The British Armed Nation, p. 156.
693 NAM 6807/405, Commission from Lord Lieutenant of Devon appointing Samuel Wells Chaplain to
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outside of his own parish. Even chaplains in regular formations, however, failed to 
make close bonds with troops in regular formations. This included even the overtly 
religious memoirists Quartermaster Surtees who evidently underwent a profound and 
painful religious conversion during his time in the army with little input from military 
clergy. 694 Above all the army's policy towards chaplains in the auxiliary forces 
demonstrated that there was relatively little concern about the religious practices of 
British soldiers, and in consequence only a limited effort was made to force the 
Anglican faith upon them.
The Duke of Wellington wrote that he believed 'the meeting of soldiers in 
their cantonments to sing psalms, or hear a sermon read... is, in the abstract, perfectly 
innocent\ 69:> This was typical of the army's policy, which sought not to instil 
Anglicanism into its troops but facilitate its practice. In consequence, chaplains on 
active service were expected to conduct church services twice per week and divine 
service each Sunday. For such services chaplains were instructed that 'more men shall 
not be assembled for that purpose [a church service] at a time, than the voice can 
reach, a precaution very necessary to ensure the attention of the soldier... [to allow 
this] the chaplain shall perform the service successively to the different corps of his 
division'. 69& The preferred location for such services was the open air as the army did 
little to provide buildings. This may be significant for understanding the attitude of 
soldiers towards religion while in the army because the decline of religious 
observance in urban areas during the period has been linked with lack of religious 
facilities. 697
There is evidence that, due to a variety of factors, services occurred
6 "4 See NAM 7912/21. Anoa Life in the 38th Foot; Surtees. Twenty Five Years in the Rifle Brigade.
pp. 300-314.
695 Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General Orders, p.429.
6y6 Adjutant General Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811. NAM
6807/22, pp.39-40.
697 Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, p.71.
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significantly less frequently than was recommended. Private Wheeler, for example, 
noted that 'in winter quarters [chaplains] once on a Sunday (weather permitting), 
perform divine service, but when the campaign opens, it is seldom, or ever, an 
opportunity offers'. 698 Thus weather and the practicalities of military life could prevent 
religious observance. Many battles - including Waterloo - were fought on Sundays, 
limiting the time available for religious observance. 699 In consequence Sundays were 
frequently perceived by soldiers on campaign to be like any other day. This was a 
significant departure from attitudes in civilian life as both pressure from ecclesiastical 
authorities and state regulations restricted the activities that could occur. Non- 
religious meetings, for example, could not be held on Sundays following the Sunday 
Observance Act (1781) and Seditious Meeting Act (1795). 70° Soldiers on campaign 
were effectively exempt from such regulations and their relaxed attitude towards 
Sunday may be evidence of the general decline in religious practice across Britain 
during the period, as noted by Anthony Harvey. 701
The lack of respect shown by many soldiers towards Sundays shocked recruits 
from staunchly religious backgrounds. Private Thomas Howell of the 71 st Regiment of 
Foot was such a soldier, although he soon adopted the practices of his colleagues, and 
admitted that he did not attend a church service while serving in Spain. 702 It may be 
that this is further evidence of a general decline in religious adherence amongst 
soldiers, reflecting trends in society itself. Through being removed from restrictive 
Sunday regulations and social pressures to conform to religious codes of conduct, it is 
possible that Howell was able to display his true feeling about religious observance 
while on campaign. There were, however, a variety of reasons why formerly devout
698 Brackets in original. Liddell - Hart (ed), 77ie Letters of Private Wheeler, p. 153.
6W Keegan, Tlie Face of Battle, p. 138.
700 Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p.32.
"01 See Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, passim.
702 Hibbeit,^ Soldier of the 71", pp.16-17.
216
individuals, such as Howell, would be reluctant to attend the religious services 
provided by the army.
It is possible that the nature and content of religious services offered by the 
army may have served to deter some soldiers. A sermon preached to the Queen's 
Regiment of Volunteers in 1804, with its references to the destruction of Jerusalem, 
demonstrated that an element of 'fire and brimstone' existed in the discourse of army 
chaplains. 703 That preaching of this nature could be unsuitable was demonstrated in 
advice issued by the Adjutant-General, who recommended that services should 'close 
with a short practical sermon, suited to the habits and understanding of soldiers'. 704 
These instructions are of note not only because of the advice they contained, but also 
that they were one of the few instances in which the army as an institution acted to 
increase its troop's attendance at religious services. This occurred at a time when there 
was growing concern at the spread of Methodism in the army. Thus, John Keegan 
argues, attempts to increase the attendance of religious services directed by army 
chaplains was an attempt to combat the spread of Methodism. 70;> Such a theory 
explains the sudden interest displayed by the army in the content of sermons during 
the later phases of the Napoleonic Wars, the preceding years having been 
characterised by the army's relative indifference to the religious practices of its troops.
Fears relating to the spread of Methodism demonstrated that there existed in 
the army a significant number of troops who were not of the Anglican faith, although 
the precise numbers concerned cannot be determined as the religion of troops was not 
included on returns until 1861 (further evidence that there was little concern about the 
religious composition of the army and, perhaps, a lack of administrative efficiency). 706
" w NAM 7404/58, A Sermon Preached At The Presentation Of Colours To The Queens Royal Regiment 
of Volunteers in 1804. pp. 1-2.
104 Adjutant General" Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811, NAM 
6807/22 l,p.40.
705 Keegan, Tlie Face of Battle, p. 137.
706 Cookson. The British Armed Nation, p. 177.
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For soldiers of other faiths the Anglican religious services provided by the army 
would have had little relevance and, as a result, they either failed to attend or utilised 
local religious facilities such as convents. 707 Such practices, however, could make 
non-Anglican soldiers a visible minority and subject to the prejudices of their 
colleagues, the word Methodist being used as derogatory term to describe a reserved 
individual. 708 Interestingly non-Anglicans were not the only soldiers of overt religious 
faith to be victimised by comrades: the Anglican Lieutenant George Hennell, for 
example, complained that his comrades were profane and mocked the bible, evidence 
of a general decline in deference towards religion in the period. 709
It is apparent that there were a considerable number of reasons why soldiers 
would be reluctant or, for that matter, unable, to attend a religious service. Yet, 
despite a relatively low demand for their services, there were an inadequate number of 
chaplains available to meet this demand. Again this parallels developments in British 
society: a lack of clergy being the factor highlighted by John Foster as the reason for 
declining religious observance in British cities during the period. 710 Lieutenant 
Bingham in particular was critical of the lack of chaplains and complained that the 
small number available was barely sufficient to do more than 'remind us that we are 
Protestants'; he also noted that he believed only by allocating chaplains to brigades 
rather than divisions could this shortfall in religious provision be avoided. 711 
Bingham's belief concerning the allocation of chaplains cut to the heart of the 
problems concerning the provision and attendance of religious services in the army. 
There is evidence that otherwise regular churchgoers, such as Judge Advocate 
Larpent, Captain Browne and Private John Green, were unable to attend religious
707 Green, Tlie Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life, p.21.
7(w Hibbert (ed),A Soldier of the 71st), p.xiii.
"0* Glover (&d),A Gentleman Volunteer, p.201.
~'° Foster. Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p.29.
711 Bingham to his mother, Galispendo 6th March 1813, NAM 6807/163, p. 12.
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services as frequently as they desired, and this inability could be attributed to 
deficiencies in the number of chaplains available. 712
The limited allocation of chaplains to divisions could significantly restrict the 
practice and observance of religion in the army (and it is important to note that there is 
little evidence the army failed to recruit the number of clergy it believed to be required 
- in this case the culprit was certainly policy, not manpower shortages). No doubt 
apathy towards such activities had to be overcome but it was also the role of chaplains 
to encourage faith as well as service the needs of those who possessed it, measures to 
combat the spread of Methodism being a case in point. As result of this role, which 
was almost missionary in nature, the small numbers of chaplains available were 
overstretched, a fact demonstrated by the orders of 1811 which instructed them to 
deliver the Sunday sermon multiple times due to the size of their congregations. 713 
When units were deployed in Christian countries this pressure on chaplains was in 
part relieved through the utilisation of local facilities by the troops, just as Catholic 
soldiers in Spain had used churches of their own religion. On occasion soldiers even 
proved willing to use other denominations' places of worship, the Protestant Private 
Green, for example, stating that he attended both 'churches and dissenting chapels' 
while in Ireland. 714 This, however, was not the situation in distant colonial garrisons, 
which often lacked access to local religious facilities of any Christian denomination.
While Bingham may have been justified to complain of a shortage of chaplains 
in the European theatre, such individuals were almost non-existent in the army 
overseas. The absence of chaplains in units deployed overseas can be attributed to a 
variety of factors. As previously stated, the army had a somewhat ambivalent attitude
712 Laipent (ed), We Private Journal of FSLarpent, vol II,, pp.150-51; Buckley (ed), The Napoleonic 
War Journal of Captain 'Thomas Henry Brawne, p.257; Green, Vicissitudes, p. 185.
713 Adjutant General Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811. NAM
6807/221, pp.39-40.
7" Green, Vicissitudes, p.218.
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to towards religion and it must be noted that, while many overseas garrisons possessed 
a sound supporting infrastructure of stores, hospitals and regimental schools, the same 
could not be said of the provision of chaplains. 715 This may, however, have been a 
consequence not of a deliberate policy (if chaplains were needed anywhere, it would 
be in garrisons isolated from Christianity in darkest Africa) but rather the practice of 
allotting chaplains to divisions. The majority of divisions existed in Europe so to 
ensure these formations were at strength, chaplains were also concentrated in this 
theatre. Conversely, units deployed on colonial duties tended to be deployed as 
regiments or even smaller formations and thus did not benefit from divisional level 
organisations as the provision of chaplains to garrisons at any level would have been 
contrary to established practice.
There is a more fundamental issue when considering the army's failure to 
allocate chaplains to colonial garrisons, which in part relates to the role of such 
individuals. Chaplains were a special case amongst the personnel who helped 
maintain the British army, as they required direct and, on occasion, one-to-one contact 
with the troops. Surgeons could claim such a role but chaplains were unique as to 
function with maximum efficiency their contact had to occur on certain days of the 
week (primarily Sunday) and at certain times of the year (such as Easter and 
Christmas). Achieving this proved a difficult enough task in the European theatre, 
where troops were heavily concentrated, and would surely have been almost 
impossible to achieve amongst the isolated outposts that controlled some of the more 
inhospitable parts of the British Empire. That concerns about the inability of chaplains 
to function adequately in dispersed garrisons persisted was demonstrated by their post 
war distribution. This saw chaplains primarily deployed not to the vast regions of 
Africa or Asia, which possessed scattered garrisons, but relatively self-contained areas
715 NAM 6112/78, pp. 13-17, 115-18, 149-57.
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such as the islands of the Caribbean (see below). In such locations the density of 
troops was higher (the garrison of Jamaica, for example, had a strength of 4,600, 
compared to approximately 1,000 defending scattered British outposts in western 
Africa) making it possible for chaplains to operate with some efficiency. 716
The end of the war in Europe brought with it changes that were to have an 
impact on the deployment of chaplains overseas. The divisions that had fought their 
way through Portugal, Spain and into southern France were, with the exception of the 
army of occupation, disbanded and the army began a transition away from a European 
field force back to one optimised for policing the Empire. 717 As the concentration of 
forces shifted away from Europe to the colonies, so too did the army's chaplains (it 
appears that in this regard reductions in the size of the army were less important than 
the relative concentration offerees in deciding the deployment of chaplains).
From 1812 to 1815 the only overseas garrison to have a chaplain assigned to it 
for any length of time had been Honduras (Chaplain J. Armstrong). 711* Between 1816 
and 1820, however, there was to be a marked and steady growth in both the number of
chaplains and the overseas garrisons to which they were deployed (see figure 31).
Year Number of Chaplains Garrisons Served
1816 6 2
1817 14 8
1818 19 8
1819 18 19
1820 29 19
Figure 31: Chaplains serving in overseas garrisons, 1816 - 20. 71"
716 PRO WO17/2814, Monthly Returns of the Ann) at Home and Abroad.
717 1. Fletcher, Wellington's Regiments (StaplehursL Spellmont, 1994), passim. This work contains
extensive references to the pre-war, wartime and post-war activities of the British units that fought in
the peninsular war, including their destinations after the armistices of 1814 and 1815.
7W 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains 1817', PRO WRO 25/254, Payments by the
Commissariat 1812 - 30.
71i> 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains 1817 to 1820', PRO WRO 25/254.
221
Of particular note is that besides serving an increased number of garrisons, in most 
years the number of chaplains actually exceeded the number of garrisons. This 
demonstrated chaplains were available to serve the more dispersed detachments.
While figure 31 clearly demonstrates that there was an increase in the 
availability of chaplains in overseas garrisons, it is important to note its limitations. 
First there is the question of garrisons and their definition. In this work overseas 
garrisons have generally been defined in accordance with the terminology used by the 
army to administer its forces deployed overseas. These could be somewhat arbitrary 
and of unequal size, Hanover, for example, counted as a single location, as did France, 
while Britain was divided into North (Scotland), South (including Wales and the 
Channel Islands) and Ireland. 720 In the case of the deployment of chaplains to overseas 
garrisons, however, a different system was adopted. In the general army system, for 
example, modern day Canada was divided into Canada and New Foundland, while 
returns for chaplains added New Brunswick. It is this latter system that is used in 
figure 31, rather than that used elsewhere in the work, because, as discussed below, 
the information has implications for understanding how chaplains operated outside of 
Europe. This, however, makes it difficult to compare properly the deployment of 
chaplains to troop concentration. Both of the systems described above relied on 
vaguely defined areas of land, those relating to chaplains merely having the distinction 
of being slightly less general, and, as the more detailed data relating to garrisons in 
this area is incomplete, any comparisons must to a degree rely on estimation.
Another limitation of figure 31 is that it masks a significant imbalance in the 
way in which chaplains were allocated to serve overseas. Specifically, between the 
years 1816 to 1817 the number of chaplains serving overseas doubled from six to
-° PRO WO 17/2814, Monthly Returns of the Army at Home and Abroad.
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fourteen, but of those fourteen no fewer than thirteen were deployed in the Caribbean 
region. The precise locations of these thirteen chaplains are shown in figure 32.
	Location(s) Served
Reverend A. Campbell Jamaica
J. Morris Jamaica
W. Hamilton Jamaica
E. Marshal Jamaica
J. King Windward and Leeward Islands, Barbados
A. Stragham Windward and Leeward Islands
J. MacMahon Windward and Leeward Islands
J. Guilding Windward and Leeward Islands, St. Vincents
W. Chaderton Windward and Leeward Islands, Antuiga
A. Newman Windward and Leeward Islands, Dominica
M Wilson Windward and Leeward Islands, Tobago
L. Berdhill St. Kitts
J. Armstrong Honduras
Figure 32: Chaplains serving in the Caribbean and Central America, 1817" 1 . 
Besides demonstrating the concentration of chaplains in the Caribbean, figure 32 also 
explains a piece of seemingly anomalous data in figure 31. This is the fact that in 
1819 there were eighteen chaplains serving overseas yet nineteen garrisons were 
served. The explanation for this is that chaplains were mobile. Chaplain Guilding, for 
example, was assigned to the Windward and Leeward Islands for two months (25 th 
April to 24th June), St. Vincents for another two months (25 th June to 24th August) and 
spent the remainder of the year at the Windward and Leeward Islands. Conversely, 
Chaplain Wilson began the year in Tobago, spent two months in the Windward and 
Leeward Islands and returned to Tobago that October. Others moved only once during 
the year: Chaplain Chaderton, for example, redeployed from Antigua to the Windward 
and Leeward Islands in June.
By 1819 the chaplains who were deployed abroad remained concentrated in 
the Caribbean, although deployments to Newfoundland and New Brunswick increased 
their number to sixteen. 722 The following year there was a more noticeable increase in 
the number of chaplains serving abroad, and they were to be found with garrisons
721 1817, Warrant Numbers 2777 to 2886. PRO WRO 25/254.
r- 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains in 1819', PRO WRO 25/254.
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such as those in New South Wales, Cape Colony and West Africa. A consequence of 
these and previous deployments was a dramatic increase in the wage bill for chaplains 
serving outside of Europe. In 1815 this had amounted to only 7s a month, which was 
paid to Chaplain J. Armstrong in Honduras. By 1816, however, this bill had rocketed 
by a staggering 34,000%, to £120 2s 7d. It may be that the meaning of this seemingly 
outrageous figure is engulfed by its magnitude, serving as a lesson for historians to be 
wary of statistics, and especially those derived from a single source or limited sample. 
Yet, despite its gargantuan proportions, the increase emphasises the point that there 
was a dramatic increase in the number of chaplains serving abroad following the end 
of the war in Europe. This growth was sustained, as demonstrated by the wage bill of 
1820, which stood at £416 13s 4d per month (a less impressive but still significant 
increase of 346%). 723
Wage bills alone need not be evidence of expansion, merely higher wages. It 
must be noted, however, that the 346% increase of the wage bill was exceeded by a 
500% increase in personnel during the years 1816 to 1820. This data is indicative of a 
slight decrease in the average wage of chaplains serving overseas, a conclusion 
supported by the fact that the average wage in 1816 was 7s, compared to 6s in the 
following year. It would be incorrect, however, to perceive this as evidence of 
chaplains' pay being reduced, rather it was indicative that a growing proportion of 
chaplains less-senior were present in overseas garrisons. As the number of chaplains 
deployed overseas grew, the organisational structures utilised in Europe for their 
administration were adopted.
The chaplains deployed to the Caribbean, circa 1817, are a useful case study of
how chaplains operated. The senior, and thus highest paid, chaplains were among the
723 "Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department 
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains in 1816';  Particular sums Ordered in 
Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department Abroad, on Account of the Pay of 
Officiating Chaplains in 1820', PRO WRO 25/254.
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first to arrive and were located on Jamaica and the Windward and Leeward Islands. 
New arrivals were of lesser rank and assigned to individual garrisons either in these 
island groups or elsewhere. Despite all holding the rank of major and being given the 
title of chaplain, there existed a separate hierarchy amongst chaplains, who received 
varying rates of pay according to their posting and responsibilities. In 1817 there 
existed six weekly rates of pay amongst the chaplains serving in the Caribbean region, 
as illustrated in figure 33:
Weekly Rate
s d
2 6
7 6
9 6
10 6
11 5
14 3
Number of Personnel
Receiving Rate
5
1
3
0
3
2
Total 14
Figure 3 3: Rates of pay for Chaplains in the Caribbean, June 1817. 1 -t
This pay structure remained relatively unaltered until 1819, when an additional rate of 
pay (16s per week) was introduced for the senior chaplain on Jamaica in 1819, in this 
case Chaplain B. Harold. 723 Although no chaplains received the rate of 10s 6d per 
week in June 1817, it was paid on occasion, reflecting the fact that rates varied 
according to posting or responsibility, a system that could only operate due to an 
efficient administration. While on the Windward and Leeward Islands, for example, 
Chaplain King was paid 10s 6d per week, but when serving in Barbados (where he 
was senior chaplain) he received 14s 3d. The pay of Chaplain Wilson switched 
between the 1 Is 5d and 7s 6d rate twice in 1817:
7 '4 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department 
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains in 1817', PRO WRO 25/254. 
7-5 1819, Warrant Numbers 2802; 2804, PRO WRO 25/254.
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25 th April to 24th June (Tobago) 11 s 5d 
25th June to 30th July (Windward/Leeward) 7s 6d 
31 st July to 24th October (Windward/Leeward) 11 s 5d 
25th October to 24th December (Windward/Leeward) 7s 6d. 726
Besides highlighting the mobility of chaplains, these variations in wage also reveal 
that the hierarchy governing them was not necessarily as rigid as in other military 
organisations or, indeed, the Church of England itself. A colonel or a bishop, for 
example, remained just that even if not the senior officer or official following the 
arrival of a higher ranked individual, yet, as demonstrated by the wage variations 
experienced by chaplains this was not so regarding military clergy.
The success of the army's policies regarding the religious practices of its 
soldiers is difficult to measure. There were changes in religious practices in British 
society during the period and the army reflected these, including the growth of 
Methodism and a general decline in deference towards religion. It was inevitable that 
the army would reflect the situation in society, as the number of chaplains was too few 
to meet the needs of practicing Anglicans, let alone bring new believers to the faith. 
This was not necessary for the army to be effective, however, as the force 
demonstrated it could be a bulwark of the Protestant state without itself being 
Protestant. There were various motivations for the policies adopted in regard to 
religion in the army, these being military, political and social. Due to the status of 
non-Anglicans in Britain the army was largely dependent on state legislation to govern 
its own reliaious affairs. Whether as an institution it may have been significantly more 
tolerant is debateable, although the limited efforts made to provide chaplains and
"6 1817. Wan-ant Numbers 2777; to 2886, PRO WRO 25/254.
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opportunity for Anglicans to worship is evidence of a more relaxed attitude, with 
Protestantism a feature rather than a principle.
The motivation for medical services were more clear-cut than those of religion 
in the army, the overriding concern being the maintenance of an effective fighting 
force. The limiting and defining factors of medicine were scientific but in this field 
the state could have been more active. The military revolution had triggered a degree 
of state involvement in medicine and Prussia took a lead in this field as early as 1713, 
when the Berlin Anatomical Theatre was established by the state to train surgeons, 
and in 1723 when a College of Medicine and Surgery was set-up. Regulations were 
also passed requiring all surgeons to graduate from the institution and serve one year 
as regimental surgeons. 727 In some respects British practices, including inoculation, 
were as advanced, but still lagged behind Prussia in relation to fundamental issues 
such as amputation.
Despite such shortcomings it is necessary to note that the medical service 
provided by the army was one of the most comprehensive of its kind in the period and 
was unrivalled by that offered to many civilians in Britain. The army demonstrated a 
willingness to adopt new developments such as inoculation, utilising an integrated 
system of hospitals that were located progressively further from the frontline, and 
introducing regulations to encourage good practice such as cleanliness. These 
regulations were often inadequate but through them the army demonstrated that it 
possessed some understanding of what was required from a modern medical system.
The motivation for reforms relating to women following the army and pension 
provision were as clear cut as those for the medical services, being concerned with 
enlistment. Pensions in particular increased the appeal of the army as a career, as did
127 M. Duffy. "The Military Revolution and State', in M. Duffy (ed), Ttie Military Revolution and State, 
1500 to 1800 (Exeter University, 1980), p.5.
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the inclusion of soldiers' families in army welfare, although this was also one of the 
more altruistic policies adopted. While policies concerning religion maintained at 
least a pretence of the force as a Protestant bulwark and medicine maintained the 
army's strength, the system concerning families could have continued for several 
more years without significant reform, as did many aspects of the army in the period - 
including the medical system. Reforms relating to families reflected the influence of 
the state on soldiers' lives at its most benign, while the attempts to enforce 
Protestantism in the force (albeit half-heartedly) reflected the negative impact of the 
relationship.
The state gave the army the features that principally characterised its 
maintenance, specifically the bureaucratic systems and departments that have formed 
the core of this study. Despite this there existed a group of institutions that lay outside 
the military sphere and, to a limited degree, the state, but were to play an important 
role in maintenance of the army. These organisations form the focus of the following 
and final chapter, a chapter concerned with neither the armed forces in the field nor 
bureaucrats and administrators but rather the bodies that governed the counties of 
Britain.
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Chapter 6 
English county governance and the British army
Maintaining the British army was very much an affair of central government, 
executed through governmental and military departments such as the Ordnance Board, 
the Commissariat and Royal Wagon Train. There remained, however, a small but 
significant role for the organisations and individuals more often associated with the 
governance of counties. Parish councils, churchwardens, justices of the peace and 
Lords Lieutenant would undertake a variety of important tasks directly related to 
maintaining the army. Prior to 1802 these tasks primarily consisted of supervising the 
movement of troops and ensuring adequate numbers of recruits were raised in the 
county. The threat of French invasion would increase the importance of these tasks 
and create new responsibilities for the organisations that governed the counties. From 
1802 the role of these bodies would change from one of merely supporting the 
standing army to raising and maintaining new auxiliary forces in the form of the 
Volunteers.
Due to the efforts of the Royal Navy the invasion was not to occur but the 
contingency plans designed to counter a French landing reveal much about British 
military thinking in the period, and the difficulties that could be encountered when 
raising and maintaining armed forces. 72" More significant is that the invasion 
preparations demonstrate the criteria under which the state would be willing to 
remove the checks and balances imposed to restrict the army and safeguard civil 
liberties, issues that lay at the heart of the army's relationship with the state and thus 
the level of support it enjoyed. The army would have been raised to the status of a
7 -s Some of this research has been previously published. C. Chilcott, "English counties and defensive 
planning. 1803 to 1805', inBulletin of the Military Historical Society, vol. 54, no.215, February 2004. 
pp. 149-154.
229
force that was central to policies for national survival, rather than the third placed 
pillar (behind the fleet and continental allies) of Britain's approach to strategy. Indeed, 
if the army had been called on to repel an invader, these other elements of British 
policy would have already failed. The invasion preparations were the most radical 
aspect of defence policy in the period, and it will become apparent that if the plans 
had been implemented they had the potential to alter many of the issues discussed in 
preceding chapters, not least being the relationship between the army and state.
Traditionally the principal link between county government and the army had 
been the Lord Lieutenant, whose role had been to raise and maintain the county militia 
battalions. While carrying out this task the Lords Lieutenant fulfilled many of the 
functions that in regular regiments were the responsibility of military departments, 
including annual inspections and returns that were similar to those conducted by the 
Adjutant General. 729 These annual inspections were frequently conducted when the 
militia battalions mustered for their fourteen days of annual training, occasions that 
were accompanied by some excitement in the neighbourhood and announced in the 
local press. 730 The outbreak of war in 1793 increased the importance of the Lords 
Lieutenant role in regard to the militia but his role remained confined to the mustering 
of auxiliary forces.
The county officials that most frequently came into contact with elements of 
the regular army were local magistrates, whose task included the supervision of troop 
movements through their areas. 731 This practice was one of the few through which the 
institutions of county governance became involved in the operational affairs of the 
army, although they were also to have a significant role in the administration of the
72y See PRO WO 27/92, Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and Ann)
Council Inspections, 1808; WSRO A1/545, Navy Acts, 1794 to 1795: Books and Papers; WSRO.
A1/550, Army and Navy Acts, 1796 to 97: Books and Papers.
~ 30 New'recruits mustered for twenty-one days. Salisbury Journal, 17th August 1812, p.4.
731 See above p. 133
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militia ballot."2 This task involved many elements of a county's administrative 
structure, the overseers of the poor in individual parishes who paid the expenses of 
those selected by the ballot, the Lord Lieutenant who co-ordinated the county militia 
and magistrates who enforced the quotas. The involvement of county institutions in 
the ballot militia ballot was effectively a blurring between the role of the centre and 
periphery in defence policy, the periphery ultimately possessing not only the power to 
raise troops but also a role in their employment. 733 Joanna Innes describes this blurring 
as evidence of a close relationship between the centre and periphery in Britain, but 
this could also be described as resulting from an anachronism. 734 During the 
eighteenth century the militia had been viewed as a force for local defence so its 
administration at county level was logical. 73" By the end of the eighteenth century, 
however, the militia had become an instrument of national defence, with regiments 
operating outside the boundaries of the home county and, importantly, as a source of 
recruits for the regular army. 736 In these circumstances, the wisdom of administering 
the militia at county level was questionable. Clearly, the relationship between the 
periphery and centre in British politics had evolved at a slower pace than military
developments.
Despite the fact that the elevation of the militia to a national defence force 
rendered the role of the county in its administration an anachronism, other evidence 
exists supporting Innes' description of the close relationship between the centre and 
periphery. Perhaps the most significant evidence can be found in the intended role of 
the bodies associated with county government in the event of a French invasion.
1}- To see how the ballot operated at a count) level, see PRO PC 1/13/160. Militia Returns for 
Lincolnshire and PRO PC l/13/155,EastRiding of Yorkshire. See also Hall, British Strategy, p.2. 
733 See below p.252. 
~ 34 Innes, "The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military State', p. 118.
735 Brewer, Tlie Sinews of Power, p.33.
736 Fletcher, Wellington's Regiments, pp. 15-16; P. Karsten, Irish soldiers in the British Army. 1792 
1922: Suborned or Subordinated?', in Journal of Social History, (Autumn 1983), p.35..
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While this never occurred, the plans drawn up by the government to counter a full- 
scale invasion warrant some consideration. This is because the preparations not only 
relate to the role of county government, which was to be significant, but also reflect 
many of the themes considered elsewhere in this work, by revealing how the resisting 
forces were to be maintained and in some cases raised, while also shedding light on 
some less well-known operational procedures in the regular army. The need to educate 
civilian bakers in military procedures quickly, for example, resulted in discussions 
concerning how the army produced its own bread, the best recipes for yeast and the 
preferred size of loaf. 737 Above all the plans demonstrate the principles that the state 
was prepared to sacrifice in order to aid national defence. 73 "
During the invasion scares that haunted Britain during the first decade of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars period, plans were drawn up regarding the 
capability of each county to help maintain a defending army. A document entitled 
'Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the General Defence' 
formed the blueprint for these plans, which were disseminated to the counties via the 
Lords Lieutenant. 739 Much emphasis was to be placed on the protection of property 
during invasion and an announcement by the Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire stated the 
plans were intended to guarantee 'the particular protection and security of persons and 
property of the inhabitants of this country... and the indemnifying persons who may 
suffer in their property by such measures for that purpose'. 740 Despite such noble 
sentiments, however, the protection of property (which was arguably the cornerstone 
of the British political system) was only a minor concern. At the heart of the scheme 
lay logistics, for both the defending and invading armies, and it was envisaged that the
737 PRO WO 30/141, pp.22-30.
73S Just as the state had shown willing to disregard the rights and beliefs of Anglicans serving in the
Jersey militia, p.23 3.
73 " PRO WO 30/141, passim.
740 Salisbury Journal 11 th July 1803, p. 3.
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whole population of a county would be mobilised to defeat any invader.
The preparations for invasion required careful planning, a process that began 
in 1803 when questionnaires were distributed to each county under the Defence of the 
Realm Act. 741 The bureaucratic practices of the period - including pre-printed forms 
and tabulated data - were used with considerable effect in an attempt to determine the 
manpower resources available in each county. 742 These, and other preparations, 
utilised the structure of county government. Parishes would report to subdivisions, in 
turn these would report back to the Deputy Lords Lieutenant, with the Lord Lieutenant 
having ultimate responsibility for a county's invasion preparations. The utilisation of 
existing bodies allowed the Lords Lieutenant to use their authority to full effect, while 
also allowing a rapid implementation of the required preparations: this was a vital 
factor given that a French landing could have occurred within months or even weeks 
if conditions were favourable. Thus, the Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire was able to 
impose a tight schedule for the initial phase of preparations. On 24th June 1803 he had 
received his instructions; these were discussed at a public meeting on 8 th July at 
Winchester, meetings were held within each Parish nine days later (17th July), and the 
subdivisions met on 25 th July, with the required returns from parishes also completed 
by this date. 743 The dates selected for each meeting were not arbitrary and the selection 
of the 17th is of note as it was a Sunday. This day was selected deliberately to allow 
the parish meetings to be held immediately after morning or evening services, it being 
believed that scheduling meetings after Sunday service would ensure good
attendance. 744
The bodies responsible for governing a county did not continue unhindered by
741 Colley, Britons, pp.306-307.
42 Brewer, Tlie Sinews of Power, pp.222-225.
743 This system was effectively a military one imposed on civilians and is similar to that utilised by 
organisations such as the Commissariat, p.49.
744 Salisbury Journal, 11 th July 1803, p. 3.
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the threat of invasion. Two to three magistrates oversaw each of the subdivisions 
within a county, and such men often held commissions in the auxiliary forces. To 
limit the impact of such persons being called to active service, Lord Hawkesbury 
advised the Lords Lieutenant 'it is essential that the magistrates who are thus 
employed should if possible be persons not holding commissions as volunteer 
officers, nor liable on any other account to be called away from the county'. 745 The 
number of individuals who had roles in both the auxiliary forces and county 
government was considerable. In Wiltshire the commander of the militia, Colonel 
Henry Herbert, Earl of Caernarvon (sic), was also a Deputy Lieutenant, an office that 
entailed separate duties in the event of invasion. The following officers also held 
considerable property or responsibilities outside of Wiltshire and may have fulfilled 
roles in these counties: Lieutenant Colonel George Montagu, Captain Awdry Ambrose 
and Captain Robert Maundrell 746 . This says much about the nature of such forces, it 
being interesting to note that the situation in rural Wiltshire was similar to urban 
Oldham, where prominent local men also provided the officers of auxiliary units. 747 
For the invasion preparations, however, the significance of prominent local figures 
serving in the auxiliary forces was that the allocation of magistrates to oversee 
subdivisions in the event of invasion itself required special planning, in addition to the 
multitude of tasks already facing counties as they prepared to resist an invasion.
The preparations undertaken by each county were to be based on a series of 
reports from each parish, the most important of which were designated schedules one 
through to nine. The information recorded in these reports reveals much about the 
parishes concerned and, most importantly, the invasion preparations themselves. In
745 Circular from Lord Hawksbury, Whitehall, 20ljl August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17, Regulations for 
each county, in case of Invasion.
746 WSRO A1/75 2/19, Return of the Qualifications of Deputy Lieutenants and Commissioned Officers 
[of Wiltshire Militia], 29* January 1796.
747 Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p. 13.
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particular it is apparent that the schedules represented forward planning, in contrast to 
the reflex doctrine normally utilised to maintain the army. 748 The purpose of each 
schedule is summarised in figure 34.
Schedule 1 Available Manpower
Schedule 2 Food
Schedule 3 Overseers
Schedule 4 Men willing to arm themselves
Schedule 5 Men willing to act as labourers
Schedule 6 Men willing to carry supplies
Schedule 7 Millers willing to mill flour
Schedule 8 Bakers
Schedule 9 Waterborne transport
Figure 34: Preparations for invasion, schedules one to nine."^
Had they been fully completed, the schedules would have amounted to a miniature 
doomsday book of England during the years 1803 to 1804. Schedule 1 was concerned 
with available manpower, those unfit for service (labelled 'infirm'), the number of 
aliens and the number of Quakers. No other denomination of dissenters was singled 
out in these reports, the Quakers being singled out as a consequence of their belief in
pacifism. 7M)
Schedule 2 was a survey of available livestock and 'deadstock' (otherwise
known as crops). This encompassed the following categories: numbers of oxen, cows, 
young cattle and colts, sheep and goats, pigs, riding and draft horses, wagons and 
carts; quarters of wheat, oats, barley, beans and peas, potatoes and malt; loads of straw 
and hay; while flour 'and other meal' was given special attention with counts of both 
quarts and sacks. Schedules 7 and 8 built on this by listing millers and bakers 
respectively who promised to supply goods in the event of an invasion. Similarly
74S Compare this to the system utilised by the Commissariat. See chapter 2.
74y WSRO 1719/30, Wiltshire Lieutenancy Papers Dealing with the Parish [of Box's] Preparation to
Raise a Volunteer Force to Meet the Anticipated French Invasion, schedules 1 to 9.
750 Voluntary Contributions, Anonymous pamphlet, 1798, WSRO 1719/30.
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schedule 6 revealed the number of wagons, categorised by the number of draught 
animals they required, that the parish would supply, in addition to associated 
personnel such as drivers. 751 Emphasis was to be placed upon four-horse wagons, 
which were vehicles seen as sufficient to carry up to either fifty hundredweight of 
flour, grain, wood or coal, or twenty hundredweight of bread, biscuit or straw. 752 The 
vehicles recorded in schedule 6 were to be supplemented by those described in 
schedule 9, which sought to determine the waterborne transport available in a 
parish. 7 " 3 Of note is that throughout these plans the role of the vehicles, whether 
wheeled or waterborne, was to be the transport of supplies rather than other tasks such 
as evacuation of wounded personnel. Indeed the lack of consideration for medical 
purposes was to be one of the most glaring deficiencies amongst the forces established 
in 1803.
Schedule 3 was particularly important as it determined who in the parish 
would be overseers for the various items outlined in other schedules. These 
individuals were to be responsible for implementing the key component of a county's 
invasion preparations, specifically the uprooting of whole communities in the path of 
an advancing enemy army. The village of Box had six such individuals appointed: 
William Brown, William Roger, John Lee, Joseph (surname illegible), Charles James 
and George Mailing. 754 On 19th November 1803 the Lord Lieutenant of Wiltshire
advised that:
the superintendents of parishes... are to convene a meeting of the inhabitants 
as soon as possible, to fix upon some place of rendezvous where all the horses, 
cattle, sheep, wagons and carriages (not wanted for the service and supply of 
the King's Troops) that can be convened away... in order to be removed... 
upon the order of the Lord Lieutenant. 7x"
751 WSRO 1719/30. schedule 6.
752 PRO WO 30/141, p.16.
753 WSRO 1719/30, schedule 9.
754 Minutes of Meeting 25* December 1803 held Parish of Box. WSRO 1719/30.
"55 Brackets in original. General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Saram, 19th November 1803. WSRO
1719/30.
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The purpose of listing the infirm in schedule 1 was to ensure means to remove them 
had been arranged prior to invasion and an overseer was also appointed for this task. 
Livestock, wagons, money and account books were all to be moved with the 
population, while bakers and millers were instructed how best to render their 
equipment unusable by an invader (by breaking crowns of ovens and upper mill stones 
respectively). 7^ Such destruction demonstrated that the policy of evacuation was 
designed to prevent resources from falling into enemy hands as much as it was a 
means of civil defence. Although a common practice in response to any invasion great 
importance was attached to denying the French invader resources because it was 
envisaged that the enemy would be forced to exist solely on supplies drawn from the 
immediate vicinity. 757
If the invader was to be so easily contained, why was a landlocked county such 
as Wiltshire included in the plan? Certainly plans had to be made for a worst-case 
scenario, i.e. an enemy breaking out of the beachhead. Wiltshire itself, however, had 
historically been considered vulnerable to invasion despite having no coastline. 7iS 
Wiltshire's borders were only 30 miles from major ports such as Bristol and 
Southampton. This demonstrates that administrative areas such as county boundaries 
were not always compatible with military realities. Yet these boundaries were to be 
the basis of the anti-invasion plan.
By its nature the plan had to prepare for a number of contingencies, a French 
advance inland being one of them. This, however, was not the sole reason for the 
continued evacuation of communities in the event of invasion. Besides denying the
756 General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30. Wiltshire 
Lieutenancy7 Papers Dealing with the Parish [of Box's] Preparation to Raise a Volunteer Force to Meet 
the Anticipated French Invasion; PRO WO 30/141, p.5n. 
~57 PRO WO 30/141, p.3. 
758 Colley, Britons, p.308.
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invader resources, the scheme was also intended to maximise those available to 
defending forces. This aim is demonstrated in orders issued by the Lord Lieutenant of 
Wiltshire regarding livestock.
If the enemy should advance into the county... His Majesty has given express 
orders... that all horses or draft cattle, that are in evident danger of falling into 
the hands of the enemy, should be shot or hamstrung, provided they are not 
wanted for the service of th_e_army... and axle trees or wheels of all carriages 
in the same predicament, should be smashed or broken as much as possible. ;759
It is apparent that the policy was not merely a genteel version of scorched earth 
(achieved through depriving the enemy of resources by a policy that emphasised 
removal rather than destruction) because, throughout the movement of these 
communities, the overriding concern was to ensure that as much as possible was 
preserved for the defending forces, who would get first pick of items scheduled to be 
destroyed. 760 Fully implemented, the invasion preparations were to have enabled the 
army to utilise the resources not only of the counties targeted by invasion but also 
those adjacent or further from the enemy lodgement. For the duration of the invasion 
at least the army would be given free rein to requisition the resources it required to 
drive the French back into the sea. This would have undermined a notion central to the 
relationship between the British state and its population in the period, namely the 
sanctity of private property. 761 As for the resources not required by the army, some 
would have been removed but the rest sacrificed for national defence.
The rights of private ownership were seemingly protected in orders issued to 
county lieutenants, which stated that 'the first principle is an indemnification from the 
communities at large... for the value of all stock which may be removed in
7W Underlining added. Orders, General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803. 
WSRO 1719/30.
760 A similar scheme was proposed for the defence of Prussia in 1813, but in that case it was the 
intention that the population would disperse to wage a guerrilla war on the occupying army. Fuller, The 
Conduct of War, p. 58.
761 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.49.
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consequence of invasion'. 762 In this respect, it appeared that the policy was little 
different to that which already existed regarding procurement and was operated by 
organisations such as the Commissariat. 763 When the practice is considered in the 
context of the anti-invasion scheme, however, the assault on the rights of ownership 
becomes apparent. This was particularly so regarding livestock, which would have 
effectively ceased to be the property of the owner, despite instructions to brand each 
animal with the mark of the parish before moving them. In many cases such marks did 
not exist and their importance is highlighted by the fact that the design for that of Box 
(a BX contained within a capital O) was the first item on the agenda at a meeting 
convened to consider the invasion preparations of the village. 764
Livestock were to be effectively little more than a mobile source of food for 
the army under the supervision of selected citizens (specifically the overseers named 
in schedule 3). 765 These personnel were to 'remain in charge of the same [cattle], 
unless it shall be appropriated for the consumption of our own troops, or to be sold... 
at markets, in the rear of the army'. 766 Orders to the overseers of the livestock from 
each parish regarding ownership were only a fa9ade, as the livestock would have 
effectively been placed under army control at the moment of evacuation. The 
movement of cattle would have required co-operation with the army, and the generals 
commanding in each district were ordered 'to give every assistance and 
accommodation in [their] power, for the protection and subsistence of the cattle, and
of persons attending the same'. 767
Once livestock and other supplies arrived at a depot or market it would be
purchased by commissaries and receipts issued. Of note is that even if items were not
""PRO WO 30/141, p.3.
763 For this in operation see chapter 2.
764 Minutes of Meeting held on 25th December 1803,. WSRO 1719/30.
^K It is apparent that if Britain had been invaded the diet of defending soldiers may have been similar to
that in Spain and Portugal, pp.72-76.
166 Orders, General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarimx 19th November 1803. WSRO 1719/30.
767 PRO WO 30/141, p.4.
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purchased, their owners required permission from a commissary to sell them, an 
important right of ownership that would have been taken over by the military. 761* Once 
purchased by a commissary the normal procedures of the army would have been 
applied and the items would have eventually filtered through the various stages of the 
logistics system until they reached the intended recipients. While the rights of 
ownership were not to be totally suspended in the event of invasion, it is clear that 
they were to be significantly restricted. The prices at which cattle and commodities 
such as flour were to be sold to the army were to be decided by magistrates. 769 
Evidently these prices would have been regularly assessed and considered, giving rise 
to the possibility of price fluctuations and varying prices between localities. This 
would have been a new way of operating for the army in Britain as it was normally
maintained through long-term contracts that provided both low and stable prices. 770
While livestock were mobile, it was acknowledged that some items too bulky
to be moved to depots would have been required by the army. Consider the village of 
Box alone, which contained amongst other items 346 quarters of wheat, 63 quarters of 
oats and 1059 loads of hay, but only three wagons allocated to the task of moving 
these goods. 771 The result was a plan to convert the villages left vacant following their 
evacuation into supply depots themselves, from which supplies such as grain and flour 
could be distributed. Of note is that this actually contradicted a central concept in 
'Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the General 
Defence', that 'the [English] county abounds in supplies of all kinds to such a degree 
which renders the laying in of extensive magazines unnecessary'. 772 By using villages 
as distribution centres they would have effectively become magazines, with the
~M PRO WO 30/141. p.5.
" 6 * PRO WO 30/141. pp.17, 22.
770 For a consideration of the benefits of contracts see pp. 89-91.
771 WSRO 1719/30, schedules 2 and 6.
772 PRO WO 30/141, p.15.
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additional advantage that many already lay on a road and canal network.
Parishes were instructed to appoint 'several and discreet trusty persons' for the 
task of remaining behind in the village after its evacuation, until the enemy 
approached or they were surrounded (how this latter situation was to be escaped was 
not made clear). Their role was to safeguard the remaining goods and 'facilitate the 
means of supplying our army with what must otherwise be destroyed'. 773 It is likely, 
but not explicit in the orders, that a number of millers and bakers may also have 
remained in the villages. Such individuals would have co-operated closely with the 
Commissariat, which would have both purchased the goods they produced and 
arranged the delivery of necessary supplies (such as flour for bakers if none was 
available locally). 774 Furthermore commissaries may have been required to advise 
civilians about how best to bake their bread, giving an insight into how this activity 
was conducted in the military. Many civilian bakers believed that ovens could only be 
used to produce four batches of bread per day, although in the military six was 
standard practice. It was anticipated that yeast would be in particularly short supply 
and bakers were advised to produce either unleavened bread, or manufacture their 
own yeast. The latter was to be achieved through using a recipe written for the Dunbar 
garrison in 1796, rather than experimentation, as it was the belief of the authorities 
that 'it is highly necessary to caution everyman concerned in supplying an army, 
against placing any confidence in schemes not perfectly and satisfactorily tried 
himself. 775 The optimum loaf size was to be between three to four and a half pounds, 
with a thick crust, as such bread stayed fresher longer. Guidance was also to be given 
how best to stack bread on wagons (preferably when cold) and the duration of any
storage prior to its consumption. 776 This advice is notable not merely because it
773 PROWO30/14l r p.5.
774 PRO WO 30/14l.pp.22-3.
775 PRO WO 30/141, p.30.
776 PRO WO 30/141, pp.24-30.
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reveals how the army stored bread but also because similar written instructions to 
commissaries in other theatres of war do not appear to have existed.
The movement of entire populations, while envisaged as a means to aid the 
supply of the army, would have been a remarkable feat of logistics itself. The scale of 
the task facing the county authorities cannot be underestimated: the livestock that was 
to be moved from the village of Box alone would have included 242 cattle and oxen, 
298 pigs and total of 2,971 sheep and goats. 777 Preparations were required to sustain 
animals and humans alike. For livestock, orders advised that the route taken included 
'such places that afforded good water and plenty of pasture', while civilians ordered to 
leave their homes were advised to take with them 'a small quantity of salted or dried 
provisions, not being cumbersome for... temporary sustenance'. 778 Those responsible 
for livestock were not expected to fend for themselves, although no allocation was 
made for them from military stores. Instead it was recommended that 'the proprietors 
[of cattle removed] should furnish them [those overseeing the cattle] with means to 
provide themselves and the cattle under their care with necessary subsistence'. 77y Only 
wagon drivers and associated personnel were to receive supplies from stores, rations 
consisting of one and a half pounds of bread per day for each man and either ten 
pounds of oats or fourteen pounds of hay per horse. 71*0 This ration was comparable to 
that prescribed for horses in the Peninsular campaign, reflecting the importance of the 
civilians wagons to the anti-invasion plan. 781 It also highlights a particular inefficiency 
of animal drawn convoys, specifically a tendency to consume much of the supplies 
that they carried. This problem would remain until the introduction of railways, when 
railheads could be established near the front to reduce the time animals spent away
777 WSRO 1719/30, schedule 2.
"7S PRO WO 30/141. p.4; Orders, General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803,
WSRO 1719/30.
7?y Orders. General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
780 PRO WO 30/141, p. 17.
7S1 See above p.78.
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from stables. 7 " 2
The movement of large numbers of civilians and livestock would have placed 
a heavy burden on the transport infrastructure. When moving large bodies of civilians 
the Lords Lieutenant were instructed that:
proper march routes should be fixed upon for driving them away to certain 
places of security in the interior of the country, taking care to chuse [sic] bye 
roads for that purpose; that the Great Turn Pike Roads may remain entirely 
free for the marching of troops... and where it may be unavoidable to pass one 
or more of the great roads, it should be done in such a manner, that they may 
only be crossed and occupied during the shortest time possible. 783
It was further recommended that, to avoid congestion, the movement of civilians be 
approved by the general commanding that district. The large herds of sheep present on 
the South Downs were a particular source of concern in Wiltshire because, due to 
their proximity to the English Channel, it was likely they would be removed soon after 
an invasion. It was stated that 'the greater part of this county is highly favourable for 
the removal, not only of inhabitants, but of large flocks of sheep requiring space; they 
must therefore take their route over the downs'. 71*4
The evacuation of herds would have caused considerable disruption not only 
to the transport infrastructure but also to the regional economy. If the French had 
driven inland then such herds would have been lost in any case but given that the 
envisaged scenario was of an invading army being confined to the coast such 
disruption would have been unnecessary. John Brewer states that the principal object 
of any invader would probably have been to cause financial panic rather than capture 
territory. 785 Thus the policy of evacuating herds as soon as invasion occurred would in 
fact have aided the enemy. It is necessary to note that while Brewer believed an
~*2 Schechter and Sander. Delivering the Goods, p. 45.
"w PRO WO 30/141. p.4.
7S4 General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
785 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 191.
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invasion with such objectives would have been best aimed at southeastern England, an 
invasion at any point in southern England would most likely have caused severe 
economic disruption due to the anti-invasion measures. This supports Linda Colley's 
claim that Wiltshire was a county likely to be threatened by an invasion, even though 
it was landlocked. 71*6 Wiltshire might have been affected by a French invasion 
primarily because of its wider repercussions, not actual military action or an advance 
inland.
Clearly sheep and civilians on foot could make the journey cross-country but 
this would have been more difficult for the wheeled conveyances that would have 
been used to move the infirm, food, personal possessions and those unwilling to walk. 
The village of Box had promised to supply three carts for conveying supplies to 
defending forces, each with four animals (a total of twelve). Schedule 2, however, 
reveals that the village contained no fewer than ninety-two draft horses, leaving a total 
of eighty animals available to pull the carts and wagons of the population. It is likely 
that, despite orders to the contrary, many of the population would have taken to the 
roads, particularly in a village such as Box that sat astride the London to Bristol road
(the modern day A4). 7 * 7
The wagons allocated for the transport of supplies were to be ready to move at
twenty fours notice. It was expected that they would travel twenty-five to thirty miles 
per day, depending on load but such a figure may have been excessively optimistic. 78 " 
These vehicles occupied an ambiguous position within the command structure and it 
is unclear whether they were to be given the same rights on the roads as the military. 
This was crucial because if the vehicles were to be regarded as military, civilians were 
expected to give way, but if this was not the case wagons, and the supplies on them,
m Colley, Britons, p.308.
7S? WSRO 1719/30. schedule 2.
7 >* PRO WO 30/141, p. 16.
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would have been expected to travel cross-country as much as possible. Such vehicles 
had only limited cross-country mobility and, while wagons earmarked for military 
service were instructed to be equipped with at least one tool such as a shovel in case 
of becoming stuck, movement would have been slow. 7ss>
It is likely that bureaucracy and regulations may have further slowed the 
movement of the civilian wagons impressed into military service. The rights of the 
individuals manning the wagons was made clear to them when opting for this duty, 
and it is apparent that in the anti-invasion scheme the rights of the individual were to 
be eroded less than those of private ownership. Each vehicle was to be given a 
certificate identifying the owner, driver, number of horses and, most significantly the 
date at which it was to be discharged from duty, along with the number of days spent 
marching. Drivers were to be paid for each day of service, according to rates set by 
magistrates and lieutenants in each county. Every wagon was also to have a conductor 
of stores, responsible for ensuring that receipts were received for all goods transferred 
and rations received. 790 The system was bureaucratic and had the potential to be a 
recipe for disaster if enacted, with drivers unwilling to move without the appropriate 
paperwork or because their period of service had expired. The Royal Wagon Train had 
been formed to avoid such situations and the utilisation of civilian transport for 
general military service would have thus been a step backwards for the army. 791
Living off requisitioned cattle and its advance probably slowed by columns of 
refugees and evacuees, the British army would have sought to drive back the invader. 
The regular army would have been supported in this task not only by the militia but 
also by other formations created to resist invasion. 792 A scheme to raise a corps of
7S" WSRO 1719/30. schedule 6.
™ PRO WO 30/141, pp. 16-17.
7>n See chapter 4.
:w For a consideration of how they were raised see C. Chilcott, "English counties and defensive
planning, 1803 to 1805\ mBulletin of the Military Historical Society, vol. 54, no.215 7 February 2004.
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mounted scouts and guides from local populations was never implemented but new 
Volunteer units were to be raised. 793 Besides infantry and cavalry formations, the 
Volunteers included pioneer corps that were to be raised from each parish. Their role 
was described in 'Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the 
General Defence' as follows:
The duty of the pioneers will generally consist in repairing and opening such 
roads, bridges and communications as may facilitate the movement of our own 
army, and in breaking up and obstructing such as it may be necessary to render 
impassable to the enemy. 794
The inclusion of a corps of pioneers in the invasion preparations is notable for several 
reasons. Not least is the fact that it demonstrates an understanding and appreciation of 
the need for supporting arms in an army. In addition the pioneers represented a natural 
progression of the doctrine adopted in British defence plans, one that sought to both 
deprive the enemy and support British forces (in this case through opening and closing 
lines of communication as required).
The pioneers were to have operated in companies of twenty-five to fifty men, 
commanded by a lieutenant or captain respectively (schedule 5). In the event that the 
minimum number of twenty-five could not be attained companies from different 
parishes would have been combined, this was a contrast to policy in the regular army, 
in which even seriously under strength formations were rarely amalgamated. 79' 
Equipment would have varied between units as personnel were required to provide 
their own and the following was a recommended list of items for a unit of twenty-five 
men: six each of pickaxes, spades and shovels, three billhooks and four felling axes. 790 
In addition it was also noted that 'a proportion of wheelbarrows will also be very
7 "3 PRO WO 30/141, p.6.
794 pRO wo 30/141, p.6.
793 Orders. General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sanim, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
7% PRO WO 30/141, p.6.
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serviceable'. 797 The fact that the pioneers had to provide their own tools was evidence 
that the state lacked the means to meet adequately the needs of defending forces itself, 
and raises doubts about their effectiveness if such tools could not be supplied.
An insight into the volunteer units formed to counter a French invasion can be 
gained by the fact that the ability of each parish to supply personnel for military 
purposes (as summarised in schedule 4) was initially based on the number of 
individuals able to arm themselves. It was anticipated that each parish would be able 
to supply contingents of both horse and foot, while the armaments each was to 
provide reveals much about the force and its potential effectiveness on the battlefield. 
Cavalry were requested to supply a pistol or a sword (preferable both), while those on 
foot would provide either a 'firelock' (musket) or pitchfork798 . The reason for this was 
laid out in a letter from the Lord Lieutenant to the parish of Box in August 1803:
There will be difficulty in issuing arms from his majesty's stores for the 
extensive training and exercise required in this period, without material injury 
to the other essential branches of the military, I am directed to resort to the 
zeal and public spirit of the inhabitants of this county for procuring a return of 
arms in their possession, in order that, with their consent, they may for a time 
be applied to the service of this country. 799
In short, there were insufficient armaments to go around and the use of civilian 
weapons alleviated the need to supply firearms to volunteer formations. 800 Of note is 
that the Lord Lieutenant stated that a ratio of one musket between four men was 
initially sufficient, to allow for adequate training and drill/ 01 There was thus a very 
real possibility that volunteer units resisting a French invader in 1803 could expect to
engage the French with a ratio of one musket to three close combat weapons (one
""PRO WO 30/14Lp.6n.
""* WSRO 1719/30, schedule 4.
"w To the Minister. Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the
County of Wilts, from the Lord Lieutenant, Wilton House, 2"d August 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
m This is further evidence that the supply of munitions to coalition partners occurred at the expense of
British forces, p. 105.
m To the Minister, Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the
County of Wilts, from the Lord Lieutenant, Wilton House, 2nd August 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
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hundred and fifty years previously, during the civil war, the ideal ratio of shot to pike 
had been approximately two to one).
Interestingly there appears to have been no attempt to emulate the tactics of 
Irish rebels in producing large numbers of pikes. Easily produced by village 
blacksmiths, these had proved to be effective weapons against cavalry in close terrain 
during the rebellion of 1798."02 This would have been of great value to the volunteer 
units given the questionable utility of their own cavalry, an arm that requires extensive 
training for both its personnel and animals."03 Furthermore, volunteer cavalry lacked 
carbines, which were weapons not generally available to private citizens, but of some 
value on the battlefield."04 This would have put them at a major disadvantage against 
other cavalry even if problems associated with insufficient training and drill could 
have been overcome. Giving the proven value of the pike in the hands of trained or 
willing civilians, as in 1798, the failure to adopt the weapons for the volunteers 
appears inexplicable. Conservative military thinking no doubt influenced the decision 
but the most likely explanation is that, fearful of unrest, the government was reluctant 
to promote the manufacture of such a weapon in the English provinces. This was 
understandable given that even a relatively quiet county in the period, such as 
Wiltshire, showed signs of growing unrest during 1802, the year in which the anti- 
invasion plans were introduced. *°- That August, for example, a Samuel Baker was 
convicted:
on a violent suspicion of having unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously 
assembled, and having feloniously by firing of arms, and using other offensive 
Weapons, attempted to destroy the dwelling-house [sic.] and mills, belonging 
to John Jones, Esq., of Staverton.*06
*°- See T. Pakenham, Tlie Year of Liberty: We History of the. Gnat Irish Rebellion of 1798 (Hodder &
Stoughton, 1992), p.77; A. T. Q. Stewait. The Summer Soldiers: Tlie 1798 Rebellion in Antrim and
Down (Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1995), passim.
m MacDonald- Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry, pp.lx-lxi.
m Haythomthwaite, Tlie Napoleonic Source Book, p. 80.
s05 Charlesworth (ed), Rural Protest, passim.
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Only four days earlier, a Thomas Hilliker and 'divers other persons not yet taken' had 
been convicted of destroying a mill, while three Trowbridge cloth workers had been 
found guilty of attempting to form an illegal combination (trade union). 807 For further 
proof that insurrection remained a concern of the government, the historian needs to 
look no further than the role of the volunteers in the event of invasion, which was to 
include suppression of disorder in rear areas. 501*
Significant difficulties would have been encountered in supplying the 
volunteer units due to the variety of firearms that would have been found in their 
ranks. As individuals were encouraged to supply their own firearms it is likely that 
everything from duelling pistols to fowling pieces, in a variety of calibres, would have 
been employed. The authorities were well aware of the potential difficulties that such 
diversity could cause and special provision was to be made for these firearms:
It is earnestly recommended to all who voluntarily offer to appear with arms, 
to provide a bullet mould for the calibre of their gun or pistol, a small bag for 
bullets, and a powder horn, lest the bore of their arms, being smaller than those 
of the army, should prevent their using the ammunition made up for the King's 
Troops, in which case a delivery of lead and powder will be made to them. 809
The request for accoutrements such as powder horns and the like, while unusual, was 
not unreasonable giving that those possessing firearms would already own some or all 
such items. Most surprising is the offer to deliver lead and powder to individuals for 
the manufacture of their own munitions. Such a decision was not taken lightly in a 
period of revolutions and demonstrates the seriousness of the French invasion threat. 
A valid question is that if the government was willing to supply shot and
806 Devizes Session, 10th January 1802, WSRO Al/125/46W , Calendar of Prisoners in the Count) Gaol 
at Fisherton Anger and Devizes and Marlborough Bridewells, 1803, p.6.
807 Devizes Session, 10th January 1802, WSRO A1/125/46W, pp.6-8.
m To the Minister, Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the 
Count) of Wilts, from the Lord Lieutenant, Wilton House, 2nd August 1803, WSRO 1719/30. 
809 WSRO 1719/30, schedule 4.
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powder, why did it not authorise the widespread manufacture of pikes? Linda Colley 
describes the decision as a calculated risk on the government's part. sl° It was also a 
limited risk, however, as those receiving the lead and powder already possessed 
firearms so the potential threat already existed, unlike a horde of rebels armed with 
pikes recently produced by a local blacksmith. In addition, allowing part-time soldiers 
to maintain possession of their firearms even when not on duty was not a new concept 
but an existing policy. This was demonstrated by the following appeal, placed in the 
Salisbury Journal by the commanding officer of the Dorset Yeomanry: 'All persons 
that formerly belonged to my regiment... and do not intend to renew their services in 
that corps, are requested to give in their arms and accoutrements to their respective 
captains'." 11 Those weapons that were not returned may well have found their way into 
the ranks of the volunteers.
Many contemporaries believed the forces raised in the counties would have 
been an effective force due to their structure, organisation and the fact that they drew 
their manpower from a single locality. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson wrote of land- 
holding officers that 'a feudal attachment [of his tenants] would, in a great degree, 
supersede the necessity for any martial control'; while the Lord Lieutenant of 
Wiltshire stated in August 1808 that 'it can scarcely require a moment's consideration 
to determine how preferable it must be for the volunteers to be formed into distinct 
corps, officered by gentlemen of respectability in their own neighbourhoods'." 12 Such 
ideas may appear to be a desperate attempt to justify the concept of the Volunteers: 
given their diverse armament and initially poor training it is difficult to imagine the 
volunteers achieving little more than being hacked down by French cavalry,
* 10 Colley. Britons, p.328.
*'' Salisbury Journal 11 * July 1803, p. 1. . 
812 Wilson An Enquiry into the state of the Forces of the British Empire, p!2; To the Minister, 
Churchwardens. Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the Count) of Wilts, from 
the Lord Lieutenant Wilton House, 2ml August 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
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presuming they stood to fight or even turned out at all. Despite this the Irish rebels of 
1798 proved what could be achieved and it is possible that the volunteers, fully 
integrated with the regulars, may have achieved some success on the battlefield. At 
worst they could have relieved frontline troops of tasks such as convoy or prisoner 
escort in the rear areas, or provided a means through which potentially serious 
disorder could be contained."13
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter with a brief consideration of county 
governance in the aftermath on invasion. Even though the volunteers were mobilised, 
livestock on the move and villages serving as depots, the magistrates of the county 
bench and lieutenants were to have continued to play a role in maintaining the 
defending forces. Due to the movement of the population away from their homes, 
continuing the militia ballot would not have been possible, although justices could 
have continued to supervise the passage of troops. In August 1804 regulations were 
published concerning 'the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of 
invasion, in each county in Great Britain'. If these regulations had been implemented 
it is apparent that the civil power, while officially supported by the military, would 
have effectively become subordinated to its requirements. Such a course would have 
been anathema to many libertarians in Britain, and surely would have been used as 
vindication for the views of those who had long warned of the dangers posed by the 
ever-growing power of the state. 814 It was a situation that may have been inevitable for 
national survival but one that could have lasted indefinitely as legislation existed for 
enacting the regulations but not repealing them.
The regulations required that the magistrates sit daily, along with an officer of
the volunteers and chief superintendent of constables. The primary task of these
m Regulations for the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of invasion, in each count) in
Great Britain, 12* August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17, Regulations for each county, in case of
Invasion.
814 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.63.
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bodies would have been suppressing disorder in the army's rear areas, the regulations 
stating that they were 'to receive and execute the orders of the magistrates, in 
preventing and quelling disturbances, in taking up and conveying offenders to prison, 
in supplying escorts for all military purposes... and furnishing a guard for the county 
gaol... if wanted'. 1* 1 ' It was anticipated that the 'military purposes' described above 
may have included the maintenance of supply lines:
If, contrary to expectation any impediment should occur in the regular supply 
of the different markets every assistance is to be afforded to the persons who 
are accustomed, or who offer to supply them; and escorts to be granted in 
cases where it may be necessary for the secure passage and conveyance of 
cattle and provisions. 816
Such duties could have only been fulfilled if the volunteers were present in the county. 
It is, however, questionable if such formations would have turned out at all, many 
militiamen in Ireland opting to remain with their families when called upon to act 
against Irish rebels in 1798.* 17
If deprived of a military force to deploy at the request of the army, the role of 
the magistrates would have been confined to determining the rates of pay for wagon 
drivers employed in support of the military, and the price at which items such as flour 
and bread were to be sold to commissaries.""* How long this situation existed would 
have been decided by the efforts of the British armed forces, aided in no small part by 
the invasion preparations implemented by the magistrates, Lords Lieutenant and 
parish officials of counties across Britain. In the meantime the army, providing the 
regulations had been fully enacted, would have been able to break many of the bonds
815 Regulations for the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of invasion, in each count) in 
Great Britain, 12th August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17, Regulations for each county, in case of 
Invasion.
816 Regulations for the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of invasion, in each count) in 
Great Britain, 12th August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17.
817 B. Cleary, 'The Battle of Oulait Hill: Context and Strategy', in D. Keogh and N. Furlong (eds), The 
Mighty Wave: the 1798 Rebellion in Wexford (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 1996), p82.
818 PRO WO 30/141, pp.17, 22.
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that bound it within the British state, particularly regulations that governed the 
requisitioning of property. It remains to be seen, however, if the breaking of these 
bonds would have been only a temporary suspension of practices or a permanent 
fracturing of the balance between state, society and army created in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. The relationship between army and state had been 
profoundly changed by the traumatic events of the seventeenth century and invasion in 
the early nineteenth century may have been no less traumatic, having the potential to 
create political repercussions of a similar magnitude. Thus, plans to maintain the army 
in the event of invasion may have proved as damaging to Britain's economic and 
political stability as military action itself. The extent to which this would have 
benefited the army is unclear, and would to a large extent have depended on the 
degree to which it was able to break free of the constraints previously imposed upon it 
by the pre-invasion British state.
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Conclusion
The relationship between the state and the army defined how the force was to 
be maintained. Because of this it would have a significant influence upon the function, 
structure, capability and effectiveness force itself. This was to have important 
consequences, both advantageous and otherwise. It is these consequences that 
demonstrate the importance of understanding the relationship between a state and its 
armed forces, as they have implications for the effectiveness of those forces and thus 
the military affairs of states.
The consequences when an army gains dominance over a state, which occurred 
in mid-seventeenth century Britain or Nazis Germany, are well known. When the role 
is reversed, with the state the dominant half of the partnership, however, this too has 
consequences. In particular, states have a stranglehold on the resources available to its 
military. Eighteenth century Britain is acknowledged to have possessed an economic 
and industrial strength unrivalled by its competitors but, as this work demonstrates, 
those resources available to the army were barely sufficient to meet the force's needs. 
A particularly important resource for the army was manpower and it was continually 
lacking a reserve of this." 19 Traditionally historians have focused on deficiencies in the 
fighting arms. This may be because it can be inferred that, as the combat arms were 
under strength, their supporting organizations could function while themselves under 
strength. It is apparent, however, that historians are in general apathetic to the 
organizations tasked with maintaining the army, almost entirely ignoring those such as 
the Royal Wagon Train and Medical Department. More importantly, it is apparent that 
such an inference is incorrect.
Hall, British Strategy, pp.6-7.
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The consequences of the manpower shortage were apparent in regard to the 
Chaplain General's Department. This was far too small for its task and unable to 
influence the religious affairs of soldiers significantly. 820 The Royal Wagon Train also 
had to contend with a shortage of manpower and could have achieved considerably 
more had it been enlarged. 821 This could have been of significant benefit for the 
Commissariat, which was often compelled to rely upon local transport overseas. The 
employment of Spanish and Portuguese muleteers was not a major problem for the 
army but could nevertheless hinder efficiency."22 Economics was a decisive factor in 
determining the quantity of manpower available but was not the only one. Much has 
been written about Britain's economic strength and its beneficial consequences, but 
this strength could only be maintained through depriving the military of vital 
resources, the most important of which was manpower. 823 Almost as important as 
manpower was materiel, as this too cost money and was required to sustain Britain's 
economic growth. The commercialisation of industry dictated that production was 
geared towards profit rather than meeting the needs of the armed forces. The two 
could be compatible but this was not always the case.
Finance permeated every aspect of logistics. To prevent the abuse of liberty the 
army was required to pay for the supplies it required, a system that relied on cash or 
credit, the availability to the army of both being controlled by the state. Required to 
pay its way with barely sufficient means the army frequently found itself living a hand 
to mouth existence and unable to construct a significant logistical reserve. Historians 
have frequently written about the small size of the army and its inability to survive 
defeat but manpower could have been raised through conscription if the need arose.
What is overlooked is that it was a capability to arm and maintain these new forces
^ See above p.220. 
821 See above p. 175. 
*" See above p.65. 
8-3 See above pp.88-89.
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that did not exist. There was simply too little slack in the system to rectify any 
deficiencies. Manufacturers were already cutting corners to meet contracts, and even 
prior to the Peninsula War deficiencies of items such as clothing were being rectified 
through using equipment acknowledged to be substandard.*24
It would be incorrect to view the army as completely starved of resources by 
the state. Surprisingly the one organization that was clear evidence of the beneficial 
consequences of the relationship between army and state is the one most often 
overlooked by historians - the Royal Wagon Train. The organization was a bright spot 
in the system used to maintain the army. The concepts underpinning it were modern, 
perhaps even progressive, and its creation was evidence that the influence of the state 
over the army was not entirely detrimental. The organization was relatively efficient 
and flexible, utilising technology created as a result of the industrial and agricultural 
revolutions, and benefited directly through the growth, (both political and 
geographical) of the British state due to the absorption of the Irish Wagon Train. The 
Royal Wagon Train represented a new doctrine as it was relatively self-contained and 
provided a transport capability maintained through its own artificers. This allowed the 
Royal Wagon Train to exhibit a degree of structural fluidity, the organization being 
able to restructure itself in response to the strategic situation. This manifested itself 
not only in an ability to create or demobilise troops but also develop new operational 
practices, leading to the creation of the depot troops.*25
The flexibility of the Royal Wagon Train made the organization ideally suited 
to the pragmatic policies adopted towards logistics as it was created to meet the needs 
of the army at the time. The Royal Wagon Train represented a modern approach to 
warfare; by comparison the quasi-military Commissariat was an evolutionary dead-
s24 See above p. 114. 
"5 See above p. 142.
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end for the army. The Commissariat is often criticised for its failings yet historians 
have shied away from addressing this, its most fundamental difficulty.
Creveld writes that nineteenth century warfare began, and eighteenth century 
warfare ended with Napoleon's campaign of 1805, when movement replaced sieges as 
the central component of strategy."26 By establishing the Royal Wagon Train in the 
1790s, therefore, the British army was already, if inadvertently, preparing for this new 
form of warfare. Neither the Royal Wagon Train nor Commissariat would survive the 
nineteenth century, their roles ultimately being amalgamated in the Royal Army 
Service Corp.*27 As a purely military force, employing its own specialist personnel, it 
was, however, the Royal Wagon Train that most closely paralleled the R.A.S.C. and 
later organizations. Intriguingly, the relationship between the British state and its 
military in the twenty first century is again becoming heavily influenced by economic 
concerns, rather than military effectiveness, and civilian contractors have once more 
become an integral part of the army's supporting services.
The Royal Wagon Train demonstrated that despite drawbacks the relationship 
between army and state was not necessarily detrimental for the former. It is the case 
that factors that caused difficulties could also bring benefits. For example, financial 
considerations frequently ensured economy rather than military effectiveness was a 
priority but also improved efficiency. 82" Administrative practice in the army was 
significantly influenced by the state and there is a tendency to equate bureaucracy with 
inefficiency. As the army of the period demonstrated, however, this was not always
the case as regulations limited corruption in the logistics system. More importantly,
*26 Creveld, Supplying War, p.40.
827 Indeed, this was the fate of almost the entire system utilised to maintain the force in the period, the 
multitude of departments with often over lapping jurisdictions slowly being amalgamated into larger, 
more efficient organizations. The most significant of these advances was the absorption of the 
Ordnance Department by the War" Office in 1855. This united the aims of the army into one command, 
although it is necessary to note that this did not necessarily improve efficiency and improve co- 
operation between the arms. As late as the 1960s there were power snuggles within the army 
concerning the responsibilities and roles of the Royal Artillery. 
82S See above p.41.
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and frequently overlooked, is that increased regulation created standards for soldiers' 
welfare even after their period of service. Regular inspections ensured that barracks, 
schools and hospitals met the required criteria. Considering the conditions in the latter 
this is contentious but nevertheless regulations existed that defined standards in 
hospitals, and these regulations were enforced on occasion. Regulations created 
additional costs and administration for the army but it is apparent that in this period 
there was a trend towards increasing investment in soldiers' welfare, a situation seen 
to benefit the army. This was most apparent in regard to the treatment of soldiers' 
families.
The state provided the resources and impetus for many of the factors that gave 
the British army its strength but this strength was fragile. The army lacked strategic 
depth, a policy that suited a state conscious to avoid disruption and control 
expenditure but one that was also a dangerous gambit. Potentially the army could have 
been a one shot weapon, defeat in one campaign spelling the end of the force, such a 
fate effectively befalling Napoleon's Grande Armee in Russia, a debacle from which 
it never recovered. 829 There was a genuine fear amongst contemporaries that such a 
fate would befall the British army if committed on the continent, and it has been 
estimated that the loss of one brigade may have been sufficient to cause the collapse 
of the Peninsular army. 100 If such an event had occurred it may well have resulted in 
the loss of the Royal Wagon Train's most effective elements and many Commissariat 
personnel, besides the loss of equipment and frontline troops.
Considering the above scenario, how realistic was the possibility of a 
significant British military defeat? Given the nature of this study, such a question 
could be turned to that of how effectively was the army maintained. Yet, as stated by
*-9 Mackesy. British Victory m Egypt, p.4.
*30 Wilson. An Enquiry into the state of the Forces of the British Empire, p.51; Weller, Wellington in 
the Peninsula, p.372.
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Schechter and Sander, the effective maintenance of a force is not itself a sound 
indicator of that force's success. Successful maintenance may make a force more 
effective but is not a guarantee of victory. 831 The example they cite is that of 
McClellan's Peninsula Campaign of 18627 in which poorly supplied Confederate 
forces consistently beat better maintained Union formations, but examples relevant to 
this study could include Spanish victories during Napoleon's initial invasion of Spain 
and the success of Irish Rebels in 1798.
When considering the possible fallibility of British arms in the period, a 
common stumbling block is the perception of the Napoleonic Wars as a British 
victory. This ranges from the outrageously jingoistic and populist version of events 
portrayed in the work of Richard Holmes, who describes the British army as 
possessing 'a certain something that flickers out across two centuries like an electric 
current', to the Anglo-centric works of historians such as lan Fletcher, who describes 
the Peninsula War as 'Britain's greatest military contribution to the downfall of 
Napoleon Bonaparte'. s32 The former statement in particular represents a throw back to 
the views of the early to mid twentieth century, held by historians such as Charles 
Oman and Jac Weller.
Piers Mackesy writes that prior to 1800 the British army had known little but 
failure, examples including defeat in North America, a fiasco in the Low Countries 
and the devastation of garrisons in the West Indies by disease."33 Following 1800 the 
force was to emerge victorious but not unbeaten, with famous victories such as 
Salamanca and Vittoria sitting alongside fiascos and disasters such as Buenos Aires
"31 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.22.
"3- R Holmes. Red Coat: We British Soldier in the Age of the Horse and Musket (London, Harper
Collins, 2001), pxvi; I. Fletcher (ed), Voices from the Peninsula: Eye Witness Accounts by Soldiers of
Wellington 'sArmy, 1808-14 (London, Greenhill, 2001), p.5. As a contrast to the work of Fletcher see
Esdaile. The Peninsular War, passim.
833 Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt,, p.3. Added to this could well be the army's performance in the
Irish Rebellion of 1798.
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and Walcheren. As noted by Peter Hofschorer even the most famous victory of all, 
Waterloo, would have been a disaster had it not been for the intervention of the 
Prussians. In fact the often forgotten campaign that followed the battle was militarily 
an overwhelming Prussian victory, with only British political influence in Paris 
keeping Blucher in check, depriving Prussia of well deserved glory in the process. 834 
Perhaps Holmes' most pertinent point about the British army is that it was capable of 
victory and not immune to defeat."35
The concept of the British army as a success can to a great extent be attributed 
to a Euro-centric perception of the Napoleonic Wars. It was within the borders of 
Europe that many decisive battles were fought, while some of the greatest fiascos 
were to occur elsewhere, including the disastrous expedition to Argentina, defeat at 
New Orleans and the devastation of garrisons in the West Indies by disease (although 
the success of British arms in Europe were not universal - the Corunna campaign 
being a case in point). As David Chandler stated, no battle or indeed campaign should 
be seen in isolation but rather as the sum of many parts, so the Napoleonic Wars 
should be no exception. 836 Despite being a struggle between European powers the 
conflict was fought across the globe, to a lesser extent than that of the Seven Years 
War maybe, but it was still a global war.*37
Another important factor is that the British army was to participate in conflicts 
that were not always part of the Napoleonic Wars or had only a tenuous link to that 
conflict, against colonial enemies in Africa, Asia, the Americas and the United States 
of America. 838 Philip Haythornthwaite effectively divides the British army into two 
during this period, that part of the force engaged in colonial actions and that arrayed
834 P. Hofschroer, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign The German Victory, Volume I (London, Greenhill,
1999), pp. 116-129, 271.
** Holmes, Red Coat, p.xvi.
536 D. Chandler, Waterloo: Tlie Hundred Days (London, Osprey, 1980), p. 11.
M7 See Black, Britain as a Military Power, pp. 115-154. 241-266.
83S Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Military Machine, p. 78; P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p. 5.
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against the French threat. 83" Yet, to understand the army the two spheres cannot be 
separated as one could influence the other and, as noted by Jeremy Black, conflict was 
closely linked to concepts of Empire in the period.*40 As demonstrated in this work 
garrisons in all theatres competed with each other (and allied armies) for the 
sometimes scarce resources that they needed, including uniforms, munitions and 
manpower (as demonstrated in the global distribution of chaplains in particular). The 
global deployment of the army was also one of the most subtle but significant 
consequences of its relationship with the state, creating a situation that not only 
hindered the army but also influenced its composition. 1*41 Thus, in the context of a 
force deployed around the world, the failures of the army beyond Europe cannot be 
ignored. M2
If it is accepted that the British army was not an overwhelming success, and a 
major defeat was possible, it must be asked how far the state was willing to alter its 
relationship with the army in order to aid the recovery of the force? The state 
demonstrated that certain principles would be sacrificed to aid national defence, such 
as the right of practising Anglicans to worship when they wished if in the auxiliary 
forces. More far reaching concessions may have been made in the event of a French 
invasion, a situation that had the potential to trigger the implementation of military 
control over large parts of southern Britain, not to mention massive economic and 
social disruption.
* 39 See Haythomthwaite, Tlie Napoleonic Source Book. Hie Colonial Wars Source Book (London.
Anns and Armour, 1997).
s40 Black. Sea Borne Empire, pp. 113-114.
841 In particular colonial commitments influenced the creation of light infantry tactics and formations in
the army. A. Harman, 'They decide not, nor are they chiefly relied upon in battle 1 : British Rifles and
Light Infantry in the Peninsular War', in P Griffiths (ed), A History of the Peninsular War Vol IX:
Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999).
pp.265-298.
s42 Imperialism could and did continue separately from military affairs. Examples include the Mungo
Park's expeditions in West Africa (1795-97, 1805-06) and Flinder's circumnavigation of Tasmania
(1802-03), the latter in particular beign concerned with trade. Black, Sea Borne Empire, pp. 165-166.
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It must be assumed that if the invasion had occurred the scheme would have 
been implemented. Not only had the necessary (and detailed) regulations been 
introduced but the army had already demonstrated that in a war zone peacetime 
regulations governing it could be eroded. At the most basic level administrative 
practices introduced due to the relationship with the state were circumvented by 
military necessities, while more significant were the ruthless activities of 
Commissariat personnel and purchasing agents in the hunt for the items they required. 
There is no reason to believe the activities of Commissaries on the front line in 
England would have been any different to those in Spain and Portugal, particularly in 
an area already devastated by French occupation. 843 Whether this would have left the 
relationship between state and army in tatters is less certain, this being dependent on 
how long the situation lasted and the extent to which the old rules were broken. What 
is apparent was the willingness of the state to consider sacrificing central principles in 
aid of national defence, thereby redefining the relationship between army and state.
The repercussions of any change in the relationship between the state and 
army in response to an invasion might have been significant. The maintenance of an 
armed force is as much a political or economic issue as it is a military one. As a 
consideration of how the army was maintained in the period demonstrates, a state can 
both facilitate and hinder the growth and maintenance of an armed force. After 
determining how an armed force is to be used, one of the most important tasks facing 
policy makers is how it should be maintained. This will define the relationship 
between an army and state, as well as the effectiveness of the force. In turn this will 
determine the military options available to a state and the ability of an armed force to 
protect the state itself.
*43 Throughout the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars there was little difference between 
the practices of occupying and friendly armies when gathering supplies. Corvisiex, Armies and 
Societies, pp.66-67.
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Introduction
The maintenance of armed forces is an under researched subject. This can 
create a significant gap in our understanding of history as it is a subject concerned 
with a variety of issues, not merely the effectiveness of armed forces. The existence of 
a gap in our knowledge is demonstrated by the maintenance of the British army at the 
end of the eighteenth century. It is incorrect to believe that the subject of how the 
army was maintained in the period is concerned solely with wagon counting. It was 
entwined with economics, politics, stability and military power, and remains an under 
considered area. This has arisen due to a polarisation in the canon of literature relating 
to Britain's military in the period. Historians including Clive Emsley, Jeremy Black 
and Lawrence Stone have written extensively on how the British state sought to 
support the army. Other historians, including Paddy Griffiths, lan Fletcher and Philip 
Haythornthwaite, have described the army in the field. The gap in our knowledge of 
the period exists because there is little consideration of how the resources provided by 
the state were translated into a form that could be utilised by the army in the field. It is 
through this process that an army is maintained, and it is also through this process that 
the consequences of the relationship between an army and state become apparent.
In his influential study of the subject, Martin van Creveld has described 
military logistics as being 'the practical art of moving armies and keeping them 
supplied'. 1 He notes that this was a key element of strategy that relates not only to 
requirements such as food but also organisation, administration and transportation. An 
important refinement of this argument has been made by Damon Schechter and 
Gordon Sander, who highlight that military logistics has since the Age of 
Enlightenment ceased to be 'just a uniformed matter', that is to say one concerned
1 M. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (CUP, 2004), p.l.
exclusively with the military.2 They argue instead that military logistics are often 
based on the ability of a nation, including its manufacturing base and infrastructure, to 
support its armed forces. There is thus a close relationship between the state and 
military logistics, as demonstrated by the relationship between the British army and 
the state during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The implications of the close relationship between state and army in the period 
could be significant. The force was contained by the state, which imposed political 
and economic boundaries on the army that restricted its influence and size. This was 
achieved through the intermeshing of the military structure with that of civilian 
government, the army being unable to act without the support of the latter. This 
intermeshing occurred not only at the higher levels, with half of the army controlled 
by a civilian (the Master of the Ordnance), but also in the field, where commissaries 
working alongside the army were employed by the Treasury. The consequences of the 
intermeshing of military and civil were to have an impact at a variety of levels, the 
extent of which has yet to be fully considered by historians.
The relationship between the state and army had considerable implications for 
both defence policy and the nature of the military power that stemmed from it. Jeremy 
Black states that the keystones of British military power in the period were four 
fundamental capabilities: suppression of revolt, a small but effective army, naval 
dominance and an ability to wage transoceanic warfare.3 This study, however, takes 
the view that British military power was instead based on three pillars: the navy, 
subsidy of foreign allies and the army. That this policy existed has often been used by 
historians as evidence of Britain's industrial strength. This study demonstrates that this
2 D. Schechter and G. Sander, Delivering the Goods: The Art of Managing Your Supply Chain (New 
Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 2002), p.21.
3 J. Black, The British Sea Borne Empire, (London, YUP, 2004), p. 170.
strength was fragile, and that the three tier policy was only practical because the army 
was given a low priority.
The lower priority given to the army did not prevent the state from at times 
ruthlessly utilising the force to pursue its own aims, a fact particularly apparent in 
regard to Empire. The global deployment of the army arose as a direct consequence of 
it being a tool of an Imperial power and it was expected to police the Empire, a 
keystone of the British state in the period, despite itself occupying the third tier of 
British defence policy. Thus the state frequently expected a return in excess of its 
sometimes-miserly investment in the army, and the disparity between resources and 
expected function was to continually hinder the army.
The relationship between army and state not only influenced the force's 
deployment and resources available but also had a significant impact on its structure. 
Through the intermeshing of civil and military, and the dominance of the former, the 
army adopted many of the characteristics of civilian administration in the period, 
including bureaucratic practices and departmentalisation, along with the benefits and 
drawbacks of each. The organizations tasked with maintaining the army exhibited 
such traits to a high degree and they were heavily departmentalised, various bodies 
having specific roles, albeit on occasion overlapping jurisdictions. The advantage of 
the departmentalisation for the historian is that the administrative structures provide a 
framework around which a study of how the army was maintained can be structured. 
This study differs from many works relating to the maintenance of the army as it does 
not focus on a single department but instead focuses on several. 4
In some cases the organizations upon which this study is based were large and 
their role significant, so they are considered in their own chapters. The first to be
4See for example J. Sutton (ed.), Wait for the Wagon (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1998); Lieutenant Colonel 
J. H. Plumridge, Hospital Ships and Ambulance Trains (London, Seeley, 1975).
considered will be Commissariat (chapter 2). This department is one of the few 
involved in maintaining the army that receives any attention of note from historians, 
who are often critical of the organization. The Commissariat had various roles, 
including storekeeper, supplying food and book keeping. It was a civil-military hybrid 
and a study of this organization is effectively a study of the relationship between army 
and state in the field, while its bureaucratic practices ensure it is also a case study of 
military administration hi the period. As this study will demonstrate it was neither the 
complete failure that it is often portrayed, nor wholly responsible for many of the 
failings in the logistics system. The only other organization to be allocated its own 
chapter is Royal Wagon Train (chapter 4). Thisorganization is almost entirely ignored 
by historians but warrants a much a higher profile than it is commonly given. Through 
an extensive consideration of the Royal Wagon Train's structure and evolution, this 
study demonstrates how the army was able to display some structural autonomy and 
had an ability to adapt to new challenges, despite the constraints placed on it by the 
state.
Organizations that fulfilled less important roles are grouped on a thematic 
basis. The first group to be considered form the basis of chapter 3, and are 
organizations tasked with procurement for the army. This group includes the Barrack 
Master General and Quarter Master General, the role of which was providing 
accommodation; the Clothing Board, that co-ordinated uniform provision; and the 
Ordnance Board, that supplied munitions. The attitude of historians towards these 
organizations and the items that they supplied has often been apathetic. Furthermore, 
when these issues have been considered it has tended to be from a limited perspective. 
Often little consideration has been given to how these items were supplied. Much has 
be written, for example, about the appearance of uniform and regulations concerning
it but not how it was regulated. The situation regarding accommodation is particularly 
interesting as historians have tended to focus on the political significance of barracks, 
rather than their importance for soldiers. As chapter 3 will demonstrate, there is much 
to be learned by examining these organizations in a wider context. In particular it will 
challenge common perceptions of Britain's industrial strength through illustrating 
fundamental shortcomings in production.
Traditionally, studies concerned with the maintenance of the army have 
focused on the consequences of production, that is to say physical items such as guns. 
The view taken in this study, however, is that not everything required by an army can 
be carried on a wagon. To be maintained an armed force requires a diverse range of 
services. Thus chapter 5 is concerned with the second group of organizations, 
specifically the Medical and Chaplain General's Departments, as well as various 
policies adopted by the army. The final group of organizations to be considered are 
those that were tasked with county governance and defence. This group forms the 
basis of chapter 6, a chapter that demonstrates the involvement of civilian bodies in 
the maintenance of the army. This is arguably the most important chapter in the entire 
work. Through utilising rarely used sources chapter 6 highlights the willingness of the 
state to drastically alter its relationship with the army to aid national defence.
The objective of the above chapters is not to provide a complete overview of 
how the army was maintained in the period, but rather to examine key features in the 
context of the relationship between state and army and the consequences of this. One 
aspect that could warrant consideration in a study of this nature is soldiers' pay. While 
an important consideration, however, it is apparent that it was something that soldiers 
could and, importantly, did do with out for many months and this study instead
focuses on more necessary items.5 Other important aspects that could have warranted 
consideration include cartography and intelligence gathering. The two issues could be 
closely linked but data concerning them tends to be either scarce or fragmentary. 
Another issue absent from this work is how foreign armies were maintained. This is 
because frequently the system utilised by Britain was by far the most comprehensive, 
the organizations utilised by other nations being smaller, not so well organised, 
crippled by corruption or even non-existent. There is also the question of doctrine: 
that of living off the land as used by the French compared to that of supplying items 
from markets at home and abroad as used by the British. The distinction between 
these two doctrines, however, was not always clear. In 1805, for example, French 
forces marching through neutral Hesse-Kassel were expected to exist on rations rather 
than plunder.6 There is also the difficulty of comparing the military capability of states 
due to their diverse circumstances and practices. 7
Although using the departmentalisation of the force as a structure, the study is 
not solely concerned with how individual departments operated. Instead it 
demonstrates that while the army is traditionally seen as a conservative institution, it 
could be innovative and flexible. Although confined within certain boundaries by its 
relationship with the state the army had some autonomy and utilised this to good 
effect. The force not only modified its structure and practices to better suit its 
requirements but also implemented policies concerned with aspects such as welfare 
and regulations to limit corruption. The army was not unique in addressing such issues
6 For a consideration of the difficulties of supplying the monetary requirements of the Peninsular army, 
see C.D. Hall, Wellington's Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807 to 1814 (London, 
Chatham, 2004), pp. 129-136. Andre Corvisier stated that following the military revolution armies 
without pay had a tendency to mutiny but the British army demonstrated this was not always the case. 
A. Corvisier (trans. A. T. Siddall), Armies and Societies in Europe 1494 -1789 (London, Indiana 
University Press, 1979), p.61.
6 Creveld, Supplying War, p.45.
7 For a consideration of systems utilised by other armies see Corvisier, Armies and Societies; J. R. 
Elting, Swords Around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee (London, Phoenix Grant, 1998); 
Creveld, Supplying War.
and in many cases, particularly welfare, the army lagged behind the Royal Navy.8 Yet 
this does not detract from the fact that many of the policies adopted by or in regard to 
the army would not be implemented outside of the British military for several 
decades, by which time many would become important social issues.
The factor that made the army distinct from the navy was its relationship to the 
state as it was often the third pillar of national defence, after the Royal Navy and 
subsidy of foreign allies. Because of this for much of the period the army would 
remain under funded and thus under resourced. How the army contended with this 
situation, which for the most part originated in the system of safeguards intended to 
limit the power of the army in the seventeenth century, is also reflected in a study of 
the organisations tasked with maintaining the force.
The organizations tasked with maintaining the British army in the period are 
frequently been overlooked by historians, who are often critical of the systems used to 
maintain the army. Yet these organizations faced many difficulties that hindered their 
activities. Some difficulties were the result of problems created by the practices of 
these organizations, some were attributable to the limits of contemporary knowledge, 
while factors as diverse as sleepy muleteers or heavy snowfalls could also have a 
significant impact. One of the most fundamental difficulties, however, was the 
relationship between the state and army in the period, and-it is the nature and origins 
of this relationship that is the focus of the chapter 1.
8 The personnel of the Royal Navy enjoyed benefits such as more efficient medical provision, a 
subsidised postal service and a system of pension some years ahead of that in the army. C. Emsley, 
British Society and the French Wars 1793 -1815 (London, Macmillan, 1979), p.55; M. Duffy, 'The 
Foundations of British Naval Power', in M. Duffy (ed), The Military Revolution and State, 1500 to 
1800 (Exeter University, 1980), pp.49-84.
Chapter 1 
The relationship between state and army
It is generally accepted that the changes that occurred in British politics and 
society due to the political turmoil of the seventeenth century brought with them many 
advantages for the nation's armed forces. It is a commonly held view that the 
administrative and financial revolutions enabled the state to channel to its military the 
resources provided by Britain's industrialisation. This chapter challenges this 
somewhat cosy picture by demonstrating how the state inhibited the army as much as 
it facilitated the army's success and expansion. Andre Corvisier wrote that the military 
revolution created obstacles for states to overcome. 9 A study of eighteenth-century 
Britain demonstrates how a state contended with these obstacles. This was to be 
achieved through the maintenance of the army becoming driven by political and 
economic concerns rather than military ones.
John Brewer has described the relationship between the British state and its 
army in the period as the fiscal-military state. 10 This somewhat over-simplifies the 
situation through accommodating diverse strands within one neat theory. In particular 
it downplays the importance of the military revolution as a distinct event, even though 
this revolution was in some ways a pre-requisite for the creation of the fiscal-military 
state." While the concept of'the fiscal-military state' maybe flawed, it is apparent that 
a fiscal-military state existed. That is to say a state in which fiscal policy and the 
military were closely linked, with implications for aspects such as defence and 
taxation policies. In any case, the fiscal-military state is a useful term to describe the 
British state at the end of the eighteenth century.
9 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.61.
10 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, passim.
11 M. Duffy, The Military Revolution and State', in Duffy(ed), The Military Revolution and State, p.l.
Since the publication of Sinews of Power, historians such as Lawrence Stone 
have discussed and expanded Brewer's arguments and theories. 12 In both Sinews and 
subsequent works historians have tended to shy away from defining the boundaries of 
the fiscal-military state and the implications such boundaries may have had. Brewer 
touched on the subject in his consideration of British sensibilities regarding enforced 
service in the military, but the boundaries still remain an under-considered area. 13 A 
concept central to Brewer's model of the fiscal-military state is that the nation 
underwent significant political, economic and social modifications to accommodate 
the needs of its armed forces. Taken to a logical conclusion this dictates that the 
armed forces would be able to expand perpetually to meet operational requirements 
but this was not to occur. During the eighteenth century the demands of Britain's 
growing military power had been met through the expansion of central government's 
ability to raise finances (and the willingness of British subjects to fund this through 
paying their taxes). By the end of the century it was apparent that this expansion could 
not continue indefinitely and the ability of the state to raise revenue was stretched to 
the limit by the Napoloenic Wars. This arose because there are limits to the 
concessions a state is able or willing to make to meet the needs of its armed forces. 
Once these limits are reached, the needs of the armed forces can no longer shape the 
state. In such a situation the armed forces are contained by the boundaries imposed by 
the state. Thus the military is tailored to the needs of the state, not the state modified 
to meet the needs of the military. 14
Historians generally agree that the power of the state was confined within 
certain boundaries but have failed to address a fundamental issue: the state could have 
ridden roughshod over the sensibilities of British citizens. Asking why the state did
12 See L. Stone (ed), An Imperial State At War: Britain From 1689 - 1815 (London, Routledge, 1994).
13 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 63.
14 This was the situation in a civilian state. In a military state, such as Prussia, the state was more likely 
to adapt to meet the needs of the military. Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.61.
not do so is important as the answer addresses important issues that are central to 
understanding Britain in the period. The first issue was that the state could only 
operate through a consensus across the various socio-economic and political groups 
and could ill afford to upset the proverbial apple cart. The system of tax collection, for 
example, would have been redundant if citizens had refused to pay their taxes en 
masse. l5 The second reason for the inability (or failure, depending on perspective) of 
the British state to ignore the concerns of its citizenry in favour of the armed forces 
was that those in power often shared similar concerns to those same citizens, thereby 
lacking the will or, for that matter, any interest in disturbing the status quo. The 
acquisition of wealth was a common goal across most sections of British society, from 
the landed gentry to the newly emerging industrialists and the growing ranks of the 
'middling sort', and growing militarism would threaten this activity. 16 As Julian 
Hoppit states, the economic consequences of larger armies - higher taxes, diversion of 
resources, disruption to markets and reductions in available labour - were far-ranging 
and, most importantly, had already been experienced in Britain to varying degrees 
during the early eighteenth century. 17
The existence of a large army would have struck at the key element of British 
economic growth, specifically the existence of a large pool of labour that was readily 
available to be transferred between economic sectors and industries (an oft-quoted 
example being from agriculture to weaving). 18 The relatively high productivity levels 
of the British workforce, particularly in agriculture, worsened the problem because
each individual removed from industry or agriculture resulted in a greater drop in
15While there is no reason to believe such a move was mooted, it was feasible. The rise of the anti-corn
law movement could be seen as evidence of a national protest movement.
16 B. Harris, 'Praising the Middling Sort: Social Identity in Eighteenth Century British Newspapers', in
A. Kidd andD. Nicols (eds.), The Making of the British Middle Classes (Stroud, Sutton, 1998), p6; F.
M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London, Routledge and Kegan,
1963), p.7.
17 1 Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? England 1689 -1782 (Oxford, Clarendon, 2000), pp. 128-9.
18 N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, Clarendon. 1985),
pp. 115-116.
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production. Wrigley estimates, for example, that British agricultural labourers 
produced enough food for three families (including their own), compared to those in 
France who produced sufficient to support only one and a half families. 19
Historians have overlooked the irony of a situation whereby Britain's military 
expansion in the eighteenth century was financed by and utilised institutions that were 
originally envisaged as means to limit the armed forces in general, and the army in 
particular. To appreciate this argument it is necessary to consider when a fiscal- 
military state began to emerge in Britain. One of the main weaknesses of Brewer's 
hypothesis on the existence of the fiscal-military state is that its origin is not clearly 
defined. Brewer's argument is that the fiscal-military state was created in the 
aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, as the relationship between monarch, 
parliament and the nation was redefined following decades of political turmoil. 20 It is 
clear, however, that the processes involved commenced much earlier than this. 
Lawrence Stone cites the mid-seventeenth century (approximately 1640 to 1660) as 
the starting point. 21 During this era Britain experienced several traumatic events, 
including the civil wars, the rise and fall of a republic, dictatorship, restoration of the 
monarchy and foreign invasion in the form of William ffl's accession to the throne in 
1689. 22 These events had a significant impact on the psyche of many Britons that 
persisted into the nineteenth century, creating an aversion to military power in the 
country that no amount of administrative reform could counter. This was to have 
significant implications for the army in the eighteenth century and helped define the 
boundaries within which its growth was contained.
Is> E. A. Wrigley, 'Society and the economy in the eighteenth century', in L. Stone (ed), An Imperial
State At War: Britain From 1689 - 1815 (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 76-77.
-° Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.xiii.
21 L. Stone, 'Introduction', in Stone (ed), An Imperial State At War,, p.46.
22While William Ill's arrival was generally welcomed as a liberation, it was effectively an invasion.
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To state that there was a fear of a powerful army in Britain is an 
oversimplification of an important issue that went deeper than questions relating to 
the armed forces alone. Certainly the dictatorship of Cromwell's generals in the 1650s 
had created a fear and distrust of the army, a fear so deep rooted that it shocked many 
soldiers into eventually supporting the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in 1660. 23 The 
hatred of soldiers and the army in which they served was, however, only part of the 
equation, just as military rule was only a part of the widespread and longer-lasting 
upheaval in seventeenth-century Britain. Significantly, it was not the existence of a 
powerful standing army that had triggered the events that led to the eventual collapse 
of the Commonwealth, but rather the role of the army in politics. Thus, in 1660 efforts 
were made to depoliticise the army and in 1661 a new type of standing army was 
created, described by John Childs as being 'a non-political body, concerned solely 
with the execution of the civil authority's wishes regarding national defence and 
preservation of internal law and order'. 24 This enabled the army to undo some of the 
damage done to its reputation by its actions in the aftermath of the civil war but its 
standing was further damaged by events in the reigns of Charles n and James JJ, 
events that created a fear of the army being used as a tool, rather than an instigator, of 
tyranny. Such fears had appeared to gain most credibility in the reign of James JJ, 
when the perceived threat was not only of an army used as an instrument of power but 
also as a Catholic and even foreign one (troops being introduced from Ireland was a 
persistent fear of James' opponents). 25
To counter the threat posed by the army, two policies were adopted that were 
to become keystones of British military policy during the eighteenth century. The first 
was the maintenance of only a small standing army, which during the reign of Charles
23 R. Hainsworth, The Swordsmen in Power (Stroui Sutton, 1997), pp.250-269.
24 J. Childs, The Army of Charles II (London, Routledge, 1976), p.l.
-5 P. Seward, The Restoration, 1660-1688 (London, Macmillan, 1991), pp. 127-130.
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II was restricted to six regiments and a garrison in the North African port of Tangier. 26 
Such was the mistrust of the army that this policy was to persist even when it was 
clearly detrimental to Britain's security, such as when Jacobite unrest was at its height 
during the early eighteenth century. 27 The second policy to contain the power of the 
army was that the force was to swear an oath to the monarch but be funded through 
parliament.28 Both policies were refined and developed during the reign of William IE, 
the Bill of Rights in 1689 establishing that a standing army required the consent of 
parliament, while the Disbanding Act of 1699 established the number of troops that 
could be maintained. 29
Of the two policies adopted to contain the army the most significant was that 
its relationship with the state was a dual one: with the crown and parliament, the 
former commanding and the latter paying for its upkeep. This concept was introduced 
in the Militia Act of 1661 and then reinforced in the 1689 Bill of Rights. 30 This 
relationship between army and state was unusual, as armed forces in Europe tended to 
be appendages of the crown. 31 The dual relationship was to have an impact on the 
structure, organisation and effectiveness of the army. It was also crucial to the 
financial and administrative revolutions that occurred during the eighteenth century, 
as the state would seek to expand and improve its ability to raise the revenue required 
to support the army. To finance the wars fought in the 1690s a system based on 
taxation was adopted, while from the Wars of the Spanish Succession the precedent 
was set of funding wars through credit. 32 These practices remained keystones of
26 Quids, The Army of Charles II, p. 30
- 1 G.C. Gibbs, The Revolution in Foreign Policy', in G. Holmes (ed), Britain After the Glorious 
Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1980), p.66.
-* Childs, We Army of Charles II, pp.30 and 218.
29 J. Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', in G. Holmes (ed), Britain After the Glorious 
Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1980), pp.43 to 44.
30 Childs, The Army oj"Charles'II, p.218; Carter, The Revolution and the Constitution', p.43.
31 Brewer. The Sinews of Power, pp. 43-4.
32 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.48; W.A. Speck, 'Conflict in Society', in Holmes 
(ed), Britain After the Glorious Revolution, p. 142.
13
Britain's wartime finance until the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 33 
These policies were to have two main impacts. The first was that the system of 
procurement utilised by the army was also to become based on credit. 34 The second 
consequence was more indirect but arose as a result of the growing number of 
government departments such as the excise, departments created to raise or allocate 
taxation. 35 The creation of such departments had implications for administrative 
practices throughout the state, eventually influencing the way in which the army itself 
was administered.
Although the dual-relationship continued to exist by the end of the eighteenth 
century its role had changed. Fears concerning militarism persisted, it being a subject 
frequently addressed by the cartoonists, caricaturists and pamphleteers. 36 Militarism 
was seen to threaten the relationship between the centre and periphery in British 
politics, opening the way for the former to attain more power at the expense of 
individuals. Because of this, fear of militarism was also linked to the notion of liberty 
that existed in Britain, which was based on the preservation of parliamentary 
democracy and rights of subjects. 3? It is apparent, however, that fear of militarism was 
not the only factor that sustained the dual-relationship: the tendency to applaud the 
success and capability of the fleet was, after all, militarism.
By the late eighteenth century the real fear of military expansion was as much 
economic as political; a large army would have tied down resources seen by many to 
be better spent on industrial expansion at home and imperial expansion overseas.
33 E.L. Ellis, 'William m and the Politicians', in Holmes (ed), Britain After the Glorious Revolution, 
p. 126.
34 See below p.40
35 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.67, 102-112.
36 R. J. White, Waterloo to Peterloo (London, Mercury Books, 1963), pp. 7-8. See also J. Brewer, The 
English Satirical Print, 1600-1832: The Common People and Politics, 1750-1790s (Cambridge, 
Chadwyck, 1986).
37 S. Caunce, 'Not Sprang from Princes: Middling Society in Eighteenth Century West Yorkshire', in 
Kidd andNicolls (eds.), The Making of the British Middle Classes, pp.26-29. True liberty was seen to 
be as dangerous as militarism. E. Royle, Revolutionary Britannia: Reflections on the Tlveat of 
Revolution in Britain, 1789 to 1848 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 14.
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Conversely, through safeguarding mercantile interests, the Royal Navy was seen to 
contribute directly to British economic growth, while the exploits of explorers such as 
Cook had further focused public attention on the importance of maritime affairs. 38 
Although such reasoning does not give due credit the part played by the army in the 
growth and maintenance of the Empire in this and the preceding period, it is fair to say 
that the importance of the army to British ambitions was considerably less than in the 
late nineteenth century. Crucially, the protection of India was not the responsibility of 
the British army but rather the army of the Honourable East India Company, and 
remained so until the mutiny of 1857. 39
Besides economic and colonial concerns (the two could become inseparable 
during this period) there were sound strategic reasons for successive governments to 
support the navy over the army. As an island nation it made more sense for Britain to 
maintain a strong fleet to prevent an invasion, rather than a strong army to repulse 
one, and there was what Jeremy Black describes as a belief in Britain's 'maritime 
destiny'. 40 In this regard the policy of the government was a success, and through an 
unequal allocation of resources the navy was able to take a lead over its rivals in the 
fields of armament and hull design, while through installations such as rope works 
and government dockyards the navy had considerably more control over production of 
its own material than did the army (including facilities overseas such as the rope 
works in Malta).41 Even when the latter maintained its own facilities, such as the 
Woolwich arsenal, a certain proportion of output would be allocated to the navy.42 The
infrastructure allocated to support the navy was far greater than that allocated to the
38 D. A. Baugh, The Maritime State and Atlantic Commerce', in Stone (ed), An Imperial State At War, 
pp. 185-223; Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 127.
39 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.88-90. The company's army was of further 
importance to Britain's militarj power as, through acting in conjvmction with other British forces, it was 
able to seize and garrison enemy colonies in the Indian Ocean region (notably Java and Madagascar) 
and supplied troops for the Egyptian campaign during the wars with France.
40 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 125.
41 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 161.
42 Baugh, The Maritime State and Atlantic Commerce', p. 186.
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army, and John Brewer estimates the cost of supporting a sailor was double that for a 
soldier. 43 Part of this cost included certain benefits for sailors that were not enjoyed by 
soldiers, a particularly contentious one being the availability of wine to naval officers 
free of duty, while army officers had to pay all such charges.44
The difficulty that faced the government by the time of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars was the success of the policy that gave priority to the navy over the 
army. It is apparent that this led to a situation in which the expansion of the navy 
continued to be tolerated while the army was allowed to stagnate.45 The success of the 
Royal Navy, which, it must be stated, came about as a result of a defence policy that 
enabled the fleet to take a qualitative and quantitative lead over its rivals, was a fragile 
one. The crucial issue to appreciate is that despite the emphasis placed on the Royal 
Navy in British defence policy it also lacked sufficient resources. While politicians 
may have approved funding for the fleet to expand, in practice the effects of this were 
limited. Manpower, in particular, was in short supply, despite the use of enforced 
service through the press gang.46 Press gangs were selective and not a significant 
benefit for recruitment to the navy. In 1808 and 1809, for example, recruitment to the 
navy suffered a shortfall of 16,000 men and even as early as 1800, failure to meet 
recruitment targets was hampering operations. By the time of the Battle of Trafalgar 
British warships regularly sailed undermanned, Nelson's flagship Victory sailing with 
only 703 of her 837-man crew in 1805. Added to the Royal Navy's recruitment 
shortfall should also be that of the marines, who were 7,000 below establishment by 
1803. 47 By 1812 the fleet was even showing signs of problems in quality, when U.S.
43 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 31.
44 See Lieutenant Fairman, A Letter on the Expediency of Allowing Wine to the Army Free of Duty as in 
the Navy (London, Carpenter, 1803).
45 C. Emsley, British Society, p.52.
46 P. Woodfine, "Proper Objects of the Press': Naval Impressment and Habeas Corpus in the French 
Revolutionary Wars', in K. Dockray and K. Laybourn (eds), The Representation and Reality of War: 
the British Experience (Stroud, Sutton, 1999), pp.39-60.
47 Hall, British Strategy, pp. 11-13. For a full consideration of the navy in this period see N. Rodger, 
The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, Collins, 1986).
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warships of a similar size outgunned British frigates. 48
The impact of the policy favouring the navy over the army was not entirely 
detrimental to the force. Sea power was utilised to significant effect to maintain the 
army, being used to move supplies and protect lines of communication. Traditionally 
historians considering the latter, such as Christopher Hall and Piers Mackesy, have 
focused on sea borne lines of communication but the importance of sea power to the 
protection of those on land should not be overlooked. Piers Mackesy notes that 
Britain's naval power enabled her to harass the enemy's coasts but this argument 
should be extended to include the fact that Britain's own coastal flanks were secure, 
preventing similar raids on British supply lines. 49 Disadvantages of the policy placing 
the navy first not only included inevitable budget deficiencies for the land based force 
but also influenced its deployment. The Royal Navy could only project its power with 
secure bases and in consequence large garrisons were deployed for the defence of 
locations that included Sicily, Minorca, Greece and Alexandria. 30
Whatever its impact on the army, the policy favouring the Royal Navy 
continued, allowing it to continue to defend the home nation, expand the Empire and 
safeguard commerce. This preference for the navy existed not just in government but 
also society in general, despite the fact that the navy could be as disruptive as the 
army. The presence of large dockyards and fleets, for example, inflated food prices in 
the locality and in 1795 this led to riots in certain regions/ 1 The unfavourable attitude 
of the population exasperated soldiers such as Ensign John Aitchinson, serving in the 
3 ld Regiment of Guards, who complained that until late in the Napoleonic Wars, when 
success in the Peninsular War finally elevated the prestige of the army, 'the navy had 
been the darling of the people, the likes of Nelson and Hood having looked down on
4S P. J. Haythornthwaite, Napoleon 's Military Machine (Staplehurst, Spellmont, 1988), pp.186-187.
49 P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, 1803 to 1810 (London, Longmans, 1957). p.7.
50 Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, 1803 to 1810, p. 16.
51 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 162.
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the army'/2 There are a variety of reasons why Britons continued to have an aversion 
to the army. As suggested above fear of overt militarism was not necessarily a factor 
as it existed in regard to the navy and, furthermore, was eventually fully embraced 
during the Peninsular War as the nation celebrated victories such as Salamanca and 
Vittoria with peals of church bells, special edition newspapers and other revelry. 53 
Neither were economic arguments concerning the value of the fleet as opposed to the 
army necessarily significant, this being a concern primarily of the wealthy or those 
educated enough to read about the markets and other financial affairs in newspapers, 
an activity that was increasingly popular amongst the middling sort in the provinces 
but less so among poorly educated labourers. 54
The factor that united many elements of society against the army was the 
disruption it could cause at a local level, directly affecting the lives of individuals. 
Fights between soldiers, which were often fuelled by alcohol, were a feature of life in 
garrison towns, and particular those that contained depots at which new recruits would 
arrive. This was the situation facing Private William Wheeler of the 51 st Regiment of 
Foot when he arrived at Maidstone in April 1809, when he described scenes of 
'drunkenness and riot' amongst the newly arrived troops in the town/5 Such disorder 
could be dangerous to inhabitants and on occasion required the deployment of other 
military forces to restore order. The memoirist Benjamin Harris recorded such an 
incident, which occurred while he was travelling from Ireland to depots in 
southeastern England and accompanied by fellow recruits to the 95th Rifles. Trouble
53 W. F. K. Thompson (ed), An Ensign in the Peninsular War: The Letters of John Aitchinson (London, 
Michael Joseph, 1981), p.230.
53 Hugh Marendes to Privy Council, Edinburgh, 25th July 1813, PRO PC 1/4011, Privy Council 
Miscellaneous Unbound Papers, July 1813; Salisbury Journal, 24th August 1812, p.4.
54 Harris, 'Praising the Middling Sort', p5; J. Brewer, 'Commercialisation and Polities', in 
N.McKendrick, J Brewer and J.H. Plumb (eds.), The Birth of a Consumer Society: The 
Commercialisation of Eighteenth Century England (London, Europa, 1982), p.216.
55 B. H. Liddell - Hart (ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809 - J828 (London, Michael Joseph, 
1951), pp.17-18. Such disorder could involve sailors but they tended to spend more time isolated from 
the population aboard ship.
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began shortly after the party left Ireland, when fights broke out between Irish Roman 
Catholics and Protestants in the group. Harris noted how the recruits, drawn mainly 
from rural backgrounds, were too overawed by the cities of Bristol (the port at which 
they disembarked) and Bath to cause more trouble. This situation continued until the 
group reached Salisbury Plain, at which point a sectarian fight broke out and violence 
continued when the group reached the town of Andover. At this point the local 
Volunteers were called out to restore order with loaded muskets and calm was 
restored/6
A more serious outbreak of disorder occurred amongst troops billeted in Cork 
during September 1795. Troops of the 105th and 113 th Regiments of Foot, en route to 
the West Indies, mutinied, marching through the city with bayonets fixed and 
releasing prisoners from the jail.^7 Needless to say the scenes caused considerable 
concern amongst the inhabitants of the city, although control was restored relatively 
bloodlessly following the imposition of a curfew and arrival of troops from the 7th 
Dragoon Guards. 58 In this case the disorder had gone beyond drunken or rowdy troops 
and was a mutiny but, while one of the more extreme examples of what could happen 
in a garrison town or city, it was a realistic threat and ample reason for civilians to 
oppose the presence of soldiers in a locality, even if they were not opposed to the 
army as an institution of the state.
Mutinies and drunken brawls were not the only reasons for hostility between 
citizens and soldiers. Indeed, while instances such as those noted above could 
potentially create conflict between soldiers and civilians, it was often the use of the 
army to restore control that caused hostility (a role that determined the locations of
56 E. Hathaway (ed), A Dorset Rifleman: Tfie Recollections of Benjamin Harris (Swanage, 
Shinglepicker, 1995), pp.20-21.
57 Deployment to the West Indies also initiated a mutiny amongst sailors in 1801. Black, Sea Borne 
Empire, p. 161.
58 John Travers to Lord Lismore, Cork, 4* September 1795, NAM 6807/370/44; Notices Announcing a 
Curfew in Cork, 4th September 1795, NAM 6807/370/43.
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their peace time deployments).'9 It is apparent, therefore, that for civilians contact with 
soldiers could be disruptive, unpleasant and dangerous. Appreciating that citizens 
were sometimes opposed to the army at a local level, whether it was due to disruption 
to markets, drunken brawls or its role as a police force, but not opposed to the army as 
an institution per se is vital for understanding the relationship of the army with the 
state and the continued existence of the dual relationship with crown and parliament. 
The attitude of the population in general is perhaps best described as 'not in my back 
yard': the army was necessary but citizens preferred it not to disrupt their lives. 60 The 
fear essentially was of disruption (be it social, political or economic), not of the force 
being used as an instrument of tyranny. Even when fears of mutiny and revolution 
were at their height following the French Revolution and Irish Rebellion of 1798 fears 
related not to the army itself but the actions of individual soldiers. By the time of the 
unrest in the post-war period the army was seen as reliable and called on by the 
government to suppress disorder in the capital. 61 Thus, in regard to the situation at the 
time of the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars, it is an oversimplification to state that 
the dual relationship the army had with crown and parliament existed as a means to 
control the force. Such a concept no doubt provided comfort to liberty minded liberals 
but more importantly the dual relationship had shaped and become embedded in the 
British state. It was the dual relationship that provided the driving force for the 
administrative and financial reforms of the eighteenth century, creating the need for 
parliament to expand and even create its own financial apparatus so that it, rather than 
the monarch, could support the armed forces. 62 Safeguards that restricted and
5" Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.51.
60 Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?, p. 157.
61 Mr. Wood, Mayor of London, to Major Elington of the Tower Garrison, Mansion House, December
1816 (undated), PRO WO 94/15, Tower of London Constables Office: Letters and Orders 1816-3 L f.4;
M.I. Thomis and P. Holt, Threats of Revolution in Britain 1789 - 1848 (Archon Books, 1977), pp.39-
75.
62 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.48.
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controlled the army were in some respects redundant by the end of the eighteenth 
century but were nevertheless an integral part of the state, one example being the 
policy that placed the Royal Navy before the army. Effectively the dual relationship 
continued to exist not for its original purpose - that of controlling the army - but 
because it enabled Britain to sustain its economic growth and social stability. A key 
factor in the relative stability enjoyed by Britain compared to other nations in the 
period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was that this suited both the 
government and large sections of the population alike.
Although the reasons for the dual relationship had changed from that initially 
envisaged (as a means of controlling the army and preventing it from becoming 
involved in politics), its impact on the army remained and should not be 
underestimated as it characterised the organisation of the force into the nineteenth 
century. Because of the dual relationship, civilian authorities governed Britain's 
armed forces to an unprecedented degree when compared to the situation elsewhere in 
Europe, particularly in Prussia, Russia and Austria. 63 This created an increasingly 
significant role for government, with the result that the army was administered 
through what can be considered a combination of old and new departments. The old 
departments predated the reign of William in and in the eighteenth century existed in 
forms quite different to those originally envisaged, in terms of both role and structure. 
Some, such as the Ordnance Board, had evolved over centuries while others, such as 
the War Office, had began to emerge in the 1640s. 64 Conversely, the new departments 
were created during or after the reign of William HI, and included the Home Office. 
Another group of departments of note were those that predated the reign of William 
in but lost significance in relation to the army, an example being the Privy Council,
63 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, pp.76, 116-122.
64 For the various stages in the evolution of the Ordnance Board from its creation in the fifteenth 
century to its decline in the nineteenth, see F. Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery (2 vols, London, 
John Murray, 1879), passim.
21
the roles of which in the affairs of the army were largely absorbed by the Cabinet 
during the eighteenth century.65
The dual relationship and subsequent administrative revolution created 
changes at the heart of civilian administration that, while not directly affecting the 
army, were to influence indirectly its own administration and effectiveness. The rise in 
the number of new departments and increasing prestige of existing ones served in part 
to undermine traditional patterns of patronage. The patronage of royalty and the 
aristocracy continued to dominate most departments, especially those that pre-dated 
the reign of William m, but the creation of newer departments opened the door for 
new elites, those whose power stemmed from politics and administration, to exercise 
their own patronage. It would be incorrect to assume that these appointments were 
free of the patronage of either royalty or the aristocracy as the new breed of politicians 
and administrators frequently owed their own positions to such patronage networks, 
but by the end of the eighteenth century there was evidence that the traditional 
patterns of patronage were beginning to break down, with the influence of traditional 
families being exercised rather more indirectly. This was to have implications for 
administration in both the military and civilian spheres, and enabled the gradual rise 
of professional administrators.66
As the army swore an oath to the Crown the ultimate authority in the army 
was, in theory, the monarch. This was the case during the reign of William HI but 
royal influence declined thereafter, as did the role of bodies such as the Privy Council, 
the role of which gradually became one of gathering information for enquiries, such 
those conducted regarding outbreaks of disease in the West Indies garrisons, 67 The
65 ]. limes, "The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military State: Government and Society in Eighteenth 
Century Britain', in L. Stone (ed),An Imperial State At War: Britain From 1689 - 1815 (London, 
Routledge, 1994), p!03.
66 Brewer, Tlie English Satirical Print p.74-87.
67 Cailer, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.52: Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military 
State', p!05; for an example of such an inquiry see PRO PC 1/13/149, Sickness in the West Indies
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result of these changes was that by the time of the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
Wars, the army was, in practice, a tool of parliament or, more specifically, whatever 
government was in power as it was this body that decided where and when the army 
would deploy. Thus, in some respects, the army was subordinated to the civilian 
administration, which had the Prime Minister at its head. 68 The power of this office 
over the army was limited due to the nature of British politics. In particular, the Prime 
Minister did not necessarily lead the largest political group in parliament, or even 
draw members of the government from his party. As a consequence the role of the 
Prime Minister more often became one of performing a political balancing act rather 
than direct involvement in every aspect of policy. Of the Prime Ministers in the early 
nineteenth century, only Pitt and Grenville became seriously involved in the affairs of 
the army. Pitt was one of the instigators of the army's involvement in operations 
against enemy colonies and reformed the national command structure through creating 
the post of Secretary for War and the Colonies, while Grenville's Foxite Ministry of 
Talents fell following attempts to reform the army. 69
The principal means through which a Prime Minister was able to influence the 
actions and structure of the army was through the appointment of his Cabinet, a body 
that had risen to prominence during the reign of William HI to meet the need for 
wartime planning. 70 Although attempts were made to run the affairs of government 
through consensus the personality of those individuals appointed to lead ministries 
and departments could be significant. It has been suggested, for example, that
Raised at Privy Council.
68 For a consideration of the relevant departments and how they operated in regard to the armed forces, 
see Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.5-9; Haythomthwaite, Tlie Napoleonic- 
Source Book, pp. 195-6.
69 Emsley British Society, pp!28-9. For a consideration of how the varjing domestic political situation 
could have an impact on a military campaign and the army, see R. Muir, "Britain and the Peninsular 
War', in P. Griffiths (ed), A History of the Peninsular War Vol IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain 
and Portugal 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999), pp.335-372.
70 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.50; Innes, "The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military 
State', p.103.
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differing preferences expressed in Cabinet concerning who should lead the British 
army dispatched to Portugal in 1808 caused the confused situation that resulted in the 
Convention of Cintra and subsequent recall of the officers concerned (Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, Sir Hew Darlymple and Sir Harry Burrard). 7 ' Of particular importance to 
the army were the following government departments and their heads: the Foreign 
Office, the policies of which could dictate where and when the army was deployed; 
the Home Office, which had jurisdiction over militia, fencible and volunteer forces; 
and the Treasury. The latter was possibly one of the largest and most important 
government departments and, amongst other roles, was responsible for the 
Commissariat. 72 This organisation was effectively part of the army and the principal 
organisation tasked with supplying the force.
Two Cabinet posts had more direct control of the army. These were the Master 
General of the Ordnance and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. The 
former was head of the Ordnance Board, which had responsibility for the engineers 
and artillery, but had only an advisory role in Cabinet. Conversely, the Secretary of 
State for War and the Colonies was a government post and had more influence over 
policy. This post was a development of the Council of War, formed in 1620, and the 
office the Secretary of War, which had emerged in the reign of Charles II. John 
Brewer describes this latter post as being only a minor one and suggests that its 
holders were generally unimportant government officials who only rarely sat in 
Cabinet and thus had little impact on policy. 73 While such a view is to an extent true, 
it is excessively dismissive of a post that was to evolve into an important government 
department. The office of the Secretary of War rose to prominence largely due to the 
efforts and ability of the first holder of the post in the reign of Charles, Sir William
71 C. J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War, (London, Alien Lane, 2002), p.95.
72 Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military State', p. 103. For a consideration of the 
Commissariat, see chapter 2.
73 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 44.
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Clarke, and his close co-operation with the Commander-in-Chief, General Monck. 
The next significant stage in the evolution of the office of the Secretary at War 
occurred in 1678 when parliament declared that it, rather than the Secretary of State, 
was to sign commissions. From 1683, following the appointment of William 
Bluthwayt as Secretary of War (first from 1683 to 1688 and then from 1690 to 1704), 
further powers were gained and the office began to maintain its own copies of 
warrants, entry books and letters, thereby creating a War Office and junior ministry. 74 
By 1685 the duties of the War Office included the issuing of marching orders, 
deciding regimental seniority and creating military codes of conduct. 75
The importance of the War Office continued to increase during the eighteenth 
century and in 1798 it was merged with the Colonial Office, to form the office of the 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Appointments to this post operated 
through traditional patronage networks and it changed hands seven times in the period 
1800 to 1815. Amongst the six holders of the post (Castlereagh being in office twice), 
there were no fewer than four lords and one viscount. These were Lord Hobart (1801 
to 1804), Lord Camden (1804 to 1805), Viscount Castlereagh (1805 to 1806, 1807 to 
1809), Lord Liverpool (1809 to 1812) and Lord Bathurst (1812 to the end of the war). 
The only non-titled holder of the position in the period was William Windham (1806 
to 1807). 76 That the post frequently changed hands was a consequence of its being a 
political appointment and thus vulnerable to fluctuations in political fortunes and 
changing ministries. Another characteristic of this post was that, being a civilian, the 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies had only a directional and administrative 
role in the structure of the army. The office was perhaps best utilised to co-ordinate 
the activities of the various departments concerned with the operation and
74 Carter. "The Revolution and the Constitution', p.53.
*s Childs, The Army of Charles II, pp.92-100.
76 Partridge and Oliver, TTit? British Army and Her Allies, p.9.
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maintenance of the army. It was rarely fully effective in fulfilling even this limited 
task, however, and could be so ineffective that Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver 
describe its creation as being little more than a 'political fudge' by Pitt the Younger to 
strengthen his control over government. 77
Despite the powers over the army granted to it by the Act of Settlement, 
parliament, through the Cabinet and then the Secretary of War, could do little more 
than order the army into a theatre of war and issue guidance, such as on the need to 
avoid casualties or to aid an allied nation. On occasion politicians did intervene more 
directly, as in the case of the Walcheren fiasco, but in such circumstances the army 
rarely met with success. It is important to note, however, that the support and 
guidance of politicians was not without value to the army. One of the few occasions 
when the army did act largely on its own initiative was the expedition to Buenos Aires 
in 1806, which proved a complete military disaster and resulted in the surrender of the 
force involved. 78 This event was also to have political repercussions as it gave the 
Spanish colonists a new self belief and increased their determination to achieve 
independence from Spanish colonial rule, an event British foreign policy makers 
sought to avoid or delay for as long as possible.
Below the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies the national command 
structure of the army became more complex, leading Andre Corvisier to state that one 
characteristic of the system was confusion, although this is perhaps excessively harsh 
about administrative practices that could prove effective. 79 The combat elements of 
the army were divided between those of Horse Guards (regular infantry and cavalry), 
the Ordnance Board (regular artillery and engineers) and the Home Office (militia, 
yeomanry, fencibles and volunteers). It is apparent that there was no single military
77 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.8.
78 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 163.
7sl Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.76.
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department with responsibility for the entire army, and of the three departments, Horse 
Guards was unique in having a military man in charge, known as the Commander-in- 
Chief. 80 The control exercised by the Home Office over auxiliary forces was only 
nominal with the result that the British army was effectively divided into two 
departments. A similar situation existed in the French army but differed in that the 
separation was based on function rather than type of arm. 81
Although only having direct control over the cavalry and infantry, the 
Commander-in-Chief was the senior military figure in the British army. Furthermore, 
the importance of the arms under Horse Guards enabled the Commander-in-Chief to 
exercise a degree of operational control over the army as whole. The Ordnance Board 
may have collated the returns of its own forces and maintained them, but it was with 
the forces under Horse Guards that they marched and relied on for their protection. It 
would be incorrect to view the importance of the infantry and cavalry arms as 
enabling the Commander-in-Chief to circumvent the national command structure and 
the checks in place to curb the power of the army, although they did permit him more 
influence than was allowed on paper. Despite this the Commander-in-Chief remained 
powerless without the co-operation of certain civilian-led departments.
The office of Commander-in-Chief for much of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars was held by Frederick, Duke of York, George Ill's second son. York 
temporarily left office in 1809 due to his affair with Mary Clarke and, although 
cleared by Parliament of any wrongdoing, he resigned as a matter of honour. York 
returned in 1811 and it has been argued that during his brief time out of office he was 
still effectively in control, as interim Commander-in-Chief General David Dundas
"° S. J. Park and G. F. Nafziger, Ttie British Military: Its System and Organisation 1803 - 1815 
(Cambridge (Canada), Rafei, 1983), pp.5 -11.
*' In the French army the combat arms were under the chief of staff while the general staff tended to 
fulfil logistical duties. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London, Methuen, 1961), p.53.
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continued his policies. 82 That York held the post of Commander-in-Chief almost 
continually from 1796 to 1827 would suggest a stagnant and conservative 
administration, in an era that would begin to require a gradually more educated rank 
and file, along with increasingly complex equipment. Fortunately for the army York, 
while a poor field general, was unafraid of innovation and was a first class 
administrator. Reforms implemented during his time in office included regimental 
schools, a staff college, published rules and regulations for non-commissioned officers 
and a subsidised mail service." Such reforms helped drag the army from its nadir of 
the previous decade, thereby directly improving morale. This was noted by fighting 
soldiers and in 1805 Captain Thomas Browne of the 23'd Foot wrote of 'a rejuvenated 
British army, whose spirit had been rejuvenated by internal reform and 
improvements'. M
Under the Commander-in-Chief was a secretary, who enabled him to 
communicate with other departments. Initially this was a civilian post but from 1811 
became a military appointment, a demonstration of increasing professionalism within 
the military hierarchy. 10 Besides this secretary, infantry and cavalry, Horse Guards 
contained two departments. These were the Quartermaster General, who was 
responsible for troop movements, information gathering and the supply of camping 
equipment, and the Adjutant-General, who was responsible for drill and discipline.
The combat arms not under Horse Guards - the artillery and engineers - were 
the responsibility of the Ordnance Board. The two organisations had developed along 
markedly different lines, this being apparent by the fact that while the Horse Guards
s2 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.6.
*3 Such a mail service already existed for the sailors of the Royal Navy. J. Bartlett, The Development of
the British Army During the Wars with France 1793 -1815 (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of
Durham, 1997), p. 184; Partridge and Oliver Army Handbook p.7.
u R. N. Buckley (ed), The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne 1807 -1816
(London, Army Records Society, 1987), p.xi.
85 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.7.
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had at its head a soldier and, until 1811, a civilian secretary, the situation in the 
Ordnance was reversed. The head of the Ordnance was a civilian with a seat in the 
Cabinet but below him was an army officer, known as the Deputy Adjutant General. 
The Deputy Adjutant General's department was created to rectify a peculiarity of the 
Royal Artillery, specifically that despite being granted the title of 'regiment' it lacked 
many of the administrative organs associated with such a formation. Prior to the 
creation of the department it had been the responsibility of the individual company 
and battalion officers deployed around the globe to transmit inspection returns to the 
Ordnance Board and make requests concerning supplies. It is possible to draw 
parallels between the creation of the Deputy Adjutant General's department and the 
administrative revolution in general, particularly in the field of data collection and 
compilation of statistics, activities that saw the growth of government departments to 
achieve this.*6 How far the formation of the Deputy Adjutant General's department 
was linked to this trend is, however, questionable. Far more influential was the poor 
performance of the army in North America, which triggered several reforms of the 
army in its aftermath.
When the Deputy Adjutant General's department was formed in 1783 the post 
carried the rank of Brigadier General, although in 1795 this was elevated to the status 
of a staff appointment. 87 The department was to fulfil many of the administrative roles 
of the Commissariat but in relation to the artillery and engineers. 88 Significantly, 
despite its name, the Deputy Adjutant General's department was a quite separate 
entity from the Adjutant General's department under the Commander-in-Chief at 
Horse Guards, the role of that organisation being primarily to ensure discipline and
86 Brewer, We Sinews of Power, p.222-225.
" Deputy Adjutant General, 8to April 1795, PRO WO 55/3045, Board of Ordnance Orders and
Regulations foot Artillery Order Book c!790 to c!846, p.73.
"* See Chapter 3.
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the movement of troops. 89 The first holder of the office was Brigadier General 
Macleod, who remained in the post throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. As stated by John Brewer, the systems of patronage utilised to fill positions 
such as the Deputy Adjutant General's department did not necessarily result in poor 
administrators and Macleod is proof of this. 90 On several occasions Macleod 
demonstrated that he possessed a good understanding of the difficulties experienced 
by the artillery in the field, and not only gathered data on these difficulties but also 
proposed effective solutions. 91
An important factor that contributed to the persistent inefficiency within the 
departments under the Board of Ordnance was the nature and structure of the board 
itself. Many of the departments responsible for the administration of the army had 
been created during the seventeenth century. In contrast the Ordnance Board had 
existed in various forms for several centuries and despite reforms was a product of a 
previous period, a situation that had implications for its structure and efficiency. 
Although the role of the Ordnance had changed over the centuries it continued to have 
at its head the Master General of the Ordnance, a post perceived as being one of the 
most important and prestigious in the United Kingdom. Its responsibilities included 
supplying the Royal Navy and army with munitions, although it was the latter that 
virtually monopolised the board's time, and, unlike the post of Commander-in-Chief, 
the post of Master General also entitled its holder to a seat in the Cabinet. 92 The 
individuals who held the office during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars were the Duke of Richmond (1784 to 1795), Marquis Cornwallis (1795 to
89 Park and Nafziger, The British Military, p.5.
* Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. 75-81.
" For his efforts relating to straw yards see Brigadier General Macleod to R.H. Crew, Woolwich, 3 rd
April 1807, PRO WO 55/1314, Letters to Board of Ordnance from Adjutant General, February 1807 to
July 1809.
92 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery, Volume 2, p!4; Park and Nafziger, The British Military, pp.7-
8.
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1801), the Earl of Chatham (1801 to 1806 and again from 1807 to 1810), Lord Moira 
(1806 to 1807) and Lord Mulgrave (1810 to 1819). 93 John Brewer notes that the armed 
forces were well represented in parliament but that the politicians concerned only 
rarely promoted the interests of the armed forces (or even safeguarded them). 94 
Examples of such individuals include the Masters General of the Ordnance.
It was common for the Masters General to hold other posts and they were 
frequently active in the House of Lords, but their activities tended to focus not on their 
duties in regard to the Ordnance but rather their own careers and interests. This was 
particularly so in the case of Lord Mulgrave, whose activities and other commitments 
interfered with the efficient running of the Ordnance Board to such an extent that 
Brigadier-General Macleod at times found it almost impossible to arrange meetings. 
On occasion important decisions were delayed because Lord Mulgrave was 
unavailable; for example, in 1811 an urgent decision concerning the deployment of 
draught animals to the artillery in Portugal was delayed due to his being in 
parliament. 9 ^ The situation so frustrated Brigadier-General Macleod that he remarked 
in one letter to Lord Mulgrave 'I shall be in town today, if your Lordship happens to 
be at the Ordnance'. 96
The difficulties caused by Mulgrave's absence from the Ordnance at crucial 
times was an example of how practices that were deemed acceptable could prove 
detrimental to the efficiency of the army. In this case difficulties arose due to the close 
relationship between the civilian and military spheres in the British state. This 
relationship was to significantly influence the structure of another department, the 
Commissariat, the organization that is the focus of the following chapter.
93 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery, Vol. 2, p.34.
94 Brewer. The Sinews of Power, p.44.
95 MacLeod to Major Chapman, Woolwhich, 8th June 1811, PRO W055/1369, Adjutant General's 
Confidential Letters (Outward), September 1810 to February 1816.
96 MacLeod to Lord Mulgrave, Woolwhich, 17th February 1812, PRO WO55/1369.
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Chapter 2 
The Commissariat and associated organizations
Of the organizations associated with the maintenance of the British army in the 
period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Commissariat was the most 
significant. It was an organization that has attained a degree of notoriety for its 
failings, being described by Mark Adkin in his analysis of the 1815 Waterloo 
campaign as 'a much maligned body'.97 As this chapter will demonstrate, however, it 
was also an organization that achieved a rarely credited degree of success through the 
adoption of new policies. This success was notable as it was achieved despite the 
constraints placed upon the organization by the practices of the period and policies of 
British governments, such as an at times labyrinthine bureaucracy, the need to manage 
finance carefully and the need to operate throughout the Empire. Through the latter 
the Commissariat would also demonstrate that many of the advantages supposedly 
provided by the fiscal-military state were only effective within certain geographical 
boundaries.
The Commissariat exemplified many aspects of administration and 
government that had developed in the eighteenth century, although the whole logistics 
network of the British army (and navy) demonstrated one characteristic in particular, a 
multitude of departments and organizations with overlapping jurisdictions, many of 
which were created in the turmoil and administrative reforms of the later Stuarts.98 
None of these departments matched the Commissariat in terms of either size or 
capability. For example, logistics in the Alexandria garrison in 1807 were the 
responsibility of four organizations. The smallest to maintain stores was the Royal
97M. Adkin, The Waterloo Companion (London, Aurum, 2001), p.325.
98 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, The Army of'Charles //, pp.96-105. Fora consideration 
of the similar system that operated in the navy see Duffy, 'The Foundations of British Naval Power', 
pp.49_84; Black, Sea Borne Empire, pp. 171 -208.
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Corps of Engineers, which employed only one clerk in the garrison. Marginally larger 
was the stores organization of the Royal Artillery, which employed a clerk and two 
keepers of stores, and the Quartermaster General's Department, which employed a 
deputy quartermaster, and assistant quartermaster and one servant. The Commissariat 
overshadowed these organizations, the department employing a deputy commissary 
general, an assistant commissary, fourteen storekeepers and clerks, nine labourers and 
seven servants, almost five times the size of the other organizations in Alexandria 
combined." Of note is the fact that the personnel of the Commissariat were not only 
employed on administrative tasks, demonstrating that the size of the organization was 
not merely the result of the need to meet the demands of increasing bureaucracy, 
unlike the situation regarding certain governmental departments. 100 The high 
proportion of storekeepers and clerks indicates that bureaucracy was a feature in the 
growth of the organization in the period but, to use a physiological analogy, labourers 
represented muscle rather than the mere fat that administrators represented. The 
Commissariat was not just an administrative body, but also one capable of performing 
functions such as moving and storing supplies.
In Alexandria the organization that most closely replicated the function and 
role of the Commissariat was the Quartermaster General. The primary role of the 
latter organization was the distribution of items designated camping equipment, 
which, in addition to items such as tents, included corn sacks for the cavalry, 
associated forage, entrenching tools for the infantry and slack lime to dispose of 
animal carcasses. 101 It is apparent that in Alexandria the ability of the Quartermaster
99 PRO WO 164/525, Royal Hospital Chelsea Prize Records, Alexandria Garrison 1807.
100 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 102.
101 General Order No. 188, by Order of the Commander of the Forces; 'Rules and Regulations Under 
Which the Foraging of the Horses of the Cavalry in Ireland is to be Conducted', PRO WO 63/91, Entry 
Book of Letters Received at Commissariat Headquarters, Dublin, 1810 - 1812, p.49; Extracts from 
General Orders, Quinta, 16th June 1811, Porta Legre, 28* July 1811, NAM 6807/221, Books of 
Commissary General N. Jackson, c!814, pp. 16 and 22.
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General to distribute such items was limited and to a large degree depended upon the 
infrastructure of the Commissariat. Thus the definition of many items as being the 
responsibility of the Quartermaster General rather than the Commissariat was 
administrative and had little bearing on practice, in effect, the Quartermaster General 
was required to ensure an adequate supply of certain items, while the Commissariat 
would distribute them. Such anomalies in regard to corn sacks and forage would 
persist until 1810, when the Commissariat was finally made responsible for their 
provision. 102
Another organization that duplicated some of the Commissariat's duties was 
the office of the Store Master General, which was created in 1808. Primarily based in 
Britain, and not present in Alexandria, its tasks included making accounts of all goods 
held in depots and the packing of military stores (prior to 1808 this had been carried 
out by civilians). The organization maintained a small number of personnel and in 
1808 its entire staff consisted of fewer than forty personnel, including ten porters, 
nineteen clerks, an accountant, a storekeeper and his deputy. The Store Master 
General's department did not have a role in the field but due to its specialist function 
the significance of the department was greater than its size alone would suggest. 103 
The Store Master General's department reflected a trend towards greater 
professionalism that was occurring in both the armed forces and administration, 
because specialist organizations were created to meet specific needs. Despite the 
existence of such departments the Commissariat remained the premier organization 
involved in the maintenance of the army. It was a cog in the logistical machine 
without which the others could not rum, not least because other departments were to 
rely on the Commissariat, whether as a store keeper, distributor or administrator.
102 General Order No. 188, PRO WO 63/91, p.49.
103 Eighth Report of Military Enquiry (London, Office of the Secretary at War, 1809), pp. 161-2.
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Reasons for the Commissariat's rise to prominence can be traced back to the 
military revolution. This had created a need for accurate pay and muster records, a 
task allocated to the Commissary General by the reforms of Charles II. 104 This 
function would later devolve to other departments but the organization had become an 
important part of military administration, although even at this early stage it was an 
organization characterised by its shortcomings, particularly corruption. 105 The 
Commissariat was a civil-military hybrid as its personnel wore military uniforms and 
held commissions but were employed by the Treasury and addressed as 'Mister'. 106
The Commissariat was the principal logistical organisation in the army and to 
a degree this enabled it to cut the across boundaries created by the division of the 
force into those arms under Horse Guards and those under the Board of Ordnance. 107 
The Ordnance maintained its own stores and supply organizations such as the Field 
Train of the Ordnance, that included the Ordnance Commissary. The logistical 
organizations of the ordnance, however, had only limited capabilities compared to the 
Commissariat or Royal Wagon Train due to the smaller scale of their task, the 
majority of the army being concentrated in the arms under Horse Guards. 108 
Procurement for the arms under the Ordnance was the responsibility of the Surveyor 
General's Department, in conjunction with the Clerk of Deliveries and Store 
Keeper. 109 Another department of the Ordnance that possessed capabilities similar to 
the Commissariat was the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, which conducted 
administrative tasks such as the collation of returns and co-ordination of requests for 
supplies. 110
104 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.65; Childs, The Army of Charles II, pp. 104-105.
105 J. Kinross, The Boyne andAughrim: the War of the Two Kings (Gloucester, Windrush Press, 1998), 
p.34.
106 See PRO Tl/1061, Instructions to His Majesty's Deputy Commissary of Accounts; PRO WO 63/43- 
49, Letters to Commissariat Officers 1808-1815.
107 See above p.24.
108 See Chapter 4.
109 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery. Vol. 2, pp.14 - 17.
110 See PRO WO 55/1314.
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Generally, whether forces were administered from Horse Guards or by the 
Board of Ordnance was of little consequence for logistical operations, and while slight 
variation in procedures existed the organizations concerned tended to work along 
similar lines. That the officers of the artillery and engineers were recruited from the 
Royal Military College at Woolwich, for example, made little difference; neither did 
the alternative system of bounty payments in the artillery nor the fact that rules 
governing women accompanying the regiments were more relaxed. 1 " Gunners and 
artillery drivers required munitions, food and uniform just as infantry and cavalrymen 
did. Even if uniform was of a different colour, or ammunition larger, such items were 
generally purchased from similar sources, requiring similar standards of 
transportation, storage and distribution.
The role of the Commissariat can best be described as logistics in its broadest 
sense. Frequently the term logistics is used purely in relation to the movement of 
supplies, although in the case of the Commissariat this included the procurement, 
storage and distribution of such items. The numerous aspects of the Commissariat's 
task become apparent through a study of Commissariat accounts from the period. 
Figure 1 illustrates the diverse roles of the Commissariat through the thirty-three 
different accounting categories, along with their relevant codes, to be found in the 
Commissariat ledgers used in the Peninsular War. Figure 1 demonstrates that 
ultimately every individual employed by the army, from the common soldiers to chief 
surgeons, would in some way rely on the Commissariat, while there was even special 
provision in its administrative practices for temporary organizations such as recruiting 
parties."2
111 Macleod et al to Mulgrave, Woolwich, 2nd January 1811, PRO WO55/1369, Adjutant General's 
Confidential Letters, Out letters, September 1810 to February 1816; Macleod to R.H. Crew, Woolwich, 
17* June 1807, Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 25th July 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
112 Wellesley-Pole to Commissary General Handfield, Dublin Castle, 2nd October 1810, PRO WO 
63/91, p.159.
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A Imprests T Portuguese Government
B Bat and Forage U Spanish Government
C Staff Payment V Loss on Bills Negotiated
D Military Contingencies W Property Tax
E Secret Service X Pay of Commissariat Department
F Clothing and Field Equipment Y Treasury Bills
G Ordnance Department Z Sums received from accounts
H Engineer Department AA Stores and Provisions Sold by
I Supplies Authority
J Purchase of Horses, Mules BB Prroperty Tax Charged Upon
K Labourers Incomes
L Transport by Land CC Bills from the Ordnance
M transport by Water Commissary and Paymaster
N Indemnifications DD Sums received, no particular
O POWs abstract allocated
P Stationery and Printing EE Balance Paid
Q Commissariat Contingencies FF Bill received upon Paymaster in
R Medical Department England
S Deputy Paymaster General
Figure 1: Commissariat Accounting Categories." 3
While the information in figure 1 is evidence of the diversity of the Commissariat's 
responsibilities, it reveals little about the organization's activities at the various stages 
of the supply chain. Indeed, when considered in isolation, there is little in the above to 
suggest that the Commissariat was in fact the army's premier logistical organization, 
and such accounting practices may appear to be little more than an example of 
bureaucracy run amok in the military. Of particular note in figure 1 is the fact that 
supplies are referred to in a single category, although it will become apparent that the 
significance of the other categories to logistics are masked by the language of 
administration in the period.
A more detailed and revealing overview of the activities actually conducted by 
the Commissariat in relation to logistics can be found in the account books of 
Assistant Commissary General George Grellier. Grellier was responsible for 
maintaining the accounts of the Commissariat in Sicily, which was one of the larger 
overseas deployments of the organization and as a result serves as a useful case study. 
The accounts for the months of September to November 1813 are summarised below:
113 Detailed Instructions to Commissariat Accountants, Cash Accounts, NAM 6807/221, p!2.
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Date Service Payment
16 September
25 September
9 October
24 October
27 October
8d
28 October
29 October
30 October
31 October
5 November
6 November
7 November
Hire of 153 pairs of bullocks
Artificers and labourers employed
for making gun carriages
For shoeing the mules of the train
Arrears of pay to Corporals and
Muleteers
Labourers employed in loading
wheat
Pay to coopers and labourers
Hire of magazine to contain forage
Pay of Corporals and Muleteers
Balance of hospital stoppages due
75 th regiment
For hire of boats, labourers and 100
planks for use by the King's bakery
Sundry articles furnished to the
Ordnance department
Grinding wheat to make biscuit
Pay of artificers and labourers
employed by the engineers department
Ditto
Pay of officers and labourers in service
of the Barrack Department
Pay of Capo Master of the engineer works
Pay of artificers and labourers
employed by the engineers department
Hire of boats labour
Allowance for hired servants
£40
£5
£1
£15
£1
£12
£12
£15
£22
£28
£75
£7
£7
£1
£5
£5
£2
£13
Os
18s
4s
9s
12s
18s
13s
9s
8s
£12
13s
15s
10s
Is
3s
14s
18s
2s
11s
lOd
lid
9d
9d
4d
lid
lOd
8s
7d
6d
Id
3d
lid
4d
9d
8d
Id J
Figure 2: The account books of Assistant Commissary General George Grellier, September-
November 1813." 4
In the three months covered by figure 2 the Commissariat was involved in the 
activities of procurement (the hire of 153 pairs of bullocks on 16 September), 
manufacturing (the grinding of wheat to make biscuit on 28 October), storage (the hire 
of a magazine to contain forage on 24 October), and transport (the hire of boats on 27 
October). 115 Besides demonstrating the extent of Commissariat involvement in the full 
range of activities associated with logistics, both figures 1 and 2 are of note as they 
illustrate the wide range of tasks associated with maintaining an army, from simple 
accountancy to construction projects.
114 NAM 7902/36, Account Book of Assistant Commissary General George Grellier.
115 All are key components of logistics. Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.22.
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The involvement of the Commissariat in the supply chain often began at the 
point at which items were procured. In Britain and Ireland this involvement primarily 
took the form of administering and awarding contracts to civilians. 116 It was, however, 
on campaign that the Commissariat's activities had the most impact. When there was 
no existing infrastructure of barracks and stores, a situation that faced the army when 
it first arrived on the continent in 1808 but also as it advanced across the Iberian 
Peninsula, the purchasing agents of the Commissariat, frequently supported by British 
diplomats, would precede the army, roaming the country for supplies and sites for 
depots. 117 The importance of this activity was such that it featured in the planning of 
campaigns, as was demonstrated by the fact that upon his arrival in northern Spain in 
1808 Sir John Moore was informed that 'it will be necessary to concert with the 
Commissary General, W. Erskine, who will be attached to your army, the best means 
of assembling an adequate supply of horses and mules for rendering your army 
mobile'. At the same time a group of agents was travelling to Asturias to procure 
'such horses and mules as that country can furnish'. 118 Such activities frequently 
required close co-operation between commissaries, especially when newly arrived 
commissaries liased with their more established colleagues, the latter possessing 
useful knowledge of the local economy and practices. As a result, Arthur Wellesley in 
1808 informed General Burrard that T will desire the commissary to let your 
commissary know, the price of the hire of carts and mules, and of other items 
purchased by him'."9
116 See below p.87.
117 Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was particularly active in preparing the army 
for the campaign in Egypt. P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 1801 (London, Routledge, 1995),
p.18.
118 To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 26* September 1808, PRO WO 1/236, War 
Department in Letters: Sir John Moore and General Baird, September 1808 to January 1809, p.9. For a 
further discussion of this mission, see p. 164.
119 A. Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard, Aeyria, 11* August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, War Department in 
Letters and Papers, June to August 1808, p. 191.
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The goods acquired by the roving commissaries would be purchased with 
either cash or credit. The former was most preferred by the vendors but was not 
always available, particularly during the prolonged campaign in Spain and Portugal 
when shortages of specie were common. 120 In 1810, for example, £5,382,166 in 
treasury notes was shipped to the Peninsula, as well £679,069 in hard cash, but the 
Commissariat was to be only one recipient for this, along with army wages and cash 
earmarked for foreign governments and other political goals. 121 As a result of the 
shortage of specie items were frequently purchased using promissory notes at home 
and abroad. The use of credit to support the army became an increasingly common 
practice from the 1690s. 122 As well as credit raised by government from institutions, 
the system of credit in Britain operated through the issuing of bills drawn on a third 
party, a system frequently utilised by the Commissariat to fund its own transactions. 123
Whether supplied by contractors or procured locally, paid for with credit or 
cash, goods were commonly stored in depots overseen by Commissariat storekeepers 
(the principal exceptions being those stores manned by organizations under the 
Ordnance). Depots could be separated by many miles, or concentrated in small areas, 
depending on the items stored in them and the requirements of the locality concerned, 
In Dublin, for example, there initially existed no fewer than four depots located at 
various buildings, all of which were rented by the Commissariat. Figure 3 shows the
locations and costs of annual rental for these depots.
Address Rent per annum Address Rent per annum
Queen Street £391 5s Rogerson's Quay £120
Lime Street £200 Cardiff Street £120
Total £831 5s
Figure 3: Commissariat depots in Dublin, 1806. 124
Muir, 'Britain and the Peninsular War', p.350.
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Brewer, 'Commercialisation and Polities', p. 205. 
124 W. Elliot to Commissary General Handfield, Dublin Castle, 27* July 1806, PRO WO 63/88, Entry 
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In 1806 it was the possibility of relocating the four Dublin depots into a single, 
specially constructed building was considered. This was to cost £6,713 for five storeys 
but it was discovered that if reduced to four storeys the cost would amount to only 
£5,609. Besides saving £831 paid for rent each year, the single depot would require 
only one assistant storekeeper rather than the four then employed. This represented a 
total saving (in rent and wages) of £1037 17s per annum. The scheme proved 
successful and the policy of amalgamating depots was implemented across Ireland. By 
1811, of the sixteen towns and cities in which Commissariat depots were located, only 
one, Enniskillen, was listed as having two. 125
The amalgamation of the depots in Ireland demonstrated that financial 
administration in the Commissariat during the period was not concerned solely with 
allocating revenue, and that an element of economy was involved. This reflected a 
boundary imposed by the state, a boundary created by the need to monitor 
expenditure. It was economics that restricted the number of depots available and 
although the amalgamations ultimately proved beneficial by increasing efficiency, the 
situation may have been different if the fear of large-scale unrest in Ireland had been 
proved true. In such a scenario single depots may have been unable to cope with 
demands for various supplies, while the loss of a single amalgamated depot would 
have caused greater disruption than if the stores it contained had been split between 
several sites.
Much of the pressure for economies in the Commissariat was due to 
parliamentary scrutiny. The cost of supplying the army (as opposed to paying soldiers' 
wages) had traditionally been a contentious issue for parliament and it was not until 
1691 that parliament was willing to provide a single annual budget for supply. Prior to 
this a distinction had been made between ordinary (peace time) supply and
125 Elliot to Handfield, Dublin Castle, 27* July 1806, PRO WO 63/88.
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extraordinary supply (that required in wartime), a situation that had enabled an army 
to be maintained while having its activities curtailed. 126 During the eighteenth century, 
the Committee for Public Accounts ensured that expenditure remained under scrutiny, 
while detailed investigations were conducted for Reports of Military Enquiry.' 27 Such 
scrutiny encouraged efficiency but potentially made finance, rather than capability, a 
priority.
While at a depot the primary role of Commissariat personnel was ensuring the 
distribution of supplies, monitoring stock levels and keeping accounts. To assist this 
task a number of special aids, including branding irons and stamps, were employed by 
storekeepers to identify Commissariat property. Various weights and measures were 
also utilised. A typical Commissariat store, for example, contained scales and weights 
for candles ranging from ten ounces to eight pounds and coal measures in quarter, half 
and whole bushels. 128 hi addition to keeping records and monitoring stores 
commissaries were also authorised to sell certain items. Generally these items were 
damaged and judged too costly to repair but in some cases were simply no longer 
required. The nature of these sales, and the commissaries' role in them, is 
demonstrated in the clear instructions given to Commissary Healy of Cork concerning 
the selling of camping equipment in December 1805:
The list of camping equipment in the Cork store now being recorded you will 
please to advertise and sell by public auction the entire of that under the head 
unserviceable be particularly careful that nothing is disposed of but what truly 
comes under that description and that nothing is preserved under the head of 
serviceable adverting to repair the doing of which may almost amount to the 
original value of the article. Your particular attention will be required during 
the sale to this point - the unserviceable camp equipage in those stores are at 
present selling and to much advantage which I trust will be the case at Cork 
and that every publicity will be given which may tend to ensure it. 1  129
126 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', p.47.
127 Eighth Report of Military Enquiry, passim; Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?, p. 147.
128 Letter from Barrak [sic] Master General to Barrak Masters (Barracks Office, 1797), appendix.
129 Punctuation as in original. P. Singer to Mr Healy, Commissary General's Office, 30* December 
1805, PRO WO 63/40, Letters to Commissariat Officers 1803 - 1807.
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Items sold did not merely include camping equipment but also ammunition pouches 
and bayonet holders. 130 That the latter items were sold to civilians is somewhat 
surprising, particularly in Ireland where fears of rebellion persisted. Other items that 
could be sold included unwanted mules and horses, along with the offal and hides of 
cattle slaughtered while on campaign. 131 Items sold by commissaries included those 
required by soldiers to replace lost or damaged uniforms and equipment (although this 
was not strictly selling, as costs were deducted from soldiers' pay). The sums of 
money involved could be considerable and, following regulations introduced in 1810, 
cavalrymen were expected to pay 7s 6V2d for new water decks and 4s 2d for corn 
sacks. Of note is the fact that soldiers would only be expected to pay for repairs if the 
object was slightly damaged, at a rate 3s 9%d and 2s Id for decks and sacks 
respectively, giving some indication of the condition equipment had to be in for the
army to consider it unserviceable. 132
The storage of items was not without difficulty as many required special
consideration. A seemingly obvious example is meat, although extensive cold stores 
were not utilised as livestock would be slaughtered as required or meat preserved by 
salting, smoking or similar methods. The storage of fodder was surprisingly complex 
and caused difficulties: old straw, for example, could not be mixed with new but new 
and old hay could be mixed freely. 133 Such difficulties were often resolved through the 
use of various containers, barrels being a common type of storage vessel used for 
certain liquids, fodder, food and gunpowder. Several Commissariat stations - 
including Heligoland and New South Wales - employed coopers permanently, while
130 Major B. Woodward to Major Ramsey, Royal Barracks, 17th September 1810, PRO WO 63/91, 
p.148.
131 Standing Orders, Order No. 17, NAM 6807/221, p.3.
132 General Order No. 188, PRO WO 63/91, p.49.
133 Commissary General Handfield to Sir W. Berdett, Commissary General's Office, 31 SI August 1810, 
PRO WO 63/45, Letters to Commissariat Officers 1810-1811.
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others - such as Malta and Sicily - employed them on a regular basis as required. 134 
The storage of bread required more consideration than that of many other items, as 
there were optimal ways to store bread depending on how fresh it was. 135 As a result 
two vessels were employed specifically for this purpose - a wooden basket and a more 
robust version braced by iron. The former was intended for distribution to units in the 
field, while the more costly braced version was intended for use solely in 
Commissariat stores. There were strict rules concerning the proper use of each type 
and a misallocation of bread containers during 1811 resulted in a severe reprimand for 
a Commissary Dunne. 136
In addition to various tools and items required to administer maintenance, the 
Commissariat's personnel were responsible for considerable sums of money that were 
either held in pay chests or used to pay for goods and services. Such money was paid 
out using a system open to fraud, in which payments were made (as either cash, 
cheques or promissory notes) and subsequent expenses claimed by the commissary 
concerned. That fraud occurred was well known and Captain Thomas Browne of the 
23 rd Foot complained that commissaries could make considerable sums of money from 
illegal activity, a situation that damaged the reputation of the Commissariat 
irreparably in the eyes of contemporaries and historians alike. 137 Common examples of 
fraud included claiming the pay of deserted muleteers, buying bills at half face value 
from illiterate soldiers and fraudulently drawing expenses for cheques that were never 
issued or should have been destroyed. 138
134 PRO WO 61/25, Commissariat Department 1816 - 17; NAM 7902/36, Account Book of Assistant 
Commissary General George Grellier.
135PRO WO 30/141, Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the General 
Defence, saving their property, and distressing the enemy, by removing the means of subsistence, from 
threatened parts of the country. Published by authority, p.30.
136 N. Malissis to Mr. Dunne, Commissary General's Office, 12* January 1810, PRO WO 63/45.
137 Buckley (ed), Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, p.203.
138 Court Martial, Cartaxo, 30th January 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221.
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The existence of fraud in the Commissariat can be attributed to a variety of 
factors. Administration in the period is generally perceived to have been corrupt and 
the Commissariat frequently sought to recruit personnel from occupations that were 
particularly associated with the practice, including professionals such as lawyers and 
estate agents. 139 Despite these factors it is incorrect to dismiss corruption in the 
Commissariat as being solely a symptom of administration in the period, as such 
organizations have traditionally attracted corruption throughout the world. In 1835, 
for example, the logistical organization of the Mexican army in Texas was rendered 
ineffective by corruption, despite the fact that Mexico exhibited few characteristics 
that we would associate with Britain at the end of eighteenth century. 140
Pressure to limit fraud within the Commissariat appears to have originated
internally as much as from pressure from parliament, and it was clearly in the 
organization's interests to optimise its financial resources by reducing fraud. The 
Commissariat's method of achieving this, through introducing new procedures, was in 
some respects typical of a trend towards increased regulation in the period. Regulation 
was not, however, the traditional approach to combating corruption. In the Excise, for 
example, corruption in the 1780s had been controlled through the introduction of new 
personnel to supervise tax collectors, thereby adding a new tier of administration 
rather than extra regulation. 141 Thus, the Commissariat was utilising its own approach 
to resolving problems and not necessarily following trends in administrative practice. 
Indeed, the Commissariat was prevented from introducing a new tier of administration 
due to restrictions on manpower, either though none being available or unwillingness 
on the part of the state to fund it.
139 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.72-73, 211; G.E. Mingey, 'The Eighteenth Century Land Steward', 
in B.C. Jones and G.E. Mingay (eds.), Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution 
(London, Edward Arnold, 1987), p.8.
140 A.A. Nofi, The Alamo and the Texas War of Independence (New York, Da Capo, 1994), p. 195.
141 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. 102-110.
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The regulations introduced by the Commissariat to limit corruption (which 
primarily took the form of fraud) were mainly directed at those responsible for stores. 
Instructions were issued in July 1812, intended to prevent the 'losses which have in 
some instances been occasioned to the department, in consequence of the store 
keepers on foreign stations obtaining more monies on account of the ordnance 
military corps than the services required'. 142 Measures included requirements for 
receipts, a second signature on bills and monthly reports. Shortfalls in the delivery of 
supplies to units, whether due to shortages in the depot or their not being required, 
were to be regularly reported to prevent them being sold on illegally. Additional 
instructions, issued in July 1815, prevented commissaries claiming funds on behalf of 
other departments, such as the artillery and engineers. 143 Equipment could only be 
removed from stores at the request of authorised personnel and a commissary in 
Ireland was reminded of the rules in 1811 following the removal of items by the Royal 
Wagon Train: 'the Commissary General directs that you should be appraised that so 
far from granting such articles on the requisition of the officer in command at your 
station you ought not to grant them at all without special permission from 
headquarters'. 144 Thus, rank alone was not sufficient to authorise the removal of 
stores. The reforms introduced in the late war period reveal that, prior to this period, 
great trust was placed in the integrity of individual personnel.
To reduce fraud further Commissariat accounts were carefully controlled and 
administered, with the result that the organization became increasingly bureaucratic. 
There were, for example, 23 separate articles, which required seven different forms
142 PRO WO 55/635, Miscellaneous Orders to Commissariat.
143 June 1808, PRO T1/1061, Instructions to His Majesty's Deputy Commissary of Accounts; Standing 
Orders, Order No. 19, NAM 6807/221, p4; Circular of July 1815 Issued to all Commissaries, PRO WO 
55/635, Miscellaneous Orders to Commissariat.
144 H. Webb to J. Jones, Commissary General's Office, 23 rd February 1811, PRO WO 63/45.
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that governed expenditure on forage for cavalry units in Ireland. 145 Such bureaucracy 
was not without difficulties and at times it appears completing paperwork threatened 
to surpass logistics as the primary aim of the organization. This was demonstrated in 
1811 when Commissary Hagan faced disciplinary action for incorrectly listing shirts 
after shoes in a list of expenses, the reprimand being more severe than that received 
by a fellow commissary known to have 'misplaced' militia stores (including 
ordnance) but who was not guilty of filling out forms incorrectly. 146 The most 
significant consequence of increasing bureaucracy was its impact on the structure of 
the Commissariat itself. The organization was effectively split into two branches, 
designated stores and accounts, with the latter becoming so large that it accounted for 
half of Commissariat personnel employed in garrisons such as that of Gibraltar in 
December 1816. 14? Thus the organization had evolved administratively, an evolution 
that went hand-in-hand with increased professionalism created by the need for skilled 
accountants and administrators.
There was a trend in the period towards the gathering of precise information, 
whether it was statistical, tabular or mathematical. 148 This was apparent in 
Commissariat practices and perhaps the most important elements in its bureaucracy 
were the ledgers and account books. The information contained within them 
ultimately formed the basis of returns utilised by the Commissariat to maintain the 
army, by generals to formulate strategy, by government to formulate policy and by 
parliamentary and Privy Council enquiries to draw conclusions on the efficiency of 
the armed forces. Commissariat accountants were issued four ledgers and instructed to
145 'Rules and Regulations Under Which the Foraging of the Horses of the Cavalry in Ireland is to be 
Conducted', PRO WO 63/91.
146 Commissary General to Mr Hagan, Cork, 17 th April 1811, PRO WO 63/46, letters to Commissariat 
Officers 1811-1812.
147 See below p.58.
148 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.222.
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carry them at all times, 'on every march and change of station'. 149 To aid efficiency 
each ledger was colour coded according to its intended use - brown for income and 
expenditures, green for provisions, blue for transfers of stores and red for provisions 
issued to troops. Returns were to reach the Commissary General by a given day of 
each month or week:
Date in Month
I Pay estimates
II Abstract of bills to the Portuguese 
15 Costs of hired vessels
24 Beginning of monthly cash and store accounts for month
25 Return of provisions supplied to regiments 
Abstract of bills to the Spanish 
Returns of forage 
Reports of shortfalls in delivery of supplies
Figure 4: Schedule for Commissariat reports and returns in Spain. 150
Weekly returns were normally expected to have arrived by Monday morning (or in 
some cases, Thursday). Serviceable and unserviceable items were only distinguished 
in the monthly, rather than weekly, returns. 151 Practices such as these failed to 
eradicate fraud completely, although the regular monitoring of accounts ensured that 
perpetrators were more likely to be apprehended and that damage done by inefficient
administrators limited.
Fraud was not the only problem faced by the Commissariat. Many of its
personnel were guilty of inefficiency rather than corruption and practices intended to 
detect fraud also served to highlight irregularities caused by errors on the part of 
commissaries. During the winter of 1810, for example, it was noted that although no 
deceit was involved certain regiments were still waiting to pay for uniforms six 
months after being issued them. 152 Occasionally, commissaries were guilty of neither
149 Cartaxo, 16th January 1811, from Extracts of General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p. 1.
150 Detailed instructions to Commissariat Accountants, Cash Accounts, NAM 6807/221, Books of 
Commissary General N. Jackson, c!814, passim.
isi 4* Article of the 9* Section of General Instructions to Resident Store Keepers, PRO WO 63/45. 
152 16* January 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p. 1.
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fraud nor error but outright incompetence. Personnel found guilty of this could be 
dismissed, although a written warning or reprimand was more common and was 
frequently sufficient to resolve the situation. A typical example of a warning was that 
issued to Commissary O. Timms in March 1806. The following extract reflects the 
way in which such matters were approached, the practices that could cause 
disciplinary action and what constituted 'incompetence':
complaints having been made by Mr Heathy, which also he has been under the 
necessity of repeating of the extreme inconvenience to which he is constantly 
subjected by the irregular transmissal [sic] and altogether inadmissible form in 
which your vouchers are made up, I beg in the first instance to put you on your 
guard against a repetition of errors which they can (thus persisted in) be 
accounted for on the ground of incompetence for the situation of a public 
accountant... must end if the matter is brought before the Commissary General 
as it quickly must - in the summary measure of removing you from your
present station. 153
Of particular note in the above extract is the structure of the disciplinary process: a 
complaint was made by a fellow commissary, which was handled by the office of the 
Commissary General and then only passed to the Commissary General himself if the 
situation remained unresolved. Furthermore, the complaint only arose after Timms 
persistently failed to complete and return paperwork satisfactorily, indicating that the 
Commissariat tolerated a degree of incompetence amongst its personnel. Finally, it 
must be noted that the warning worked as Timms evidently continued in his post. Just 
as advances in administration enabled efficient administrators to rise to prominence, 
so too did they allow less competent individuals to remain in post. 154
As noted previously, not all cases of inefficiency could be attributed to the 
incompetence described above. Genuine mistakes were made, which was inevitable 
when the sheer scale of the task facing the organization is considered: the
153 Punctuation as in original. W. Webb to O. Timms, Commissary General's Office, 25* March 1806, 
PRO WO 63/40.
154 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.77.
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Commissariat was a global organization. Our perception of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars is often Eurocentric, shaped by the writings of historians such as 
John Keegan, David Chandler and Charles Esdaile, all of whom emphasise conflict in 
the European theatre. Thus, there is a tendency to overlook the extent of Britain's 
imperial commitments in the period. Even when these are considered they usually 
involve the expeditions sent against French colonies or rebellious Indian princes. For 
the Commissariat, the reality was quite different to this Eurocentric perception and the 
organization found itself attempting to supply garrisons dispersed across the empire 
and beyond, which often included remote and militarily quiet regions of Africa or 
Asia, proving Daniel Baugh's assertion that despite their economic advantages 
colonies could be a strategic burden. 155 Supplying the more isolated outposts could be 
amongst the most difficult tasks faced by the Commissariat and the situation was such 
that Charles Greenwood estimated it could take as long as two years for items arriving 
in a colony to reach the most distant outposts. The isolation of certain garrisons also 
hampered communications, which disrupted the normal pattern of Commissariat 
activities and therefore disrupted the delivery and monitoring of stores. Greenwood 
wrote of regiments in foreign stations that they 'may be, and frequently, are so divided 
and dispersed as to make it extremely difficult to ascertain the quantity of clothing 
delivered [or required]'. 156
The numbers of items to be supplied posed further problems for the 
Commissariat, the scale of the task being demonstrated by the request of the Duke of 
Wellington in 1811 for the delivery of 150,000 pairs of shoes to the River Tagus by
155 Baugh, 'The Maritime State', p. 186. Historians including Jeremy Black have argued the converse: 
that colonial expansion contributed to success in warfare. Such views, however, are often based solely 
on the economic contribution of colonies, with little reference to their strategic consequences. Black, 
Sea Borne Empire, p. 170.
156 C. Greenwood to Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, Craig's Court, 30* March 1811, PRO WO 377/2, 
Various Papers, 1809 upon the System of Clothing and Off Reckonings for the Army.
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sea. Added to the burden of the Commissariat in each locality was the requirement 
to procure supplies for forces in other regions. Ireland, for example, was to become a 
significant source of food and clothing for the Peninsula army. 158 Sicily fulfilled a 
similar role, and is described by Piers Mackesy as being 'the granary' for the large 
British military presence in the central Mediterranean. 159
Corruption, incompetence and the scale of its task were not the only factors 
that served to undermine the effectiveness of the Commissariat and efforts to increase 
the organization's efficiency. As is often the case in any situation involving military 
organizations there was competition for resources and like the Royal Wagon Train, 
the Commissariat found itself in competition with the artillery for draught animals. 160 
In 1811, for example, it was proposed that the Royal Artillery acquire mules from the 
Commissariat to transport mobile forges. 161 In addition there was a myriad of other 
difficulties with which the Commissariat had to contend. These included clashes of 
jurisdiction with other organizations and the practice of employing civilians in 
overseas postings. The latter caused difficulties due to the requirement that payments 
be made in their local currency: in Sicily, for example, the pay chest included pounds 
sterling, Spanish dollars and Sicilian dollars. 162 The need to make payments in foreign 
currency was one of the greatest challenges faced by an army due to the need not only
to acquire but also exchange specie. 163
Organizations upon which the Commissariat relied made errors that
compounded its own inefficiency. The transfer of horses required record keeping by 
both the receiving and transferring organization, and it was frequently the case that the
157 Wellington to Liverpool, Cartaxo, 3 1 st March 1811, PRO WO 1/248, War Department in Letters: 
Wellington, January to March 1811.
158 Treasury Minute, 8th January 1811, PRO WO 63/91, p.256.
159 P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, pp. 14-15.
160 See below pp.156-157.
161 PRO WO 37/10/26, Papers Relating to Provision of Portable Forges, 1810-12, paragraph 17,
162 Statement of Money Remaining in the Military Chest, 1 st January 1814, NAM 7902/36/
163 Corvisier, Armies and Societies, p.67.
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parent formation rather than the Commissariat made mistakes. Horses were identified 
by name, distinguishing marks and a code (consisting of a letter and number) but in 
July 1806, for example, two horses transferred from the Dragoon Guards were 
wrongly reported as being E31 and F77 by the regiment. The numbers should have 
actually been G31 and G77, and for a time it appeared that the correct horses were not 
present. 164 This was only a minor administrative error as the correct number of 
animals was received, although this was not always the case. In April 1810, for 
example, fifteen horses were supposed to be transferred from the 2nd German Heavy 
Dragoons, but thirty-six were delivered. 165
Despite a growing dependency on, not to mention an apparent obsession with, 
data collection and related paperwork in the administrative organizations during the 
period, bureaucracy alone could not guarantee the availability of supplies. 
Improvements in administrative efficiency, measures to reduce fraud in the 
Commissariat and even the economic strength of the British state were futile if the 
required goods could not be procured. Frequently the efforts of the Commissariat were 
hindered, if not thwarted, by the simple fact that the supplies it required did not exist. 
During the Peninsular War providing grain proved to be particularly problematic due 
to the scarcity of that commodity in the theatre. Due to the Continental System this 
could only be rectified by importing great quantities directly from the United States, 
Canada and Brazil. 166
Of the difficulties encountered regarding the supply of grain to the Peninsular 
army Arthur Wellesley noted that:
in the present season of the year [summer] you cannot depend upon the 
country for bread. Portugal never fed itself during more than seven months out 
of twelve, the common consumption of the country is Indian corn; and the
164 Return of the Horses of 7th Dragoon Guard to be Transferred to the Commissariat in Half Yearly 
Inspection in July 1806, Major General Affleck, 1 st August 1806, PRO WO 63/88.
165 Adjutant General's Office to Commissary General, Dublin, 9"1 April 1810, PRO WO 63/91, p.63.
166 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p.6; Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean , p. 10.
52
little wheat there is in the country cannot be ground at this season of the year 
as the mills are generally turned by water and there is now no water in the mill ponds. 167
Wellesley's comments not only highlight the difficulties of procuring sufficient 
supplies but also the difficulties that could be encountered when processing them (in 
this case, milling). Added to these problems was the difficulty of transporting the 
required items, whether in raw (such as harvested crops) or refined (such as flour) 
forms. The Commissariat was hampered hi this activity by the inefficient tasking and 
utilisation of the wheeled conveyances operated by the army. Not only were these 
vehicles split between various organizations, including the Royal Wagon Train and 
Commissariat, there were also pools of vehicles held by individual regiments. 168 As a 
result the only means through which a deficiency of transport could be rectified was 
by utilising assets otherwise allotted to other duties, thus Commissariat carts that 
could have been moving supplies were frequently used to move wounded personnel 
between hospitals (the situation could of course be reversed, with serious 
consequences for the medical services). 169 Significantly, even if these duties were 
conducted on return journeys, that is to say after carts had delivered supplies and were 
empty en route to the depot, their journey was still slowed.
Even if available, many of the carts operated by the Commissariat were often 
unsuited to the task, and a report on wagons was sceptical about their use over the 
rough terrain encountered in Spain and Portugal, a region noted for its poor roads. In 
Spain there existed Royal Roads, constructed using the latest building techniques and 
30 to 60 feet wide but these were few in number, linked only major cities and were 
badly maintained. The most common types of roads were known as caminos and
167 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 1 I th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p. 191.
168 See below pp.133-134.
169 Thomar, 8* March 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p.8.
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carrils, both types being essentially dirt tracks, although the latter had two rows of 
paving stones that, only in theory, eased the passage of wheeled vehicles. 170 As a result 
travel could be treacherous and it was noted that 'accidents are continuously 
occurring... carts seldom make a march without the occurrence of such accidents... 
no wheeled carriage can, with any degree of security, travel over mountains'. 171 
Significantly, wagons were easily hindered by bad weather, a shortcoming that was 
apparent during the winter of 1810 - 1811, when parts of the United Kingdom 
experienced heavy snowfalls that closed many roads and caused chaos for logistical 
organizations such as the Commissariat. Despite the mobilisation of the nation's 
resources, nature could not be overcome.
hi a letter to Commissary James Gilchrist, who was located in a badly affected 
area, the Commissary General in Ireland stated 'I presume the roads are so much 
injured from the late fall of snow, that you will have suspended drawing oats from 
[your usual source] or any other distant quarter'. 172 Of note is the fact that no attempt 
was made by the Commissary General to ascertain the situation regarding roads as it 
was assumed they were impassable to wagons. Interestingly, it appears that in such 
circumstances it was not common practice for Commissariat personnel to determine 
which roads, if any, were passable. This was demonstrated in another letter from the 
Commissary General's office, this time to Commissary Colvill, who was instructed
that:
as the very heavy fall of snow may have rendered the roads in a certain degree 
impassable... the Commissary General wishes you would carefully ascertain 
and report on the state of the road leading from Fermoy to Clonell [sic] and 
Cork, it would not be inadvisable also to inquire as to the other... roads 
branching from your station. 173
170 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p.4.
171 PRO WO 37/10/26, Paragraphs 7 and 9f I\.V_/  \~r J 11 i\Jf £*\Jj -i- «-» "•&* M.p'*"-' ' «---* ~- •
172 Charles Handfield to James Gilchrist, Commissary General's Office, 4* February 1811, PRO WO
63/45.OJ/tJ
173 P. Singer to R. Colvill [sic], Commissary General's Office, 31 st January 1811, PRO WO 63/88.
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That it was not standard practice for commissaries to inspect roads automatically in 
such circumstances is somewhat surprising when it is considered that the organization 
relied on the movement of wagons by road to undertake its duties. In part this could be 
explained by the structure of the British army, specifically that the movement of 
troops was the responsibility of the Quartermaster General, although this applied 
mainly at a strategic level and responsibility inevitably devolved to local officers. 174 
Even if local roads were found to be open, however, there was then the problem of 
snow in other areas forcing significant detours. The drivers of one group of wagons 
were instructed that 'the weather and state of the roads must govern the departure of 
the detachment; and it will march through Limerick (the crossroads at Cashel being 
reported impassable) and Birr, where fresh horses will be supplied'. 175
The snowfalls experienced in the United Kingdom that winter were unusually 
heavy, but, while accompanying a wagon train to Almeida during the winter of 
1812, Conductor of Stores W. Morris recorded in his diary the difficulties that 
could be encountered when moving convoys even in relatively good weather:
Wednesday 18 November 1812
We were very unfortunate this day with our mules falling down particularly in
passing over the water... some of them fell with our boxes but nothing of very
serious consequence... the road [to Almeida] was wholly lined with sick and
convalescing troops - marching for different villages in the neighbourhood of
Almeida.
Friday 20 November 1812
We could scarcely make any way in consequence of the road being crowded
with bullock cars conveying the sick and wounded baggage.
Added to Morris' problems was that on Sunday 22 November the column did not 
move at all because it was still awaiting orders concerning the route that it was to
174 Park and Nafziger, The British Military, p6; see also Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 17* June 1807, 
PRO WO 55/1314..
175 Brackets in original. N. Malasses to Robert Colvill [sic], Commissary General's Office, 4* February 
1811, PRO WO 63/45.
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take. 176 This is significant as it demonstrates that the routes of supply columns were 
not planned in advance. As highlighted by Morris, however, this could prove 
detrimental and delay the delivery of supplies. In contrast the French army operated 
with sometimes-strict traffic regulations, with certain bridges open to only specific 
traffic, such as troops, wounded or supplies. 177
Another factor that hindered the activities of the Commissariat was the 
allocation of its personnel, which could at times appear to be chaotic. This was 
particularly apparent in 1808 when elements of the army were deployed for action in 
Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar. Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, for example, was 
instructed to lead to the Peninsula a sizeable contingent of reinforcements that 
consisted of seven infantry battalions and two companies of artillery. The force was to 
travel from Cork to Falmouth but was delayed for three weeks by the late arrival of 
transport vessels. Eventually arriving in Falmouth and already several weeks late, 
Baird discovered that several key personnel were not awaiting his arrival. This was 
reported to the War Office, the general informing Castlereagh that 'I think it necessary 
to appraise your Lordship also that I have not as yet heard of any paymaster or 
commissary being appointed to this army'. 178 Thus, even after a three-week delay, the 
commissary (and paymaster) had not arrived. Two days later there was some 
confusion when an officer from the Commissariat reported to the general, who 
promptly informed the War Office that he would take matters into his own hands if
the situation was not resolved soon:
I beg leave to state that an assistant Commissary of accounts, I. Dickson Esq. - 
has just reported to me his arrival from Portsmouth, but does not appear to 
know whether he should consider himself part of the army, as he has received 
no instructions upon the subject. I understand some under Commissaries are
176 NAM 7508/24, Notebook of W. Morris, Conductor of Stores, 1812.
177 Creveld, Supplying War, p.53.
178 Lieutenant-General Baird, to Castlereagh, Falmouth, I st October 1808, PRO WO 1/236, War 
Department in Letters: Sir John Moore and General Baird, September 1808 to January 1809, p.337.
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also here in similar circumstances -1 intend taking the whole with me, unless I 
should receive any particular instructions respecting them. 1179
The force left Falmouth on 9 October, over a month late, but with its full complement 
of Commissariat personnel. That the force embarked late was bad enough, but that a 
general had been forced to consider acting on his own accord to ensure a commissary 
sailed with him says much about the system through which commissaries were 
assigned to individual forces. The concern expressed by Baird at the absence of a 
commissary is also significant, as it reflects the importance attached to the 
Commissariat, although much more may perhaps be inferred by the placing of the 
missing paymaster before the commissary in his letter of 1 st October. More significant 
is how the episode highlights that, despite improvements in administration, the system 
struggled to co-ordinate the various departments and organizations that had been 
created, even for a small force such as that commanded by Baird. 180
Despite its obvious importance to the operational capability of the army, the 
Commissariat took second place to the manpower requirements of the front line 
formations. This was inevitable when it is considered that a fully manned 
Commissariat would have been of no value to an under-strength army (although that 
neither the army nor the Commissariat were ever at full strength is evidence of the 
state's inability to sustain the army). Some manpower could be made available 
through centralising depots but, while the centralisation of depots in a city such as 
Dublin was feasible, the policy could not be implemented across an organization 
operating in war zones or far-flung colonial outposts. 181 This was one of the features 
of the Commissariat that set it apart from other supporting organizations, as its
179 Lieutenant-General Baird, to Castlereagh, Falmouth, 3 rd October September 1808, PRO WO 1/236,
p.340.
180 Baird's force would face further delays due to lack of shipping and chaotic Spanish organisation 
before disembarking in Galicia. Hall, Wellington's Navy, p.66.
181 See W. Elliot to Handfield, Dublin Castle, 27* July 1806, PRO WO 63/88.
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deployment was truly global; other organizations deployed personnel overseas but 
none to the extent of the Commissariat. 182 Of the organizations that comprised the 
British army only the fighting arms were as widely dispersed as the Commissariat. 
The global deployment of Commissariat personnel in December 1816 is illustrated in 
figure 5. The postings cited in the table are based on the definitions used in 
Commissariat documents and, although seemingly straightforward, they require some 
explanation. Such names were not universal in the army, different departments and 
organizations using various names to describe the same geographical area. 
Interestingly, it seems that there existed standardised forms for submitting returns of 
strength, but not standard terminology for describing Britain's colonial possessions.
Region
Africa
Cape Colony 
Mauritius
Africa
Total
Caribbean
Bahamas
Bermuda
Honduras
West Indies
Windward &
Leeward Is.
Total
Number
30
24
15
69
5
12
2
10
98
127
Region
Europe
France 
Gibraltar
Number
150
21
Mediterranean 97 
Portugal
UK 52 
Heligoland 3 
Total 402
North America
Canada 137 
Newfoundland 16 
Nova Scotia 46 
Total 199
Australia (New S. Wales) 44
79
Figure 5: The Global Deployment of the Commissariat, December 1816.' 83
hi the above table the term Mediterranean refers to garrisons in Sicily, Malta, Corfu 
and the Ionian Islands. 'Africa' is a reference to the various colonies scattered across 
this continent, sometimes referred to as West Africa or Gorre in general army 
returns. 184 Of note is the absence of Commissariat personnel in regions such as the
182 See chapter 4 and chapter 5.
183 PRO WO 61/25.
184 See PRO WO 17/2814, Monthly Returns of the Army at Home and Abroad.
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Indian subcontinent, a region that was the responsibility of the Honourable East India 
Company.
Figure 5 reveals little about the roles of personnel and in some respects the 
data in the original source is fragmentary. This is especially so in regard to the 
respective branches of the Commissariat in which individuals were employed. Some 
regions were defined as having distinct stores and accounts departments (such as 
Canada) while others did not (such as Africa) or were listed as having stores only 
(such as Heligoland). Figure 6 illustrates how personnel were divided between stores 
and accounts in the relevant countries or regions:
Posting
Canada
Cape Good Hope 
Gibraltar
Mauritius
Mediterranean
Nova Scotia
Portugal
Stores
125
26 
11
18
85
41
60
Accounts
12
4 
10
6
12
5
19
% Employed in
8.7%
13.3% 
47.6%
25%
12.4%
10.9%
24.1%
Accounts
Figure 6: Commissariat stores and accounts departments, December 1816. 185
Where the two branches of stores and accounts were listed separately, it is apparent 
that the latter could account for 30% of the personnel.
Administration was not solely the domain of the accounts branch, and stores 
employed a considerable number of administrators. Of the 125 personnel employed in 
stores in Canada, fifty-three were clerks, which, along with the two office runners, 
amounted to approximately 42% of the branch's manpower. In Britain the manpower 
of the Commissariat at this point appears to have been almost entirely administrative 
and among its fifty-two personnel there were four chief clerks, thirty-eight clerks, 
three messengers and one office keeper. Unusually on the strength in Britain there 
were also five domestic staff consisting of two housekeepers and three housemaids. 186
185 PRO WO 61/25, Commissariat Department 1816 - 17.
186 PRO WO 61/25.
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The system utilised to support the Commissariat was cumbersome but it was in some 
respects efficient and in particular it appears that its administrative apparatus would 
have been able to cope with a significantly expanded organization without itself 
expanding. Returns and finances were handled efficiently and there were few signs of 
strain in an administrative system co-ordinating a globally deployed organization, 
evidence that Commissariat administration could have shouldered an additional 
burden with the resources that already existed.
There was no typical structure of a Commissariat station and there was much 
variation due to individual circumstances and the nature of certain postings. Personnel 
were employed to fulfil a wide range of tasks depending on local requirements, while 
it is apparent that there was also some variation in which the role of personnel was 
recorded. In Bermuda and Malta, for example, boatmen were employed, the 
Commissariat in New South Wales was unusual in having a bookbinder on its 
strength, Nova Scotia was the only station to record the specific roles of its issuers 
(either fuel or food) and in 1816 Mauritius was the sole location in which a store 
serjeant (sic.) was present. 187 Figure 7 is based on a single and relatively small 
Commissariat station (in this case Calais) in February 1816. Of note is its very 
conventional structure, with only storekeepers and clerks employed, and neither 
labourers nor specialists, such as coopers and boatmen.
Deputy Commissary 
Deputy Assistant Commissary
ADMINISTRATION STORES
2 Clerks 2 Storekeepers
Figure 7: Personnel of the Commissariat serving in Calais, February 1816.
187 PRO WO 61/25.
188 Commissary General J. Drummond to Quarter Master General Murray, Paris, 1 st February 1816, 
PRO WO 28/14, Letters from Quarter Master General's Department, 1816 January to June.
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During 1816 the senior Commissariat officer in France (with 150 personnel), Portugal 
(with 79) and Canada (with 137) was a Commissary General. Although larger than the 
department in Portugal, that in the Windward and Leeward Islands, along with the 
Mediterranean, were split between several locations and in consequence three 
Assistant Commissaries General in each region shared command, hi Honduras the 
senior Commissariat officer was only a temporary clerk, the affairs of the department 
being overseen by a committee that was collectively granted the rank of Deputy 
Assistant Commissary General, demonstrating that the Commissariat was on occasion 
able to modify its practices to accommodate certain local situations. 189
As the Napoleonic Wars progressed the Commissariat frequently found itself 
hamstrung by global deployments and the need to expand despite already having 
insufficient manpower. As a result the organization employed a large number of 
foreigners, particularly locals in Italy, Spain and Portugal. The contribution of foreign 
personnel to the British armed forces as mercenaries has long been recognised, E.A. 
Wrigley citing them as a tangible way in which the financial strength of a state could 
be applied to its army. 190 By the time of the Napoleonic Wars the use of true 
mercenaries in the British army had declined and foreign troops tended to be either 
exiles from occupied countries, prisoners of war, or motivated by ideology or 
patriotism rather than financial gain, examples being the forces of the Duke of 
Brunswick and the King's German Legion. 191 More significant to the British army in 
this period were the foreigners employed in organizations to support the army, of 
which the Commissariat was perhaps the largest employer.
189 PRO WO 61/25.
190 Wrigley, 'Society and the economy in the eighteenth century', p.73. The Royal Navy also used a 
considerabie number of foreigners and it is estimated that in 1812, 9% of trained seamen serving in the 
royal Navy were not of British origin. Duffy, 'British Naval Power', p.9.
191 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.86-88.
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The Commissariat's reliance on foreign personnel in certain stations was 
reflected in the garrison of Sicily in 1813, the returns for which note that the personnel 
employed by the organisation consisted of eight Italians, five Sicilians, four English 
(with no reference to Scots, Irish or Welsh) and one Swiss. 192 The differing 
nationalities present were concentrated in certain occupations and, significantly, 
Englishmen did not hold all of the senior positions. This says much about the structure 
of the Commissariat overseas, as British personnel would be expected to dominate by 
rank, if not numerically. This was the case in the Sicilian garrison itself, which was 
supported by British troops and advisors. Those listed as English were concentrated in 
the bakery, occupying three of the four positions there: they were the master baker 
John Henderson and the two head bakers Robert Witlaw [sic] and Thomas 
Richardson, while the overseer of bakery was a Swiss named Fran9ois Solincy. The 
remaining Englishman, John Mitchel, was the senior Commissariat administrator in 
Sicily and held the post of clerk. Mitchel's office also consisted of five under clerks, 
all of whom were listed as Italians: Dominico Agedo, Parlo Averia, Antonio Grosso, 
Fransico Scullina, Giuseppe Bruno. Of the remaining posts, Italians also occupied 
those of storekeeper and under storekeeper, these being held by Pasquale de Gaelano 
and Puolo Chilleme respectively, while the Sicilian Andrea Caravello oversaw the 
officers' mess. All three posts were positions of responsibility and required 
trustworthy individuals as they involved the handling of money and management of 
stores. Finally the labourers and craftsmen were all Sicilian. These were the coopers 
Alberto Castelli and Antonio Caiopardo, along with Gioachine Crisalli and Antonio 
Pioro, both of whom were labourers. It is apparent that other than Andrea Caravello hi 
the officers' mess, Sicilians held few positions of trust.
192 Monthly returns of those employed in the Commissariat Department under the control of Assistant 
Commissary General Grellier at Milazzo, 25 th October 1813 to 24th November 1813, NAM 7902/36.
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The example of the Sicilian garrison demonstrates that personnel from various 
nations occupied the ranks of the Commissariat and overseas it could be a 
cosmopolitan organization. If the financial power of the state did provide the British 
army an advantage by giving it a capability to employ foreigners it was these 
personnel, rather than mercenaries, that proved most crucial to the war effort. The role 
of foreign personnel in the Commissariat is highlighted by the fact that, due to the 
publication of his memoirs, the German A.L.F. Schauman is arguably the most 
famous commissary of the period. 193 As a serving officer, however, Schauman was not 
a typical example of the majority of foreigners employed by the Commissariat. More 
common were the local civilians employed under contract to support the army 
overseas, the most significant group of such persons being the Spanish and Portuguese 
muleteers who transported supplies in the Peninsula.
Initially, little thought was given to the utilisation of drivers indigenous to the 
nation in which the army was operating, despite the fact that such a policy had proved 
successful for Napoleon during his campaign of 1805. 194 It was believed that the 
vehicles and personnel of the Royal Wagon Train, in conjunction with the logistical 
organizations of allied armies, would be sufficient to meet the logistical needs of the 
army. 195 This was reflected in the orders issued when the army first arrived in the 
Peninsula, where the only mention of the region's indigenous transport capability is in 
relation to the purchase of mules, horses and oxen. 196 John Brewer writes that a major 
advantage provided by the fiscal-military state was one of the most advanced transport 
infrastructures of the era. 197 This infrastructure, however, terminated at Britain's 
borders and was of little relevance to the army operating overseas. The initial
193 See A. L. F. Schauman, On the Road with Wellington (London, William Heinemann, 1924).
194 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.38.
195 See chapter 4.
196 To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 26* September 1808, PRO WO 1/236, p.9.
197 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 183.
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experiences of the army soon proved that its existing transport capability was 
inadequate and in a letter dated 11 August 1808, Arthur Wellesley informed General 
Burrard that 'you must therefore depend on the carriage of the country drawn by 
bullocks... each of these [animals] will carry about 6001bs and travel in a day about 
12 miles'. 198
It was fitting that a significant number of these locally procured oxen found 
themselves drawing local carts. These carts did not benefit from the advances made in 
transport technology in Britain and were poorly produced using square axles. This 
gave them a distinctive sound which Grenville-Eliot of the Royal Artillery, writing to 
his wife hi August 1808, described as a 'voice that could be heard a mile off, 199 Those 
who drove these carts were Portuguese and Spanish muleteers, individuals who 
performed a vital role but who have been virtually written out of the history of the 
British army. At no point in the works of P.L. Isemonger or I. Fletcher, which 
examine the personnel of the British army, are the muleteers mentioned.200 They have 
fallen victim to both the general apathy shown by historians towards the logistical 
elements of the army and the unwillingness to acknowledge the contribution of the 
Spanish and Portuguese to the successful outcome of the Peninsula War, an attitude 
criticised in the works of Charles Esdaile.201 As Christopher Hall states, their 
existence was fortunate for the Peninsula army as it is likely that without them the 
British transport system would not have been able to achieve the success that it did.202
198 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11* August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p.191.
199 Grenville Eliot to Wife, Llavos, 7* August 1808, NAM 5903/127/6, letters of William Grenville 
Eliot, R.A.
200 See P. L. Isemonger, Wellington's War: A Living History (Stroud, Sutton, 1998); I. Fletcher, 
Wellington's Regiments (Staplehurst, Spellmont, 1994).
201 C. Esdaile, 'The Peninsular War: a Review of Recent Literature', in The Historian, No.6, (Winter 
1999), pp.9-13; Esdaile, The Peninsular War, passim. 
202 Hall, Wellington's Navy, pp.130-131.
64
The existence of the muleteers rests uneasily with John Brewer's model of the 
fiscal-military state, discussions about which tend to be Anglocentric. 203 The emphasis 
of historians has, to date, been on the domestic implications of the fiscal-military 
state, particularly in the fields of politics and economics, rather than a broader 
consideration of its impact on the army and the reach of the fiscal-military state 
overseas. This has led to a somewhat over-optimistic appraisal of the situation 
regarding logistics, it being assumed that as the fiscal-military state successfully 
encouraged the development of an efficient domestic transport infrastructure a similar 
situation also existed in the army. Improvements to the road and canal network in 
Britain, however, were in many respects irrelevant to the army serving in Spain and 
Portugal. The cornerstone of the fiscal-military state was control, whether it was of 
state apparatus or resources, but this control was effectively limited to geographical 
boundaries (Britain's borders and certain parts of the Empire) and was seriously 
weakened beyond them. 204 Despite the backing of the British Empire and state, 
military strategy could start to fall apart due to the tendency of Portuguese drivers to 
take siestas at awkward times, due to the use of out dated wagons or because narrow 
Spanish roads were easily congested.
Spanish and Portuguese muleteers could be as important to the success of the 
British army in the field as the soldiers themselves and, by implication, the success of 
the state in supporting the army. The initial impression of the muleteers was often less 
than favourable and they soon gained a reputation for laziness and desertion. After 
only a few weeks of employing these individuals Arthur Wellesley informed General 
Burrard that 'I don't believe any power you exert over them... would induce the
203 See for example Wrigley, 'Society and the economy', pp.72-95; Innes, 'The Domestic Face of the 
Fiscal-Military State', pp.96-127.
204 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.251.
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owners of the carts to go from their horses a greater distance, than to the nearest place 
you could get carts to relieve them'.205
Despite the obvious failings of the muleteers many contemporaries 
sympathised with their plight. W. Morris, leading a wagon train through Spain in 
November 1812, regarded them as equals and the officers of Morris' unit shared 
accommodation with them while in the field.206 Time was also spent attending to the 
needs of the muleteers and concerning preparations for a march Morris wrote: 'this 
morning was all bustle and confusion. In looking after the stores [and] muleteers we 
had no time to get any refreshment ourselves'.207 At times even Arthur Wellesley 
sympathised with the difficulties faced by the muleteers, and once tempered his 
criticism of them by explaining that they were exhausted after having 'made an 
exertion against the enemy by the assistance which they have given to me'. 208 Perhaps 
most significant was the attitude of the army to the muleteers, as they were allowed 
relative autonomy and normal military protocols relating to rank were followed. They 
were not second-class personnel and a muleteer occupied the same position in the 
military hierarchy as an English fighting soldier of that rank. Muleteers were divided 
into sections under their own corporals (known as capatrasses) who were responsible 
for distributing rations, while orders issued in 1811 instructed that soldiers escorting 
mules to the rear were there purely as escorts (it being advised to select 'one steady 
man' for each column) and were told to 'not force them to march faster or further than 
the capatraz is inclined to go'. 209
The reputation of muleteers rapidly improved following 1808 and they came to 
be acknowledged as an important element of the logistics system. A report on forge
205 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p.191.
206 Wednesday 4* November 1812, NAM 7508/24, Notebook of W. Morris, Conductor of Stores, 1812.
207 Saturday 7* November 1812, NAM 7508/24.
208 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p.191.
209 Standing Orders, Order No. 37, NAM 6807/221, p.8; Villa Formosa, 10th December 1811, Extracts 
from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, pp. 12-13.
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wagons in 1811 highlighted the advantages of using muleteers, although it also 
stressed the differences between the army's official practices and the opinions of an 
individual experienced in their successful employment. The report stated that a 
significant advantage of employing local drivers, besides releasing military personnel 
for other duties, was that 'by this means you place the beasts... under the charge of 
people of the country, who are more capable of doing it well'. 210 It was advised that 
the ideal ratio of muleteers to mules should be one to four, rather than the standard 
practice in the army of one to three. This suggests the report's anonymous author had 
greater faith in the abilities of muleteers than did his superiors. 211 His most surprising 
recommendation, however, was the following as it was concerned with the ownership 
of the mules:
it is most strongly to be recommended however that these mules be the 
property of the muleteer, and not of the government for from the circumstance 
of it being proposed to place them entirely under the charge of the muleteer 
himself, not allowing the farriers to interfere with them at all, they are most 
likely to be well treated, and kept in readiness to march if the private property 
of the individual.212
This would have been a considerable departure from previous policy, in which the 
mule occupied an ambiguous position, being the property of the army but only for the 
duration of the muleteer's employment. 213
An important element in the relationship between the British army and state 
was the legislation that prevented the army from requisitioning civilian property. 
Issues relating to the relationship between the British army and civilians tend to be 
seen in the context of England, but this policy was to have implications not only
210 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 14. ,
211 Standing Orders, Order No. 37, NAM 6807/221, p.S
212 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 17.
213 Standing Orders, Order No. 36, NAM 6807/22, p.7.
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throughout the British Isles but also overseas.214 One way this manifested itself in the 
Peninsular War was through an ambiguous approach regarding the employment and, 
indeed, ownership of the mules utilised by the respective logistical organizations of 
Horse Guards and Ordnance Board. Those employed by each arm of service had a 
distinct brand (see figure 8) and Commissariat personnel were under strict instructions 
not to operate unmarked animals.
Brand Arm of Service Branch
A Foot Artillery Ordnance
C Cavalry Horse Guards
D Infantry Horse Guards
HA Horse Artillery Ordnance
Figure 8: Marks denoting the ownership of mules operated by each arm. 215
Despite such marks, however, mules hired by these organizations were not included in 
separate returns, but instead counted under a single heading. This suggests different 
policies existed regarding the operation of mules at strategic and operational levels. 216 
The report of 1811 raised issues relating not only to the ownership of the 
mules themselves, but also items required for their effective operation. Its author 
recommended that 'the pack saddle should be the property of the muleteer and the 
shoeing of the mules his own private concern'. 217 The proposals might appear to be an 
overwhelming vote of confidence in the muleteers, but their appeal to a budget- 
conscious military establishment should not be overlooked. By 1811 the financial 
position of the Peninsular Army was, to say the least, uncertain and if implemented
214 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.49.
215 Standing Orders, Order No. 39, NAM 6807/221, p.8.
216 Standing Orders, Order No. 40, NAM 6807/221, p.9.
217 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 18.
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the system would have removed almost all the expenses associated with the operation 
of mules. The Commissariat was the first organization to adopt a similar system for its 
muleteers and it soon discovered that muleteers were indeed more effective when 
employed in this way.218
An organization with diverse personnel, with diverse roles fulfilled with 
mixed success is perhaps a suitable description of the Commissariat. Its scope, in 
terms of both brief and geographical area of operations, was indeed large but it has 
come to be most associated with one item in particular: food. When hungry, soldiers 
had little doubt upon whom to heap the blame. Private James Gunn of the Black 
Watch Regiment noted that 'I never complained but when the Commissariat was at 
fault (and that was not seldom)', while a Rifleman of the 95th Rifles declared to his 
colleagues 'damme, boys, if the commissary don't show his front we must find a 
potato field or have a killing a day', this being a reference to the practice of looting 
dead French soldiers for food. 219 Criticisms concerning the role of the Commissariat in 
the supply of food were justified, as the organization was involved in the procurement 
and supply of this commodity to such an extent that it was almost solely responsible 
for its provision. This was unlike the situation regarding other items, such as uniform, 
which were frequently the responsibility of other departments and the role of the 
Commissariat in their provision tended to be one of distribution or storage rather than
procurement.
Although food may simply be seen as the bread, meat and biscuit supplied to
the troops, there is a broader definition, one that includes drinking water, alcohol and 
the fodder for the numerous animals utilised by the army. It is also important that the 
significance of regular supplies of food should not be underestimated. If the
218 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 17.
219 Brackets in original. R. H. Roy (ed), 'The Memoirs of Private James Gunn', in JSAHR, Vol 49 
(1971), p. 119; A. Brett-James (ed), Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns 
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Commissariat failed to ensure adequate supplies of food troops would be required to 
spend more time foraging, while generals could not plan future operations with any 
certainty. The Duke of Wellington demonstrated an awareness of these difficulties and 
their importance throughout the Peninsular campaign, declaring in 1809 that 'the 
foundation of all military plans is compounded of the situations of one's own troops, 
those of the allies, and those of the enemy; but if I cannot be certain even of my own, 
it is impossible for me to form, much less execute, any military plan'.220 hi the worst 
case scenario an army deprived of food may collapse into a starving rabble, looting 
friend and foe alike in an effort to survive. Park and Nafziger state that British soldiers 
were particularly susceptible to this weakness, noting that they 'tended to fall apart 
faster than the French when deprived of regular rations [or] subjected to hardship'.221 
Such a conclusion is contentious considering the fate that befell Napoleon's Grand 
Annee in 1812 but it clearly highlights the potential consequences of an army's failure 
to provide food. 222
An insight into the type and quantity of food supplied by the army to its troops 
can be gained from a return of the supplies available to the army in December 1813. 
Those available to three divisions are shown in figure 9:
Division
3 rd
4*
7th
Days of
Bread/Biscuit
5
1
None
Days of
Meat
13
13
11
Days of
Wine/Spirit
2
2
3
Figure 9: Availability of supplies in the centre army corps, December 1813. 223
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Despite occupying an approximately similar geographical position in the same time 
frame, it is apparent that the level of supply to the three divisions was somewhat 
inconsistent: the 3 rd division possessed only two days of full supply and the 4th one, 
while the 7th did not have sufficient quantities of each commodity for a single day. The 
situation for the 3 rd is improved significantly (to five days) by discarding alcohol. The 
importance of this commodity should not, however, be discounted, due to its influence 
on morale and discipline.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the data in figure 9 is the disparity between 
reserves of meat when compared to those of bread and biscuit. This situation was 
primarily due to the differences in how meat, bread and biscuit were supplied. Meat 
marched on the hoof with the army, was available regardless of season and could be 
slaughtered as required on the spot. Conversely bread and biscuits required some 
effort to produce and their manufacture was a relatively long process. To begin with, 
baking required wheat, which was not always available and also required 
processing.224 Another difficulty was procuring or manufacturing sufficient yeast for 
the baking process, great efforts being made by army bakers throughout the period to 
increase both the quality and cost effectiveness of this important ingredient. 225 Finally, 
even if these difficulties could be overcome the baking of bread was time 
consuming. 226 This affected strategy and planning at the highest levels and was 
apparent in the orders issued to Lieutenant General Sir John Moore concerning his 
expedition to northern Spain in 1808: 'a large proportion of biscuit has been sent in 
the victuallers [sic] that you may be relieved from the inconvenience of baking when 
the troops are in motion'.227
More easily stored and preserved, biscuit was generally seen as an emergency
224 p.54.
225 PRO WO 30/141, pp.30-32.
226 Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
227 To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 26* September 1808, PRO WO 1/236.
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ration that could take the place of bread when required, but such characteristics also 
made it preferable for an army wishing to remain on the march, hence its inclusion in 
the same category as bread in returns. Despite the advantages of biscuit, however, 
bread was more easily digestible and thus popular with the troops, especially if 
consumed fresh. Regular stops to bake bread would have hindered an army on the 
march but there was no such difficulty when encamped. In consequence, units on 
occasion produced bread independently of the Commissariat. Following the Battle of 
Talavera, when supplies became short due to the large number of troops present in the 
region, Lieutenant Bingham of the 53 rd Regiment of Foot wrote that 'we were living at 
Talavera from hand to mouth, that is we were obliged to thrash the corn ourselves, 
grind the flour and make the bread'.228 The duty was clearly unpopular with the 
lieutenant and he was relieved to write in a letter home the following month that 'we 
are, however, plentifully supplied, having an excellent market'.229 On other occasions 
the bread ration was issued as grain to speed up the supply process. 230
Bingham's account of bread production after Talavera reveals two important 
issues. Firstly it says something about the composition of his unit, which contained 
personnel able to harvest wheat, mill it and then bake bread. The personnel need not 
have been professional farmers, millers or bakers before enlisting but it is likely they 
had some experience in such backgrounds. More important than the composition of 
Bingham's unit, however, is the fact that the situation after Talavera demonstrates the 
relationship between strategic and local supply. In 1809 stores of flour in Lisbon were 
so full that vessels allocated to transport the commodity were reassigned to other 
tasks, yet soldiers in the field, such as Bingham, had to find their own sources of
228 Bingham to mother, Delatosa, 10* August 1809, Vol. 1, NAM 6807/163, p.62.
229 Bingham to mother, Badajoz 13* September 1809, Vol. 1, NAM 6807/163, p.68.
230 G. Larpent (ed), The Private Journal ofF S Larpent: Judge Advocate General of British Forces in 
the Peninsula, vol 3 (London, Richard Bentley, 1853), p.6.
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flour.231 The stocks held in Lisbon no doubt enabled markets to recover rapidly, but it 
remains apparent that the existence of such extensive stocks did not always benefit the 
army in the field. This gives rise to a situation in which there is a considerable 
disparity between anecdotal evidence and official records regarding the supply of food 
to troops in the field.
Whatever the type, the food supplied by the Commissariat was sometimes of 
questionable quality and its nutritional value was clearly in some doubt, indicating a 
preference for quantity rather than quality. In his melancholy 'Subaltern's Elergy' 
Ensign Meade described his pitiful rations thus: 'see in camp kettles all we have to 
dine, yielding soup meagre to frighten swine', and there was also a tinge of envy and 
longing for the comforts of Britain when he wrote of 'ye fat rich citizens of London... 
snug over claret... Blest be the land of rich turtle soup - glamorous venison 
haunches'. 232 The poor quality of rations was not merely a complaint of troops in the 
field. Judge Advocate Larpent, based at army headquarters, complained that ration 
beef 'cooked up like Indian rubber', while a letter written concerning the 
Commissariat depot in Longford described a sample of biscuits containing 'dust and
dirt and bad bits'233 .
The poor diet of the army was a source of some concern for several soldiers,
although it is apparent that the food available to soldiers may have been of a superior 
quality and more plentiful than that available to civilians. A study based on scientific 
data such as the average calories consumed by civilians and soldiers would be of 
interest, although the lack of suitable information concerning their respective diets 
precludes an accurate comparison from being made. Despite the scarcity of data, 
general conclusions can be drawn concerning the diet of soldiers compared to that of
231 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p. 115.
232 NAM 7505/10, J. R. Meade, 'The Subaltern's Elegy' (Spain, 1 st July 1813).
233 P. Singer to Mr. Heathy, Commissary General's Office, 25th March 1806; G. Larpent (ed), The 
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civilians. The period from 1790 to 1820 was in general characterised by declining 
food consumption across much of the civilian population, a decline triggered by rising 
prices and falling wages, factors from which soldiers were relatively isolated due to 
the impact of long-term government contracts.234 The potential differences between 
the diets of soldiers and civilians were not only quantitative. Meat was only a small 
part of the diet for many labourers and when available tended to be lamb or bacon, 
while there was a growing reliance on potatoes. 235 Conversely, for soldiers, 
approximately half of the diet consisted of meat, which was most commonly beef.236
Although a consideration of trends in the availability of food suggests that the 
diets of soldiers were indeed superior, it is necessary to appreciate that there existed a 
considerable difference between the prescribed diet of soldiers and that which they 
actually consumed. Furthermore, while superior in some respects to that of civilians, 
the diet of soldiers was not always adequate for their needs. William Dent, then 
serving as a hospital mate, attributed an outbreak of typhus amongst the Colchester 
garrison in April 1809 to the poor quality of rations. He believed that 'it was brought 
on from the soldiers being exposed to the cold and being weakened from not having 
sufficient quantity of nutritive food proportionable [sic] to the quantity of fatigue and 
exercise they had daily to undergo'.237 Whether or not poor diet did indeed 
significantly contribute to the spread of typhus at Colchester is unknown. More likely 
culprits included poor living conditions in barracks and cramped medical facilities but 
that Dent, a future surgeon, noted the poor state of army rations is noteworthy as it
displays a level of competence rarely attributed to military surgeons in the period. 238
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A disease more easy to attribute to poor diet than typhus was dysentery, 
outbreaks of which were common. Lieutenant Bingham believed 'a total want of 
vegetables and salt, introduced dysentery amongst both officers and men to rather an 
alarming degree', although in many cases dysentery may well have been due to the 
poor quality of drinking water.239 Conductor of Stores W. Morris attributed a period of 
ill health to the effects of poor quality water, stating that 'I was taken vehemently ill 
this day with a pain in my bowels, accompanied by a flux. The water in this country is 
very bad'. 240 The following particularly unpleasant event, recorded by Surgeon Henry, 
also relates to the safety of drinking water. A thirsty group of soldiers stopped to drink 
from an old fountain and subsequently 150 of them were rushed to hospital with
leeches in their mouths, nostrils, throats, gullets and stomachs. 241
Concerns about the safety of drinking water led to the widespread 
consumption of alcohol, hence the inclusion in the return of food available in 
December 1813 a listing for wines and spirits but none for potable water. Such was 
the importance attached to ensuring supplies of good quality alcohol that brewers, 
unlike other contractors, were required to take an oath guaranteeing its quality. 242 Such 
measures, however, were seen by certain soldiers to be insufficient, and they requested 
that to ensure adequate supplies army officers be exempted from paying duties on 
alcohol so that they could purchase their own stocks more easily. Lieutenant Fairman 
was such an individual and he described wine as being among 'the heaviest, if not the 
most necessary, articles of expenditure', estimating that one-quarter of a subaltern's 
pay would be spent on alcohol. 243 He went on to state that 'its moderate use proves
239 Bingham to mother, Badajoz 13* September 1809, Vol.1, NAM 6807/163, p.68.
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very essential towards the preservation and recovery of health, and not infrequently 
operates as a preventative against epidemic disease'.244 Such views permeated the 
upper ranks of society and the army itself, General Wetherall recommending that 
regimental canteens be set up to guarantee the supply 'of good and wholesome 
liquor'.245 Considering that such policies and attitudes concerning alcohol existed it is 
perhaps unsurprising that, in the words of Lieutenant John Ford of 79th Cameron 
Highlanders, drunkenness became 'the bane of the British army'.246
Even if the Commissariat could have ensured adequate supplies of food there 
were numerous problems associated with its provision. As the army marched through 
the Pyrenees in 1813, for example, Rifleman Costello stated that his daily ration 
consisted of a single biscuit per day, while Private Howell of 71 st Regiment of Foot 
confessed to stealing the dog biscuits that he was preparing for the Duke of 
Wellington's hounds to relieve his hunger.247 There was a variety of factors that could 
lead to such a desperate situation. Simply cooking the meat ration could be a problem 
due to either a shortage of cooking implements or lack of time caused by rapid 
marches, the latter being a significant cause of hunger on the retreat from Burgos. 248 
The problem of scarce cooking implements was partly rectified following the 
widespread issue of tents later in the war - a unit's mules being tasked to carry these, 
while utensils were carried by the men and thus available as soon as the unit 
encamped. Carriage by the unit, however, did not always ensure the safe and timely 
arrival of the required equipment, as troops carrying utensils could get delayed,
244 Fairman, A Letter on the Expediency of Allowing Wine to the Army Free of Duty as in the Navy, 
p.35.
245 Letter from General Wetherall to Govenor General of Calcutta, the Earl of Moira, Bangaloor (sic), 
28 th November 1813, NAM 6112/78, Wetherall Papers Inspection Returns and Correspondence of 
Major General F. A. Wetherall, p.230.
246 NAM 6807/71, Notebook of Lieutenant John Ford 1808 - 12, p. 111.
247 Brett-James (ed), Edward Costello, p. 122; C. Hibbert (ed), A Soldier of the 71st (London, Leo 
Cooper, 1976),pp.72-73.
248 H. F. N. Jourdain, The Connaught Rangers, Volume I (London, Royal United Service Institute, 
1924), p.105.
76
redirected or even lost (another example of how factors outside of its control could 
bring the best efforts of a state to support its military grinding to a halt). Due to these 
risks, units tasked to carry items such as camp kettles received an armed escort, 
initially of mounted dragoons although this task was eventually allocated to soldiers 
on foot. 249
No matter what escort was provided, utensils could only arrive if they had 
been issued. Although supplied with an adequate number of camp kettles in 1815 (157 
- approximately one per four men), the 1 st battalion of the 88th had an insufficient 
number of billy hooks (94) to support them over fires. In 1809 the ratios had been 
even worse, at one kettle per 6 men and one hook per 10 men. 250 The actions of 
soldiers themselves also served to undermine the efforts of the Commissariat. 
Lieutenant Bingham was critical of the actions of fellow officers, noting that supplies 
went 'but little way with young gentlemen who have been used to gorge themselves at 
a regimental mess'.251 Judge Advocate Larpent's criticisms were aimed at the actions 
of common soldiers upon receiving their rations. He wrote that:
the poor soldiers, having three days rations served out at once, consume all the 
drink on the first day, sell the meat to save carriage and the trouble of cooking 
it, and live upon bread and grapes and water, till their next supply comes. 252
In consequence of such actions the Commissariat sought to issue rations only on a 
daily basis but this was rarely achieved and the policy could only ever be feasible if 
the units in question were in close proximity to permanent depots, a situation that 
rarely arose due to the centralisation of stores or the need to avoid their proximity to 
the enemy.253
249 Qunita, 2nd July 1811, NAM 6807/221, p. 15.
250 NAM 6112/689, Field Equipment Return for the 1 st Battalion 88th Foot, 9* June 1815.
251 Bingham to mother, Almofala, 5th October 1813, Volume 4, NAM 6807/163, p.21.
252 G. Larpent (ed), The Private Journal of F S Larpent, Vol. 1, pp. 18-19.
253 Villa Formosa, 15 th April 1811, NAM 6807/221, p. 13.
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Of the arms of service in the army the cavalry was to cause the most problems 
for the Commissariat - although the number of animals used by the infantry divisions 
should not be underestimated. In the 7th Infantry Division, serving in Spain in 1813 
and consisting of 5,876 men, there were 244 horses, 268 mules operated by the 
regiments and 246 mules operated by the Commissariat, giving a total of 758 animals, 
which was the equivalent to a full-strength cavalry regiment.254 Added to the animals 
already consuming forage could be those that were not officially on the strength of the 
regiment or even in the army. General Cole, for example, maintained a menagerie 
consisting often goats, a cow and thirty-six sheep to supplement his rations, and even 
if the animals did not consume army fodder, their grazing would have consumed local 
supplies that could potentially have been utilised by the army. 255
For units stationed in Britain a common difficulty relating to the maintenance 
of animals was not a shortage of fodder so much as an excess of this commodity. The 
seasonal production of forage inevitably resulted in gluts at certain times of year, the 
results of which were noted by P. Singer of the Commissary General's Office when he 
declared that 'the straw in Commissariat Depots throughout the kingdom is rather 
decayed' as it remained in storage too long.256 Storage was less of a problem in the 
case of hay, as old and new hay could be mixed, while different deliveries of straw 
had to be kept separately. 257 Forces in Spain and Portugal faced the opposite problem 
to those in Britain, and the difficulty was procuring sufficient fodder to start with. The 
quantity required by the Peninsular army was considerable and in 1809 the cavalry 
ration was defined as being 141b of hay, 121b of oats or lOlb of barley per horse, while
254 NAM 7512/124, Supplies to the Divisions of the Centre Army Corps in the Peninsula, December
1813; Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies (London, Constable, 1999), p.28.
233 G.'Larpent (ed), The Private Journal ofF S Larpent, Vol 2, (London, Richard Bentley, 1853), p.65.
256 Singer to Heathy, Commissary General's Office, 25* March 1806, PRO WO 63/40.
257 Handfield to Sir W. Berdett, Commissary General's Office, 31 st August 1810, PRO WO 63/45.
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that of mules employed on supply operations was SOlbs corn per week. 258 Demand 
could in part be met by importing forage from Britain, 4.5 million pounds of straw 
and oats being requested in 1809.259 Other than this the Commissariat had little choice 
except to make do with what it could find in each region, often with serious 
consequences for the local economy and the cavalry itself. The latter was particularly 
true when the only fodder available was green corn and, due to the potential risks to 
horses, commissaries were instructed to use it only as a last resort. 260 The difficulty of 
supplying the cavalry with fodder was a source of consternation for Commissary 
Schauman, who was critical of the practices employed by cavalrymen. In particular he 
complained that they preferred hay instead of straw to feed their horses, although it 
must be noted that in some cases this is a preferable food source for horses so 
Schauman may have been displaying a lack of knowledge regarding this. Schauman 
also complained that cavalrymen frequently swapped their forage ration for alcohol, 
but noted that following the introduction of regulations to prevent this British horses
soon became fatter and those of the locals thinner.261
Any failure by the Commissariat to supply food adequately for either man or 
beast is highly visible to the historian, such situations being enthusiastically recorded 
by letter writers, diarists and memoirists alike. Frequently these individuals aimed 
their criticisms directly at the organization. Rifleman Costello, for example, 
complained that throughout the Peninsular War 'we suffered much from a deficiency 
of supplies from the Commissariat', while Private Gunn wrote of the campaign that it 
was 'not seldom' at fault. 262 It is clear that criticisms of this nature were not 
unjustified, even though it is apparent that many of the difficulties encountered by the
258 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/238; Standing Orders, Order No. 37, 
NAM 6807/22 l,p.8.
259 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/238.
260 Villa Formosa, 13 th April 1811, Extracts from General Orders, NAM 6807/221, p. 13.
261 Schauman, On the Road with Wellington, pp.219, 227.
262 Brett-James, Edward Costello, p!20; Roy (ed), 'The Memoirs of Private James Gunn', pi 19.
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Commissariat were beyond its control, and a study of the organization's efforts to 
supply food highlights what was possibly its greatest weakness regarding operations 
in the field: specifically a reflexive doctrine that aimed to react to situations rather 
than prepare for them.
Creveld states that the first requisite of any logistics system is an exact 
definition of requirements.263 This was clearly lacking in the Commissariat's doctrine 
and from the very start of a campaign the resulting limitations were apparent. As 
noted above, the first personnel from the organization to arrive in a region were 
purchasing agents. The task of these individuals was not one of ascertaining the ability 
of a province to sustain a force in the long term but rather to purchase the supplies 
required by army when it arrived. This was to be achieved regardless of long-term 
consequences for the local economy and, by implication, future procurement 
activities. This was demonstrated in August 1808, when commissaries in the force 
under the command of Arthur Wellesley procured so many mules that subsequent 
forces were compelled to purchase other draught animals. 264 Further evidence is 
provided by the disastrous effect of procurement activities on local markets and 
commodity prices. Captain Bragge of the 3 rd Dragoons noted of the vicinity of Belem 
in 1811 that 'the English have ruined this market as they do all others, and at this 
moment everything from a hen's egg to a mule is dearer than in England', while Judge 
Advocate Larpent complained in May 1813 that 'we cannot buy anything to eat except
honey, sugar, bacon, bread and cheese'.265
The depletion of markets alone was not sufficient to end the activities of the 
Commissariat in a region and its personnel were expected to utilise any means
263 Creveld, Supplying War, p. 18.
264 Wellesley to Bmrard, Aeyria, 11 th August 1808, PRO WO 1/228, p. 191.
265 S. A. C. Cassels (ed), Peninsula Portrait 1811 -1814: The Letters of Captain William Bragge 3rd 
(Kings Own) Dragoons (London, OUP, 1963), p. 13; G. Larpent (ed), The Private Journal of FS 
Larpent,Vol I,p.l95.
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necessary to acquire supplies. This was achieved through the employment of 
occasionally brutal tactics that could literally be those of an occupying army: to 
counter local attempts to conceal stores underground, for example, commissaries 
resorted to the French practice of pouring water on the ground to locate areas of 
recently disturbed soil (where it drained away quicker). 266 Some of the other methods 
used by commissaries were little more than terrorism and in 1813 a commissary was 
found guilty of burning down a Spanish house.267 It is also interesting to note that 
commissaries co-operated with guerrillas, Lieutenant John Ford recording in his diary 
that 'the inhabitants of Amaraz were very much alarmed by the arrival of a 
commissary and a company of guerrillas... to search the houses for provisions'. 268
The plundering of supplies in this way was dramatically at odds with a concept 
that was crucial in defining the relationship between the British army and state, 
specifically that the army should cause as little disruption to civilians as possible. 269 
Although primarily a domestic policy, it would be incorrect to view the tactics utilised 
by the Commissariat overseas as evidence that the concept of limiting disruption to 
civilians was applied only in the home nation or its colonies. The British government 
was anxious not only to avoid upsetting its allies but also the population of France, 
therefore an extension of a policy that inflicted minimum disruption to civilians was 
thus required on the continent270 . Ultimately, however, operational requirements 
would on occasion take precedence over political expediency and the practices 
normally utilised to placate civilians were ignored. 271 Thus the Commissariat 
continued to utilise all means at its disposal when the situation warranted.
266 Buckley (ed), The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, p. 181.
267 L C Gurwood (ed), General Orders of the Duke of Wellington in the Campaigns of1809-14 
(London, Clowes and Son, 1837), p. 14.
268 NAM 6807/7l,p.53.
269 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.49.
270 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, passim.
271 It is likely that such a situation would have existed in Britain also had the French invaded. See 
chapter 6.
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The ruthlessness of commissaries in the field was to have implications for the 
organization. In a country already devastated and left, in the words of Henry Booth, 
'wretched in the extreme from the French occupation', it was inevitable that the 
inhabitants of towns and villages would react with hostility to the arrival of a 
commissary intent on plundering what remained of local stocks. 272 On occasion this 
led to violence and in 1810 Spanish civilians set upon two members of a foraging 
party, one receiving seven gunshot wounds and the other being shot through the 
lung. 273 This was a consequence of a policy that sought to provide supplies through 
legalised plunder; an unbalanced policy that, instead of maximising the potential of a 
region to sustain a force, could provide only a short-term solution to the problem of 
maintaining the army.
The plundering of supplies was a crucial element of the reflexive doctrine in 
the field, although this doctrine was also to have an influence on other aspects of the 
Commissariat, including its bureaucracy and administration. General J.F.C. Fuller 
cites planning as a key element of warfare in the period, noting that Napoleon himself 
said that 'nothing is gained in war except by calculation' and that 'it is only when 
plans are deeply thought out that one succeeds in war'. 274 Yet planning was noticeably 
absent in the Commissariat. The many volumes of paperwork tended to be concerned 
primarily with returns relating to the situation at the time of writing, rather than what 
was required in a week, a month or a year (data collection, rather than estimation and 
projection appears to have been the objective of such bureaucracy). Information of 
this nature was vital if shortages caused by the mismanagement of local resources 
were to be rectified through imports, yet it was rarely collated. There is little evidence 
that the Commissariat sought to understand what was required by a body of men such
272 Henry Booth to wife, nr Vittoria, 20* June 1813, NAM 6702/33/102, Booth Letters.
273 W. Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer 1809 -1815 (Staplehurst, Spellmont, 1999), p.35.
274 Fuller, The Conduct of War, p.47.
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as a regiment over a period of time and returns were rarely accompanied by estimates 
of how long the listed stores would last. Thus, the activities of the Commissariat were 
based on the supply situation as it had been up to a year earlier: estimates of the 
fodder required in the Peninsula, for example, were based on the previous year's 
consumption.275 Such practice was sound but only when force levels were stable; in 
particular, they did not take into account increases in the number of personnel and 
animals in the theatre. This doctrine of response rather than preparation was possibly 
the greatest failing of the Commissariat, although it was a doctrine forced on it by 
circumstance, not least being the limitations imposed on the army by the state's desire 
to limit its size and cost.
When considering the Commissariat it is necessary to note that it met many of 
the criteria stated by P.D, Foxton in the twentieth century to be essential for a sound 
logistical system. The five key elements were foresight, flexibility, simplicity, 
economy and co-operation. Only in the case of foresight (the ability to plan ahead) 
was the Commissariat lacking, its doctrine making up for this in flexibility, economy 
(forced upon it by the demands of the state) and co-operation (the utilisation of
resources in the host nation, such as muleteers).276
When considering how the relationship between state and army influenced the 
Commissariat, it is apparent that it facilitated the creation of a relatively effective 
system to support the force, but it was a system constrained by geography. In the 
United Kingdom a policy based on purchase rather than plunder was feasible due to 
continuing improvements in the national transport network and proximity to both 
markets and sources.277 Overseas, however, this situation did not always exist and the
275 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/23 8/
276 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.22.
277 Wrigley, 'Society and the economy in the eighteenth century', pp.76-77; Brewer, The Sinews of 
Power, p. 183.
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278flexibility of secure naval transport was only of benefit in proximity to the coast. 
Thus the Commissariat was forced to rely on the local infrastructure to carry out its 
task, a situation that hindered the distribution of supplies be they purchased or attained 
through plunder. The result was that troops in Britain were well maintained and 
provisioned but those overseas less so. The Commissariat therefore represents both 
the worst and the best aspects of British defence policy.
Besides the geographical boundaries of the state, the Commissariat also had to 
contend with an increasingly bureaucratic and regulated system. This proved to be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand bureaucracy hampered activities and was not 
always as comprehensive as it could and should have been, a situation that contributed 
to the reflexive doctrine, but in other respects bureaucracy was beneficial. Regulations 
gave the Commissariat structure and a framework in which its personnel could act, a 
situation that did not exist to a significant degree in the French army until the 
bureaucratisation of its own logistics system from 1805.279 When the systems used to 
govern the Commissariat worked, the organization proved a success but outside of 
sometimes-limited boundaries and constrained by regulation it could prove a notable 
failure at worst and, at best, barely able to match the effectiveness of methods utilised 
to maintain the armies of continental states. The Commissariat, however, was not the 
only organization employed to achieve this aim and it is the organizations with which 
the Commissariat shared responsibility that form the basis of the following chapters, 
beginning with those involved at the start of the logistical process: procurement.
278 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p.6.
279 Creveld, Supplying War, p.44.
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Chapter 3 
Procurement for the British Army
Procurement for the British army in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
relates in particular to one aspect of the relationship between the army and the state, 
this being the extent to which the force benefited from Britain's growing economic 
and industrial power. By the time of the Revolutionary Wars Britain's armed forces 
were to become not only a means to promote the nation's diplomatic ambitions but 
also economic, colonial, industrial and even technological growth. Initially a reason 
for the financial revolution, the armed forces had rapidly become a means to sustain it 
through their role in the economy, providing employment, possessing considerable 
purchasing power and safeguarding the Empire. 280 Such was the importance of the 
armed forces that an increasingly broad section of society shared a common interest in 
their development and maintenance.
In coastal areas in particular the state had become the largest purchaser of 
food, clothing and metal ware, while also providing the biggest source of employment 
in the construction industry due to the building of dockyards and barracks. 2" 1 Members 
of the public took an increasing interest in military affairs. During the eighteenth 
century it was to become ever more fashionable to read about the exploits of Britain's 
soldiers and sailors, while during the Nine Years War days of public thanks were 
introduced to celebrate important victories, a practice that persisted into the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 21* 2 When these factors are added to Britain's 
expanding industrial and economic potential it would appear that the scene was set for 
the army to be supported to an unprecedented level. 283
2SO Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.27, 59.
281 Dufiy, 'British Naval Power'. pp. 51 -60
-*- Harris,   Praising the Middling Sort', p.5; Hoppit, A Land of Liberty'?, p. 130.
2W Wrigley, 'Society and the Economy', p. 72.
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It is estimated that in 1811 Britain's expenditure on war amounted to sixteen 
percent of gross national product, the same as that expended in 1915. 2M It would thus 
appear that the army had reaped the rewards from a financial revolution that it had 
helped to create, but this was not the case. Due to the policies implemented by 
successive British governments, figures concerning expenditure on the war are 
relatively meaningless in the context of the army. Indeed, figures of this nature in 
general should be avoided, as they can overawe as much as inform. Because of the 
army's bureaucratic practices the historian can learn, for example, that the cost of the 
army maintained in Britain and Ireland during 1803 amounted to £2,322,700. 
Compared to the figures for the previous year or peacetime, this impressive total 
would show an increase that, while improving the capability of the force, also masked 
its deficiencies. 285 As Jeremy Black notes, a thriving economy and effective public 
finances were useful, but the war still had to be fought. 286 The state would prove 
unable to maintain the army to its maximum potential, in part due to its own policies 
but also certain economic and industrial practices that developed alongside it, the 
allocation of labour being one of them.
The British economy dealt a double blow to the army because while it 
effectively limited the manpower available to the army by encouraging the 
concentration of human resources in key sectors, the extra output this allowed did not 
fully benefit the army either. 2" Another difficulty was that a defining feature of the 
British state in the period was that economics and social stability were persistently 
fiven priority over military effectiveness. 2SS Because of these factors the armed forces 
would remain unable to capitalise fully on the benefits offered by Britain's growing
-*A A D. Harvey. Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century (London, Batsford, 1978), p.334. 
:s5 Journals of the House of Commons, vol 58, 1802 to 1803, p.323.
256 Black. Sea Borne Empire, p. 170.
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manufacturing capability. It is incorrect to dismiss the role of Britain's growing 
economic strength in aiding the procurement activities of the army, however, and it 
will become apparent during this chapter that the army was able to exploit certain 
advantages but not to utilize them to their full potential.
Almost all of the numerous organisations and departments in the army would 
be involved at various stages of procurement, whether it was through actually 
purchasing goods or issuing a specification for requirements. In addition to the 
Commissariat, four departments in particular stand out and form the focus of this 
chapter, as they were concerned with specialised items. These were the Quarter 
Master General (one concern of which was the supply of camping equipment), the 
Barrack Master General (who oversaw barracks), the Clothing board (which set the 
standards for uniform and oversaw its supply) and Ordnance Board (munitions 
production). A fifth department with specialist requirements was that concerned with 
medical provision but this is considered in the subsequent chapter. Of the 
aforementioned organisations, only the Ordnance Board possessed its own production 
facilities, and in most cases procurement was conducted through civilian contractors.
The utilisation of contractors intermeshed military organisations with private 
companies, making the army an important element in the British economy, while 
contracts also enabled the army to exist without the need maintain its own extensive 
production facilities. The terms of individual contracts could vary, but generally 
contractors would produce goods, which were then transported to army depots by 
either themselves or a different contractor. Distribution to the troops would then be 
conducted through the appropriate army organisation. Local laws could have an 
impact on how contracts could work, and this was particularly so in Portugal where a 
royal warrant was required to sell soap, tobacco and snuff. So as not to contravene
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these regulations the army itself was unable to supply these items to its troops and 
fourteen suppliers were contracted to supply the divisions of the British army in 
Portugal. As supplying these items without a contract was effectively a breach of 
Portuguese law, the Provost Marshal was given responsibility for enforcing and 
monitoring the relevant contracts. 289 Through the involvement of an organisation that 
had little else to do with procurement other than through monitoring its own logistical 
requirements, the situation regarding the supply of soap and tobacco in Portugal 
highlighted how the structures and procedures put in place by the state could have 
little relevance outside of the United Kingdom. This was a significant limitation that 
was to have implications for the effectiveness of the army and its supply organisation. 
The details of contracts varied according to the nature of the items supplied, 
although an example of how a contract may have operated can be found in that for 
supplying fodder to the Norwich garrison in 1797. The terms of the contract were 
explained to the commanding officer of the garrison in a letter from the Barrack 
Office:
Sir,
It has been found expedient to enter into a contract for the supply of 
forage to the troops stationed in the barracks at Norwich, from the 1 st day of 
October 1797, to the 30th day of September 1798, a copy where of is in the 
hands of the Barrack Master, who is directed to communicate its contents to 
you as well as my instructions with regard to the receipt and delivery of the 
forage, to which I am to desire you will confirm whatever is required from you 
as commanding the troops in the said barracks; and that a regular succession in 
the supply of forage may be kept up, you will be pleased to make a requisition 
in writing, fourteen days before the quantity to be delivered is wanted, to the 
Barrack Master, who will call upon the contractor to furnish it accordingly; 
and you will, on each delivery, give a receipt for the quantity, for which you 
are to remain accountable: and that at such periods as the contractor, in 
conformity to the terms of his agreement, is entitled to be paid for the quantity 
of forage issued, you will give him a draft upon the agent of your regiment, at 
ten days sight, for the amount of the stoppages; and for the amount exceeding 
the stoppages, you will give him a draft upon me, at ten days sight; and as the 
General Return and Certificate required by the 18th article of His Majesty's 
Regulations for the Government of Barracks, is the only voucher money can
2S" Extracts from General Orders, Cartaxo 28th February 1811, NAM 6807/221, pp.5-7.
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be paid for the purchase of forage, you will be pleased, when you give the draft 
to the contractor, to furnish to the Barrack Master / who is responsible for the 
due transmission thereof / a General Return and Certificate of the quantities of 
each species of forage that have been issued in conformity to the before 
mentioned article of the King's regulations: to which necessary forms are 
annexed. And you are also, in compliance with the said article, to give the 
Barrack Master every Monday morning, the customary return of the horses 
belonging to the officers, Quarter Masters, and soldiers, which have been 
foraged the preceding seven days, specifying the names of the said officers and 
quartermasters. 290
The letter reveals several key points about the operation of such contracts. They were 
of twelve months' duration (in this case September to August inclusive), responsibility 
for administering the contract locally rested not with personnel from the Commissariat 
or Barrack Master General's office but the commanding officer, requests for supply- 
were made through the Barrack Master's Department, a degree of estimation was 
required on the part of the officer - requests having to be made fourteen days in 
advance of forage being required, bills were to be paid within ten days, and anti-fraud 
measures (including receipts, returns of horses on the unit's strength and payment of 
excess bills by Barrack Master's department) were in place.
There was some flexibility in contracts, which could work to the advantage of 
either the contractor or the army. Those supplying forage, as in the above example, 
were sometimes able to negotiate clauses that allowed them to buy back, borrow or 
otherwise acquire excess fodder from the army. 291 The terms of such an agreement, 
operating in 1806, were explained as follows:
it has been considered an object of advantage to permit the forage contractors 
to have the use of a part of it [excess forage] under the personal responsibility 
of the Assistant Commissary of the District, you will therefore please on the 
requisition of Mr. Joseph Webb forage contractor... to cause such a proportion 
to be issued to him as may he may want under stipulation of his returning it 
into store when called on for that purpose. 292
290 Punctuation as in original. NAM 7211/58/1, Barrack Office to Officer Commanding in Barracks at
Norwich, 20th September 1797.
-" This situation was particularly common at harvest time. p. 80.
2W Singer to Heathy, Commissary General's office, 25th March 1806, PRO WO 63/45.
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Such arrangements were only temporary (effectively only while there was excess 
forage available) and by June 1810 the situation was such that personnel were 
informed 'it is not expedient just now to part with the hay and straw in any depot. 293 
While the clause had operated, however, Mr. Webb the forage merchant had 
effectively been allowed to use the forage store as an extension of his own at no extra 
cost. Furthermore the arrangement had benefited the army, the Commissary being 
informed that it was 'an object of advantage'. The reasons for this were not explained 
in the letter, although difficulties were frequently experienced regarding the storage of 
excess fodder. 294
Contracts were monitored and would be lost if the contractor was found to be 
in breach of the terms. Particularly large contracts came under the scrutiny of 
Parliament itself, and in 1809 a contractor named John Trotter was called to give 
evidence to a parliamentary enquiry. Mr. Trotter had a contract to supply camping 
equipment to the army and was the nephew of the individual (also called John Trotter) 
awarded the same contract in 1775. While the inquiry lasted several days, and the 
minutes are therefore too long to reproduce in their entirety, it is of value to consider 
some of the questions and responses as they reflect how such a contract operated. Of 
particular interest were the following extracts:
Question 13: In what manner have you made your charges on the current 
articles?
Answer: The charge to government is made on the same principles in 
both; the cost of the materials is brought to the money price, as 
I have before stated, to which we add the price of labour, and 
these two form the net ready money cost on which all other 
percentages are calculated.
Question 14: What expenses and outgoings are covered by the ten percent 
charge?
-9? Malisses to G. Bimiy. Commissary General's Office, 9* June 1810, PRO WO 63/45.
-'* See above p.78.
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Answer: It is intended to be a clear profit for the services we perform, 
which are not confined to the provision of the articles simply, 
but include excessive labour and anxiety in the subsequent 
management.
It is apparent that there was some confusion concerning the charges made by the 
contractor. After total costs including labour and raw materials were calculated an 
additional ten percent was added and the commissioners clearly believed this was 
intended to cover additional costs. Conversely Mr. Trotter, despite a somewhat vague 
answer to the second question, primarily viewed it as profit. The second issue raised 
in the above extract is that of how contracts could encourage inefficiency. In this case, 
for example, the contractor's profits effectively increased with costs: whether or not 
the ten percent was wholly profit, the percentage was of more value when costs were 
higher. Thus, a contractor seeking to increase profits could potentially benefit from 
inefficiency and would have made false reporting of costs particularly lucrative, such 
practices being relatively common in the period. 295 The enquiry convened and on the 
following day questioned Mr. Trotter about who authorised him to deliver items:
Question 19: On what requisitions or authority do you issue the supplies of the 
articles?
Answer: The camp necessities are issued by authority of the 
Quartermaster General, and hospital stores by that of the 
Surgeon General; occasionally they are issued by order of the 
Commander-in-Chief [or] the Secretary at War.
It is apparent that orders for the items produced by Mr. Trotter could come from no 
fewer than four separate departments, one of which was the civilian War Office. 
Utilising a single manufacturer maximised the potential economic benefits of such a 
contract and ensured that the equipment used by the various organisations was 
compatible. Both advantages, however, would have been greatly enhanced had a 
central store of camping equipment existed in the British army. This would have 
allowed a rationalisation of the stores held by each department, improving efficiency,
-^ Brewer, •Commercialisation and Polities', p. 197.
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while folly exploiting the compatibility of equipment derived from a single source. 
The next question concerned the delivery of items:
Question 20: Are you responsible for the safe delivery of the articles at the 
places in Great Britain to which they are ordered?
Answer: Certainly not. At the same time permit me to add, that I know 
not of any instance of loss by miscarriage, one alone excepted.
At the point of leaving the source of production, therefore, the items concerned ceased 
to be the responsibility of that particular contractor, a different contract being awarded 
for their transportation. Evidently Mr. Trotter satisfied the enquiry as he continued to 
supply camping equipment to the army following his interview. 296
Contracts were of benefit to the military for a variety of reasons. Not least was 
the fact that they could fix prices for a length of time that could not be guaranteed in a 
wartime economy. Furthermore, the already limited manpower of organisations such 
as the Royal Wagon Train and Commissariat muleteers was not employed in 
transporting large quantities of goods from their source but more usefully in supplying 
the troops. The contractors themselves, however, also benefited and this went beyond 
merely earning a steady income and reliable payments. Dealing with the military 
allowed them to operate under special rules, exempt from certain regulations. In 1805, 
for example, it was ruled that the Russian, Danish and Swedish vessels chartered by 
Turnball, Forbes & Co. to deliver wine to the garrison in Gibraltar could not be seized 
by the Royal Navy, which was the common practice regarding vessels of this type.-97 
Similarly exports of arms to Africa were exempt from certain customs inspections to 
avoid 'an unnecessary delay in carrying on this trade'. 298
Despite contracts to supply the army being put out to tender, the system had
2"6 Eighth Report of Military Enquiry, pp.22 7-8.
-*1 Draft of Instructions to the High Court of Admiralty Respecting Vessels Belonging to Russia, 
Denmark or Sweden, 2ml February, 1805, PRO PC 1/3643, Privy Council Miscellaneous Unbound
Papers, February 1805.
-m Privy Council to (Illegible), 17th August 1813, PRO PC 1/4013, Privy Council Miscellaneous 
Unbound Papers, August 1813.
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only a fa?ade of fair competition, a characteristic of contracts in general during the 
period. 2" Consider, for example, the tender put out by the Barracks Department in 
1802 for the supply of coal to certain barracks. Adverts were placed in the relevant 
local press and on 5th April 1802 it was announced that the contract would run for 
twelve months, from 25 th June that year. Proposals for the contract were to be 
delivered in sealed envelopes to the Barrack Master General on or before 12th April 
(seven days after the announcement). The terms of the contract were not advertised at 
this time but were available from either local barrack masters or the barrack office 
itself. An insight into early-nineteenth century British bureaucracy is provided by the 
fact that the latter was open for such enquiries only between 12pm and 3pm each day, 
except for Sundays. Proposals were required to specify the pits from which the coal 
was to originate, to be supported by 'adequate security' and to include the names of 
two referees willing to confirm these details. Clearly the requirement for securities 
gave some protection to the army but the time period of seven days was too short for 
many potential contractors to respond, particularly considering that little would 
happen on the Sunday and that the terms of the contract first needed to be acquired. 300 
In short, only a supplier aware of the contract in advance would have been able to 
meet the terms of the tender, and this could only have been achieved through inside 
knowledge.
The utilisation of contractors by the army was to be both beneficial and 
detrimental. The state benefited as contracts, if properly managed were economical 
and prevented the need for the army to acquire its own manufacturing capability, a 
situation that would have undermined the state as it would have enabled the army to 
obtain a greater degree of autonomy. John Bartlett states that the greatest advantage,
2^ Brewer. -Commercialisation and Polities', p. 199. 
300 Salisbury Journal. 5 th April 1802, p.3.
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however, was that contracts isolated the army, and consequently its troops from the 
price rises and fluctuations of the wartime economy. 301 Such a statement overlooks 
more fundamental benefits of contracts, specifically that they prevented the need for 
the army to maintain its own extensive production facilities and therefore freed 
manpower for military duties. This itself brought disadvantages, especially that of the 
army being dependent on outside agencies.
By their nature contracts were inflexible and it was one thing to maintain a 
garrison in this way as it represented a military presence that would remain in a single 
location for a long period, even though its constituent military units may have 
changed, but it was quite a different matter for specific formations as they could 
potentially be redeployed within a short period of time. An unexpected movement 
could take place before supplies were delivered, and while a unit may have taken 
several days to reach a port of embarkation, the logistical system and communications 
also moved at a slow speed. Such a situation, involving several companies of artillery 
from the King's German Legion, arose in 1807. Initially concern was expressed that 
the contractor had failed to supply the units in question with feathers, but a subsequent 
investigation by Brigadier General Macleod revealed that the contract had had another 
eight weeks to run when the units had embarked and the contractor had intended 
fulfilling the contract in this final period. Of note is the fact that Macleod warned that 
several other companies would leave Britain without this item, indicating that no 
attempt would be made to rectify the situation and that any deficiencies would only be 
remedied at their eventual destination. 302
It is important to note that the army's controlling of production may not have 
resolved the problems caused by relying on civilian producers. Evidence of this may
301 Bartlett The Development of the British Army, p. 136.
302 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 1* May 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
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be found in the manufacture and supply of munitions, which was primarily the 
responsibility of the Ordnance Board. The organisation controlled several locations 
concerned with the production of armaments, the most important being the Woolwich 
Arsenal in London. This site included a sizeable garrison to provide both defence and 
a workforce, while non-military personnel were also employed. 303 Despite such 
facilities, however, the army enjoyed only limited success in meeting demand for 
munitions. During the summer of 1810, for example, the Duke of Wellington was 
compelled to request ordnance form Portuguese stores, including 2,000 barrels of 
powder, 1,000 rounds of canister and 1,000 rounds of howitzer ammunition, to rectify 
deficiencies of British arms. 304 Significantly, these stores were ammunition rather than 
actual weapons, items with which British formations on the continent were normally 
adequately supplied, unlike their counterparts dispersed across the Empire.
It is apparent that the success of the British army in the campaigns on the 
European continent may have masked deficiencies in other theatres. Even units 
deployed in the defence of Britain and Ireland suffered from shortages of munitions, 
and auxiliary units raised specifically for home defence could be particularly 
deficient. 305 The armament returns for three regular regiments stationed in Britain 
during 1808 are shown in figure 10.
Unit
4th Dragoons
20th Light Drg.
51 Jl Foot
Date Location
7* May Canterbury
4* May Chichester
23'a April Unknown
Weapon Required
Carbine 844
Carbine 513
Musket 624
Short-
fall
56
146
57
Deficit as % of
Requirement
7%
28%
9%
Figure 10: Weapon deficiencies amongst three units deployed in Britain. 1808. 30'
303 Council Chamber, Whitehall, 2nd March 1816, PRO PC 1/4087, Privy Council Miscellaneous 
Unbound Papers, March 1816; J MacLeod to Mulgrave, Woolwhich, 17* February 1812, PRO 
WO55/1369.
304 Wellington to Liverpool, Alvera, 22ml August 1810, PRO WO 1/245.
305 See below p.247.
306 p^Q y/Q 27/92/1, Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and Army
Council Inspections, 1808.
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The above data has certain characteristics that warrant consideration before discussing 
its implications for the regiments concerned. Of particular note is the fact that, unlike 
returns of available stores of food submitted by the Commissariat, inspection reports 
made by the department of the Adjutant-General highlight deficiencies as well as what 
was available. 307 This allowed the army to estimate what items were required to bring 
units to strength, a crucial element that was lacking in Commissariat record 
keeping. 301* Secondly, it is apparent that deficiencies are based on the actual strength of 
the units concerned, not their authorised or paper strength. John Brewer states that the 
collection of such comprehensive data was characteristic of administration in the 
period, especially in the tabular form utilised in inspection returns. 309 Such practices, 
however, were not typical in the army because departments such as the Commissariat 
could be less meticulous in their collation of data. Pressures caused by operational 
requirements and the breakdown of peacetime practices in wartime overrode, or at 
least eroded, advances in administrative practice.
That the data was based on actual strength rather than paper strength is 
demonstrated by the disparity between the requirements of the 4th Dragoons and 20th 
Light Dragoons, the theoretical strengths of the two units being the same 
(approximately 900 to 1,000 men). Thus, a considerable number of personnel (over 
one quarter of the 20th Dragoons) did not possess a firearm or, in the case of the 
cavalry who carried a mixture of swords, carbines and pistols, a full complement of 
such items. This is clear evidence that the army was unable to supply its troops with 
the small arms they required, whether through its own output or contractors, and that 
this applied to even under strength regiments That the regiments concerned were
307 The original listed the number of items that the regiments were deficient, while the percentages were
calculated for comparative purposes in this study.
m See above p. 80.
30" Brewer, Tlw Sinews of Power, pp.222-225.
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deployed in Britain, however, raises the question of whether such shortages were 
significant if troops were not deployed in war zones.
As these units were not in the frontline equipment shortages maybe considered 
to be insignificant, but there was a realistic possibility of them becoming involved in 
action. Britain appeared to be enjoying a period of stability, the threat of revolution 
having declined considerably since the 1790s and early 1800s. 310 This stability, 
however, was fragile as there was continuous unrest across Britain during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, including food riots, enclosure protests and 
industrial unrest. 311 1812 was a particularly turbulent year as large numbers of troops 
were deployed to suppress disorder in northern England, more troops in fact than were 
sent to Portugal in 1808, while Prime Minister Spencer Perceival was assassinated in 
the lobby of the House of Commons. 312 The unrest continued into the post-war period 
and included the Spa Fields Rally (1816), the March of the Blanketeers (1817) and the 
Cato Street Conspiracy (1820). 313 There is little reason to doubt that if the economic 
conditions that forced the Luddites onto the streets in 1811 had taken hold a few years 
earlier, perhaps due to a premature outbreak of war with the United States of America 
or successful French occupation of Portugal, similar unrest could have occurred in 
1808 and the army may have been called upon to suppress disorder. As it was the 
army did on occasion become involved in suppressing disorder in 1808, but only on a
small scale.
While it is apparent that there was a realistic possibility of widespread disorder 
at any point of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, a successful landing by
310 E Royle. Revolutionary Britannia: Reflections on the Threat of Revolution in Britain. 1789 to 1848 
(Manchester. Manchester University Press, 2000), passim.
311 A. Charlesworth (ed), An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain, 1548 - 1900 (London, Croom Helm). 
pp.51.97,104.
312 Emsley. British Society, p. 158; D. Read, Tlie English Provinces c.1760- I960: a Study in Influence 
(London, Edward Arnold, 1964), p. 63.
313 Thomis and Holt, Ttireats of Revolution, pp.39-75; Read, The English Provinces, p.70.
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enemy forces appears to have been so unlikely that it was almost fantastical. By 1808, 
the year in which these inspections occurred, the threat of French invasion was 
virtually non-existent, due to a combination of Britain's almost insurmountable naval 
supremacy and Napoleon's own strategic aims, the latter ensuring that French 
attention would be focused almost exclusively on the continent (and increasingly on 
the Iberian Peninsular).314 Yet, there was a threat, albeit slight, and that the 
government recognised this is demonstrated by the continued existence of coastal 
artillery and similar defences against amphibious attack. As Jeremy Black highlights, 
the importance of British naval success after 1805 was just as important as Trafalgar if 
French ambitions were to remain contained.315 Since 1796 and 1798, when French 
forces had reached Ireland, French naval power had been substantially reduced but it 
still remained capable of conducting operations. Of note is that the French fleet had 
been blockaded in 1798, just as it was in 1811 and 1812 when the Toulon fleet 
sortied. 316 In short, it was not beyond possibility that the French could have made a 
landing of some form on the British coast, particularly in an area such as the South 
East; an area, which, according to John Brewer, would have been a tempting target for 
a raid designed to cause maximum panic and economic disruption. 317 That the French 
never attempted such a raid, choosing instead to attack the peripheries of British 
power, brings this assumption into doubt but considering its proximity to French ports 
and those of the Low Countries, it would have been a viable option in the event of a 
plan based on a rapid dash across the Channel.
There clearly existed the potential for units on home defence to become 
embroiled in action so the effectiveness of such units must be considered. Regarding
314 N Tracy, Nelson's Battles (London. Caxton, 2001), p.217; C. J. Esdaile, ne Wars of Napoleon 
(Addison Wesley, 1995), passim.
315 Black, Sea Borne Empire, p. 157.
316 Tracy, Nelson's Battles, pp.36-37, 215-216; Black, Sea Borne Empire, p.159.
317 Brewer, We Sinews of Power, p. 191.
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civil disorder it appears that cavalry armed merely with sabres would be sufficient, as 
demonstrated bloodily at Peterloo. An insurrection or landing would, however, have 
been a different matter and the experiences of the army in suppressing the Irish 
rebellion demonstrates that enthusiastic rebels could, in the right circumstances, inflict 
a reverse on an ill-prepared force of regulars, as could a small force of regular troops 
landed to either support such a rebellion or act independently. 318 Despite the relative 
security of Britain, therefore, it is apparent that a deficiency of munitions could have 
had potentially serious consequences for units deployed on home defence duties. 
Added to this should also be the fact that insufficiently armed units could not be sent 
to fight on the continent and thus had only limited utility until deficiencies could be 
rectified. Depriving units on home defence was thus a way of maximising the 
potential of the field army but was nonetheless a dangerous gambit.
Shortages of weapons could be serious enough, but the effective strength of 
units may have been even lower when other factors are considered. In particular it is 
important to appreciate the ergonomic aspects of infantry weapons, as equipment of 
this nature required items such as rifle straps, pistol holsters and sword scabbards to 
be properly utilised. That the army acknowledged the significance of such items was 
demonstrated by their inclusion in the section of inspection returns concerned not with 
aesthetics (such as uniform) but armaments. This was illustrated by a return of the 
weapons present in the 4th battalion, Royal Artillery in Canada, during May 1808, the 
following items being listed: muskets, bayonets, rammers, musket slings and 
ammunition pouches. Besides indicating the items required to utilise a musket fully, 
the return is of further note because it was made as part of the 'demand of arms and 
accoutrements for four companies of the 4th Battalion, Royal Artillery in Canada, in
318 T. Pakenham, The Year of Liberty: The History of the Great Irish Rebellion ofl 798 (Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1992), pp.95-105.
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lieu of those in possessions [sic] of the companies, being rendered totally unfit for any 
further service, having been in use for twenty-two years'. il ''
It is apparent that the small arms of the 4th battalion were in desperate need of 
replacement. Even though they were not technologically obsolete (as few advances 
had been made in musketry technology during the intervening decades) they would 
have been subjected to considerable wear and weathering. 320 Black powder weapons 
employed only basic mechanisms but were susceptible to both factors and even a 
heavy shower of rain could degrade effectiveness. During 1798 Captain Jennings of 
the 14th Regiment recorded that following a march in such weather 'the 14* were 
mostly employed repairing the injury done to our arms and ammunition'. 321 That the 
4th battalion had to wait so long for replacements may be attributed to its deployment 
in a colonial garrison, as British units deployed on the continent tended to receive the 
pick of equipment. As demonstrated by the Canadian garrison in 1808, however, 
formations deployed to relatively quiet postings could soon find themselves in a war 
zone, with Canada becoming a front line in the war against the United States four 
years later.
Weaknesses in the infantry and cavalry could have been rectified through 
artillery but this was an arm in which the British army was notoriously weak. Again 
the forces deployed in defence of Britain suffered from deficiencies, the situation 
regarding coastal artillery in the county of Dorset during 1798 being shown below in 
figure 11.
"" Major-General Stead to Crew, Woolwich, 9th May 1808. PRO WO 55/1314.
320 A. Hannan,' "They decide not nor are they chiefly relied upon in battle" : British Rifles and Light 
Infantry in the Peninsular War', in P Griffiths (ed), A History of the Peninsular War Vol IX: Modem 
Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999), p.273.
321 NAM 8301/102, Memoirs of Captain Peter Jennings, p. 7.
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-  
Serviceability
Serviceable
Unserviceable
Deficient
Total
61b
2
12
-
14
91b
18
4
14
36
Calibre 
121b
-
-
2
2
18lb
11
7
3
21
241b Total
12 43
23
19
12 85
Figure 11: Artillery allocated to coastal defence in the count) of Dorset, 1798. 3"
Taking into account guns that were unserviceable (not useable) and deficient (not 
present) the county lacked almost half of the artillery required for defence against 
French landings. This was a shocking situation considering that the survey was 
conducted five years after the start of hostilities and, most significantly, when there 
existed a real threat of French invasion: the French fleet was still strong in northern 
waters, while Dorset's geographical position made it vulnerable to French amphibious 
operations be they full-scale invasions or large-scale raids.
It is often said that the devil is in the detail and the state of coastal artillery was 
no exception. As noted by the survey's author, many of the guns available were too 
small a calibre for the task of coastal defence, indicating that deficiencies existed in 
terms of both quantity and quality. 6-pound artillery pieces in particular were of 
questionable value and they were to be slowly replaced by 9-pound calibres in the 
field artillery units of the British army, their use largely being confined to the horse 
artillery where weight and thus speed of movement were as important as lethality. The 
trend towards 9-pounders in the field artillery is in part reflected by the limited 
availability of this calibre for coastal defence, while the large number of unserviceable 
6-pounders reflects pieces of this calibre being removed from field duties and
3" PRO WO 30/116, Report on the Coast of Dorsetshire, 1798, p. 17.
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reallocated to other roles. The reason for the scarcity of 12-pounders was similar to 
that for 9-pounders, 12-pounder artillery being considered the highest practical calibre 
for field artillery. Of all the calibres, only the 18- and 24-pounders approached 
authorised strength. These calibres were too large for field use and classed as either 
siege or garrison artillery (the latter being their role in coastal defence).-' 23
The army failed to meet the demand for munitions due to a variety of reasons. 
One factor was the constant attrition to which weapons were subjected in the field: 
during 1808 the Royal Artillery alone in Spain lost or had rendered unusable 355 
swords, along with 375 items of associated equipment. 324 Such attrition, however, 
should have been easily absorbed by an industrialising nation such as Britain. 325 That 
this was the case was demonstrated by the fact that, for the most part, the level of 
munitions supplied to the army remained relatively consistent throughout the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. There is no evidence that soldiers serving in 
Flanders in the 1790s, for example, were significantly less well armed than those 
serving in the Low Countries in 1815. 32S
More significant than attrition in limiting the nation's ability to supply the 
army with munitions were factors that underpinned the British state itself. These were 
the guiding principles of foreign policy, specifically the pre-eminence of the Royal 
Navy and the subsidising of Britain's continental allies. 327 There existed, for example, 
a fundamental imbalance in British artillery production that favoured the Royal Navy 
in terms of quantity and quality that was to have a direct influence on the composition 
of the field army and its operational capability. 328 It is of note that during the siege
323 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.28-9.
324 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 22nJ May 1809. PRO WO 55/1314.
325 Crafts, British Economic Growth, passim.
326 Although the latter forces were better maintained in other ways. See M. Adkin, Tlie Waterloo 
Companion (London, Aurum, 2001). 
27 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 178. 
2tl The Board of Ordnance supplied both the army and navy. Duff), 'British Naval Power', p. 78.
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327 
32H
actions of 1812 the army was compelled to rely on ordnance temporarily transferred 
from the fleet, and captured Russian pieces, to provide guns of the necessary calibre to 
pound enemy fortifications. 329 Piers Mackesy states that often this arose not due to a 
shortage of army guns (a contentious point) but due to a preference for the greater 
mobility of naval guns. This, however, further highlights the technological lead 
enjoyed by the navy. 330 More significant than the navy in drawing munitions away 
from the army (not least because the former had its own production facilities such as 
those at Carron) was the policy of supporting allied nations. This was a policy that 
both exploited and maximised Britain's economic potential. The former was achieved 
through supplies of cash and material to allied nations, while the latter was facilitated 
by Britain maintaining a small army and letting its proxies do the fighting. 331
The extent of Britain's military contribution to the successive coalitions 
created to counter French power during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is 
open to some doubt and it was perhaps Austria that deserved the title of Napoleon's 
most resolute enemy. There can be little question, however, regarding the important 
role played by Britain as both financier and arsenal for the major European nations. 33 ' 
In the first three years of the Peninsular War, British vessels alone delivered 200,000 
muskets and 155 artillery pieces to Spanish and Portuguese forces, and initially 
individual ships captains in the Royal Navy were given free reign as to who they 
supplied muskets too, often several hundred at a time, in an attempt to raise bands of 
guerrillas. 333 Historians such as Christopher Hall see this in the context of Britain's 
contribution to the Allied war effort and evidence of Britain's industrial strength, yet
'^ Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, p.49; C. W. C. Oman, A History of the 
Peninsular War, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1930), V, pp.257-61.
330 P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 1801 (London, Routledge, 1995), p.27.
331 And the supply of munitions to allied forces was not always cost effective. By 1808 many of Sicily's 
fortresses remained unarmed and the army was ill equipped. P. Mackesy, Tfie War in the 
Mediterranean, p. 108.
332 See R. Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon (Yale, YUP, 1996). 
"3 Hall, Wellington 'sNavy, p. 13 7.
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this was only achieved at the expense of the British army. In 1810, for example, a 
consignment consisting of 20,000 stands of arms (a stand consisting of a musket and 
associated equipment such as ammunition pouches) was despatched to Portugal. 
16,000 of these, and other 'corresponding equipment', were subsequently sent to 
Cadiz for allocation to Spanish forces, with only 4,000 held in reserve for British, or 
other allied forces, at the Tagus. 334 This is significant because within months the Duke 
of Wellington would be requesting the transfer of munitions from Portuguese stores, 
demonstrating that items supplied to allied armies were also required by British 
forces. 335 It appears that the shortages rectified by the transfer of Portuguese stores in 
August 1810 may in part have been caused by their allocation to Portugal to begin 
with.
The supply of arms to allied nations was evidence of the army's role as one of 
three elements of British defence policy, along with the Royal Navy and support of 
coalition partners. It is apparent that in some cases, due to the supply of munitions to 
foreign powers, the army was third place in this relationship, although that the army 
was not adequately supplied may also indicate the limitations of British manufacturing 
output. There is a tendency to focus on the achievements and capabilities of British 
manufacturing, although the fact that the army was not adequately supplied may 
indicate an inability on the part of British industry to produce sufficient munitions for 
both the army and foreign powers. The question is not merely one of manufacturing 
capacity and relates to the fact that industry operates in sectors and that deficiencies in 
one sector may not always be rectified up by reallocating capacity from another. 336
While a consideration of munitions is fundamental to any study concerning the 
effectiveness and capability of an armed force, it is a subject that, on occasion, has
3J4 Wellington to Liverpool, Cartaxo, 12th January 1811. PRO WO 1/248.
335 Wellington to Liverpool, Alvera, 221"1 August 18KIPRO WO 1/245.
336 P. Kenned)', The Rise and Fall of the Great Pavers (London, Fontanna, 1988), passim.
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been given too much attention by historians. The most famous example of this is 
Charles Oman's theory on the role of British firepower in countering French infantry 
tactics. This theory is now discredited due to the work of historians such as Brent 
Nosworthy, who have sought to consider how various factors, including firepower and 
discipline, combined to cause events on the battlefield. 337 While the significance of 
munitions has been overemphasised, the converse is true regarding uniform in debates 
concerning the army in the period. It is often overlooked, for example, that soldiers in 
many allied armies were clothed as well as armed by British manufacturers. 33*
When considering uniform it is necessary to appreciate that, while the canon of 
literature concerned with the subject is of both considerable quantity and quality, it 
has traditionally been confined within relatively restricted boundaries. In particular 
studies related to uniform have tended to focus on uniform as defined in the 
regulations laid down by Horse Guards, with little consideration of the actual state of 
uniform. While common sense compelled historians to consider that dress was not 
always immaculate and often patched or torn, the image portrayed by them (and 
artists) was still at times far removed from that of reality. Recently there has been a 
trend towards a more realistic appraisal of uniform, a trend apparent in the 
illustrations accompanying Mark Adkin's work regarding the Battle of Waterloo, 
illustrations that show how soldiers would probably have appeared on campaign, not 
how regulations instructed them to dress. 339 There remains, however, a gulf between 
how the uniform worn in the field is portrayed by historians and by contemporaries.
3377 B. Nosworthy, 'Charles Oman on Line versus Column', in P Griffiths (ed), A History of the 
Peninsular War VolLX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal 1808 -1814 (London. 
Greenhill Books, 1999), pp.231-264. 
338 Hall, Wellington 'sNavy, P-137.
Adkin, Tlie Waterloo Companion, plates 1 - 16.339
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Interestingly there is some evidence that, regarding uniform, twentieth century popular 
culture may have overtaken historians in terms of accuracy. 340
Historians may have struggled to address fully issues relating to uniform, as 
military dress is rarely seen outside its role as a means of battlefield identity. Besides 
preventing a full understanding of the significance of uniform to soldiers and the 
army, this can also limit attempts to understand its provision and issues surrounding 
this. In consequence a certain degree of complacency has risen regarding uniform, 
leading to a tendency to accept the regulations laid down by Horse Guards at face 
value and assume that this was how soldiers appeared on campaign. 341 Only by fully 
appreciating the importance of an item such as uniform, however, can there be a 
consideration of the wider issues that surround it.
Central to a broader perception of uniform is its relationship to British society 
and perceptions of the army in the period. Military uniform came to symbolise many 
things; masculinity in portraits, military glory in art and national pride in 
propaganda. 342 Dress and appearance very much represented the public face of the 
army and its condition was seen as a measure of how tough fighting had been during a 
specific campaign. This was apparent in a newspaper article that recorded the return 
of troops from the Mediterranean to Southampton during February 1802. It reported 
that 'different detachments of the 10th and 22nd Light Dragoons have... lately landed
""Although largely derided by Charles Esdaile in his survey of Peninsular War literature, the television 
series Sharpe is to be commended for promoting the image of vagabond soldiers. The main protagonist 
has a French pack and sword, his sergeant carries a non-regulation firearm and his other troops wear a 
mixture of headgear. While precise details may indeed be of dubious accuracy it is an image concurrent 
with that given by memoirists such as Private Wheeler and Lieutenant Grattan. C. Esdaile, 'The 
Peninsular War: aReview of Recent Literature', in The Historian, No. 6, (Winter 1999), p.9; B. H. 
Liddell - Hail (ed), Tlw Letters of Private Wheeler 1809 -1828 (London, Michael Joseph, 1951), p.74; 
W. Grattan, Adventures with the ConnaughtRangers, 1809 - 1814 (London, Greenhill, 1989), p. 135. 
The issue of captured equipment is well highlighted in the episode entitled Sharpe's Gold, Carlton 
DVD, 2002.
341 See for example Park and Nafziger, Tlie British Military, passim: R. M. Bames, A History of the 
Regiments and Uniforms of the British Army (London. Seeley Service & Co), passim: P. J. 
Haythornthwaite, Uniforms of Waterloo (London, Anns and Armour. 1974), passim.
342 L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London, Vintage, 1996), p. 303; J. Brewer, The 
Sinews of Power, (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1989), p.58.
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from Egypt, and their appearance testifies the hardships and fatigue they have 
undergone since they embarked at this port nearly 18 months ago'. 343 The state of a 
uniform could also be used to signify military effectiveness, or lack thereof. The latter 
was apparent in the sometimes-comical depiction of Irish rebels and French soldiers 
by caricaturists, who frequently over-emphasised their patched and battered clothing 
or mixture of badly fitting civilian and military apparel. 344
One of the most intriguing aspects of British uniform in the period is the 
ambiguous attitude of the population towards it. As well as being a symbol of national 
pride military uniform also made the population uneasy, being associated with overt 
militarism. 34^ The Duke of Wellington wrote that 'we are not naturally a military 
people; the whole business of an army upon service is foreign to our habits', and it is 
interesting to note that a suspicion of those in uniform not only existed in civilians. 346 
Many Auxiliary units did not always muster in uniform, and the dress code for a 
particular event was posted along with its announcement in the local press. In 1803, 
for example, troopers of the Hampshire and Fawley Light Dragoons were informed 
that 'the corps will meet out of uniform' for a meeting to discuss new recruits. 347 It is 
thus apparent that there existed two divergent perceptions of military uniform in 
Britain. They would appear to be diametrically opposed but coexisted in the British 
mindset because, as John Brewer notes, 'they [the British] wanted military glory 
without what they saw as European militarism'. 34* The two views of uniform 
demonstrated this notion in practice.
343 Salisbury Journal, 15th February 1802, p.2.
344 Brewer, The English Satirical Print, passim; A. M. Broadley, Napoleon in Caricature, 2 volumes. 
(London, John Lane, 1911), passim.
345 p.9.
346 Wellington to Right Honourable J. Villiers, 30 May 1809, Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General
Orders, p.263.
347 Salisbury Journal, iTJuly 1803, pi. 
3411 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 60.
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When considering both contemporary and modern attitudes towards the 
uniform of the British army in the period, it is apparent that ambiguity existed. This 
ambivalence, however, existed not only in attitudes but also the administration of 
uniform. There existed over 100 volumes relating to the regulation and administration 
of uniform, while being improperly dressed on parade was a court-martial offence, yet 
on campaign certain officers appeared to be particularly lax. 349 Of the Duke of 
Wellington, an individual known for conservatism, Lieutenant Grattan noted that:
[he] was a most indulgent commander... provided we brought our men into the 
field, well appointed, and with sixty rounds of good ammunition each, he 
never looked to see whether their trousers were black, blue or grey; and as 
ourselves, we might be rigged out in all the colours of the rainbow if we 
fancied it. 350
The provision of uniform was unusual, as, unlike many other items required by the 
army, it was overseen not by a single department but various sub-organisations. This 
was unusual because the trend in the period was for increasing regulation, and in 
many respects the regulation and provision of uniform had changed little since the late 
seventeenth century despite the administrative revolution. Although the reasons for 
this are unclear, and may possibly be found in the structure and interdepartmental 
power struggles of the eighteenth century, a logical answer is simply that uniform had 
changed relatively little in the era other than to conform to fashion and thus its 
administration remained relatively unaltered. The bodies responsible for regulating the 
provision of uniform, including the style and material to be used, were the Clothing 
Board, commissions of military enquiry and various 'Boards of General Officers'. The 
latter were created to consider specific matters, such as proposals to modify items of
uniform or appropriate regulations. These boards were primarily drawn from a single
w Draft Wan-ant 1816, PRO WO43/296, Amalgamation of Boards of General Officers with 
Inspectorate of Clothing to form the Consolidated Board; PRO WO 90/1, General Courts Martial 
Abroad, 1796 -1825. 
350 Grattan, Adventures with the ConnaughtRangers, p.50.
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body, which consisted of seven generals, ten lieutenant generals and two major 
generals. 3' 1 Such boards were not always well attended and during one such meeting 
only two generals and three lieutenant generals were present, the absentees including 
the chairman, General Grenville. 352 Following the Napoleonic Wars the various boards 
were merged into a single body known as 'the Consolidated Board of General 
Officers', a study of which reveals much about the functions and procedures of both 
itself and predecessors. Its role was described as 'the inspection and sealing of pattern 
articles of clothing and appointments for the army', a task for which it inherited a vast 
number of associated records.3^3 The records included:
44 Assignment books. 
14 General Officers' Letter Books. 
8 General Officers' Minute Books. 
8 Computations of Off Reckonings.
2 Books of General Entries.
3 Establishment Books. 
3 Warrant Books. 
1 Computation of Musters.
1 Regulations of Clothing Appointments for Regiments of Cavalry and 
Infantry, 1 st July 1751.
1 Regimental Memoranda.
2 Agents' Accounts.
2 Abstracts of Assignments.
1 Regulations for Clothing Appointments for Regiments of Cavalry and
Infantry, 19th December 1768. 
6 Books of Pattern Looping for Regiments of Infantry of the Line from
1 st Foot to 101 st .
2 Books of Pattern Looping for Regiments of Cavalry. 
6 Books of Pattern Looping for English and Scottish Militia, Lettered A
toY. 
2 Books of Pattern Looping for Foreign Corps, and others on the British
Establishment. 
1 Invalid Clothing. 
1 The book now in use for entering abstracts of assignments on an
improved plan.
351 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, 13 th March 1811, PRO WO 377/2. 
Various Papers, 1809 upon the System of Clothing and Off Reckonings for the Army.
352 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, Great George Street, Westminster, 15th 
April 1811. PRO WO 377/2.
353 Draft Warrant, 1816, PRO WO43/296.
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This was a total of 108 books and these volumes say much about the administration of 
the provision of clothing: books relating to regulations in 1751 and 1768 were 
superfluous considering that more up to date books existed from 1798, while the 
reference to invalid clothing serves as a useful reminder that uniform was not only 
issued to fighting soldiers.
The ten pattern books reflect the scale of the task facing the Consolidated 
Board and its predecessors; while the existence of books concerned with particulars as 
specific as looping demonstrates the level of detail involved in the regulation of 
uniform. 3 - 4 The image is of a highly regulated and bureaucratic system, both of which 
were characteristics of administration in the period. Yet the extent of the bureaucracy 
surrounding uniform should not be entirely attributed to contemporary administrative 
practices. Of note is the fact that, through relying not on a major department but minor 
organisations, the system of uniform provision was not typical of military 
administration. There is also the issue of military uniform itself, which has 
traditionally been a complex subject requiring its own administration. In the French 
army of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, uniform was dictated 
by convention, particularly following the reforms of the Marquis de Louyois. 355
It would be incorrect to infer that uniform provision operated entirely outside 
of normal administrative practices. Rather it functioned within the system to a lesser 
degree than was the case regarding munitions and similar items, due to the way in 
which responsibility was shared amongst various boards. In December 1816 this 
situation changed when the Consolidated Board of General Officers came into being. 
It consisted of eighteen Generals, twenty Lieutenant Generals and seventeen Major
Generals, the senior officer being the Earl of Harcourt, while R. Barry was appointed
334 R. Bany, Secretary Consolidated Board of General Officers, to Secretary at War, Office of Military 
Board. 23"' January 1817, PRO WO43/296.
355 C. S. Grant, From Pike to Shot, 1685-1720: Armies and Battles of Western Europe (Devizes. 
Wargames Research Group, 1986), p. 59.
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secretary.3- 6 This new board was to work in close co-operation with the Inspectors of 
Army Clothing while it could, in addition, call upon other organisations, as made clear 
in its instructions:
His Royal Highness thinks it highly necessary that the committee shall, in 
addition be allowed at their discretion the occasional assistance of two quarter 
masters, or other persons experienced in the nature and quality of army 
clothing, to inspect and examine materials in the presence, and under the 
personal direction of the committee... the two quarter masters or other 
persons... should receive an allowance of 5s for every day their attendance is 
required [and officers] the staff pay of their respective ranks. 357
The recommendation that the board call upon the services of experts was significant, 
being tacit acknowledgement that a group of such high-ranking officers may not 
themselves have possessed sufficient knowledge to conduct their duties. The pride of 
these officers was preserved by instructions that the experts could only 'examine 
materials in the presence, and under the personal direction of the committee'. Despite 
this clause, the introduction of experts was evidence that the provision of clothing was 
adopting more characteristics of administration in the period, in this case the use of 
professionals or specialists. 358
Despite the efforts of the various boards and commissions that existed to set 
the standards of army uniform, it is apparent that the dress of soldiers in the field was 
frequently far removed from that laid down in regulations. As Piers Mackesy writes, 
regulations were only relevant if they were enforced, and it is apparent that those 
relating to uniform were frequently not. 3;>y Lieutenant Ford, for example, wrote that in 
the 79th the coats of its officers were 'black or blue of various forms', not the
356 'Warrantfor consolidating into one establishment from 25* December 1816 inclusive, the Clothing 
Board and all other boards of General Officers usually held in London'; Heylehurst to Secretary of 
State for War, Horse Guards, 2nd October 1816, PRO WO43/296.
357 Illegible to Secretary of State for War, Horse Guards, 21 st June 1816, PRO WO43/296.
358 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, TlieArmy of Charles II, p.81; Mingey, The Eighteenth
Century Land Steward', p.8.
3Sy P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p.30.
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regulation red, while top hats became popular with officers serving in Egypt due to the 
greater protection they offered against the sun. 360 That such dress was the norm, and 
not merely a practice in the field or on informal occasions, was demonstrated in Major 
General Cartwright's report on the uniform of the 4th Queen's Own Dragoons. He 
concluded that the standard of uniform in the regiment was good even though many of 
the pairs of breeches worn were not regulation issue and were purchased from several 
sources. 361 This last point is significant as the state was clearly unable to provide the 
items of clothing that officers required, which led to individuals purchasing their own 
items. Besides being more colourful than often thought (and allowed in Kings 
Regulations) uniform may in some cases have been torn, patched or even ragged. 
Lieutenant Meade, complaining as usual, wrote of his uniform: 'see the crimson coat 
beseamed with stitches. The torn degenerate regimental breeches'; Captain 
Tomkinson described the cavalry helmets issued to his unit as 'completely worn out, 
and so warped... that the men could scarcely wear them'; and Private Wheeler wrote 
of his unit: 'it was difficult to tell to what regiment we belonged, for each man's coat 
was like Joseph's "a coat of many colours'". 362
The sometimes-shocking state of soldiers' clothing could be attributed to a 
variety of factors. Uniforms were subjected to constant attrition caused by weathering 
and other wear and tear on campaign. Both Wheeler and Tomkinson attributed their 
complaints to this but the situation was worsened by the provision of poor quality 
items. Particular difficulties were encountered in regard to equipment and clothing 
made from leather. From 1807, for example, the spur leathers of artillery drivers were 
to be replaced annually, rather than every two years, due to 'many [spurs] being lost
360
361
NAM 6807/71, p. 133; P. Mackesy, British Victory/ in Egypt, 1801, p.29.
Major General Caitwright's confidential report on the actual state of the 4th Queen's Own Dragoons, 
7th May 1808, PRO WO 27/92/1, Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and 
Army Council Inspections, 1808.
362 NAM 7505/10; TomMnsoa The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p.34; Liddell - Hart (ed), The Letters of 
Private Wlieder, p. 74.
112
due to the spur leather perishing'. 363 More significant were the doubts expressed 
concerning the durability of footwear. Of that issued to cavalry it was noted the 
contractor 'instead of jacking them by boiling them and beating them in the proper 
methods, barely stiffens them by means of some gummy substance'. iM Similarly 
Captain Jennings noted of infantry boots issued to his unit that 'the shoes finished by 
the contractors were so bad that in twenty four hours they were useless, the soles were 
very little thicker than the uppers and had paper between the soles to make them 
stronger. Most of the men carried their shoes in their hands' 365 . It is interesting to note 
that both of the above criticisms extended not from flaws inherent in the design of the 
specified items, but the fact that contractors sought to limit costs. This is evidence of 
competition for contracts, with consequences for troops in the field and, by 
implication, the effectiveness of the army itself. Through encouraging such practices 
the system was contributing to the army's problems rather than resolving them: when 
supplying the army in this way the imperative was economics as much as 
effectiveness.
Supplies of good quality footwear were important both aesthetically and for 
speed during marches, although these were not the only issues. The Duke of 
Wellington, for example, believed that 'as the soldiers pay for the shoes they receive, 
it is but fair towards them that they should be of the best quality for their purpose and 
should fit them' (this is also further evidence of the inability of the state to supply 
soldiers as their footwear was only subsidised, not purchased for them). 366 Good 
quality boots were required both to improve the effectiveness of troops and for safety. 
This was particularly true of the cavalry arm, which, while not requiring boots
363 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 19th July 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
364 Duke of Northumberland to Lieutenant Colonel Hill, Alnwick Castle 4th February 1812. NAM 
6309/138, Various Letters from the Duke of Northumberland.
365 NAM 8301/102, no page number or other reference and the passage is included on a separate, 
undated, sheet.
366 Wellington to Liverpool, 31 st March, 1811, PRO WO 1/248.
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designed for long marches, had other requirements. Thus in 1812 the Duke of 
Northumberland felt compelled to complain about the standard of boots supplied to 
the cavalry. In particular he highlighted that:
Jack boots properly made are the most advantageous to troopers under service, 
they not only save the man's legs and knees from that most severe pressure, 
occasioned by such horses in a charge, which I have known attended by 
various injurious consequences but in case of the horse falling upon his side, 
they are certain to save the trooper's leg being broken. 367
Considering the potential implications of poor quality uniform, it is surprising that 
when defective or poor quality items were returned to the depot they were not 
destroyed but merely re-issued, often without modification. In 1807, for example, a 
consignment of greatcoats intended to be issued to the Royal Artillery in Malta were 
returned as defective, but were then re-issued to new recruits in Britain. This situation 
was seen as unsatisfactory by Brigadier-General Macleod, and his subsequent 
communication with the Board of Ordnance on the subject demonstrated that the 
defects were not minor: 'I am sorry to add, that it would have been better if they had 
been destroyed at Malta, as they are so bad, that battalions will not be able to profit by 
any of them'. 368 Issuing clothing already acknowledged to be defective was further 
evidence that the state lacked the ability to supply the army adequately. This was 
despite the fact that the British armed forces were, in 1807, below strength and that 
the challenges of the Peninsular War had yet to be faced.
Even if the clothing available was of sufficient quality there were other factors. 
Some deficiencies could be attributed to the actions of soldiers themselves, who 
discarded clothing to make their packs lighter or during sieges threw shakos into the
367 Duke of Northumberland to Lieutenant Colonel Hill, Alnwick Castle 4th February 1812. NAM
6309/138.
36* Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 5th March 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
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air to give the defenders a target and waste ammunition. 369 Soldiers, however, had 
ample incentive to respect their uniform: being improperly dressed on parade was 
potentially punishable by court-martial and they were charged for replacement 
clothing, soldiers in the Peninsula paying 6d for a pair of boots and 6d 7s for shirts. 370 
In many cases uniform deficiencies were caused not by destruction of the item (be it 
through wear, weathering or misuse) but rather the fact that items were not available, 
as noted by General Wetherall in his report concerning the 83' d Foot. Describing the 
regiment's great coats as 'entirely worn out', he blamed not misuse by the men but the 
poor provision of replacement clothing.371 Brigadier-General Macleod noted a similar 
situation existed in relation to the state of the artillery of the King's German Legion in 
May 1807, informing the Board of Ordnance that:
I also take this opportunity of observing, that a very small portion for the 
King's German Artillery has as yet been delivered into store and that 
consisting of incomplete suits; I have directed a survey to be immediately held 
upon what has been delivered in.
As the German artillery are now under orders for foreign service, I am very 
apprehensive that they will not be supplied with their clothing (of which they 
are in extreme want). 372
Even the 4th Dragoons (850 all ranks), a unit noted as being well attired, was deficient 
of 154 pairs of breeches, 46 pairs of gloves, 46 hats, 3 cloaks and 32 saddles and 
bridles. 373
A significant reason for the shortages experienced by units newly arrived or 
awaiting deployment overseas was that the provision of uniform in such cases 
depended on an at times confusing combination of items received upon arrival and
36V Grattan, Adventures with the Connanght Rangers, pp.87, 104; J. Green, The Vicissitudes of a 
Soldier's Life (Cambridge, Ken Trotman, 1996), p.p.80,149.
370 Standing Orders, Order No 27, NAM 6807/221, p.5.
371 Half Yearly Report of 83ld Regiment, Cape of Good Hope, NAM 6112/78, p. 15.
372 Under lining and brackets as in original. Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 1 s May 1807. PRO WO 
55/1314.
373 Returns of clothing and accoutrements of the 4ft Queen's Own Dragoons, 7th May 1808, PRO WO 
27/92/1. Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and Army Council 
Inspections, 1808.
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items taken with them. This was demonstrated by the orders issued concerning the 
embarkation of several militia units in August 1811:
the commander of the forces for the time being having been pleased to direct 
that the several regiments of Irish militia under orders for embarkation should 
take with them their canteens and haversacks, I have the honour to inform you 
that the necessary directions have been given to officers commanding the 
several corps to retain these articles in their possession, delivering in the 
remaining articles of field equipment into store as at first intended. 374
The practice of militia units taking some items of equipment and uniform with them 
was to prove a double-edged sword. It was often the case that the militia concerned 
were not merely redeploying but joining a different regiment. This meant the parent 
formation would need to be brought back to strength, requiring the replacement of 
items taken by those personnel deploying overseas (in the case of the units in the 
above example this meant canteens and haversacks). The extent of losses is illustrated 
by those incurred during 1805, 2,927 watch coats being lost from a total of twenty- 
five Irish militia regiments due to deployments overseas. Of these units six (Carlow, 
Kings County, Louth, Tipperary, Tyrone and Westmeath) each lost more than 150 
such coats. 375
Inconsistencies in what units took with them when deploying overseas could 
not always be put right from stores at the destination and in consequence newly 
arrived units often lacked even basic equipment. For example, in November 1808 
Brigadier Taylor complained that the 2nd battalion of the 72nd Foot arrived in South 
Africa fresh from the Isle of Wight depot 'with a short compliment of necessities'. 376 
While the arrival of a unit in such a state in a distant colony may be excused due to
374Assistant Quarter Master General to Lieutenant Colonel John French, Quarter Master General's
Office. ^August 1811. PRO WO 63/91.
rs E.B, Littlehales to Commissary General Hanfield, Dublin Castle, 13 th September, 1805, PRO WO
63/88.
376 Letter from Brigadier General J. Taylor to Adjutant General Horse Guards, Isle of wight Aim)
Depot, 8th November 1808, NAM 6112/78, p.76.
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more pressing needs in Europe, even units deploying to this theatre did not always 
arrive correctly attired. In a complaint forwarded to the Earl of Liverpool by the Duke 
of Wellington, General Peacock expressed concern at 'the improper state in which 
some detachments sent from England'. 377 This was not a new occurrence and in the 
previous October Wellington himself had written to the War Office concerning 1 3,500 
accoutrements of those lately arrived from England... which it appears are not new 
[and] too small'. 378
While regulations concerning the clothing of units deploying overseas could 
be confusing enough, there were other factors that complicated the issuing of uniform. 
Not least in this regard was that the attire of some units could be modified by the 
whim of commanding officers. This was a practice that primarily occurred in the 
auxiliary forces, and was demonstrated by the request made in September 1810 by 
Major B. Woodward of the Cavan Militia for 150 bayonet belts to be supplied to the 
unit. This purchase was to be made at Woodward's own expense (Woodward offering 
to pay 5d per belt) 'for the purpose of fastening by the accoutrements in the quick 
movements of the light infantry'. 379 The request was refused because according to 
Commissary General Handfield 'only an order from the Lord Lieutenant [can allow] 
any article of store to be disposed of m This did not end the matter, however, and 
Handfield advised Woodward that he could purchase the items he requested at the 
next sale of surplus equipment. It is necessary to note that Woodward's initial request 
was denied not on grounds of military regulations relating to uniform conventions but 
rather due to regulations concerning stock control as the items could not be supplied 
directly from army stores. That Woodward sought to improve the effectiveness of the
377 Wellington to Earl of Liverpool, Cartaxo, 19th January 1811, PRO WO 1/248.
!:" Wellington to Earl of Liverpool, Alvera, 9th July 1810, PRO WO 1/245.
3  Major B. Woodward to Major Rarnsey; Royal Barracks, 17th September 1810. PRO WO 63/91,
Entry Book of Letters Received at Commissariat Headquarters, Dublin, 1810 - 12.
380 Commissary General Charles Handfield to Major B. Woodward, Commissary General's Office, 19th
September 1810, PRO WO 63/91.
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unit is commendable, and it must be noted that the only factor hindering the 
implementation of the scheme was bureaucratic regulation. A unit of the British army 
could not obtain equipment from stores, but through the auction of surplus equipment 
such items were available to civilians in Ireland, a country in which armed 
insurrection was perceived as a near constant threat.
There existed other conventions and rules governing uniform to hinder its 
effective supply. Although items were referred to with catchall terms, such as tunics, 
those required by various units or personnel were not always the same and there were 
variations in style and colour stipulated in regulations. 381 A company's designation as 
line, light or grenadier dictated the arrangement of its lace and shoulder decoration. 
Tunic colours were broadly divided into red for the infantry, blue or red for cavalry 
and blue for the supporting arms, although there were variations (most famously the 
green of the Rifle Brigade) and the facing colour of regiments also varied (basically 
this was the colouring of the cuffs and collar). Furthermore, details concerning colours 
could be confused and in the 4th Dragoons, for example, the commanding officer was 
unsure whether the holsters should have been black or bearskin. 3 *2
Uniforms were expensive, a parliamentary report of 1807 revealing that of 319 
articles waiting to be settled, approximately one-third (98) related to uniform or 
similar items including horse furniture. 3"3 An average price for uniforms being £1 17s 
lOd for a private soldier's, £3 12s lOd for a drummer's and £5 Is 3d for a sergeant's. 3 "4 
Interestingly David Dundas (the Commander-in-Chief in 1809) believed that there 
was little variation in these costs when uniforms were purchased overseas, noting that
m See for example E. Littlehales to Commissary General, Dublin Castle, 1 st March 1811, PRO WO
63/91.
™- Major General Cartwright's confidential report on the actual state of the 4Ul Queen's Own Dragoons.
7th May 1808, PRO WO 27/92/1.
3a Statement of the Number of Unsettled Accounts in The Miscellaneous Department, in Eighth Report
of Military Enquiry.
M*A Treatise on Military Finance (Whitehall, Egerton, 1796), pp. 113-5.
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'the expense of clothing in Europe, Africa and America is nearly the same'. 31*5 A more 
significant factor than cost was the scale of the task required to guarantee an adequate 
supply of replacement clothing, the Peninsular army requiring 30,000 pairs of shoes in 
1809, rising to 150,000 in 1810.386 The problem of supplying new uniform was only 
partly rectified by recycling old ones - such as cutting down the previous year's tunics 
to make waistcoats.
In the case of munitions the army was involved in procurement through 
issuing specifications and production orders (the War Office) and manufacture 
(arsenals), while the production of uniforms was merely directed by the army. The 
situation regarding accommodation and shelter was decidedly different and the 
organisations concerned not only issued specifications (be they for the construction of 
structures or supply of associated items) but were also actively involved in both 
maintenance and administration: it was the task of the Adjutant-General's department 
and commanding officers, rather than the clothing boards, to compile returns of 
uniform, while barrack masters themselves reported on the condition of barracks 
maintained by the Barrack Master General's department.
Accommodation and shelter in the army during the period can be divided in to 
the categories of permanent (barracks), temporary (tents and shelter provided by the 
army) and field (any shelter considered expedient). Responsibility for providing the 
latter frequently rested with commissaries, individuals who were expected to be 
familiar with all the resources required by the army in their area. Troops, however, 
also relied on their own ingenuity for such shelter and Captain Bragge wrote how his 
unit had resided in 'very indifferent huts built of boughs and open at each end, without
385 Memo from David Dundas, Commander in Chief, PRO WO 377/2, Various Papers, 1809 upon the 
System of Clothing and Off Reckonings for the Army, paragraphs 1 to 2 and 9. 
™ Wellington to Castlereagh, 31 st May 1809, PRO WO 1/238; Wellington to Liverpool 31 st March, 
1811. PRO WO 1/248.
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any straw, palliasses or things of that nature to lie on' for several days. 387 To construct 
such shelters units were compelled to utilise whatever building materials were at 
hand, with the result that frequently whole villages could be stripped to provide 
building materials for makeshift shelters and, more commonly, fuel. The practice was 
to become so widespread that in 1811 general orders were issued in an attempt to limit 
such activity:
The commander of the forces requests the general officer commanding 
divisions will place safeguards in the villages in the neighbourhood of 
encampments to prevent the soldiers from carrying off furniture, poles of the 
vines, and other property of the inhabitants. 381*
Away from the frontline, when troops tended to be less mobile, the allocation of 
shelter and associated items, such as fuel, could be better controlled. Indeed, troops 
were less likely to be given a crude shelter and instead find themselves billeted in the 
home of a local civilian (a policy that was in theory the responsibility of the Quarter 
Master General but practicalities in the field dictated that it was executed by the 
Commissariat).
In Spain and Portugal the practice was popular amongst many locals as those 
most commonly accommodated in this way were officers, the presence of whom were 
believed to deter looting. The validity of such a belief was seemingly demonstrated 
during the storming of Badajoz. Lieutenant Grattan was invited to dine in a house at 
this time and he wrote, 'all outside was noise and pillage [but] affairs within went on 
agreeably enough'. iw Despite protection from looting, however, the arrival of an 
officer was not always "welcome and they could prove to be less than gracious guests. 
Captain Browne, for example, instructed his servant to steal clothing from his Spanish
387 Cassels (ed), Tlie Letters of Captain William Bragge, p. 75.
3 *s Poimbera, 18th March 1811, Extracts of General Orders, NAM 6807/221, pp.8-9.
m Grattan, Adventures with the ConnaughtRangers, p!61.
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host.390 The rank and file rarely had the luxury of being billeted with a family, 
although Private Thomas Howell of the 71 sl Regiment of Foot experienced this during 
the winter of 1812-13. This was a learning experience for both parties and 
demonstrated the ignorance each had of the other's culture - Howell was surprised to 
find Spanish children so well treated and the local priest amazed to discover the 
'heretical' English knew the Lord's Prayer.391 Despite the example of Howell, for 
most of the rank and file local accommodation tended to be a crowded barn or peasant 
dwelling. This could be an unpleasant experience for owner and occupier alike, as 
demonstrated by the fact that Commissary Schauman deliberately billeted troops in 
the properties of locals he disliked. 392
The billeting of troops in local properties was not unique to overseas 
deployments, and during the early stages of the Revolutionary Wars it had been 
common practice in Britain to billet troops at local inns and even in local homes. This 
latter practice went against a concept central to British policy in the period: that the 
existence of the army should cause minimum inconvenience to civilians. 393 The 
billeting of troops in homes continued as a result of a loophole in seventeenth century 
legislation that had allowed the practice to continue in certain parts of Edinburgh. 
Furthermore the owners were only eligible for compensation if the property was 
located in certain suburbs of the city, going against another concept that characterised 
the relationship between he army and society: that the army had to pay its way and not 
requisition items. 394 This did not stop officers from renting rooms but merely 
prevented them from being forced on homeowners, although even the leasing of 
rooms could be unpopular. This was particularly so in 1809, when large numbers of
3VO Buckley (ed), Tlw Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Tliomas Henry Browne, p. 181.
391 Hibbert (ed),A Soldier of the 71st, pp. 80-2.
39- Schauman, On the Road with Wellington, p. 76. See also Hibbert (ed), A Soldier of the, p.57.
m Brewer, Hie Sinews of Power, p.49.
3M Anon, A Treatise on Military Finance, p.66; Brewer, Tlie Sinews of Power, p.36.
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officers suffering from fever contracted in Walcheren were understandably but cold- 
heartedly refused accommodation by the citizens of Harwich. 395 The billeting of troops 
at inns was another unpopular practice, drunkenness amongst soldiers being 
common. 395 The blow to innkeepers was partly softened by the payment of generous 
financial compensation, which amounted to 12d to 16d per cavalryman with horse, 6d 
if without a horse, 10s 6d per chaplain and his horse and 4d per infantryman. 397 In 
addition to these payments for accommodation, innkeepers also received money 
described as being 'in lieu of beer' directly from the War Office. 39"
It was one thing for soldiers to participate in an occasional fracas while drunk, 
but the billeting of troops in inns also significantly increased the danger of them 
becoming involved in more serious politically motivated, even revolutionary, 
disorder. Partly in response to this threat, but also in response to the growth of the 
army during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the government of 
Prime Minister William Pitt instigated a barrack-building programme. 399 The concept 
of barracks was not new, but rather their widespread introduction to Britain was. 
Barracks had long existed in Britain and overseas, frequently earning a reputation for 
poor conditions. Captain Jennings, for instance, described the Picket Yard barracks of 
Gibraltar as 'this cursed garrison' during a brief visit in 1799. 400
The expansion of available barracks brought with it significant improvements 
to living conditions, including schools and hospitals. 401 As was usual in the period this
3 "5 Dent to Mother, Colchester, 12th September 1809, NAM 7008/11/2. The fact that they had to seek
accommodation of this nature is further evidence of the limitations of the barrack-building programme
discussed below.
3 "6 NAM 6807/71, p.111.
-w PRO WO 55/3045,, p44; Anon, A Treatise on Military Finance. pp.66-9.
398 PRO WO 12/1522, Royal Wagon Train 1799-1801.
3W C. Emsley, The Military and Popular' Disorder in England 1790-1801' Part 1, in Journal of Army
Historical Research, Volume LXI, (Spring 1983), pplO-21 and Part 2, (Summer 1983). pp!06-112.
400 NAM 8301/102, p. 14.
401 Few historians consider barracks beyond their role in isolating soldiers from the population. For an 
exception see C. Jones, "The Military Revolution and the Professionalism of the French Army under the 
Ancien Regime', inDuffy (ed). Die Military Revolution and State , p.42.
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also created extra regulation but this bureaucracy generally benefited soldiers by going 
some way to ensure their barrack accommodation was of a reasonable standard. 
Barracks were the responsibility of the Barrack Department, which in 1812 consisted 
of three inspectors general; twelve assistant inspectors general and one hundred and 
fifty barrack masters (approximately one for each barrack, although some postings had 
two). Other personnel employed included varying numbers of artificers (for example 
six in 1806, none in 1812)402 . Barrack masters oversaw individual barracks and their 
role was to ensure the blocks were properly equipped, maintained and run in 
accordance with a bureaucratic system of regular returns, including monthly, four- 
monthly and six-monthly reports. 403
In barracks the rooms of officers were equipped almost solely as a place to 
sleep, containing few items other than those for bedding, washing and heating, a desk 
and a chair (with a variety of 'luxury' options, including rosewood inlays). Even these 
basics were not always available, however, as Judge Advocate Larpent complained 
that he lacked even a stool. 404 Captains were allocated individual rooms, while two 
subalterns or staff officers shared a single room. An inventory of the differing items in 
the rooms of officers and the other ranks, compiled from a list of requirements written 
in 1797, is shown in figure 12. It can be seen that one of the primary differences 
between the rooms of officers and other ranks was the provision of cooking 
implements, including a wide variety of pots and pans. Conspicuous by its absence 
from the list of officers' furniture is bedding, although other sources indicate its 
presence. The rooms of the other ranks were clearly intended for use by far greater 
numbers of men, and the rooms also contained lower-quality bedding materials - 
primarily straw and sacking.
4(i- Army List, 1806 to 1812 (London, War Office, 1806), passim.
403 See Letter from Barrak [sic] Master General to Barrak Masters (Barraks Office. 1797).
404 Larpent (ed). The Private Journal of FSLarpent, Vol. I (London, Richard Bentley. 1853). p.66.
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Fenders f Large Bowls f
iFire Irons [iron Pots ] Large Platters j
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Figure 12: An inventory of furniture and utensils in a barracks. c!797. 405
There was little variation between the barracks of the cavalry and infantry other than 
extra candles for the stables of the former.
Despite the increased number of barracks and the benefits that they brought, 
the success of the barrack-building programme in the period is easy to overestimate. 
The pace of construction was slowed by the outbreak of peace in 1802, during which 
period certain barracks were sold-off at public auctions, one example being the almost 
new 900 man barrack block near the Backwater at Weymouth.406 As a result, even as 
the Napoleonic Wars reached their final stages, there was less barrack accommodation 
available in Britain than required. This was demonstrated in the following letter, 
written in 1812 and concerning the militia billeted at Woolwich artillery barracks:
for tho' [sic] the number of our recruits in the country exceed the space we 
have left the space we have left for their accommodation... we are always 
more or less, but particularly at this time sending off drilled parties to fill 
deficiencies abroad. 407
Letter from Barrak [sic] Masrer General to Barrak Masters (Barraks Office. 1797), Appendix. 
  Salisbury Journal. 15th February 1802, p.2. 
407 Underlining in original. MacLeod to Mulgrave, Woolwhich, 17th February 1812, PRO W0?3/1369.
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In effect, there was only sufficient barracks space for the artillery while large numbers 
of its personnel were deployed abroad. The experience of the Royal Artillery at 
Woolwich suggests, therefore, that the success of the barrack-building programme in 
terms of accommodating troops may not have been due to an impressive rate of 
construction so much as extensive commitments on the continent and in the colonies.
Barracks were to play an increasingly important role in accommodating the 
army. It was apparent, however, that the needs of the force could not be met through 
the utilisation of barracks and civilian properties alone; in particular the army needed 
to expand its capability to house troops in the field. The solution was to make greater 
use of camping equipment. As demonstrated by the contract awarded to the uncle of 
John Trotter in 1775, the concept itself was not new, although its use to accommodate 
troops grew during the course of the Napoleonic Wars. The provision of camping 
equipment was theoretically the responsibility of the Quarter Master General's 
department, although as noted in the previous chapter some of its tasks were in 
practice conducted by the Commissariat.
Initially the provision of camping equipment was such that, according to 
Lieutenant Grattan, the only cover for many troops was 'the canopy of heaven'. 40S 
Sleeping in the open in this way could be particularly ruinous to health and Private 
Howell wrote of awaking one morning that 'we were up, an hour before day, and 
wrung out our blankets, emptied our shoes of the water, each man trembling like the 
leaf of a tree'. 409 The first (and on occasion only) line of defence for a soldier against 
the elements was his blanket. This could be used either conventionally or as part of a 
crude shelter, supported by muskets. The latter role was facilitated by the introduction 
of a reinforced ring in the corner of army blankets. 410 Not all soldiers, however,
tm Grattan, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, p.292.
40" Hibbert (ed),^ Soldier of the 71st, pp.7922.
410 L. C. Gurwood (ed), General Orders of the Duke of Wellington in the Campaigns of 1809-14
(London, Clowes and Son, 1837), p.35.
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enjoyed even this basic protection from the elements: until 1810 only half to three 
quarters of infantry serving in the Peninsula had been issued with these special 
blankets, and of those received many were lost or, as in the case of Private Wheeler's, 
illegally sold or traded by soldiers for food, alcohol or clothing. 411 In addition, the 
erection of the makeshift shelter was noted as being unpopular by Quarter Master 
Surtees because it provided little protection during cold nights. 412 A more substantial 
solution than the blanket shelter was the round tent, which was initially developed for 
use in Flanders but officially issued to all British forces from 18U.4U In practice many 
units received them much later than this or not at all, and Judge Advocate Larpent 
noted that there were sufficient tents available only if absentees, servants and sentries 
were discounted. 414
The procurement of tents, like other items, for the British army reflects an 
important factor in the relationship between the force and the state - the extent to 
which the state was willing to allocate resources to sustain the force. When 
considering the procurement activities of the army it is clear that Britain's economic 
and industrial capability was not fully exploited. This was because the machinery of 
the British state was created not to pander to the needs of the army but to contain its 
power. There is no evidence that there was a concerted policy to keep the army in 
check through deliberately failing to meet its needs. Rather it was a question of 
priority. The first hurdle confronting the army was the attitude of both the state and 
society towards the military and war, conflict being seen as disruptive to the economy. 
The proportion of output allocated to fighting the Napoleonic Wars, however, 
demonstrates a willingness on the part of the state to meet the challenge of war. The 
difficulty facing the army was thus not one of resources committed to the war in
411 Liddell - Hail (ed), Tlie Letters of Private Wheeler, p.70.
4U W. Surtees. Twenty Five Years in the Rifle Brigade (London, GreenhilL 1996), p. 189.
413 Bartlett, The Development of the British Army, p. 136.
414 Laipent (ed), We Private Journal of FSLarpent, Vol. 2, p.63.
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general, but the proportion of these resources that it would receive. Regarding this the 
force faced not only competition with the Royal Navy but also the armies of other 
countries. Therefore, the army did not necessarily receive a fare share of the resources 
allocated to the national war effort and it was often hampered in utilising those that it 
did receive by the policies of the state. The use of contractors, for example, was not 
always an efficient way to meet the needs of the force, while the need to comply with 
regulations was not neccesarily compatible with operational necessity. These 
regulations could be overridden when required but the rise of the professional 
administrator in the period, at the expense of less able but more military minded 
counterparts, ensured that administrative concerns would increasingly take precedence 
over military issues.
Regulation and bureaucracy were to have an increasing (and often detrimental) 
influence on the army but the force remained able to maintain a certain amount of 
autonomy in its structure if not its administration and prove able to adapt despite the 
limitations imposed on it due to the nature its relationship with the state. This is 
demonstrated in the following chapter, which is concerned with the Royal Wagon 
Train.
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Chapter 4 
Transport in the British Army415
Transport is a central but often overlooked part of logistics.416 One might 
assume that the British army was almost certain to possess a sound transport 
infrastructure due to the support of the state yet as in the case of manufacturing this 
support was neither total nor adequate. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars Britain lay 
between the end of the canal building boom and on the brink of railway mania, 
possessing national canal and road networks that were unrivalled. The significance of 
such advances for the army, however, was far less than that for industry and, as noted 
in the previous chapter, the resulting industrial and economic benefits of canals and 
roads could not be fully exploited by the army. The simple fact was that while 
operating in its home country the British army had internal lines of communication 
unlike any other force in Europe but, while this may have been a factor if an invasion 
had occurred, in the event had little significant impact in the main theatres of war. 
Roads and turnpikes may have enhanced the mobility of British forces travelling to 
and from ports of embarkation but this then depended on shipping schedules to be of 
value.
For the army, shipping was to be the most reliable aspect of Britain's transport 
infrastructure. Between 1808 and 1814 404 convoys sailed from Britain to the Iberian 
Peninsular, a total of 13,427 voyages in a system that proved secure from any 
action.417 British naval supremacy was such that its merchant ships no longer had to be 
designed with defensive armament in mind, allowing increases in cargo capacity and
415 Some of this research has been published. C. Chilcott, 'The Royal Wagon Train (notes and 
documents)', in JSAHR, volume 82, number 330, Summer 2004, pp. 175-177.
416 Creveld, Supplying War, p.l.
417 Hall, Wellington's Navy, p. 113.
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stowage capability.418 Such naval transport was not infallible, as demonstrated in 1808 
when delays relating to shipping impeded the embarkation of units bound for Spain 
and Portugal, but was nonetheless a significant factor in the successes of the army. 419 
The land-based infrastructure of Britain was too remote from the battlefields of 
Europe to influence the army's operational capability significantly, and its 
significance to the force even in Britain was limited by regulations. These regulations 
related to a concept that characterised the relationship between army and state in the 
period - that the force should cause as little inconvenience to the population as 
possible.
The goal of minimal inconvenience was to be achieved through several means. 
One of the most fundamental was that when arriving in a new area, troops were to 
present a warrant authorising their entry, which was then to be signed by a magistrate 
who would subsequently direct them along the quickest route to their next destination 
or billet. 420 The system ensured troops arriving in unfamiliar territory would receive 
the benefit of local knowledge, as well as minimising the time spent transiting an area 
and ensuring that military forces remained under the close supervision of the civil 
power, in this case magistrates. The weakness of the system was that it could only 
operate if the correct papers were presented. If this did not occur magistrates were 
able to refuse a force entry to their area, as was the case in June 1807 when a column 
of wagons carrying supplies for the artillery arrived unexpectedly at the Sussex town 
of Winchelsea. As he had not been informed of their pending arrival the local 
magistrate refused them passage and sent the column on a detour around the town, 
resulting hi a four hour delay.421 Such incidents were rare but highlighted the problems
418 Black, Sea Borne Empire, (London, YUP, 2004), p. 155.
419 Baird, to Castlereagh, Falmouth, 1 st October 1808, PRO WO 1/236, p.337.
420 Minutes of 2nd February 1808, WSRO B18/100/7, Salisbury Division, Justices Minute Books, 
January 1808 to January 1809.
421 Macleodto Crew, Woolwich, 17* June 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
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that could potentially occur when the army was required to co-operate with the local 
authorities.
The concept of minimal inconvenience further restricted the mobility of the 
army by limiting the manpower and vehicles that were available for general transport 
duties. Until 1795 the army had little integral transport capability of note and instead 
relied on civilian contractors. This practice had came to the fore in Europe during the 
Thirty Years War and has been defined as effectively marking the start of modern 
logistics.422 Yet it was a system with drawbacks and such contractors were not always 
reliable. This was illustrated by the case of James Maton, who was called before 
Wiltshire magistrates in November 1808 'for not attending with a wagon and five 
horses in the market place [of] Sarum to receive the arms, clothes and accoutrements 
of the 5 th Dragoon Guards and then convey the same to Stockbridge', despite being 
contracted to do so.423 Another feature of the employment of civilian drivers, and one 
not typical of British politics in the period, was a lack of regulation from central 
government regarding their employment. 424 Instead these contracts were administered 
at county level, and local magistrates were allowed to determine payments to be made 
based on mileage and transport supplied, hi October 1803, for example, it was agreed 
that contractors in Wiltshire would receive 1 s per mile for wagons, with an additional 
3d if towed by four horses or six oxen, while payments for carts were to be 9d per 
mile, with an additional 2d for four horses or oxen. 425 It is apparent, therefore, that due 
to their role as guides, allowing entry to convoys and establishing rates for 
contractors, magistrates fulfilled a vital role in military transport within Britain.
Considering the inefficiency of a transport system utilising only civilian 
drivers, the reluctance of the state to allow the army control of civilian property and a
422 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.35.
423 Minutes of meeting held at Fisherton Anger, 8 November 1808, WSRO B18/100/7.
424 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 102.
425 Salisbury Journal, 31 October 1803, p.l.
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growing tendency towards professionalism and specialisation in society in general, it 
is surprising that no dedicated corps dedicated to transport in the army existed until 
1795. Known as the Corps of Royal Waggoners, this formation soon proved 
inadequate and was disbanded.426 Subsequently, in 1799 the Royal Wagon Train was 
formed from a cadre of cavalry personnel to meet the transport requirements of the 
British army in the Netherlands.427 Like its predecessor, the Royal Wagon Train would 
prove incapable of carrying out its task and the Commissariat would be forced to rely 
upon civilian drivers to maintain the majority of the supply network. Despite its 
shortcomings, however, the train provided a professional core around which the 
transport network could operate, reflecting the increasing professionalism of the army 
in general during the period.
The employment of military drivers rather than civilians gave the Royal 
Wagon Train flexibility, as it was not hindered through operational constraints 
imposed by contracts. Military drivers could be called on to deliver supplies under 
fire, for example, and were thus more effectively utilised if assigned to such tasks, 
rather than transporting manure from barracks, a role, amongst others, for which 
civilian contractors continued to be employed. 428 The employment of military 
personnel as drivers also enabled the army to resolve difficulties more rapidly as its 
personnel could be subject to action far sooner than civilians could through the courts. 
Besides being able to use military discipline officers on occasion resorted to their own 
initiative to get convoys moving, as was the case when Major Dickson found six of 
his drivers drunk. He noted that 'previous to moving from Torquemada I ducked [in a 
water barrel] drivers Henderson, Mitchell, Ash, Farmer, O'Neal... and driver Doran
426 Even prior to its employment in Flanders senior British officers had expressed doubts about its 
effectiveness. P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p. 10.
427 The designation of this organization from 1799 to 1802 was the Royal Wagon Corps, but for clarity 
the later designation of Royal Wagon Train is adhered to in this work.
428 Singer to Boyes, Commissary General's office, 24 March 1806, PRO WO 63/45.
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was so completely inebriated that he was left behind'. 429 Inevitably there were 
difficulties involved in employing civilian or military drivers, but it is the 
consequences for the individuals involved that underline the value of the latter. 
Dickson was able to resort to instant (not to mention dramatic) measures to resolve his 
difficulties, while in the case of civilians such as James Maton (above) there were few 
sanctions beyond any penalty clauses, revoking the contract and a fine (in this case 
40s) imposed by a civilian court days or weeks after the event. 430 A footnote to 
Dickson's actions, and one that puts the issues into perspective, is that if he had 
ducked contractors he would have effectively been guilty of assault as British soldiers 
were bound by civil law even when carrying out their duty.431
Besides illustrating the benefits offered by the employment of military 
personnel, the Royal Wagon Train is important to a study concerned with the 
maintenance of the British army for a variety of reasons. One of the most fundamental 
is that it was an organization that played a significant role in logistics but a detailed 
study of the train also reveals much about the relationship between state and the army. 
The Royal Wagon Train perhaps reflects this relationship more than any other 
formation because it was a product of the contemporary state. The train had no real 
roots in an earlier period, unlike the Commissariat, which had slowly evolved, with 
each new development or practice, be it administrative, social, military or 
technological, being added to and eventually absorbed by the organization (as was to 
occur in many institutions in the period).432 Conversely the Royal Wagon Train was 
created at the end of the eighteenth century, when many of these developments had 
occurred or were underway and were incorporated into the organization from its 
conception. Thus the Royal Wagon Train warrants a detailed consideration, not only
429 Leslie, The Dickson Manuscripts, Vol. 4, p.712.
430 Minutes of meeting held at Fisherton Anger, 8 November 1808, WSRO B18/100/7.
431 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.48.
432 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.69.
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to reveal the relationship between the state and army but also to demonstrate a product 
of this system. In addition a study of the Royal Wagon Train will bring together issues 
previously raised in this study, particularly in regard to the reflexive or pragmatic 
policies that characterised the methods used to maintain the army.
The Royal Wagon Train performed a crucial role for the army but is one of the 
least studied units of the British army. The train is frequently overlooked in works by 
informed contemporaries such as Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, J. MacDonald and the 
anonymous writer of A Treatise on Military Finance, all of whom paid scant attention 
to the organization and its role in logistics. 433 The train was a relatively anonymous 
organization in the Napoleonic British army, a situation that has often worked to its 
advantage as criticism is deflected to the much more prominent Commissariat. This 
was apparent in Arthur Wellesley's letter of 16 August 1808, in which he informed 
Castlereagh that 'I have found the British Commissariat to be so ill composed as to be 
incapable of distributing even to the British troops the ample supplies which have 
been procured for them'. 434 Wellesley made no mention of the pathetically small, and 
totally inadequate detachment of the train then operating in the theatre.435 This was 
despite the fact that Wellesley was well aware of the limitations of the Royal Wagon 
Train, believing that no effective wagon train had existed in the British army until the 
absorption of the Irish Wagon Train.436
The operation of wagons in the army was not exclusive to the Royal Wagon 
Train and regiments held a limited number. These were utilised for duties including 
the distributing supplies from regimental depots, carrying wounded and administrative 
tasks. Commissaries accompanying units used a wagon for the carriage of ledgers,
433 See L. T. Wilson, An Enquiry into the state of the Forces of the British Empire (London, 1804); J. 
MacDonald, Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry in Actual Service (London, 1807); Anon, A 
Treatise on Military Finance.
434 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 16 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
435 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, August 1808, PRO WO 17/54/1, Wagon Train 1805 - 12.
436 Arthur Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
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while Paymasters often commandeered vehicles against regulations to ease the 
carriage of pay books.437 This latter practice frequently utilised wagons that were 
otherwise allocated for medical duties (an extreme example of bureaucracy interfering 
in military operations!) and prompted the Duke of Wellington to condemn the practice 
in a general order of 11 September 1809.438
The difference between the train and other wagon using organisations was not 
so much the ability to operate wagons but a capability to maintain them. Organisations 
such as the Quartermaster's Department and Commissariat hired civilians, on 
contracts of varying length, to maintain their wagons; the train employed its own 
specialist personnel.439 Personnel employed by the Royal Wagon Train on 
maintenance duties included blacksmiths, cotton weavers, wheelwrights, collar- 
makers and farriers. An interesting feature of administration in this period is that, 
while in many respects comprehensive, its lexicon could vary and these individuals 
were variously referred to using either the blanket term of artificers or identified by 
their speciality.440 The importance of such personnel was highlighted in a report of 
October 1811, which outlined the difficulties encountered when untrained personnel, 
specifically cavalry farriers, attempted to repair carts and wagons:
[they] are able to perform the smallest repair on the cart but in clumsiest 
manner, and are wholly ignorant how to refit it, in case of serious accident - 
the very repairs thus made by [them], from being so clumsily performed, prove 
a means of tearing to pieces and ultimately demolishing a cart... in the event 
of a wheel being broken, these carts remain totally unserviceable unless a 
wheel man can be obtained. 441
437 Standing orders, order number 2, NAM 6807/221, Books of Commissary General N. Jackson, 1814.
438 Gurwood (ed), General Orders of the Duke of Wellington, p.49. Logisiticians refer to the practice of 
improperly holding on to utilising resources in this way as 'hoarding', a practice that continues into the 
twenty-first century and remains a drain on resources in any combat zone. Schechter and Sander, 
Delivering the Goods, p.84.
439 Monthly returns of those employed in the Commissariat department under the control of assistant 
Commissary General George Grellier at Milazzo, NAM 7902/36.
440 See PRO WO 12/1522, Royal Wagon Train 1799 - 1801.
441 PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraphs 5 to 6.
134
It is necessary to appreciate that employing specialist personnel was not itself unusual 
as the cavalry employed farriers, but employing them to maintain wagons was. 
Furthermore those employed by the train covered a range of trades.
An additional specialist appointment, although not one unique to the Royal 
Wagon Train, was the post of Veterinary Surgeon (who was, in theory, also assigned a 
deputy). Interestingly, the train went for three years (1803 - 1806) without a 
veterinary surgeon and the deputy filled the role, although this occurred during a 
relatively quiet period for the army and does not appear to have unduly affected the 
operational capabilities of the organization.442 Finally, the skills of the drivers 
themselves should not be underestimated. The report of October 1811 stated that 'no 
wheeled carriage can be securely drawn over an [sic] hilly country for even one 
march, especially when drawn by horses little accustomed to draught, and under the 
charge of men wholly ignorant of governing horses'.443
The specialisation of the Royal Wagon Train was significant as it 
demonstrated the future of military logistics and maintenance. The organization would 
evolve throughout the nineteenth century, leading to the formation of the Army 
Service Corps in 1889, and the Royal Army Service Corps (R.A.S.C.) in 1918.444 As a 
predecessor of the R.A.S.C., the Royal Wagon Train must thus be considered as 
representing the British army at its most progressive. It is incorrect to view the Royal 
Wagon Train as merely an ancestor of the R.A.S.C., in the way in which, for example, 
the guards regiments raised during the Restoration were forerunners of modern 
formations bearing the same name. 445 The concepts that lay at the heart of the Royal 
Wagon Train - specialist military personnel and the concentration of assets (in this
PRO WO 17/54/1, Monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train.
PRO WO 37/10/26, paragraph 9.
J. Sutton (ed), Wait for the Wagon (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1998), pp.33-37; R.H. Beadon, The 
Royal Army Service Corp, (Cambridge, CUP, 1931), passim. 
445 Childs, The Army of Charles II, p.233.
442
443
444
135
case transportation) - represented a new way of maintaining the army and ultimately 
waging war.
The employment of specialists also reflected the trend towards professionalism 
that was occurring in both the army and society. While that of society increasingly 
relied on education through the use of examinations, however, the army was adopting 
both an academic approach and one emphasising practical skills.446 The latter is 
important as it demonstrates that the army was starting to appreciate the importance of 
experience, a crucial step towards undermining the worst aspects of the purchase 
system. This is apparent when it is considered that in the period increasing numbers of 
officers were indeed promoted based on this principle, rather than through purchase, 
patronage or other privileges. 447
Despite the fact that the concept of the Royal Wagon Train was progressive, 
its structure reveals origins rooted in contemporary military thinking. At the heart of 
train's organization lay the troops, which approximately equated to companies or 
squadrons in the regiments of the combat arms, and reflected the fact that the 
organization shared many of its administrative practices with the cavalry. The number 
and composition of these troops were not constant, as shown in figure 13. The number 
of troops on the strength of the train fluctuated due to a variety of factors. These 
include the absorption of the Irish Wagon Train following the Act of Union (reflected 
by the increase from three troops in September 1799 to eight by 1801); the reductions 
in defence expenditure caused by the Peace of Amiens; the restructuring of the troops 
in 1804; the invasion scare of 1805 which promoted an increase in Britain's military 
readiness; the peak of the organization's efficiency in 1813-14; and the dispersal of
446 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 88.
447 P. J. Haythomthwaite, 'The British Army, Wellington and Moore: Some Aspects of Service in the 
Peninsular War' in P. Griffiths (ed) A History of the Peninsular War Vol. IX: Modern Studies of the 
War in Spain and Portugal 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999) pp.90-100. For a wider 
consideration of purchase and its demise see also A. Bruce, The Purchase System in the British Army 
1660 -1871 (London, RHS, 1980), passim.
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the force in 1814 - 15 to maintain forces in Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Hanover. Figure 13, therefore, reveals how decisions made at state level could 
directly influence the composition and thus capabilities of an organization such as the 
Royal Wagon Tram.
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Figure 13: Active Troops in the Royal Wagon Train 1799 - 1817.***
Upon its formation in 1799 the train was based at Canterbury and consisted of six 
troops. Officially, no 1 st Troop existed and its place in the returns of the Royal Wagon 
Train was filled by a list of staff appointments, hi August 1799 this consisted 
primarily of the regiment's commanding officer, Colonel Digby Hamilton (who would 
remain in command of the regiment for the duration of the war), Surgeon John Oxley, 
Assistant Surgeon John Geddes, Veterinary Surgeon John Burke and Pay Master 
William Pettigrew. The remaining troops were numbered two to six although they 
were sometimes identified by the name of their commanding officer, a practice that 
had been discontinued in the combat arms during the early eighteenth century. That 
this practice occurred in the Royal Wagon Train is intriguing as it was a new
448 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay lists, PRO WO 12/1522 to WO 12/1526, Royal Wagon Train 1799 
-1809.
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formation in the British army, with no real roots in an earlier period (although it could 
claim some cavalry heritage). Only three of the six troops (3 rd, 4th and 5th) conformed 
to a normal structure, the second was in the process of forming, while the 1 st and 6th 
each had a special function and organization. Of note is that, while the structure of the 
Royal Wagon Train was, due to its role, unconventional it remained a recognizable 
part of the British army. Commanded by a colonel, and with each troop commanded 
by a major or captain, in terms of organization it was effectively a six-company 
regiment. For comparison purposes, infantry regiments had ten companies and cavalry 
had ten troops.
The 2nd Troop was building up its strength during 1799 and contained only a 
small cadre of essential personnel. Consequentially it had no wagons on strength but 
had a headquarters that consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, a comet and a 
quartermaster, all of whom were unpaid until the troop became active. The 6th Troop 
contained personnel categorised as reduced troops and was principally a reserve of 
manpower. The 3 rd, 4th and 5th troops followed a standard model and were commanded 
by either a major (the 3 rd) or captain (the 4th and 5 th). The officers commanding each 
troop of the train in August 1799 are illustrated in figure 14:
Commanding Officer, Royal Wagon Train Colonel Hamilton
2nd Troop Captain J. W. Whittle
3rd Troop Major W. Langley
4th Troop Captain Steele
5th Troop Captain Cunningham
6th Troop Lieutenant Wishens
Figure 14: Troop commanders of the Royal Wagon Train, August 1799. 449
Other personnel in each troop typically consisted of two lieutenants, three sergeants, 
two corporals, three artificers and 55 privates. Occasionally a trumpeter may have
449 PRO WO 12/1522.
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been present in a troop although this was an exception rather than the rule. The 
artificers included a mixture of wheelwrights, farriers, blacksmiths and collar- 
makers. 450
This was the organization of the Royal Wagon Train that went to war in the 
Netherlands. The logistical services were singled out for harsh criticism after this war 
but the performance of the army in general was unsatisfactory, it being in this 
campaign that Wellington famously learned 'what one ought not to do' in war.451 
Following the campaign in Flanders the train avoided the fate of its predecessor and 
instead of disbanding was restructured. By June 1800 the headquarters formation, 
renamed the Commandant's Troop, was brought up to the strength of a troop, a 
process that had began the previous December with the addition of four non- 
commissioned officers. The following personnel were employed in the troop at this 
time: Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, Adjutant Walford, Surgeon Oxley, Assistant 
Surgeon Geddes, Veterinary Surgeon Burke, Paymaster Pettigrew, four sergeants, 
three corporals, two artificers and forty-five privates. 452 The Commandant's troop 
would remain active until April 1804, when it was again removed from the list of 
troops. The troop was reduced to a command formation and consisted of the following 
officers: Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel Langley, Adjutant Purvis, Surgeon 
Oxley, Veterinary Surgeon Baker and Paymaster Pettigrew. Of note is that the 
regiment was still commanded by Digby Hamilton but he had now been promoted to a 
full colonel, while a new officer, Lieutenant Colonel Langley, had arrived to fill the 
vacancy created by Hamilton's promotion. The newly awarded colonelcy, therefore, 
was not merely a sop to the vanity of the Royal Wagon Train's commanding officer,
but a reflection of the train's increasing status and importance to the army. 453 The
450 Ibid.
451 C. Hibbert, Wellington: A Personnel History (London, Harper Collins, 1997), p. 14.
452 PRO WO 12/1522.
453 Royal wagon train monthly pay list, April 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
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addition of a lieutenant colonel was also to prove of considerable value operationally 
and ensured that a senior officer was available to remain with the units of the Royal 
Wagon Train that were deployed to Spain and Portugal. 454
By 1800 the Royal Wagon Train had expanded to five full troops and one of 
reduced personnel. Its manpower and capabilities were further increased by the 
absorption of the Irish Wagon Train as a result of the 1801 Act of Union. The 
consequences of this are noteworthy for two primary reasons. The first is that it was 
the only major logistical organization of the Dish army to be fully absorbed into the 
British army immediately after the union, unlike the Irish Commissariat and barracks 
departments, both of which retained a degree of independence until 1822 (although in 
practice the Commissariat was unified). 455 The second fact of note is that the 
absorption of the Irish Wagon Train resulted in a seemingly dramatic increase in the 
manpower of the train, and the number of active troops more than doubled from three 
to eight. Arthur Wellesley noted the importance of Irish wagons in a letter to 
Castlereagh as late as 1808, while historians such as Jac Weller and A.E.C. Bredin 
have highlighted the significant role played by the personnel transferred to the Royal 
Wagon Train following the act the Act of Union. 456 It is apparent that the Royal 
Wagon Train may only have become effective because of the absorption of the Irish 
train.
As noted in the previous chapter the state proved unable to meet fully the 
demands of the army regarding procurement and so its capability to support the Royal 
Wagon Train should also be considered. Put another way, did the Royal Wagon Train 
achieve what it was later to do because of the absorption of the Irish train or the
454 PRO WO 17/54/2, Return of the Royal Wagon Train in Spain and Portugal, March 1810.
455 R. B. McDowell, Irish Administration 1801 - 1914 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp!6-
19.
456Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8* August 1808, Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General Orders, p.204;
Weller, Wellington in the Peninsula, p.29; A. E. C. Bredin, History of the Irish Soldier (Belfast,
Century Books, 1987),p.234.
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support of the state? While the number of personnel involved was considerable, 
approximately 300, the long-term significance of the absorption of the Irish Wagon 
Train may be overestimated. Not least is the fact that by 1803 the personnel of the 
Royal Wagon Train had been drastically cut back and in effect a new force, based on a 
cadre of former personnel, was raised to support the army in the Peninsular War. The 
importance attached to the Irish train has no doubt arose in part from the timing of its 
absorption - between the failure of the Royal Wagon Train in Flanders and its success 
(or rather improved performance) in the Peninsular War. Based on this it would 
appear that the Irish train had indeed been a catalyst for the success of the train in the 
Peninsula but other factors should also be considered. In particular the Royal Wagon 
Train had been in its infancy in 1799 and had gone to war below strength and in the 
process of forming. It will also become apparent that by 1808 the lessons of the first 
campaign had been learned and that the organisation, structure and composition of the 
train were significantly modified in the based on this. Crucially the organization 
would also receive more resources, a factor that can be attributed solely to the 
economic strength of the British state.
On 1 July 1802 the Wagon Train was organised as follows: commanding 
officer Colonel Digby Hamilton, the 1 st Troop under Major William Langley, the 2nd 
Troop under Captain A. Robuy, the 3 rd Troop under Captain Charles Tudor, the 4th 
Troop under Captain William Horton, the 5th Troop under Captain Thomas Shields, 
and the 6th Troop, which had no permanent commander assigned. The typical strength 
of the troops numbered 1 through to 5 was as follows: one captain (a major in the 1 st 
troop), one lieutenant, one comet, one quartermaster, three sergeants, three corporals, 
one trumpeter, one wheelwright, one collar maker, one blacksmith, two farriers and 
forty-nine privates.457
457 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, July 1802, PRO WO 17/53/2.
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The Wagon Train was to remain based at Canterbury until 1803, when its 
headquarters were moved to Croydon Barracks.458 The 1802 Peace of Amiens was to 
cause a dramatic reduction in the personnel employed in the Royal Wagon Train, 
which was reduced to four troops, each with an average strength of 65 non- 
commissioned officers, privates and artificers. The command structure of the Royal 
Wagon Train in the aftermath of this restructuring, is illustrated in figure 15:
Troop Commanding Officer
Commandant's Troop Colonel Digby Hamilton
2nd Troop Captain Tudor
3'd Troop Captain Hart
4th Troop Captain Aird
Figure 15: The structure of the Royal Wagon Train after the Peace of Amiens.459
Following the resumption of hostilities in 1803 the number of active troops was 
increased from four to the pre-1802 strength of eight. This was later increased to 
twelve in consequence of a modification to the structure of the Royal Wagon Train, 
specifically the introduction in 1804 of Depot Troops.
The formation of Depot Troops was an indication of the flexibility of the 
Royal Wagon Train, a trait that could rarely be attributed to other formations in the 
British army of the period. The Depot Troops not only represented a reallocation of 
resources but a new approach to a situation, demonstrating the organization was 
capable of adapting its structure to meet new challenges. The creation of the Depot 
Troops allowed the Royal Wagon Train to deploy smaller, self-contained troops to 
support units and garrisons, rather than the system of detachments that had 
characterised the earlier deployments. This was significant as it maintained the 
integrity of formations, a practice perceived to be vital for both morale and 
efficiency.460 ___
458 See monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train, PRO WO 17/53/2.
459 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, July 1803, PRO WO 12/1522.
460 Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, p. 143.
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The Depot Troops first formed as cadres in December 1803 and, while starting 
as under strength formations, they were soon to expand. This ability to expand (and 
contract) was a notable feature of the Royal Wagon Train and demonstrated that it 
could benefit from and utilise additional resources more rapidly than other 
organizations. Clearly there is a question of scale as it was easier to raise the 
manpower required for a troop for train consisting of approximately 60 personnel 
rather than a 100 strong infantry company, yet taking into account the equipment and 
animals required this was still a considerable achievement and one that gave the 
formation flexibility.
While the organization was relatively flexible, it is necessary to appreciate that 
any significant expansion of the Royal Wagon Train (one that involved the creation of 
new troops) would take time and could not necessarily occur as an immediate 
response to a crisis. The processes involved in the forming of new troops were 
demonstrated by the raising of the Depot Troops in 1803. In December of that year 
there existed four such troops, all of which were assigned a skeleton staff, as shown in 
figure 16:
1 s' Depot Troop Captain Turner, one Quarter Master, one sergeant and three 
corporals.
2nd Depot Troop Captain Green, one Quarter Master and two corporals.
3 rd Depot Troop Captain Ewing, one Quarter Master and two corporals.
4th Depot Troop Captain Ravenscroft, one Quarter Master and two corporals
Figure 16: The Depot Troops of the Royal Wagon Train, December 1803.46 '
hi the months of January to March 1804 the process of enlarging the troops began but 
they remained well below operational strength (as shown in figure 17). Even the full 
complement of trumpeters (one per troop) was not attained until March.
461 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, December 1803, PRO WO 12/1523.
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1 sl Troop
2nd Troop
3 td Troop
4th Troop
Officers
4
4
3
4
Non-commissioned Officers
5
5
6
4
Other Ranks
9
8
7
9
Figure 17: The Depot Troops of the Royal Wagon Train, March 1804.462
In addition to the above personnel there were eleven artificers shared between the 
troops. The 1 st to 3 rd Depot Troops each had a blacksmith, collar maker and 
wheelwright on strength, the 4th Depot Troop having only a blacksmith and 
wheelwright. The three artificers were temporarily removed from the 1 st Depot Troop 
in March 1804 but returned the following month.463 hi the subsequent twelve months 
the Depot Troops slowly increased their strength and Captain Green's troop was 
included in the returns as a regular troop, while Captain Turner's troop was 
approaching full strength. The number of privates in the 3 rd and 4th Depot Troops 
languished at seventeen and eighteen respectively, although it is interesting to note 
that all four troops maintained a complement of four artificers.464
The employment of full complements of artificers and officers (both 
commissioned and non-commissioned) in otherwise under strength troops was 
important as it enabled them to form the core around which a new active troop could 
be raised. This reflected forward planning in the organization and structure of the 
Royal Wagon Train, a feature that set it apart not only from the Commissariat but also 
eighteenth-century administrative practices in general. The Commissariat utilised a
462 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, March 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
463 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay lists, April to March 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
464 Ibid.
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reflexive policy and this in many ways was a characteristic of the British way of 
waging war in the period, as demonstrated by the raising of credit to finance conflict 
rather than maintaining a large cash reserve. 465 Pragmatism in this field had existed in 
the financing of war since the seventeenth century, with annual budgets tending to be 
set according to the tempo of current, rather than anticipated, operations. 466
Another factor that increased the flexibility of the train was the addition in 
1804 of a Lieutenant Colonel. 467 This was to prove vital because, in response to the 
Peninsular War, the organization would effectively be split into two - the Royal 
Wagon Train at Croydon and the Royal Wagon Train in the Peninsula. 468 This 
administrative division was significant and set a precedent for the future overseas 
deployments of the organization. Despite being split between Britain and Flanders 
during the campaigns of 1793 to 1799, the train had functioned as an administrative 
whole: there was one headquarters (at Canterbury) that collated the returns of all the 
troops. This practice continued when the detachments of the Royal Wagon Train first 
arrived in Spain and Portugal during the course of 1808 and the returns of the relevant 
units were listed as footnotes in returns of total strength. By 1809, however, the force 
had grown from a number of detachments to complete troops and returns for the 
Royal Wagon Train in the Iberian Peninsula were collated by a headquarters 
established at Lisbon. This practice continued and the Royal Wagon Train would 
eventually be administered through what amounted to theatre commands, even though 
the forces concerned continued to be referred to as detachments. The most important 
overseas detachments of the organization in the period were located in the Peninsula, 
France (including the army of occupation) and Hanover.
465 Speck, 'Conflict in Society', p. 142.
466 Carter, 'The Revolution and the Constitution', pp.41, 47.
467 Royal wagon train monthly pay list, April 1804, PRO WO 12/1524.
468 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, September 1809, PRO WO 17/54/2.
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Initially the deployment to the Peninsula was regarded as only a minor one, so 
the officers assigned were listed as a footnote at the bottom of the main return. This 
deployment included only two troops, each led by a captain, lieutenant and two 
sergeants in April 1809. 469 The force despatched soon proved inadequate for the task 
and in 1808 Arthur Wellesley complained to Castlereagh that he was forced to leave 
behind heavy equipment at the beach after landing.470 Wellesley also noted that the 
inadequate provision of transport was worsened due to the poor Spanish logistical 
system.471 The situation had arisen as a direct result of British policy because initially 
the force despatched to the Peninsula was seen as only expeditionary in nature and 
upgraded to 'the theatre of Spain, Portugal and the Mediterranean' only in 1809. The 
initial reluctance to commit Britain fully to the Peninsula venture can be attributed to 
a variety of factors. Charles Esdaile cites instability in British domestic politics as the 
major reason although involvement in the Peninsular War would also have conflicted 
with what John Brewer states to have been an element central to British attitudes 
towards war and foreign policy, specifically a reluctance to become embroiled in 
prolonged military operations on the continent. 472 In the event it seems that Esdaile's 
theory was correct as the initial objections were soon overcome and the British 
commitment to the Peninsula accelerated, a situation that would not have arisen if 
such a campaign had indeed conflicted with ideas fundamental to the British state.
The increase in the status of the force operating in Spain and Portugal that 
occurred during 1809 was reflected in the introduction of separate returns for the 
troops of the Royal Wagon Train deployed to the Iberian Peninsula in this period.473 It 
was an example, however, of how bureaucracy and terminology could have little
469 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1809, PRO WO 17/54/2.
470 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8* August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
471 Wellesley to Marquis Welleley KP, 30* October 1809, Gurwood (ed.), Despatches and General
Orders, p.308.
472 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, pp.87-91; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.178.
473 Orders for June and August, PRO Tl/1061.
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bearing on the actual situation, and it was not until March 1810 that the Royal Wagon 
Train deployed a significant amount of manpower to the theatre: of the organization's 
nine troops, five were deployed to the Iberian Peninsula. The manpower of the force 
in that theatre consisted of the following: one colonel, one major, three captains, seven 
lieutenants, four cornets, one paymaster, one adjutant, one assistant surgeon, two 
quartermasters, six sergeant majors, twenty sergeants, four trumpeters and 293 rank 
and file. The presence of only four troop commanders (one major and three captains) 
indicates that one troop of reduced personnel operated in the Peninsula. Of the troops, 
four were based at Leira and one at Rio Mayor, while a small detachment was 
deployed to Belem. The number of officers was subject to some fluctuation and both 
Colonel Hamilton and Major Tudor, among others, were in the theatre for varying 
periods of time.
In September 1810 the 'Detachment of the Royal Wagon Train in Spain and 
Portugal', as the force became known, reached the peak at which it was to remain 
until 1814. Its principal officers were Lieutenant Colonel W. Langley, Quartermaster 
C. Carter, Quartermaster W. Newman, Adjutant J. Backer, Assistant Surgeon T. Noye, 
Paymaster J. Harrison, Major T. Aird, Captain F. Bloeme, Captain B. Jaimy, Captain 
G. Lenon, Captain S. Watson and Captain J. Whittle. Of note is the presence of the 
two quartermasters with the organization in the Peninsula, as typically only one such 
officer had been on the strength of the Royal Wagon Train in Britain. The presence of 
two with the organization in the Peninsula is perhaps indicative of that detachment's 
greater mobility and dispersal across the theatre.474 Additionally, this force provided 
the core of the 'Detachment Royal Wagon Train in France' that served in that country
during 1814, where it was then commanded by Major Aird.475 That the strength of the
474 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, Leira, March 1810, PRO WO 12/1527, Royal Wagon Train
1810- 11.
475 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, France, April 1814, PRO WO 12/1529, Royal Wagon Train
1814-15.
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Royal Wagon Train in Spain and Portugal effectively peaked in 1810 should not be 
taken as evidence that optimum capability had been reached. Transport shortages 
continued, demonstrating that like other military organizations the Royal Wagon Train 
did not benefit from the full extent of the state's capabilities even when operating in a 
major theatre of war.476
By necessity the elements of the Royal Wagon Train based in Britain were 
seen as being of secondary importance to the force deployed in the Peninsula, and 
their capability reflected this. The Royal Wagon Train in Britain during this period 
was split between depots in Hythe, Canterbury, the Isle of White and Portsmouth. 
This deployment is interesting as none was based at Croydon, which remained the 
headquarters, demonstrating a split had occurred between operations and 
administration. By this stage of the conflict the majority of the organization's 
formations operating in Britain were Depot Troops, as opposed to the better-equipped 
and more mobile marching troops deployed to the Peninsula. 477 Manpower present in 
Britain consisted of one colonel, three captains, six lieutenants, three cornets, one 
paymaster, one veterinary surgeon, one adjutant, one assistant surgeon, one 
quartermaster, twenty-one sergeants, three trumpeters and 186 rank and file. As in 
Spain, the number of captains (three) and the lack of a major indicates that one of the 
four troops was a battalion of reduced personnel.478 Thus, taking into consideration the 
number of Depot Troops deployed in Britain, it is apparent that the force deployed to 
Spain and Portugal represented the cream of the organization in terms of both quantity 
and quality. In March 1810 the organization was effectively at full stretch, with its 
marn operational elements serving in the Iberian Peninsula and only a reserve existing
476 For a consideration of transport capabilities in the later phases of the Peninsular War, see Weller, 
Wellington in the Peninsula, passim.
477 Return of officers, non-commissioned officers, men and horses detached from headquarters of the 
Royal Wagon Train, Croydon, March 1810, PRO WO 17/54/1.
478 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, Croydon, March 1810, PRO WO 17/54/2.
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in Britain. If necessary the Depot Troops could have formed a core around which 
additional troops could be raised in an emergency, but not without weakening the 
units deployed at home. This is significant because it must be borne in mind that the 
Royal Wagon Train based in Britain, while maintaining a similar number of troops, 
was actually weaker than during the peace of Amiens when it had been drastically 
reduced (a strength of approximately 200 in 1810 compared to 250 in 1802).
There were several differences between the Royal Wagon Train as it deployed 
to Spain in 1809 and the Netherlands in 1799. By the time of the Peninsular War 
command and control in the train had improved dramatically and reflected trends 
elsewhere in the army due to the addition of an extra sergeant, sergeant major and 
lieutenant to each troop, while trumpeters were also more common.479 The 
introduction of such personnel related not only to discipline, however, but also 
reflected changes intended to improve the attractiveness of the army as a career 
through increasing opportunity for promotion.480 More significant for improving the 
operational capability of the Royal Wagon Train than the introduction of additional 
personnel was a slight increase in the number of wagons available in each troop 
(rising from 27 to 30). Besides a marginal increase in strength the Royal Wagon Train 
also benefited from improvements to transport technology in the period. This was an 
indirect consequence of the agricultural and industrial revolutions and arose due to 
improvements in agricultural practices.481 The three types of wagon employed by the 
train during the Napoleonic Wars were designated as bread, sprung and forage wagons 
respectively. The regulation number of wagons per troop in April 1805 is shown in 
figure 18. Of note is the smaller number of wagons employed by the Depot Troops.
479 The addition of non-commissioned and lower ranked commissioned officers being an important 
reform of the British army operationally. Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle, p.55.
480 Bartlett, The Development of the British Army, p. 137; Haythomthwaite, 'The British Army, 
Wellington and Moore', p.91.
481 John, 'Farming in Wartime, 1793 to 1815', p.35; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.183.
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Type of Wagon:
Bread______Sprung______Forage 
Depot troops 15 3 
Marching troops 21 3 6
Figure 18: Wagon allocation by type in 1805. 482
By December 1812 wagons consisted almost entirely of the superior sprung type, with 
only four bread wagons and none of the forage type being on the strength of the train 
in either Spain or Britain.483 This demonstrates that the expansion of the Royal Wagon 
Train in the period occurred in conjunction with a corresponding upgrading of 
equipment. Thus improvements to the organization were both qualitative and 
quantitative, meaning that its capabilities increased further than the growing number 
of troops alone would suggest. This progressive upgrading of equipment was unusual 
in the army as for most of the period the technology remained relatively static, 
particularly regarding firearms, and even uniform, other than headwear, changed little. 
The existence of superior technology, and an ability to upgrade its assets 
correspondingly, was a direct benefit of the financial power of the British state 
enjoyed by the Royal Wagon Train and enabled the small organization to maintain a 
capability unmatched by continental counterparts. 484
The increase in the number of wagons brought with it greater demand for 
draught animals. Traditionally these had been horses and such was the Royal Wagon 
Train's reliance on this animal that its administration shared much in common with 
the cavalry. This was to have surprising implications for the bureaucracy of the 
organization because, despite increasing professionalism and standardisation in 
bureaucratic practices in the period, the Royal Wagon Train was forced to adopt a
482 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1805, PRO WO 17/54/1.
483 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, December 1812, PRO WO 17/54/2.
484 Haythomthwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, pp. 109-110, 199-209.
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relatively inefficient administrative system. 485 Ironically, while the operational 
capability of the Royal Wagon Train in the field was characterised by specialisation, 
the converse was true of its administration. An important consequence of the 
administrative revolution had been the increasing use of specialised stationery for 
administrative purposes, such as pre-printed forms designed for specific purposes. 
Despite its unusual role and composition, however, the Royal Wagon Train possessed 
little pro-forma designed specifically for the organisations and instead relied upon 
documentation intended for use by the cavalry. The impact of the failure to give the 
Royal Wagon Train its own pro-forma was only minor, creating headaches for 
administrators rather than full-blown administrative problems. Yet the situation is 
worthy of consideration as it highlights an often under considered aspect of 
maintaining the army in the period: paperwork, the tool of a bureaucratic system.
The administrative practices of organisations followed a standard pattern, with 
slight variations in the format of paper work. The pre-printed forms upon which the 
organization supplied returns to Horse Guards were the same as those used by the 
cavalry, often being titled 'for the Regiments of Cavalry at Home', while its returns 
were sometimes grouped with those of cavalry regiments (such as returns of the 15 th to 
25* Dragoons, Brunswick Hussars and Wagon Train in 1814). 486 A similar situation 
existed regarding pre-printed forms submitted to the paymaster. An example of such a 
form is the affidavit signed by the paymaster, sworn before a local justice of the peace 
and witnessed by the adjutant and commanding officer of the regiment in accordance 
with standard army practice:
I _______________^_ do swear, that on ____ of ______ I 
mustered His Majesty's ___________________ Regiment of 
_________
__ at which time I saw such Commissioned Officers, Non 
Commissioned Officers and Private Men, as are borne on the foregoing Muster Roll
485 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, The Army of Charles H, pp.77-81.
486 For examples, see monthly pay lists of the Royal Wagon Train, PRO WO 17/53/1 and WO 17/53/2.
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and Paylist (sic), excepting those for whom Certificates signed by the Commanding 
Officer and Adjutant of the said Regiment as given above, specifying the respective 
Reasons for their Absence, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the same are 
the true and the actual reasons thereof.
I likewise saw_________________ Troop Horses, and believe the 
Number stated and certified as absent to be just, and their absence truly accounted for.
I do further swear, that all the sums set down in the said Roll, have been paid 
by me to the respective persons, and for the respective persons, and for the respective 
services therein specified, in strict conformity to the King's regulations. 487
It is immediately apparent that the form is designed to record the pay of a regiment, 
not an organization such as the Royal Wagon Train. This is also of note as it is 
indicative of the Royal Wagon Train's status relative to other units, the organization 
being seen as the equivalent of a regimental formation. The fact that it had no 
regimental number would, however, place it at the bottom of the British army's list of 
regimental seniority (it was designated as being one of the 'Miscellaneous Regiments' 
and placed between the West Indies regiments and the overseas garrison battalions).488 
Secondly, although not so apparent, is the reference to troop horses. This was intended 
for cavalry regiments but served the Royal Wagon Train just as well.
Two other forms were also submitted with the paymaster's affidavit, a 
certificate from the commanding officer of the regiment and a similar document from 
the adjutant, both confirming the authenticity of the paymaster's statements:
I do hereby Certify, upon my Word and Honour, as an Officer and a 
Gentleman, that I have carefully examined the particulars of the foregoing Muster 
Roll and Accounts of Sums paid by the Pay Master within the period commencing the 
25th of ________ and ending the 24th of _______ following, and that to the 
best of my Knowledge, Information and Belief, I find, and declare them to be truly 
and justly stated, as to Names, Returns, Times and Payments.
I do further certify in like manner, that to the best of my Knowledge, 
Information and Belief, all those, who were not present, have the true Reasons of their 
Absence assigned against their names on the said Muster roll.
Commanding Officer
of the ________. Regiment
487 Affidavit of Regimental Paymaster Pettigrew, April 1800, PRO WO 12/1522.
488 War Office, Army List, (London, 1814), table of contents.
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At first glance there is little to suggest that the intended user of the certificate 
was not the Royal Wagon Train. The location intended for the signature of the 
commanding officer, however, betrays the document as being intended for the fighting 
regiments of the army, hi the case of a cavalry regiment, for example, this was 
intended to read:
Commanding Officer
of the _J6'h Regiment
of Light Dragoons.
For the Royal Wagon Train, however, this section of the form was amended by hand, 
with the appropriate wording crossed out or added, to read (italics indicating added 
text):
Commanding Officer
of the Regiment-
of- : - the Royal Wagon Train.
The forms used by the army were supplied from a variety of sources. Government 
printers working on behalf of His Majesty's Stationery Office provided those intended 
for the summaries of the organization's strength that were returned to Whitehall. 
These included printers T. Egerton of the Military Library Whitehall, Teape of Tower 
Hill, London, and W. Cloves of Northumberland Court, The Strand. Local suppliers 
such as J. Simms of Canterbury typically supplied the forms upon which more 
detailed returns were recorded. An example of such a form is the 'Return of the
489 Certificate of Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Digby Hamilton, April 1802, PRO WO
12/1523.
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Officers, Non Commissioned Officers, men, horses and wagons detached from the 
Headquarters of the Royal Wagon train', printed at Canterbury in 1803.490
It is interesting to note that a solitary contractor did not supply stationery, and 
that contracts were negotiated at both national and local level. This did not prevent the 
pre-printed paper work used by the army from following a standard format, an 
important characteristic of administration hi the period.491 Due to their widespread use 
these forms were printed in large quantities and as a result could be found in 
circulation years later. The strength of the Royal Wagon Train in Britain in December 
1812, for example, was returned on a form printed on 6 February 1809.492 Although 
there was a large reserve of forms, those available were sometimes available in 
insufficient quantities to satisfy the administrative requirements of the organization. In 
the returns for the Royal Wagon Train in France March 1814 two privates were 
recorded per line instead of one due to a shortage of forms, while no pre-printed form 
was available for Paymaster Pettigrew in April 1813, therefore his affidavit was 
written by hand. 493 Manpower, uniforms, food and stationery - the state failed to 
provide them all in sufficient quantities.
The format used by the army for recording returns changed during the period. 
Until the summer of 1807 returns had been recorded on individual forms each month, 
army months being from the 'period commencing the 25 th of [the month] and ending 
the 24th of following'.494 Under the new system, instead of returns being recorded on a 
different form each month, they were to be listed by quarter and the relevant part of 
the quarter (1 st, 2nd or 3 rd). 495 To illustrate this change consider the period of 25
490 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1803, PRO WO 17/53/2.
491 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.67; Childs, The Army of Charles II, pp.222-225.
492 Monthly return of the Royal Wagon Train, December 1812, PRO WO 17/54/2.
493 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, France, March 1814, PRO WO 12/1529; Affidavit of 
Regimental Paymaster Pettigrew, April 1800, PRO WO 12/1528, Royal Wagon Train 1812 - 13.
494 Certificate of Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Digby Hamilton, April 1802, PRO WO 
12/1523.
495 Detailed instructions to Commissariat accountants, cash accounts, NAM 6807/221, pp. 1-3.
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December to 24 of March in a given year. Under the original system a unit's strength 
for the period would have been recorded on three separate returns: 25 December to 24 
January, 25 January to 24 February and 25 February to 24 March. When a new 
system, based on quarterly returns, was adopted the strength of the unit was returned 
on the same sheet, with columns for the 1 st , 2nd and 3 rd periods (25th December to 24 
January, 25 January to 24 February and 25 February to 24 March).496 Although 
perhaps only a minor modification to administration it did have some implications, 
especially for the Royal Wagon Train, as the forms were more compact and had 
marginally less space. The same categories existed on the forms (such as columns for 
sergeants, corporals, privates) but the Royal Wagon Train had traditionally inserted a 
section for artificers at the top of the return for privates, and modified the 
accompanying numbering system accordingly (each row on forms used for returns 
being numbered to ease the task of calculating strength. These numbers commenced 
from 1 at the start of each section. The column concerning sergeants, for example 
would include columns numbered one to eight and trumpeters one to six). With less 
space available on the new format of returns it is apparent that the artificers were 
included in the alphabetical returns for privates, with a brief note added to distinguish 
them (one such system being 'cm' for collar maker, 'bs' for blacksmith and 'ww' for 
wheelwright). Eventually the administrators of the Royal Wagon Train found a way to 
modify the forms to accommodate the artificers better, making the differences 
between them and privates clearer, although this is evidence of the difficulties that 
could be encountered when the specialist needs of an organization such as the Royal 
Wagon Train were not accommodated in general administrative practice.497
496 For an example of both systems in operation, PRO WO 12/1526, Royal Wagon Train 1807 - 09.
497 See monthly returns of Royal Wagon Train, 1816 - 17, PRO WO 12/1530.
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The use of the administrative methods of the cavalry was to a large extent due 
to similarities between this arm and the Royal Wagon Train (specifically their use of 
large numbers of horses).498 At times the needs of the train would even be met by 
transferring animals from fighting units, a practice that was particularly desirable 
given that the cost of purchasing horses in Britain increased continually during the 
period.499 The number of animals transferred could be considerable. For example: 150 
draught animals intended for General Spencer's artillery brigade in Portugal in August 
1808 were reallocated to General Burrard for logistical tasks after their late arrival, 
while a total of 14 animals were transferred from the 16th Light Dragoons to the Royal 
Wagon Train in March 1810. 500 Appreciating that the army possessed the capability to 
transfer horses in this way is important to this study not only because the practice 
increased the strength of the Royal Wagon Train but also because it is one of the few 
examples of different departments and organizations sharing resources in the period. It 
must be highlighted that the transfer of horses need not have occurred at the expense 
of a cavalry unit's strength, and the animals concerned tended to be unsuitable for 
cavalry service. This was made clear hi Major General Mahon's report on horses to be 
transferred from the 7th Light Dragoons during 1810, hi which he stated 'I certify that I 
have examined the above horses minutely and from the reasons there stated find them 
totally unfit for the service of the regiment and recommend them to be transferred'. 501 
The case of horses being unfit for cavalry service but not draught duties was not 
unusual, and when arriving in a new region the army often fell victim to dishonest 
horse dealers. 502 Major General Cartwright noted that some horses employed by the 4th
498 Chilcott, "The Royal Wagon Train', pp. 175-177.
499 John, 'Farming in Wartime', p.28
500 A. Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard, Aeyria, 11 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228; Return of horses 
received by the Royal Wagon Train, March 1810, PRO WO 17/54/2.
501 Return of horses of the 7* Light Dragoons cast by Honourable Major General S. Mahon, Dublin, 16 
September 1810, PRO WO 63/91.
502 p. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p. 19.
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(Queen's Own) Dragoons were too big for cavalry duties (being more suited to pulling 
wagons), while in April 1809 Arthur Wellesley had written to Castelreagh expressing 
concern that even the regiments of guards had on their strength horses that were 
unsuitable for combat duty. 503
It is apparent that the Royal Wagon Train on occasion received the cast-offs of 
the cavalry. This says something about the pecking order in the British military 
establishment and, importantly, reveals that many of the animals it employed were not 
carthorses, but breeds more suited to cavalry use had it not been for their condition. 
Surprisingly this could be an advantage because while carthorses were ideally suited 
to the task of pulling wagons and carts, they were more costly both to purchase and 
maintain, while they also took up more room on naval transport vessels. 504 Often there 
was barely sufficient transportation for the cavalry horses, let alone the animals 
required by the Royal Wagon Train, further evidence that the advances in British 
transportation capacity that occurred during the period were of little significance to the 
army on campaign.505 The difficulties encountered when moving horses to war zones 
was demonstrated by the instructions given to General Sir John Moore upon his 
arrival in Spain during 1808:
the cavalry you will... direct to move by land and if the horses for the artillery 
can take the same route so as to admit the whole of the horse transports being 
returned to England, it will tend much to accelerate the arrival of the cavalry 
from home. 506
The orders make no mention of the animals of the train, indicating that they were 
either not present or too few in numbers to affect the planning of the operation. It is
503 Major General Cartwright's confidential report on the actual state of the 4* Queen's Own Dragoons, 
7 May 1808, PRO WO 27/92/1; Wellesley to Castlereagh, Lisbon, 29 April 1809, PRO WO 1/238.
504 John, 'Fanning in Wartime' p.28; Weller, Wellington in the Peninsula, p.29.
505 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 183. Advances in transport technology directly improved the 
effectiveness of the Royal Wagon Train but due to the small size of the organization and other factors 
the army gained only minor benefits from these advances.
506 To Moore, Downing Street, 26 September 1808, PRO WO 1/236.
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interesting to note that during the months of July and August 1808 reinforcements 
from Britain were indeed delayed by the shortage of horse transports. Lieutenant- 
General Baird was due to leave Cork for Spain with a force of seven battalions and 
two artillery companies but was delayed for over three weeks due to the non-arrival of 
horse transports. 507 Even by 1810, with the army established in the Peninsula, the 
situation had not been resolved: Colonel Bambury wrote that there were a number of 
'horses waiting for a conveyance to Portugal' and that 'as soon as cavalry transports 
are at our disposal, sufficient tonnage will be allotted to the horses in question; but 
their embarkation has been delayed by the total want of the means of transporting 
them'.508 The Duke of Wellington also complained of transport vessels being 
requisitioned for other duties by the transport board.509 The simple fact of the matter 
was that with three organizations competing for space aboard horse transports (the 
regiments of cavalry, Royal Artillery and Royal Wagon Train) none of them would 
ever have adequate space allocated, but the needs of the cavahy would always be met 
first as it was one of the primary combat arms.
With the provision of horse transports so erratic it was inevitable the animals 
required by the Royal Wagon Tram would not travel with them but would be procured 
at their destination. In some respects this is further evidence of a reflexive or 
pragmatic doctrine in the British army but it was due as much to strategic limitations 
as a lack of forward planning or reserves, hi a letter intended to brief Sir Harry 
Burrard upon his arrival in August 1808, Arthur Wellesley stated:
I conclude that you will have come equipped with horses to draw your 
artillery; you will want therefore mules to draw the carriages of your reserve 
musket ammunition, and some to carry provisions for a few days to march 
with the troops. 510
507 Baird, to Castlereagh, Cork, 8 September 1808; Baird, to Castlereagh, Cork, 1 st October September 
1808, PRO WO 1/236.
508 Colonel Bambury to MacLeod, Downing Street, 6 February 1810, PRO WO55/1369.
509 Wellington to Liverpool, Celario, 18 August 1810, PRO WO 1/245.
510 A. Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard, Aeyria, 11 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
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Prior to the full-scale deployment of the British army in a region of a friendly country 
such as Spain or Portugal, agents would be despatched to ensure an adequate number 
of animals were found. In 1808 the agents for Sir John Moore's expedition to 
Northern Spain were Deputy Commissary Azziotte and Colonel Hamilton of the 
Royal Wagon Train (recognition that a majority of animals purchased would be 
employed by these organizations). Their role was described in a letter from the Prime 
Minister to the General:
Deputy Commissary Azziotte has been despatched with Colonel Hamilton of 
the Wagon Train into the Asturias to procure such horses and mules as that 
country can furnish and he is directed to report the progress of his purchases to 
you - when ascertained the numbers of cattle of different descriptions, that you 
will require for rendering your army movable, which you will feel it important 
to restrict within the narrowest compass consistent with the efficiency of your 
Corps, you will be enabled to regulate the purchases made by the several 
agents, and should you deem it necessary to procure the support of His 
Majesty's Minister... who is now proceeding to the central Government to 
facilitate these purchases - you will address yourself to him on the subject or to 
any of His Majesty's Servants Civil or Military now employed in the 
respective provinces of Spain.511
This part of Sir John's orders reveals much about the Royal Wagon Train and the 
British army's system for the purchase of draught animals in the period. Immediately 
apparent is the fact that while the duties of the Royal Wagon Train included 
procurement, Colonel Hamilton was subordinated to a Deputy Commissary while 
undertaking this role. The importance of this mission is demonstrated by the potential 
involvement of a government minister and that every effort was to be made to ensure 
the required animals were purchased.
The letter is of further importance as it reveals that even at this very early stage 
of the peninsular war, the army was utilising mules and oxen for its mobility. This
Prime Minister Lord Portland to Moore, Downing Street, 26 September 1808, PRO WO 1/236.
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contradicts the popularly held view that credits the Duke of Wellington with the 
widespread introduction of oxen as draught animals to the British army, such animals 
clearly being in use before the then Arthur Wellesley had any influence of note over 
policy.512 Significantly, in his detailed appraisal of the logistical situation facing 
General Burrard in 1808, Wellesley, the supposed instigator of the use of oxen by the 
British army in Spain and Portugal made little mention of draught animals except for 
horses and mules, other than to describe the limitations of oxen. They were certainly 
not Wellesley's draught animal of choice, and he stated:
as for mules for carriage I believe you will find none, for I believe my corps 
has swept the country very handsomely of this animal you must therefore 
depend for the carriage of the country drawn by bullocks. 513
Clearly Wellesley had gone to great lengths to ensure an adequate supply of mules for 
his force, leaving Burrard with what he believed to be animals of limited utility. 
Furthermore, even as Wellington came to appreciate the qualities of oxen as draught 
animals, he remained aware of their limitations. When he requested that a pontoon 
bridge be despatched to Spain, Wellington stated that bullocks would be used as 
draught animals but also requested that horse harness be sent in case the bridge 
needed to be moved more rapidly.514 The Duke of Wellington's supposed faith in the 
value of bullocks as draught animals is often stated to extend from his service in India, 
years that are often seen as his most formative. 515 If the Duke did not in fact possess as 
much faith in these creatures as is often thought, many other aspects of the
512 For an example of this view see Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.41.
513 A. Wellesley to Burrard, Aeyria, 11 August 1808, PRO WO 1/228.
514 Wellington to Liverpool, Cartaxo, 31 March 1811, PRO WO 1/248.
515 Hibbert, Wellington, passim; E. Longford, Wellington: the Years of the Sword (London, Weidenfield 
& Nicolson, 1969), passim.
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historiography (and mythology) surrounding Wellington may be brought into 
question. 516
In some respects the Royal Wagon Train managed its manpower as it 
maintained its animals. This is not a reference to harsh conditions but rather the way 
in which its strength was expanded or contracted to meet operational requirements. 
The variable strength of the Royal Wagon Train emphasises the pragmatic approach 
towards maintaining the army in the period. Peace in 1802, for example, triggered 
contraction, while operations in Spain during 1810 caused expansion. In essence, the 
methods employed by the Royal Wagon Train to recruit personnel were little different 
to those of other organizations in the British army, including the combat arms, 
although there were some differences between the practices employed by these 
organizations and the Royal Wagon Train. The focus of recruitment were the 
recruiting parties but it is apparent that officers played a lesser role in those of the 
Royal Wagon Train. Even during the period of expansion following the Peace of 
Amiens no officers were assigned to this task, but eight sergeants were. 517 The bounty 
offered to recruits by these parties was also different as it was much lower than that of 
these other arms. In 1802 recruits to the Royal Wagon Train would receive only £6 2s, 
compared to £13 5s for infantrymen (a difference of £7 3s), while infantrymen were 
also eligible for an extra bounty if transferring from the militia or volunteers 
(amounting to £7 12s 6d). 518 As the war progressed recruitment bounties for the train 
were significantly reduced, with the result that by January 1814 the Royal Wagon 
Train bounty payment amounted to only £4 4s, while in 1816 it fell to £3 14s. 519
516 See N. Gash, Wellington Anecdotes: a Critical Survey (Southampton, University of Southampton, 
1992).
517 Monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train, June 1803 and October 1804, PRO WO 17/53/2.
518 Bounty payments, 1802, PRO WO 17/2813, Monthly returns of the British army at home and 
abroad, Jan 1803 - Aug 1805, with at front, scale of age and standards for recruits, 1802-1808, and 
scale of bounty, 1802-1823.
519 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, January 1814 to January 1816, PRO WO 12/1529 and WO 
12/1530.
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Historians such as lan Fletcher have cited recruitment bounties as being one of 
the most important elements of recruiting practices in the period, so it may thus be 
expected that a lower bounty would have had a detrimental impact on the quality and 
quantity of recruits.520 For those historians who have equated height to physical 
effectiveness there is ample evidence of this, as the height requirement for the Royal 
Wagon Train was lower than that of fighting arms.521 In 1808 this was only five feet 
one inch for the train, compared to five feet five inches for the infantry and five feet 
seven inches for the cavalry.522 It is contentious whether a link between height and 
effectiveness can be said to exist and a study of the Royal Wagon Train does little to 
aid the argument in either direction. 523 In particular, it is interesting to note that despite 
their reduced height requirement the personnel of the Royal Wagon Train were 
generally fitter than those of other formations. At the headquarters of the Peninsular 
army in October 1810, for example, 276 personnel of the Royal Wagon Train were 
present, of which only 19 (approximately seven percent) were listed as sick, a figure 
that compares favourably with those for the infantry (1,191 sick out of 6,913 or 17%); 
the cavalry (1,451 sick out of 5,850 or 25%); and foot artillery (149 out of 637 or 
24%). 524 These other formations were, however, combat arms, the personnel of which 
were subjected to far more stresses and deprivations than those of the Royal Wagon 
Train, making any comparison of sickness rates in relation to general fitness 
unbalanced.
The strength of the Royal Wagon Train rarely fell below that required by 
regulations. This was particularly apparent regarding specialist personnel, who were
520 Fletcher, Wellington's Regiments, p. 14.
521 J. Mokyr and C. O'Grada, The Heights of the British and Irish cl800-1815: Evidence from Recruits 
to the East India Company's Army (unpublished research paper, University College Dublin, 1990), 
passim.
522 Minimum height requirements, 1808, PRO WO 17/2813.
523 The Ghurkhas and Japanese are ample evidence to disprove the theory that shorter recruits do not 
necessarily equate to worse soldiers.
524 General return, WO 17246, War Department in Letters and Papers 1810, f. 1.
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vital for the successful operation of the train. In part this may be attributed to the pay 
structure of the organization, as special provision was made for such personnel. In 
1799 artisans employed by the train were paid as follows: blacksmiths £4 13s per 
month, wheelwrights £3 9s and collar-makers £2 2s. For comparison privates received 
£1 10s 9d, corporals £2 3s 10 Vi d, sergeants £3 7s 2d and Quarter Masters £4 13s. 525 
During this period, however, a relatively unskilled London journeyman could earn at 
least £4 20d per month, and probably more. 526 It is thus apparent that, despite being 
paid more than common soldiers, wages alone may not have been sufficient to attract 
artisans away from civilian occupations to serve in the Royal Wagon Train. Rather, it 
is likely that if such individuals had decided to serve in the army, they would then 
have been drawn to the Royal Wagon Train due to the extra money paid for their 
skills. The difference in pay between common soldiers and artisans was maintained 
despite successive wage increases and the ratios of pay remained approximately the 
same. By 1813 blacksmiths, wheelwrights and collar-makers were all included as 
artificers on returns and were in a single pay band (£11 7s 6d, compared to £3 8s and 
3d for soldiers). 527
Higher rates of pay for certain personnel were not the only factor that could 
attract recruits to the Royal Wagon Train, hi fact, the overall manpower of the 
organization rarely fell below that of regulation strength, demonstrating that the Royal 
Wagon Train had a broad appeal. In some respects the train was something of a soft 
option compared to other organizations, its personnel being governed by the same 
regulations as those of the Commissariat. 528 Despite this, service in the organization 
was not necessarily easy and its personnel could come under fire, even if not expected 
to take part in combat. Away from the front line, the role of the Royal Wagon Train
525 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, November 1799, PRO WO 12/1522.
526 Emsley, British Society, p. 83.
527 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, January 1816, PRO WO 12/1530.
528 J. Burleigh, Circular letter to Commissaries, 18th February 1807, PRO WO 63/40.
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dictated that it was continually active, and bad weather that forced fighting regiments 
to return to cantonments or remain in barracks was not allowed to hinder its activities. 
This was particularly apparent during the Peninsular War, a campaign in which the 
army pursued a strategy of fighting decisive battles and then withdrawing for long 
periods, a tactic exemplified by the retreat of the army to the lines of Torres Vedras in 
1810.529 Captain Grenville-Eliot of the Royal Artillery believed such periods were 
'very much to the satisfaction of every individual in the army' as they allowed the 
army to recuperate. 530 This, however, could only be achieved if during such periods 
the activities of organizations such as the Royal Wagon Train continued; supplies 
were required not only to maintain forces but also to refit them following the previous 
campaign and prepare them for the next. The situation was worsened by the fact that 
the organization was required to transport not only essentials, such as food, fuel, 
clothing or munitions, but other items as well. In February 1811, for example, when 
Ireland was experiencing some of the worst snow in years, a troop of the Royal 
Wagon Train was still despatched to brave both blocked roads and the elements to 
move the belongings of Major General Beck to his new billet. 531 The result of such 
duties was that the personnel of the Royal Wagon Train were to become amongst the 
most mobile in the British army.
While on campaign the Royal Wagon Train followed the movements of the 
army, but even in Britain the troops of the train were redeployed to meet the 
requirements of the army on both a local and national basis. The latter is illustrated in 
figure 19.
529 W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, Vol 3, (London, John Murray, 1890), pp.39- 
47.
530 Grenville Eliot to wife, Truxillo, 19* August 1809, NAM 5903/127/6.
531 J. Malasses to J. Jones, Commissary General's Office, 4th February 1811, PRO WO 63/45.
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Bexhill
Canterbury
Chelmsford
Croydon
Dover
Dungness
Isle of Wight
Ramsgate
November 1803
None
Headquarters 
Four troops
Two troops
None
Detachment
Detachment
Detachment
Detachment
April 1805
One troop
Three troops
Four Troops
Headquarters 
Four Depot Troops
None
None
None
None
Figure 19: The deployment of the Royal Wagon train, 1803 and 1805. 5U
While the movement of troops may appear unremarkable in a fifteen-month period, it 
demonstrates that the Royal Wagon Train was capable of both concentration and 
dispersal. The relocation of the organization's headquarters from Canterbury to 
Croydon was a significant event; while it is interesting to note that in 1805 the 
greatest concentration of assets was not at headquarters (or even Canterbury) as in 
1803, but at Chelmsford (four troops were present at Croydon in 1805 but these were 
smaller Depot Troops). This is further evidence of the organization's ability to 
concentrate and disperse its assets as necessary, a policy made practical by the 
mobility and frequent movement of the troops, and one that enabled the train to 
support the pragmatic doctrines of the army.
The information in figure 19 demonstrates shifts in the location of troops, or 
rather their centre of gravity as personnel would be detached on various duties, using 
locations such as those listed above as a centre of operations. Due to the requirements
532 Return of officers, non-commissioned officers, men and horses detached from headquarters of the 
Royal Wagon Train, November 1803, PRO WO 17/53/2; Return of officers, non-commissioned 
officers, men and horses detached from headquarters of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1805, PRO WO
17/54/1.
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of the army at certain locations the workload of the Royal Wagon Train was not 
shared equally amongst troops, with the result that in a given period of time certain 
personnel would be more active than others. For example, between August 1799 and 
February 1800 the 2nd Troop of the Royal Wagon Train spent only nine days of the six 
months on the march, and the remainder in billet, hi the same six-month period, the 3 rd 
Troop (which was renumbered as the 5th Troop in January 1800) spent twenty-four 
days on the march, six aboard ship and the remainder in billet. 533 Again, this data 
provides only a limited picture of the activities of the Royal Wagon Train's personnel. 
More informative is the data in figure 20. In addition to highlighting the varying level 
of activity in different troops, figure 20 gives some indication of distances involved, 
the 4th Troop having detachments en route from across England, including the 
southwest, midlands and northern England. Figure 20 also demonstrates the flexibility 
of the Royal Wagon Train, as it was capable of deploying assets en mass (as in the 
case of the 3 rd Troop) or in small detachments (as in the case of the 4th Troop).
3rd Troop
From
Barnet
Enfield
4th Troop
Penrith
Newcastle
Exeter
Hull
Sheffield
Manchester
Dover
Bromley
5th Troop
Newcastle
Exeter
Perth
To
Enfield
Barnet
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Blackwall
Bromley
Bromley
Bromley
Number of Privates
70
70
13
5
17
10
9
6
4
6
27
4
3
Figure 20: Marches of the Royal Wagon Train, August - September 1799.5
533 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay lists, August 1799 to February 1800, PRO WO 12/1522.
534 Monthly returns of the Royal Wagon Train, August to September 1799, PRO WO 12/1522.
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Despite its flexibility, the size of Royal Wagon Train dictated that the organization 
was never adequate to meet the needs of the wartime British army fully. The force 
continued to rely on civilian transport, including muleteers and contractors, for much 
of its needs. Yet the organization was also too large for the peacetime establishment 
of the army. Combined with the fact that, as noted by Commissary Schauman, 
logistical organizations were traditionally amongst the first organizations affected by 
post-war defence reductions, it was inevitable that the Royal Wagon Train was 
significantly reduced in size at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.535 The process of 
demobilisation was rapid and serves as a useful case study not only of how logistical 
units were reduced after a war but also armies in general.
In January 1816 the number of troops in the Royal Wagon Train stood at 
fifteen, three of which were listed as foreign (primarily consisting of Germans). 536 In 
April 1816 there remained three such troops in existence in the train, each led by a 
Captain (see figure 21):
Troop
1
Captains
Lieutenants
Cornet
Sergeant Major
Sergeants
Corporals
Privates
Trumpeters
Artificers
Total
1
1
1
0
1
7
7
56
4
0
77
2
1
2
2
1
7
8
62
0
0
83
3
1
1
2
1
8
7
51
1
8
80
Total
3
5
4
3
22
22
169
5
8
240
Figure 21: Foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train, April 1816.5
535 Schauman, On the Road with Wellington, p.415.
536 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, April 1816, PRO WO 12/12017, Royal Wagon Train Foreign 
Corps, 1816.
537 Ibid.
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In May 1816 these three troops were amalgamated into one. Of the forty-four non- 
commissioned officers employed in April, only sixteen remained, the number of 
privates was reduced from 169 to 70, and the artificers were removed from the 
strength of the remaining troop. As in earlier periods the trumpeters were among the 
first personnel removed from the strength of the troops when reductions were 
required, demonstrating the relative lack of importance attached to these individuals. 
Of note is the fact that after the contraction in numbers of May 1816, the overall 
strength of the troop increased following the amalgamation with the other troops. This 
is of note as it demonstrates that the process of demobilisation was not simply 
mobilisation in reverse. The latter had been achieved in the Royal Wagon Train 
through creating an administrative structure (containing a handful of personnel) and 
then progressively adding manpower. Demobilisation removed both manpower and 
administrative structures simultaneously; the same manpower could have been 
maintained in three separate troops but the policy of amalgamation was economical as 
it streamlined administration. This is further evidence of flexibility in the structure 
and administration of the Royal Wagon Train, but was a contrast to fighting 
formations, in which even heavily depleted companies and squadrons were 
maintained. An infantry battalion, for example, consisted of ten companies even if 
reduced to only 240 men from regulation battalion strength of 1,000, while in the train 
the practice was to concentrate strength. 538
The changes in the number of personnel employed in the Royal Wagon Train 
during April and June 1816 are summarised below in figures 22 and 23:
1 Partridge and Oliver, The British Army and Her Allies, pp.21 to 28.
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Non-Commissioned 
Officers
Commissioned Of­ 
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O April 
D May
Qjune
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Number on Strength
Figure 22: Officers serving in the foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train, April to June 1816.
Total Strength
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Number on Strength
NCO
CO
Other Ranks
Total
April May June 
47 17 17 
1164 
182 70 84 
230 94 105
Figure 23: Other ranks and total strength of the foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train, April
to June 1816.539
By June 1816 no captains remained on the strength of the foreign troop and the senior 
officer was a lieutenant, supported by an additional lieutenant, two cornets, a sergeant
major, nine sergeants and seven corporals. Although the number of non- 
539 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, April 1816, PRO WO 12/12017.
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commissioned officers remained the same between May and June, one corporal was 
promoted to sergeant, a response no doubt to the increase in the number of other 
ranks. This increase, however, should not detract from the fact that there was a 55% 
decline in the numbers employed in the foreign units of the Royal Wagon Train 
between April and June. Furthermore no artificers remained with these units. 540 It was 
the presence of these skilled individuals that made the troops of the Royal Wagon 
Train distinct from the other wagon-using units and their loss was indicative that the 
remaining foreign troops' days were numbered.
The hatchet of post-war reductions did not fall solely on the foreign units of 
the Royal Wagon Train. Peace brought with it reductions and re-organization 
throughout the train. In January 1816 the strength of the Royal Wagon Train was 
divided between three regions, as shown in figure 24:
Privates NCOs Horses Farriers Troops
United Kingdom 989 115 310 68 6
France 444 56 561 24 4
Hanover 265 30 157 23 2
Figure 24: The distribution of the Royal Wagon Train, January 1816. 541
Confusingly, each region had evolved its own numbering system, demonstrating an 
emphasis on local rather than centralised administration. Those troops in France were 
numbered 1 st , 2ad, 3 rd and 4th, those in Hannover 4th and 6th, while the six in the United 
Kingdom consisted of the 2nd, 3 rd, 6th, 7th, 8 th and 12 th . In September 1816 the 
Hanoverian force was disbanded and further reductions were made to the force in 
Britain, the strength of the Royal Wagon Train being concentrated in France. The
540 Ibid.
541 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, January 1816, PRO WO 12/1530.
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reduction in the strength of the wagon train in Britain compared to that in France is 
shown in figure 25:
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Figure 25: The deployment of the NCOs and other ranks of the Royal Wagon Train, 1816 -
17. 542
It is apparent that following the reductions of 1816 the strength of the Royal Wagon 
Train became concentrated in the army of occupation serving in France. This was 
achieved not through significantly increasing the number of personnel in that country, 
but through reductions in the number of personnel deployed in Britain.543 hi fact there 
would appear to have been little increase in the capability of the force operating in 
France with only a marginal increase in manpower between February 1816 and 
November 1817, an increase of only twenty-eighty privates and NCOs.
The elements of the Royal Wagon Train deployed to support the army of 
occupation represented not only a concentration of manpower but also capability. This 
is an issue that cannot be ignored when considering the Royal Wagon Train because it 
was effectively the organization's capability to operate wagons that determined its 
effectiveness. Advances in wagon technology were important but the most significant 
factors remained the organization's artificers and draught animals. Figures 26 and 27 
allow a comparison to be made between those assets deployed in Britain and France.
542 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, February 1816 to November 1817, PRO WO 12/1530.
543 The force assigned to the army of occupation also included elements of the Royal Wagon Train 
despatched to support operations in the Netherlands during 1815.
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Figure 26: The allocation of the horses of the Royal Wagon Train, 1816-1817.
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Figure 27: The allocation of the artificers of the Royal Wagon Train, 1816 - 1817. 5
544 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, February 1816 to November 1817, PRO WO 12/1530.
545 Ibid.
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By November 1816 there was clearly a concentration of capability as well as 
manpower in France. This was reflected in the number of active troops deployed, with 
four in France and only one in Britain. The solitary troop in Britain was, however, 
massively over strength compared to its predecessors earlier in the war. In terms of 
personnel this one troop, 166 strong, was approximately equivalent to the three active 
troops that accounted for the main element of the Royal Wagon Train in the summer 
of 1799, each of which had an average strength of approximately 60 privates. 
Furthermore, the number of artificers - eleven - was actually more than the total 
number employed by all of the troops in that same period. Thus, the operational 
capability of Royal Wagon Train in Britain was at least as good as, if not marginally 
better, than it had been at the turn of the century. That only one troop existed did not 
unduly influence its flexibility either. Although still based at Croydon Barracks, the 
Royal Wagon Train continued to maintain detachments at Hythe, Sandhurst and on 
the Isle of Wight.
The men of the Royal Wagon Train stationed in Britain in 1817 were 
administered differently to their comrades on the continent. Even the way in which 
Waterloo veterans were noted in returns was different, this practice being introduced 
in September 1817. In both cases the veterans were noted in muster rolls by a Union 
Flag symbol (specifically the cross of St. George and St. Patrick in red) next to their 
names. 546 hi Britain this was recorded in the column indicating length of service, 
whereas hi France it was placed directly next to the individual's name. The most 
noticeable difference in the organization and structure of the two forces was the 
respective complements of their specialist sergeants. In Britain the train had on its 
strength a school master sergeant, an armourer sergeant, a saddler sergeant and a 
trumpet major sergeant, but no sergeant majors. In contrast the force in France
1 Royal Wagon Train monthly pay list, September 1816, PRO WO 12/1530.
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deployed over a dozen of these latter individuals, indicating the emphasis placed on 
command and control over other aspects of army life. If there was no sergeant 
schoolmaster in France, then there was no regimental school, arguably one of the most 
significant additions to army barracks in the period.
The existence of the Royal Wagon Train into the post war period was an 
achievement for the organization and one that is often overlooked. Its survival was 
significant because the train had been created during the war, in response to a wartime 
situation, its continued existence in to peacetime evidence that it had became to be 
considered an essential element of the British army. The majority of transport duties 
for the army continued to be conducted by civilians but these duties tended to be the 
mundane, such as delivering produce from suppliers. It was in a war zone that the 
Royal Wagon Train came to the fore; delivering supplies at key moments in the heat 
of battle or ensuring troops at the very front line of an advance were maintained. The 
Royal Wagon train could easily have been disbanded in 1815, its forte being the 
support of large scale military operations, yet by maintaining the train the army 
demonstrated a reluctance to return to the rather ad hoc policy towards military 
logistics that had existed prior to the Revolutionary Wars. The army would eventually 
return to such a policy in 1833 following the disbandment of the Royal Wagon Train 
but this would be short lived.
The continued existence of the Royal Wagon Train reflected that an evolution 
had occurred in the army regarding logistics. Thus, the creation of the train could be 
considered progressive but it was restricted by the traditional shortcoming of all 
elements of the British military - lack of resources. There can be little doubt that a 
larger train would have achieved more even if it continued to focus on its main role, 
that of operating when civilians may have been less effective. The organization,
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however, had a strength that allowed it in part to circumvent its small size, specifically 
an ability to evolve or adapt to a situation. In particular the train was able to 
restructure itself, contracting and expanding in response to peace and war time 
situations, creating new elements within its structure (the Depot Troops), splitting 
itself between different theatres and incorporating changes adopted by other elements 
of the army (such as new administrative practices). It is apparent that the Royal 
Wagon Train was the most flexible of the organizations tasked with maintaining the 
British army.
Although there were a variety of possible reasons for the flexibility of the train 
compared to other organisations, one of the most important is that it was a new 
organization and thus did not require extensive reform to remove outdated practices or 
to incorporate new ones. This was in contrast to the Commissariat, which was a 
lumbering behemoth compared to the leaner and more efficient Royal Wagon Train 
and was forced to expend its energies trying to improve practices rather than adapt to 
new situations. 547 The Royal Wagon Train also had other advantages over the 
Commissariat and in particular it was one of the few organisations not to deploy assets 
outside of the European theatre in the period. Yet this factor should not be 
overestimated because there is little evidence to suggest that the Commissariat would 
have been significantly more efficient if its activities had been concentrated in Europe. 
The organisation would have been leaner but there is no reason to believe its systems 
would have been less cumbersome as a result.
Comparisons between the Royal Wagon Train and Commissariat are not 
always appropriate. The task of the latter was broad, while the focused on one aspect 
of logistics, transportation. When considering the Commissariat solely in regard to 
this, however, another advantage of the Royal Wagon Train over other organizations
547 See above pp.80 to 84.
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becomes apparent. The Royal Wagon Train was able to benefit from the British state 
in an unusual way as it was able to utilise technology that was, in effect, transferred 
directly from the state and was a consequence of the agricultural and industrial 
revolutions. The period saw subtle but significant improvements to the technology of 
wheeled transport, including suspension and axle designs, and in many respects 
Britain led Europe in such fields. Using this technology made the wagons used by the 
train superior not only to those of continental armies but also superior to those hired 
by other British military organizations on the continent, particularly those utilised by 
muleteers, and upon which the Commissariat relied. The Royal Wagon Train was not 
unique in utilising the superior technology available in Britain during the period but 
that advances were made in its specialist field enabled it to benefit to a significant 
degree.
The state offered the train other advantages, the capability to expand in 
response to a situation being of note only when backed by the resources of the state. 
Yet the fact remains that, like other organisations, the train was constrained by the 
boundaries imposed by financial considerations and the resources that the state was 
willing to allocate. Thus, in many respects, the train reflected the best and worst 
aspects of the army's relationship with the state. The strength of the system was that 
resources (be it money, materiel or technology) could be made available quickly but 
these resources were limited due to the reluctance of the state to support the army to 
the extent that the force wished. Although important, it was not only lack of resources 
that limited the ability of Royal Wagon Train to maintain the army. Some 
commodities that the force required were less tangible than bread or guns and could 
not be carried on the back of a wagon. It is these commodities that are the focus of the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 5 
The provision of sundry necessities
The military revolution had created the need for a state to pay, train and equip 
its soldiers. In consequence military personnel represented an investment and, as 
noted by Colin Jones, one that had to be protected and nurtured, with states taking a 
growing interest in their welfare/41* Issues pertaining to welfare in the army can be 
divided into two categories: those related to specific departments and those that were 
more general issues, managed by either several departments or by government 
legislation. This chapter examines both, the former through the medical and 
chaplain's departments and the latter through a consideration of the army's policies to 
encourage men with families to enlist. In all three areas the army was to demonstrate 
both innovation and conservatism, with policies that had varying degrees of success. 
The common denominator, however, remained a concern for soldiers' welfare and 
while not logistics in a conventional sense this could be as vital to maintaining the 
army as guns or food.
One of the most innovative policies adopted by the army in the period was its 
encouragement of men with families to enlist. Through legislating for families the 
army was to increase its responsibilities, adding extra persons whose welfare the force 
had to consider. Despite such drawbacks, this policy was considered important not 
only to increase manpower but also because men with families were perceived to be 
of a higher standard and more reliable, the Duke of Wellington stating in a letter to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens in 1811 that the army's failure to cater for their needs 
encouraged 'the worst description of men to enter the service'. M9 Such a view was
S4S Jones, "The Military Revolution and the Professionalism of the French Army under the Ancien
Regime', p.41.
54V Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General Orders, p.348.
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progressive as the question of soldiers' families was a concept that led to the creation 
of married quarters in the mid-nineteenth century and has become something of an 
emotive subject and political issue in the twenty-first century due to media coverage 
concerned with the families of serving soldiers.550 The problem of soldiers' families is 
thus still a subject with which the state struggles to contend.
A potentially important reason for men with families not to enlist was 
economics. In civilian life women could make a substantial contribution to a family's 
income, earning an average of 6s per week in an industrial city such as Birmingham 
during the 1790s, which was almost equivalent to a soldier's pay of Is per day. 551 In 
the Midlands during 1795 it was established that a family consisting of a husband, 
wife and two children should receive 15s per week, any shortfall in wages being 
rectified through poor relief."2 Thus, for a man with a family to enlist there was a 
potential loss of income that could not be avoided if the husband was to serve in the 
army. The economic issues related to the recruitment of men with families, however, 
not only concerned incomes. While labourers and their families could earn more than 
soldiers their expenses could also be considerable. The terms 'labourer' and 'poor' 
have been described as being synonymous in this period and labouring families, 
particularly in rural areas, were not so well off as their incomes alone may suggest.^ 
It has been estimated, for example, that early in the nineteenth century a labouring 
married couple could spend £20 per year on food, £3 on rent and £8 on clothing."" 4 By 
enlisting at least these costs would be subsidised by the army, who would clothe, feed 
and provide accommodation for the soldier. Another consideration was the nature of
5SO See for. example, the media coverage concerning the 2004 Invasion of Iraq.
551 1. R. Christie. Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth Century Britain (Oxford Clarendon, 1984),
p.84.
552 M. Blaug, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the Making of the New', in M. W. Flinn and T.C. 
Smout (eds), Essays in Social History (Oxford, Clarendon, 1974), p. 131.
553 R. J. White, Life in Regency England (London, Batsford, 1963), p.22.
534 E.W. Bovill, English Country Life 1780 - 2830 (London, OUP, 1962), p. 18.
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the support offered through local poor rates, which was not always monetary. 
Authorities could be creative in how subsidies were paid, sometimes paying in kind 
through services such as clothing or laundry rather than with cash. 555
Although the economic arguments against men enlisting were not as strong as 
they may first appear, there were other factors that could prevent men with families 
from enlisting. One difficulty was the family remaining together during the soldier's 
various redeployments and at the outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
the army made little provision for them to travel with soldiers. Regulations concerning 
this referred only to wives, it being assumed any children would also accompany 
them. It was relatively easy for wives to follow husbands serving in Britain and, 
despite the fact that married quarters and similar provision for wives did not exist 
until the mid-nineteenth century, families could remain together or at least in 
proximity due to the practice of billeting troops at inns (a practice that became less 
common as more barracks were constructed).556 When travelling overseas the army 
allowed a restricted number of wives (and their children) to follow each regiment. In 
such circumstances the army allowed for only six wives to travel with each infantry 
company or cavalry troop, while in the Royal Artillery the allocation was a more 
generous eight and ten for foot and horse batteries respectively."7 Rations were 
established as being half that of a man's for women and one third for children. 55 "
Only the wives of privates and non-commissioned officers were permitted to 
travel with the regiments to foreign postings at the expense of the army, while
555 Christie. Stress and Stability, p. 106.
556 M. Trustram. Women of the Regiment: Marriage and the Victorian Army (Cambridge, CUP, 1984), 
passim. Colonel N. T. St John Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children: The Story of the Education of 
Army's Children (London, HMSO, 1971), p.6.
557 H. Ton-ens to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 5th November 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.40; 
Brigadier-General Macleod to R.H. Crew, Woolwich, 10th July 1809, PRO WO 55/1314. For the 
expedition to Egjpt the permitted number of wives allowed to follow the force was reduced to three per 
company, a policy that adversely affected morale. P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypi, 1801 (London, 
Routledge, 1995), p. 15. 
ss* Ton-ens Wellington, Horse Guards, 5th November 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.41.
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commissioned officers frequently paid for their wives to travel with them. Grenville- 
Eliot of the Royal Artillery, for example, urged on several occasions that his wife 
travel with him so he could control her financial expenditure. 559 Other men married 
local women while on service (despite the fact that since 1685 permission had been 
required from a soldier's commanding officer for him to marry), with the result that a 
large number of women and children followed regiments while they were deployed 
overseas/60 With the 25 th Light Dragoon Regiment in India during the latter stages of 
the war, for example, there were no less than seventy-two women, forty-one of whom 
were European, the remainder being of local origin. 561
Whether widowed or married there was initially little provision made for the 
women who followed the army abroad. Left to fend for themselves they inevitably 
turned to looting, and in August 1812 the Duke of Wellington remarked that 'the 
followers of the army, the Portuguese women in particular, must be prevented by the 
provosts from plundering the gardens and fields of vegetables'.""62 Thus the army 
found itself on the horns of a dilemma in regard to women and children. They were 
seen to hamper the supply of the army by consuming food and taking up transport, and 
even those authorised to travel with the regiments required special permission to 
travel aboard ship. 563 J. MacDonald, a former army officer writing proposals for 
reforms of the army in 1807, held such a view, stating that 'no woman, who is not by 
profession a washerwoman, will be permitted to follow the battalions'. 564 Wives and 
children were, according to Mary Trustram, 'a millstone around the army's neck, 
affecting mobility, discipline and efficiency'. 565 Despite the difficulties caused by their
S}" NAM 5903/127/6.
560 The practice had been introduced into the regiments of guards in 1671. Trustram, Women of the 
Regiment, p.30.
561 Half Yearly Report on 25th Light Dragoons, Bagalore, 15th February 1813, NAM 6112/78, p.184.
56- Gurwood (ed), General Orders, p.32.
s63 Macleod to Crew, Woolwich, 17th June 1807, PRO WO 55/1314.
564 MacDonald, Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry, p.7.
365 Trustram, Women of the Regiment, p.29
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presence, however, women were not simply a burden on resources and performed 
useful duties such as nursing and foraging. 366 Ultimately the army was forced to 
acknowledge that whatever their overall impact, wives would always follow the army 
and legislation was required to accommodate this fact of life.
In 1811 an act 'for enabling the wives and families of soldiers embarked on 
foreign service' was introduced. This effectively provided an allowance for families to 
return home, being extended to include widows in 1812 and regiments embarking in 
Ireland in 1818. 567 Following the end of the Peninsular Campaign in 1814 it was the 
army's policy to encourage Spanish and Portuguese women to return to their own 
homes rather than follow their husbands back to Britain but this was not strictly 
enforced. In 1814 Adjutant General Edward Packenham successfully argued that a 
limited number of foreign wives, selected with 'the greatest caution', be allowed back 
to Britain. 568 Thus, during 1816 some 44 women and 27 children, who had been 
following the 88th Regiment on the continent, were allowed to return with their 
husbands. 569 First proposed in 1811, wives, widows, children and orphans were 
eventually allowed to draw food from army stockpiles in 1818.570 Until 1846 many of 
these regulations continued to be applied even if the child was born out of wedlock.' 71 
Although rudimentary, the army operated a system of welfare for the families of its 
soldiers.
The legislation introduced to enable the army to provide for the families of its 
soldiers is an example of the force at its most innovative. From virtually ignoring the
5(56 Ensign Wheatley wrote of the of the benefits of women employed on such duties. C. Hibbert (ed),
The Wheatley Diary (London, 1964), pi 8.
567 Letter from War Office to Regimental Colonels, 19* July 181 1, PRO ADM 201/20, Discharges. Pay.
Pensions and Allowances (Royal Marines).
558 Gurwood (ed), General Orders, p.323.
569 Illegible to Lord Bathurst, Paris, 19th March 1816, PRO WO 28/14, Letters from Quarter Master 
General's Department, 1816 January to June.
570 Ton-ens to Wellington, Horse Guards, 5th November 1811, NAM 6807/221, pp. 41-42; Gurwood 
(ed), General Orders, p.324.
571 Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, p.ll; Blaug, 'The Myth of the Old Poor Law', pp.123-53.
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wives and children of its soldiers the army would adopt policies that were in some 
respects ahead of those in civilian society, as evident in regard to education. The 
availability of education, for soldiers and their children alike, was one of the more 
tangible advantageous offered by a career in the army, the education of soldiers' 
children being an offshoot of programmes intended to educate the rank and file. The 
subject of educating soldiers was a source of some debate; one contemporary arguing 
that service in the army alone was sufficient, due to 'the beneficial influence of 
moderate instruction and impressing the mind with a due sense of moral and religious 
duty'/72 Such a view, however, was not common and formal education in the British 
army had a history stretching as far back as 1675, when the first army school was 
created in the Tangiers garrison. The growth in the number of such establishments 
was not rapid but the barrack-building program enabled permanent schools to be 
established in most regiments by 1809. The purpose of these schools was to educate 
soldiers but it was common for their children to be taught in them when the regiment 
was away. 573 Initially the provision of such education was at the whim of regimental 
colonels although a standard structure was soon adopted and General Wetherall noted 
that the school of the 80th Regiment in particular paid great attention to the children of
574the regiment.
The Duke of York was a keen advocate of education in the army, for both 
soldiers and their children alike, and he considered that the cost of schools to be 
'trifling compared to the benefits [of] attending such an establishment'. 575 It is no 
coincidence that during York's tenure as commander-in-chief several notable 
advances in the field of army education were to occur. One of the most significant
5T- MacDonald, Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry, p.cl.
573 Williams, Tommy Atkins'Children, pp3-9.
514 NAM 6112/78, p!55.
575 Duke of York to Viscount Palmerston, Horse Guards, 26th August 1811, Williams, Tommy Atkins'
Children, Appendix B.
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reforms implemented, and one typical of the period, was the formalisation of 
regimental school administration. This structure was explained to Lord Palmerston in 
1811, by which time the scheme had been implemented. York wrote that:
a sergeant-school-master should be appointed to each battalion and... he 
should be paid according to the rate of pay now attached to the paymasters 
clerk. It will also be necessary that the commissioners for the affairs of 
barracks shall be authorised to appropriate one room in each barrack for the 
use of the school... and it will be essential to allow an extra charge upon the 
contingent account of each regiment, for the articles of stationery and books 
which be requisite for the use of the boys and children. 576
The Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea and its sister institution at Dover were both 
clear indications of the army's commitment to a policy that emphasised education, at a 
time when it is estimated that only 15% of the population received any schooling. 577 
The establishment at Chelsea was funded by the state and in 1812 received a grant of 
£20,000, while civilian schools tended to be funded by charities and philanthropists, 
and did not receive significant state funding until 1831 in Ireland and 1833 in 
Britain.' 7 * The army lagged behind the navy in education, as a similar institution for 
the navy had been established at Portsmouth in 1729. Despite this, the army was 
addressing what would later become an important social issue/ 79
Staff at the Chelsea establishment included a chaplain, reading and knitting 
mistresses, a sergeant-major instructor, sergeant master tailors and cobblers and nine 
sergeant assistants. Eighteen corporals and 36 lance corporals were recruited from 
senior pupils to assist the non-commissioned officers. Education was open to both 
genders - boys learning trades such as tailoring and cobbling, girls sewing and
1U1U.
5T ~ E.G. West. Education and the Industrial Revolution (London, Batsford, 1975), p.75. 
57S P. Horn, Education in Rural England, 1800 to 1914 (London, Gill and MacMillan, 1978). pp.33-34: 
J.H. Adamson, English Education 1789 to 1902 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.20. 
5  Although similar establishments had existed for the navy since 1729. Duffy, 'The Military
T) n-.mln+^.n .tnA Ctofo 5 r\ ^Revolution and State', p.5.
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laundry.'*0 This use of apprenticeships was not unique to the army and was similar to 
the system utilised in industrial schools, in which the child's labour contributed to 
running costs. 3 " 1 This should not detract from the fact, however, that the apprentice 
system was further evidence of a shift in army policy that improved the situation of 
soldiers' families. The majority of teaching was to have been conducted by senior 
pupils, this being a characteristic of the monitorial systems adopted in the eighteenth 
century. 582
The education offered at institutions such as Chelsea, Dover and the 
regimental schools was in some respects innovative. Education available to civilians 
was dominated by Sunday schools of various denominations. These establishments 
had became increasingly secular during the 1790s with the result that by 1818 two 
thirds of children attending school in England did so at Sunday School. 5 * 3 
Secularisation in civilian education was such that it even interfered with learning, 
through preventing co-operation with similar establishments of different 
denominations or even by the fact that certain activities, such as writing, were not 
allowed on Sundays. 5 "4 Army schools differed as they were less concerned with 
religious matters and instead focused upon skills considered likely to be of use in 
adult life. 585 In this respect the army occupied a middle ground in its education 
practices, ahead of such practices in the less progressive schools but lagging 
somewhat behind the ideas of educationalists inspired by the works of Rousseau, 
ideas that would remain on the fringes of education until the mid-nineteenth
wo Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, p. 12.
581 W.A.C. Stewart, Progressives and Radicals in English Education, 1750 to 1970 (London,
MacMillan, 1972), p.92.
™- Stewart, Progressives and Radicals, p.27.
5 *3 Horn, Education m Rural England, pp.30-32..
554 A.P. Wadsworth, The First Manchester Sunday Schools', in M.W. Flinn and T.C. Smout (eds). 
Essavs in Social History (Oxford, Clarendon, 1974), pp. 110-114; Horn, Education in Rural England,
p.3L
555 Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, p.13.
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century. This approach - the adopting of current but not necessarily established 
ideas - was to characterise army education and was reflected in the adoption of the 
Bell monitorial system prior to its use nation-wide. 5"
It is apparent that through policies such as those intended to support soldiers' 
families and, as discussed in previous chapters, soldiers themselves, the army was to 
become increasingly involved in welfare. The extent of and motivation for these 
policies is open to some interpretation but it is evident that the army was one of the 
few careers that fed, clothed, sheltered and even educated its employees. With the 
exception of the Royal Navy, other employers provided less comprehensive support, 
factory owners, for example, providing schools, and some farmers housing and 
feeding their labourers out of season/ 81* Another important area of welfare was the 
provision of pensions.
Initially perceived as a means to prevent disgruntled former soldiers becoming 
involved in unrest, pensions had, by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, become linked 
to the appeal of the army as a career and also related to the welfare of soldiers and 
their families. 5 " 9 The army lagged behind the Royal Navy in the field of pensions and 
in 1806 William Windham, then Secretary of State for War and Colonies, proposed 
significant reforms of the system utilised by the army. If fully implemented, these 
reforms would have dramatically improved the status of the regular army as a possible 
career but they became entangled with politics and ultimately proved too ambitious." 90 
Windham recognised that for a career in the army to become viable, there was a need 
to improve pay and, most importantly, increase pensions. Following Windham's 
reforms every soldier was to receive a pension and in an effort to make some postings
M Stewart, Progressives and Radicals, pp.21-22.
5157 Stewart, Progressives and Radicals, pp.92-96; Williams, Tommy Atkins' Children, pp.24-26. 
sw J. Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Tliree 
English Towns (London, Widenfield & Nicolson, 1974), p.215; Christie. Stress and Stability, p.209.
589 Jones. 'The Military Revolution', p.41; Corvisier, Annies and Societies, pp.83-83.
590 Emsley British Society, pp. 128-9.
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more acceptable, two years served in the West Indies were to count as three served 
elsewhere. Widows' payments were not increased by Windham, although they were 
raised in 1812. Details are provided in figure 28.
Rank Pension Rank Pension Rank Pension
Colonel £50 Lieutenant £20 Chaplain £16
Major £30 Ensign £16 Surgeon £16
Captain £26 Adjutant £16 QTVtaster £16
Figure 28: Army pensions received by widows, c!796. 5 '"
Windham's crucial pension reform was to ensure that they were available to every 
soldier, along with the widows, children, siblings and even the next of kin of those 
who died in service. Examples of such payments include that of £50 to a barrack 
master in Novia Scotia; £30 to each sister of a staff surgeon; £5 to William Marsden, 
whose three sons were all dead by 1813; and £150 to the widow of Captain William 
Wheatley/92 To claim a pension a widow needed to take an oath and produce a 
certificate signed by an appropriate regimental colonel. 593 To the credit of early 
bureaucracy in the period, cases in which the full pension was not received were 
resolved as swiftly as possible. Examples include the case of a Glasgow widow who 
was proved to be £4 short of her £9 entitlement, the matter being quickly resolved 
through Chelsea Hospital. 594
Many of the pension reforms introduced by Windham would not benefit 
soldiers until later in the century. Sergeant Robert Edwards of the Wiltshire Militia 
was an example of an individual who entered the army during the Napoleonic Wars 
and, although it is pure conjecture as to whether or not his decision to enlist was 
influenced by the prospect of a pension, it is apparent that he did not receive such 
payments until 1834. Sergeant Edwards was typical of many soldiers and represents a
5!" A Treatise on Military Finance (Whitehall Egerton, 1796), p.96.
5" PRO WO 25/3995, Register of Annual Bounty Paid to Deceased Officers Widows.
5" A Treatise on Military Finance (Whitehall, Egerton, 1796), p. 116.
594 PRO WO 245/134, W. Horton to Deputy Treasurer of Chelsea Hospital, Glasgow, 1816.
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case study of how a soldier serving during the early nineteenth century benefited from 
his service in later years. Edwards enlisted in the militia, aged 28, in 1802, serving for 
30 years and 1 month. Due to a condition described by doctors as 'mental imbecility' 
he became an outpatient of Chelsea Hospital at the age of 60, residing at Bishop's 
Canning's near Devizes. His annual pension was £17 6s 83/4d, paid at quarterly 
intervals as illustrated in figure 29.
1 st January
1 st April
1 st July
1 st October
£
4
4
4
4
s
5
6
7
7
d
6
5'/4
43/4
43/4
Figure 29: Quarterly pension payments to Sergeant Robert Edwards, 1834. 5 '5
To collect his pension Edwards, like all other pensioners, was required to prove his 
identity by producing two certificates signed by local magistrates - impersonating a 
Chelsea out-patient being an offence punishable by hanging until 1818. 5% There were 
several ways in which he could have forfeited his pension, including refusal to serve 
again after less than twenty-four years in the cavalry or twenty-one years in the 
infantry; failing to claim in four successive quarters; fraud; and 'violence or outrage 
towards persons employed in paying the pensioners'. Payments received in 'countries 
not forming part of His Majesty's dominions' also required special permission from 
the authorities, but it is credit to the efficiency of nineteenth century bureaucracy that 
pensions could be paid overseas.M7
Pensions, education and providing for the families of soldiers were tasks 
shared by numerous departments. Conversely other areas of soldiers' welfare were
s "5 WSRO 632/134. Certificate(s) of Sergeant R. Edwards, Outpatient of Chelsea Hospital, 1834. 
51)6 Affidavit of Magistrate, WSRO 632/134, Certificate(s) of Sergeant R. Edwards, Out Patient of 
Chelsea Hospital, 1834; E. L. Woodward, The Age ofReforml815~1870 (Oxford, Clarendon. 1938).
p.431.
5VT Rules Governing Payment of Pensions, WSRO 632/134.
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almost the sole responsibility of certain departments, particularly in regard to the 
provision of medical care and religious services. Military medicine in the early 
nineteenth century was possibly most famous for its shortcomings. It is both an under- 
considered and under-appreciated aspect of army life in the period, while its 
availability was a tangible advantage enjoyed by soldiers over civilians. While 
facilities were often rudimentary and unsanitary they were regulated, and, in theory at 
least, staffed by trained personnel with access to up-to-date advances in medicine. At 
this juncture it is necessary to stress that military and battlefield medicine can be 
distinct and separate subjects. Battlefield medicine is concerned almost exclusively 
with wounds and other injuries sustained on the battlefield, in effect the occupational 
hazards of a career as a soldier, such as gunshot wounds. Conversely military 
medicine is much broader subject that encompasses not only battlefield medicine but 
also the provision of more general medical treatment, for those ailments and injuries 
that could be suffered by soldiers had they been civilians, such as fevers and broken 
legs caused by falls. Thus it is military medicine that forms the basis in this chapter as 
it covers the full range of activities conducted by the army's medical personnel.
The organisation with overall responsibility for the provision of medical 
services in the army was the medical board. This body consisted of the Surgeon 
General, Physician General, Inspector-General of Hospitals and a number of advisors, 
persons who were specialists in their fields but who only temporarily sat on the board. 
In 1816, for example, Surgeon James Fellows and Dr. Pym were consulted over the 
outbreak of fever amongst British troops in Spain. 591* In his general overview of the 
army in the period, P.J. Haythornthwaite is critical of the board. In particular he states 
that the individuals who sat on the board possessed their own private practices in
5 '" Army Medical Board to Secretary at War, 28th March 1816, PRO PC 1/4087, Privy Council 
Miscellaneous Unbound Papers. March 1816.
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civilian life and thus devoted little time to their military duties. 599 While there can be 
little doubt that the board frequently failed to address issues with the required vigour, 
the potential benefits of its structure should not be underestimated. In one respect a 
part-time board of this nature went against the trend of increasing professionalism in 
the army during this period, but it was also concurrent with the trend as it utilised 
skilled specialists to meet the needs of the army. By allowing the members of the 
board to continue in their more profitable civilian careers the army gained the benefit 
of their expertise without the expense of paying their full wages. In consequence even 
advisors to the board were frequently individuals of some standing and held in high 
regard. Viscount Palmerston, the future Prime Minister, described Dr Pym as being 
'an excellent man, [about which] I have heard a great deal in his favour'. 600 Due to the 
advice of individuals such as Pym, medical provision for soldiers was more advanced 
than that available to many civilians.
The very existence of the Medical Board was itself evidence of the superior 
medical provision available to soldiers compared to civilians. A similar organisation 
for the civilian population was not proposed by the Royal College of Physicians until 
1805 and, despite consisting of five rather than three permanent members, it was to 
have fewer responsibilities than its military counterpart, its primary role being to 
safeguard Britain from outbreaks of diseases such as the plague."01 The advice of its 
own Medical Board led to the army adopting some of the most up to date medical 
practices available in the early nineteenth century. 602 In particular the army was at the 
forefront of inoculation and while soldiers were not necessarily inoculated as a matter
sw Haythornthwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, p.209.
600 Palmerston to Mr. Wharton, 26th July 1813, PRO PC 1/4011, Privy Council Miscellaneous Unbound 
Papers, July 1813.
601 Royal College of Physicians to Privy Council, 5 th February 1805; Instructions to the Board of Health. 
13 th February 1805, PRO PC 1/3643, Privy Council Miscellaneous Unbound Papers, February 1805.
602 With the exception of the treatment of battlefield wounds, the army was almost always several years 
behind the practices of the Royal Navy. M. Duffy, 'The Foundations of British Naval Power', inM. 
Duff)- (ed), The Military Revolution and State, 1500 to 1800 (Exeter University, 1980), pp.74-75.
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of routine, the army invested considerable resources on the practice. 603 In March 1801, 
for example, the army spent £115 inoculating slave labourers in Jamaica. 604 
Inoculation was one of the few fields in which the army did not lag significantly 
behind the Royal Navy, widespread inoculation not being introduced for sailors until 
1798. 605
Despite the expertise of those who sat on the Medical Board, the Board should 
not be perceived as an overwhelming success and it possessed several limitations. It is 
necessary to appreciate that while those who advised and sat on the board included 
some of the most eminent physicians in Britain, some of their ideas lagged behind 
those of their continental colleagues. This was a view expressed by Thomas 
Chevalier, a surgeon of some note who not only served as Surgeon to the Prince of 
Wales but also wrote a treatise on the treatment of musket wounds that was adopted 
by both the Irish and London Royal Colleges of Surgeons. In particular he urged a 
more modern approach be adopted towards amputation, a practice limited in the 
Prussian army from the mid-eighteenth century but one that remained common in the 
British army. 606 Also apparent is that, even when the ideas of the Medical Board were 
in line with, or even in advance of, continental thinking the practice of medicine was 
further limited by nineteenth century opinions concerning anatomy, physiology and 
disease. 607
An additional factor that inhibited the Medical Board was its role as an 
advisory body. Because of this the skills of its personnel were not directly available to
603 P.E. Razell, 'Population Growth and Economic change in Eighteenth century and Early Nineteenth 
Century England and Ireland', in E.G. Jones and G.E. Mingay (eds.). Land, Labour and Population in 
the Industrial Revolution (London, Edward Arnold, 1987), pp.263.
604 NAM 7508/55/2, Particular Account Number 2. Being for Monies Paid and Advanced by Matthew 
Atkinson, Agent General.
605 Dufly, The Foundations of British Naval Power', p.74.
606 T. Chevalier, A Treatise on Gunshot Wounds (London, Bagster, 1806), pp. 104-122
607 Until the 1840s, for example, there were few advances made in the treatment of tropical diseases. 
P.D. Curtin. Disease and Empire: the Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa (CUP. 
1998), pp.5-11.
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troops in the field and it relied instead upon the personnel of other departments for 
this task. The day-to-day running of medical services in the army was the 
responsibility of the Medical Departments, one existing for each of the army's two 
branches (Horse Guards and the Ordnance). At the head of the Horse Guards Medical 
Department was a director-general and two principal inspectors, both of who were 
qualified doctors, and all three men had joint responsible for employing personnel. 
The number of other personnel employed by the department was subject to some 
variation, and the following figures are based on those of 1812. The Inspectors of 
Hospitals and their deputies oversaw hospitals, a total of eight and twenty-three of 
these personnel respectively being on strength.
The Medical Department exhibited many of the traits of such organisations in 
the period, such as a bureaucratic administration, but differed from similar bodies as 
its structure, while conforming to conventional military practices of hierarchy, was not 
a pyramid. 608 In 1812 the total number of staff employed in army hospitals were, in 
order of seniority, as follows: twenty-four physicians, one hundred and eighteen 
surgeons, ten assistant surgeons, five purveyors, twenty-five deputy purveyors and 
fifteen apothecaries. A total of thirteen personnel (an inspector, a deputy inspector, a 
deputy purveyor and ten surgeons) were noted as being foreign, although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the number of foreigners employed to have been much 
greater. 609 The discrepancy between sources such as surgeons' memoirs and returns 
concerning the number of foreign personnel employed in hospitals may be explained 
by the close co-operation that occurred between the medical services of the British 
army and those of other allied forces; certainly by the end of the peninsular war the 
forces of Britain, Spain and Portugal were co-operating so closely in military
m NAM 6807/441, Appointment of John Webb as hospital mate. 24th December 1811.
609 Army List, 1812 (London, War Office, 1812), p. See P. Hayward (ed). Surgeon Henry's Trifles:
Events of a Military Life (London, Chatto & Windus, 1970).
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operations it was inevitable that supporting services were shared. A feature of medical 
staff was the relatively large number of servants allocated compared to other 
departments, including large Commissariat stations. 610 Physicians, surgeons, 
apothecaries, purveyors and some hospital mates each had a servant assigned, while 
inspectors were each allotted two. Curiously, however, funding for these servants was 
only to be received if they were recruited from amongst the local population. 6 " This 
policy placated medical personnel who wished to have servants, but also prevented the 
employment of soldiers as servants, which was to prove a contentious issue in the
612army.
Inevitably the composition and number of staff present at each hospital varied 
according to the requirements of the army in each region. Those employed at the 
hospital of the Alexandria garrison and their rates of pay are shown below in figure 
30. A notable absence from figure 30 is a purveyor, who would have been present at a 
larger establishment but, as rarely more than half a dozen such persons were employed 
at any one time, the Alexandria hospital remains a typical example of such an 
establishment in the British army.
Rank
Pay
Deputy Inspector
Physician
Staff Surgeon
Apothecary
Deputy Purveyor
Hospital Mate
Hnsnita! Plprk
Number Present
1
1
3
1
1
6
7
£
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
Daily
s
5
-
15
10
10
7
7
Rate of
d
-
-
-
-
-
6
f>
Figure 30: The staff of the British army hospital in Alexandria, 1807. 613 
Some idea of wages relative to expenses can be found in the costs incurred by
610 See NAM 7902/36. Account Book of Assistant Commissary General George Grellier.
611 Quinto de Banos, 8th July 1811, NAM 6807/221, pp. 17-18.
6l - In 1811 orders were issued demanding that soldiers of the Peninsula army employed as servants
without authorisation be returned to their units as the use of soldiers in this role was having a
detrimental impact on manpower. NAM 6807/221, pp.14 -18.
613 NAM 8010/19, Hospital Staff at Alexandria.
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William Dent while serving as a hospital mate at Colchester: lodgings 5s per week, an 
additional charge for the use of sheets at his lodgings (Dent not citing how much this 
cost), a servant from the ranks 2s per week and meals at officers mess: breakfast Is, 
dinner 2s 6d, supper 9d.614 Subtracted from this should also be other expenses 
including the cost of clothing: in October 1810, for example, he spent £1 14s on new 
boots and a coat 6 ' 5
Due to their role surgeons, who comprised almost half the personnel of 
medical departments, were perhaps the most important medical personnel. The status 
of surgeons in the army was ambiguous and somewhat similar to that of 
commissaries. Surgeons wore a uniform (that of the infantry but with a black plume) 
and held a commission, but were not combat soldiers. Despite on occasion serving in 
hospitals that were within earshot of battle, it was not anticipated that surgeons would 
become involved in combat. This was demonstrated by the case of Surgeon Shakelton, 
who was refused compensation for a wound received because, as a surgeon, he was 
not expected to be in the line of fire (although in this case the wound had been caused 
by a stray bullet some distance from the battle). 616 It was not only surgeons serving in 
war zones, however, who had reason to feel aggrieved about their perceived low 
standing in the army: militia surgeons were amongst the lowest paid and in 1804 a 
group serving in Ireland petitioned the Duke of York for an increase in pay. 617 Despite 
such instances it would be incorrect to assume that the army failed to acknowledge the 
contribution of surgeons to the war effort and the sacrifices they could make. An 
interesting example is that of Surgeon Dr. William Irvine, who died of a fever 
contracted whilst treating prisoners of war: his widow received £60 in compensation
614 Dent to Mother, Colchester, 5th March 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
615 Dent to Mother. London, 30th October 1808, NAM 7008/11/2.
616 Sometimes referred to as Shekelton. PRO WO 43/366, Wound gratuity refused to aim) surgeon 
Robert Shakelton.
617 NAM 6801/43, Letter from Irish Militia Surgeons to the Duke of York Expressing Concerns about
Pay, C1804.
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, 618for her husband's death as it was considered to have been in the line of duty. 6
The cases of Shakelton and Irvine demonstrate that the life of an army surgeon 
could be dangerous; while their skills ensured that they would be moved between 
regiments, garrisons or theatres of war as required. Thus, unlike fighting soldiers who 
may well have remained with the same regiment for the duration of their career, 
surgeons had little regimental loyalty. Consider, for example, the career of William 
Dent. His first encounter with military medicine occurred in February 1809 while he 
was still a medical student and continued for several months at Colchester Barracks. &[V 
In May 1810 he qualified as a surgeon but continued to serve as a hospital mate at 
Hilsea Barracks. In August 1810 he arrived at Gibraltar to take up the post of 
Assistant Surgeon to the 9th Regiment but, due to the delay in receiving mail, did not 
receive confirmation of his new role until September. Dent then stayed at Gibraltar 
until March 1811, spending three months treating French prisoners of war at Cadiz. 
Until May he served as acting surgeon at Tarifa and then spent the winter in Portugal. 
In October 1814 he arrived in Canada, returned to England the following August and 
then served in the army of occupation. In 1819 he returned to England before being 
posted to St. Vincents in April. He was subsequently posted to Dominica in October 
1820 and Trinidad in April 1823, after which he was promoted to surgeon."20
Except for those employed as veterinaries (which was in any case a separate 
department), all army surgeons were expected to hold an appropriate qualification. 021 
Thus these individuals comprised a group of qualified persons, a situation reflected in 
a growing professionalism amongst army surgeons. This was evident in a petition 
made by militia surgeons in 1804, which in addition to improved pay, called for staff
appointments to be made available and the allowances of militia surgeons to be
61S PRO WO 25/3995, Register of Annual Bounty Paid to Deceased Officers' Widows.
619 See below p.200
620 See NAM 7008/11, Dent Letters.
621 EighthReport of Military Enquiry (London, Office of the Secretary at War, 1809), p. 150.
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brought into line with those of the regulars (militia surgeons had to serve for fifteen 
years before gaining the same rights as their counterparts in the regulars). Most 
significantly the petition highlighted the fact that a majority of these surgeons already 
had successful careers in civilian life, to which they would return if their situation did 
not improve. 622 Yet, despite possessing qualifications and demonstrating growing 
professionalism, there remained a number of surgeons who were of questionable 
competence.
Surgeon Henry was highly critical of his superior, a German surgeon, and 
noted that he was 'much fonder of schnapps than of surgery; and from keeping late 
hours, not particularly punctual in his morning visits at the hospital; in fact, 
sometimes staying away altogether three or four days'. 623 Interestingly, similar 
comments were made in regard to another surgeon in 1825, who was subsequently 
court-martialled. While falling just outside of the period covered by this work, the 
case of Surgeon Inglis is of significance as it reveals what the army expected of 
competent surgeons and their responsibilities. Inglis faced three charges in relation to 
his conduct at the army hospital on Corfu and it is interesting to note that while 
ostensibly a surgeon of the Ordnance Medical Department, the surgeon operated 
alongside those of Horse Guards. 624 The first charge was of:
Great irregularity in his attendance on Sergeant Reavil of the Royal Artillery 
while in hospital having proscribed for him irregularly, and not having paid 
that attention to his case which it appears to have demanded... [and also] 
conduct tending to aggravate the complaint."25
Surgeons were expected to attend their patients at least twice a day 'to keep regular
622 NAM 6801/43, Letter from Irish Militia Surgeons to the Duke of York Expressing Concerns about 
Pay, c!804.
623 Hayward (ed), Surgeon Henry's Trifles, p.29.
624 PRO WO 71/114, General Courts Martial of Assistant Surgeon Charles Inglis.
625 Charges Preferred Against Assistant Surgeon Charles Inglis of the Ordnance Medical Department 
Office of Ordnance, Corfu 10th November 1825, PRO WO 71/114, General Courts Martial of Assistant 
Surgeon Charles Inglis.
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books of diseases, medicines, diet tables and hospital funds'. 626 Inglis' failure to keep 
adequate records of either the treatment or progress of his patients was raised in the 
second charge:
Negligence as a medical officer in not having regularly recorded or detailed 
the symptoms of Sergeant ReaviPs case, nor the cases of other patients in his 
diary journal or register. 627
The third charge was basically an addition to the first and would no doubt have 
seemed familiar to Surgeon Henry, specifically 'general irregularity in hours of 
visiting his patients in hospital, and for general inattention to those entitled to his 
attendance out of hospital'. 628
The charges demonstrate that surgeons were expected to attend their patients 
regularly and keep records. This is hardly surprising, although the second part of the 
third charge, relating to patients outside of hospital, is revealing. During the hearing it 
was to emerge that Inglis failed to attend at the quarters of a sick officer, and it was 
the opinion of the court that it was the duty of an army surgeon to make house calls of 
this nature. Indeed, this was perceived as being of equal importance to his work in 
hospital. Another important issue raised in the case was the failure of Inglis to treat a 
civilian employed as the servant of an officer. Again the court ruled against the 
surgeon, indicating that servants and non-military personnel were regarded as part of 
the military establishment in regard to eligibility for medical treatment, even though 
they may not have been eligible to draw rations or clothing from the army. 62S
Non-military personnel were referred to in regulations as 'inferior persons' and 
the procedures for the treatment of such persons employed by the Commissariat were 
outlined in the following order:
626 NAM 6807/370/29, Orders For Regimental Hospitals, 1804.
627 PRO WO 71/114, Charges Preferred Against Assistant Surgeon Charles Inglis.
628 PRO WO 71/114.
62y Office of Ordnance, Corfu, 8th November 1825, PRO WO 71/114.
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Whenever any of the inferior persons of the Commissariat department may 
require admission into any field or general hospitals application for that 
purpose must be made by the Commissariat officer under whom such inferior 
person or persons may be serving, to the senior medical officer of the hospital. 
And the Commissariat officer will send the sick person to the hospital with a 
ticket, specifying his name, trade and place of birth. 630
Of note is that admission of 'inferior persons' to hospital, unlike cases involving 
military personnel, required authorisation from both the commanding officer and the 
senior medical officer, not just a sick certificate. The order also addresses the 
difficulty of identifying the large number of persons employed by the Commissariat, 
as the commanding officer was to provide proof of identity. This would have been of 
additional importance overseas, given that the personnel may have been locals unable 
to speak English. 631
The trial of Surgeon Inglis demonstrated that the army would not tolerate 
incompetent surgeons. In addition to doubts about their abilities, however, surgeons 
were also vulnerable to accusations of fraud and embezzlement due to their 
responsibility for medical stores including medicine but also items such as food for 
patients. Such charges were not always correct and in 1815, for example, Surgeon 
Barker, then serving with the 11 th Regiment of foot at Gibraltar, was cleared of 
charges relating to embezzlement and failure to carry out his duty, although it was the 
opinion of the court that he had made some 'dubious decisions'. 632
As a group surgeons were open to criticism but it is important to highlight in 
their defence that their effectiveness could be influenced by other factors. The daily 
running of hospitals effectively rested not with themselves but the sergeants allocated 
to each ward. Possessing at best a rudimentary knowledge of medicine, these
individuals were expected to fulfil a variety of diverse duties within hospitals on a
630 Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
631 See above p.63.
632 PRO WO 17/113, Proceedings Against Surgeon Barker, 1815.
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daily basis. These included ensuring rooms were ventilated and cleaned, that 'no man 
able to sit up is to lie upon his bed during the day', taking responsibility for patients' 
possessions, washing patients, and administering medicine. 633 Thus the success of 
treatments prescribed or administered by surgeons depended to a degree upon the 
abilities of the non-commissioned officers who ran each ward. If, for example, a 
surgeon correctly prescribed a medicine, this could only be effective if the sergeant 
ensured that it was administered.
Besides specialist knowledge to be effective the sergeants appointed to run 
wards also required integrity but this was a trait not always apparent in either 
themselves or their staff. Theft from patients was common, and of his time spent in 
hospital at Wlachern Private Thomas Howell of the 71 st Regiment of Foot noted that:
All the time I was in hospital, my soul was oppressed by the distress of my 
fellow-sufferers, and shocked at the conduct of the hospital men. Often I have 
seen them fighting over the expiring bodies of the patients, their eyes not yet 
closed in death, for articles of apparel that two had seized at once; cursing and 
oaths mingling with the dying groans and prayers of the poor sufferers.634
Besides the limitations of those responsible for the daily running of hospitals, another 
factor that could hinder surgeons was that the system could be stretched beyond 
capacity by a large number of casualties sustained during a single military operation, a 
problem not only in war zones but also Britain itself. This was demonstrated during 
the Walcheren operation, which saw wounded conveyed directly from the war zone to 
hospitals in southern and eastern Britain, and the opening phases of the peninsular 
war, when the required infrastructure to handle large numbers of casualties was not in 
place locally. In such circumstances there was often an insufficient number of 
surgeons available, as the hospitals were prepared to cope with the sick and,
633 NAM 6807/370/29, Orders For Regimental Hospitals, 1804.
634 Hibbert (ed),.4 Soldier of the. 71st, p.45.
199
occasionally, wounded soldiers encountered in a garrison, not battlefield casualties, 
while under normal conditions the ratio of the sick to medical personnel in garrison 
hospitals could be as low as eight to one. 635 This resulted in medical students being 
sent into the hospitals at times of crisis and for William Dent this was to be his first 
experience of military medicine. The situation was such that he wrote 'the wounded 
are so numerous and the assistant surgeons so scarce, that the poor men are actually 
lost for want of surgical aid'. 636 Besides being practical training for his future career 
(and enabling him to attain the rank of hospital mate before qualifying as a surgeon) it 
is interesting to note that service in the hospitals at this time gave Dent opportunities 
rarely encountered as he civilian. He recorded that l l am glad that I came here 
[Colchester Barracks] for besides attending the sick and wounded we have the 
privilege of dissecting those who die, and in London we could not get a dead body
> 637under three guineas'.
When a soldier was injured on the battlefield the first stage of his treatment 
was conveyance to a medical post or field hospital. The process of transporting 
wounded away from the field of battle was beset with difficulties. Essential for the 
rapid removal of wounded was the provision of sufficient transport but this was not 
always achieved. Captain John Aitchinson of the 3 rd Regiment of Foot Guards 
highlighted this, when he noted that in the aftermath of the Battle of Salamanca there 
was sufficient transport in the 1 st Division to transport only 42 wounded, despite the 
fact that the formation suffered 300 such casualties. 63" The small number of wagons 
available to remove wounded after a battle was noted by the Duke of Wellington. He 
believed, however, the cause of the problem was not a poor allocation of wagons per
635 Dent to his Mother. Hilsea Barracks, 24th June 1810, NAM 7008/11/2.
636 Dent to his Mother. London. 17th February 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
637 Dent to his Mother, Colchester, 5th March 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
S3S Thompson (ed), An Ensign in the Peninsular War, p.220; Smith, Napoleonic Wars Data Book,
p.381.
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se but rather the utilisation of those allocated to transport items such as regimental 
account books. As a result general orders were issued restricting the practice but this 
did little to improve the process of casualty removal from the battlefield. 639
It is necessary to note that it was not practical for a division to possess a 
number of wagons sufficient to remove all its casualties at the same time, not least 
because casualty rates could vary from battle to battle. At Talavera, for example, 
Aitchinson's division suffered over 1,800 wounded, six times the number sustained at 
Salamanca in the following year. 640 As a result it was inevitable that a number of 
movements would be required to clear casualties but this was hindered by other 
shortcomings. Of major importance was the absence of an effective triage system at 
any point in the process of casualty removal or treatment, with casualties being 
removed from the field as encountered and not according to the seriousness of their 
injuries.
A factor that aggravated the difficulties caused by insufficient transport was 
lack of discipline. Looting would invariably follow victory, while in the aftermath of a 
defeat the wounded would be left to fend for themselves as the army left the field. 
Himself wounded during the Battle of Salamanca, the anonymous author of Life in the 
38th Foot wrote that 'I was so weak that I could not get in [the sick wagon] of myself 
so I was left laying on the ground and was taken prisoner'. 641 Those taken prisoner 
were perhaps fortunate as they were spared the fate of many other injured comrades, 
who, due to the lack of attention paid to the wounded in the aftermath of a battle, fell 
victim to looters, succumbed to their injuries or died of exposure as they lay on the 
battlefield. Immediately after a battle swarms of looters would descend, primarily 
locals but also soldiers and their wives. Captain Browne noted soldiers' wives were
6M Gurwood (ed), General Orders, p.49.
640 Smith. Napoleomc Wars Data Book, p.327.
641 NAM 7912/21, Anon, Life in the 38th Foot, p.52.
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particularly vicious looters, writing that:
They covered in number the ground of the field of battle when the action was 
over, and were seen stripping and plundering friend and foe alike. It is not 
doubted that they gave the finishing blow, to many an officer who was 
struggling with a mortal wound; Major Offley of the 23rd Regiment, who lay 
on the ground, unable to move, but not dead, is said to have fallen victim to 
this unheard of barbarity. 1542
After this looting many bodies were simply left to decompose and following a battle 
the dead were often left on the field in great numbers. During the days following the 
storming of Badajoz Ensign Hennell complained of 'constantly treading on feet or 
heads'. 643 The aftermath of Salamanca was particularly grim, Private Wheeler 
complaining that following the battle 'the smell from a few dead bodies was very 
offensive' and Captain Browne understandably found 'the sight of unburied comrades, 
undergoing the different changes and progress towards putrefaction' particularly 
distressing. 544 Arriving in October 1812, three months after the battle, Conductor of 
Stores W. Morris wrote of the battlefield that 'it still presents a shocking spectacle, 
great numbers remain on the ground, some partly buried with their bones scattered 
about, sculls [sic] and teeth. The effluence arising from it is very offensive'. 64" 
Interestingly, barely a generation later in the late nineteenth-century, the failure to 
bury the dead of either side after a battle would be seen by Europeans as a 
characteristic of so called 'primitive' cultures such as the Zulu. 646
A wounded soldier fortunate enough to be conveyed away from the battlefield 
then had to await treatment in a field hospital, which was often a makeshift
642 R. N. Buckley (ed). The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Tliomas Henry Browne 1807 - 1816 
(London, Army Records Society, 1987). p!74.
643 M. Glover (ed), A Gentleman Volunteer: Tlie Letters of George Hennell From the Peninsular War
1812-13 (London, Heinemann, 1979), p!8;
644 Liddell - Hart (ed). The Letters of Private Wlieeler, p89; Buckley (ed). Journal of Captain Tlwmas
Henry Browne, p232.
643 4th October 1812, NAM 7508/24, Notebook of W. Morris, Conductor of Stores. 1812.
646 During his second invasion of Zululand, Lord Chelmsford avoided the battlefield of Isandlwana due
to the remains of British soldiers that lay on the ground months after the engagement. D. Rattray,
Anglo-Zulu War Battlefields (Bamsley, Leo Cooper, 2003), p. 135.
202
establishment in a hastily acquired local building such as a farmhouse. Here, despite 
the best efforts of surgeons, large numbers of casualties would result in a backlog that 
could take days to clear. In 1811 Dent was given the task of caring for wounded 
French prisoners of war, during which time he witnessed the consequences of a 
medical system without triage, and a situation where certain individuals were 
inevitably given a low priority:
We found these unfortunate creatures in a most wretched condition; I think 
without exception the ugliest wounds I ever saw, numbers of them having 
fractured limbs from grape shot, and not being dressed for three days after the 
action (on account of our own wounded being so numerous) they really had a 
frightful appearance, and to crown all, they were laying on the floor, it being 
impossible to procure hospital bedsteads in sufficient numbers. 647
One positive consequence of the lack of triage was that there was little respect of rank 
regarding the treatment of the wounded in hospital. In such situations Surgeon Henry 
claimed to have worked on the principle of'first come, first served; without respect of 
persons [or their rank]'. 64*1
Facilities with resources stretched beyond capacity, poor medical practice and 
a limited understanding of human physiology were not the only factors that restricted 
the effectiveness of surgeons in the British army. The failure of the army to supply 
hospitals adequately with basic medicines and equipment hampered surgeons. The 
Duke of Wellington complained to Lord Castlereagh that even a relatively small 
battle, such as Talavera, would deplete hospital stores. 649 Perhaps the most significant 
difficulty facing surgeons, however, was that one of the most common lethal wounds, 
and therefore the most frequently treated, were those inflicted by musket balls. This 
was unfortunate as musket balls were capable of inflicting horrific and potentially life-
647 Dent to his Mother, Gibraltar, 21 st August 1811, NAM 7008/11/2.
S4S Hayward (ed), Surgeon Henry's Trifles, p82.
649 Wellington to Castlereagh, Talavera, 21 st August 1809, PRO WO 1/228, War Department in Letters
and Papers, 1808-1820.
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threatening injuries. Of such injuries Chevalier wrote that:
a wound of this description must... produce more or less contusion and 
laceration of the wounded parts; will often be accompanied with haemorrhage; 
the fracture of a bone; and, in many instances, with the lodgement of 
extraneous substances. 630
Frequently the velocity of gunshots was sufficient to allow a musket ball to strip 
muscle from bone after entering the body, further adding to the trauma caused by the 
injury. 651
Despite the severe damage inflicted by gunshots even serious wounds could be 
survived. In 1813, for example, Lieutenant Bingham noted how a soldier of his 
regiment survived being shot through both his nose and the roof of his mouth. 652 This 
is remarkable considering that, prior to Chevalier's treatise, the accepted medical 
practice in regard to gunshot wounds was, quite literally, hit and miss. In his treatise 
Chevalier urged surgeons to open wounds prior to operating. This was because such 
practice was perceived to be:
generally safer and better, and often gives much less pain, than poking into a 
narrow and inadequate aperture, or making a random plunge, which may 
include parts that had better be avoided, and perhaps even miss the vessel it 
was intended to secure. 6'3
While primitive by twenty-first-century standards, the advice contained within 
Chevalier's work was a step forwards. Thus, the Royal Colleges of Surgeons adopted 
Chevalier's treatise in 1806 but until this information was disseminated to surgeons 
the wounded continued to suffer the 'random plunge' of medical instruments.
After leaving the field hospital the casualty, depending on the seriousness or 
nature of the injuries sustained, could return straight to his unit, begin a period of
650 T. Chevalier,^ Treatise on Gunshot Wounds (London, Bagster, 1806), p.2.
651 Chevalier, A Treatise on Gunshot Wounds, p. 97.
652 Bingham to his mother, nr Echelar, 3"1 April 1813, NAM 6807/163, p.59.
653 Chevalier. .4 Treatise on Gunshot Wounds, p.75.
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convalescence or be sent to a permanent hospital, such establishments tending to be 
located around six to ten leagues from the lead elements of the army. 654 If transferred 
to another hospital those able to walk made their journey on foot while the others 
were conveyed in wagons or upon mules. Compared to the situation regarding 
transport assigned to remove casualties, transportation for those moving between 
hospitals was relatively well organised: a wagon was assigned to transport the packs 
of the wounded, while mules were allotted to carry either specified personnel or 
medicine. 6^ A column of such troops was placed in the charge of either a surgeon or 
an assistant surgeon and given rations for the required number of days, pre-cooked if 
possible. 6^ Containing large numbers of personnel and slow moving, these columns 
frequently caused heavy congestion on routes used for the transport of supplies and 
other military purposes. In November 1812, for example, Conductor of Stores W. 
Morris noted that 'the road [to Almeida] was wholly lined with sick and convalescing 
troops', making the movement of his supply column impossible. 657
Some personnel did not survive these journeys and William Dent noted of 
casualties arriving in Britain that 'several [officers] have died and the men were 
buried by dozens... the landing at Harwich was truly an awful sight, several men died 
in the landing on the beach'. fo8 For those that did survive, however, the eventual 
destinations varied. Convalescing personnel generally remained at the rear of the 
army, although officers could be allowed to return home. In such cases the period of 
absence was strictly defined and contact was to be made with the appropriate 
headquarters as soon as it ended (commissaries, for example, were expected to report 
to the office of the Commissary General). 659 For the remaining sick and wounded the
654 Quinta, 23tJ June 181L NAM 6807/221, p.16.
655 PortaLegre, 23 rd My 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.21.
656 Thomar. 8th March 1811, NAM 6807/221, p.8.
657 Wednesday 18th November 1812, NAM 7508/24.
S5tl Dent to Mother, Colchester, 12th September 1809, NAM 7008/11/2.
S5 " Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
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likely destination would have been either a permanent hospital or hospital ship, either 
of which could have been in the same region as their posting or Britain.
Twenty-six hospital ships were active during the course of the Napoleonic and 
Revolutionary Wars, although the highest number active in a single year was nine in 
1799. The navy had used hospital ships since Tudor times but the army had made little 
use of them and initially viewed such vessels as being little more than transports for 
the sick and wounded, although from 1808 limited use was made of them as floating 
hospitals (such as HMS Charon). Prior to this soldiers had been treated aboard similar 
vessels in colonies, such as HMS Seraphis in Jamaica, where shore-based medical 
facilities were limited. Some craft were designated as stationary hospital ships and 
permanently moored at a single location. Such vessels were not always well placed 
and one was moored a league off the coast of Cornwall, where it was noted that for at 
least one week per year poor weather made it 'almost impossible for a boat to have 
any intercourse [with the shore]'. 660 Hospital ships were often no more than regular 
naval or merchant vessels, converted through the addition of extra bedding, and often 
retained a secondary role as store ships (such has HMS Magnificent). They were 
described as being cramped, dirty and airless. 601
Those soldiers sent to a regimental hospital were in theory better off than their 
comrades afloat. Regimental hospitals were governed by numerous regulations 
concerning ventilation, hygiene and diet but these were frequently circumvented or 
just ignored due to circumstance, lethargy or conftision. Much emphasis, for example, 
was placed on cleanliness but instructions regarding this could be vague. Consider the 
following order, which relates to the cleaning of wards: 'occasionally, in fine weather,
the rugs and blankets [are] to be hung out and well aired, and the bedsteads and
660 Secretary of Customs, Extract on the Report on the Collector and Comptroller of the Customs at 
Sciliy Relative to the Stationary Hospital Ships', 2nd February 1805. PRO PC 1/3643.
661 PRO ADM 102/1, Hospital Ship Musters; Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Plumridge, Hospital Ships and 
Ambulance Trains (London, Seeley, 1975), pp. 16-26.
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canvas to be washed with soap and water, and the plastered walls to be frequently 
whitewashed' 662 . Although the requirement for regular cleaning is note worthy there 
was little real guidance in regard to the frequency of this activity. Is occasionally 
weekly, monthly, six monthly or bi-annually? And what of'frequently whitewashed'? 
Clearly there was a need for the frequencies to be stipulated, although even when this 
occurred it raised further questions: windows, for example, were to be opened daily 
but there is no indication whether this order was rescinded in winter. Often the 
regulations, even if the hospital staff wished to adhere to them, were simply 
impractical or even impossible. It is apparent that the orders were written with ideal 
conditions (such as those encountered in Britain) in mind. It was stated, for example, 
that each man was to be allocated a bed, the linen of which was to be changed 
fortnightly, and 5 feet of space. In practice hospital overcrowding, particularly 
following a large battle or in regions prone to high rates of sickness prevented such 
luxuries. At times the only available bedding was straw on the floor and space, 
especially in the wards of the West Indies, could be as little as 22 inches. 663
There can be little doubt that conditions in military hospitals could be 
unpleasant and even hazardous to health, with death rates ranging from one in sixty- 
seven in Britain to one in twenty-four in the Caribbean. 664 For patients this state of 
affairs was readily, and depressingly, apparent: Private Wheeler of the 51 st Regiment 
of Foot spent five weeks in hospital with a fever and noted that during this time, in a 
bed adjacent to his own, five men died and another left in 'a hopeless state', while the 
anonymous writer of Life in the 38th was convinced he would not survive a prolonged 
stay in hospital665 .
662 NAM 6807/370/29, Orders For Regimental Hospitals, 1804.
663 Statistical Report on the Sickness Mortality and Invaliding Among the Troops of the West Indies 
(London. HMSO, 1838), p.4.
664 Ibid.
665 Liddell - Hart (ed), The Letters of Private Wheeler, p. 153; NAM 7912/21, Anon Life in the 38th 
Foot, p. 24.
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The experience of a period spent in hospital would have been worsened for 
many soldiers by the strict regulations governing them. It is interesting to note that 
these regulations were to be posted in each hospital on a large notice and read out to 
new patients, in a manner similar to modern day health and safety regulations. A 
hospital uniform consisting of white long coat, flannel waist coat, shirt, trousers and 
cap was to be worn at all times and entry to hospitals was strictly controlled so visits 
from colleagues were rare. To ensure these rules were adhered to sentinels were 
appointed:
to prevent all persons from entering the hospital, the staff, or officers in 
uniform, patients and servants of the hospital excepted; to be particularly 
careful in preventing liquor, or anything improper from being carried into the 
hospital. No patients to be allowed to go out without a ticket of leave from the 
surgeon. 666
Ward sergeants were responsible for imposing further restrictions and were instructed 
to 'prevent patients from spitting on the floor, irregularities, gaming [and] swearing', 
as well as preventing the defacing of hospital property. Although perhaps not common 
activities while in the ranks on the parade ground, these would have been common 
amongst soldiers at rest or even on the march, in regimental hospitals, however, 
soldiers were continually under the watchful gaze of the sergeants, who were to report 
any disobedience (although there is little evidence that sergeants did so). In addition to 
these restrictions normal military conventions, such as morning roll call, continued to 
be applied. Then, adding to the misery of a soldier wounded in service of his country, 
was the fact that he was also deducted nine pence per day for the duration of his stay 
in hospital! 667
After several weeks or months in hospital patients would be either sent back to 
their units or allowed a period of convalescing. Some, such as Lieutenant Anderson of
666 Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
667 Standing Orders, Order No. 52, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
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the 78th Regiment of Foot, who was wounded at the Battle of Fuentas d'Onoro, were 
granted permission to return home for the period of convalescence. 66" While popular 
with those concerned it was less so with senior army officers, who resented the loss of 
manpower: although required to maintain contact with the army, the personnel could 
still take days or weeks to return to a war zone depending on the movement of 
shipping. 669 The Duke of Wellington in particular was known to be critical of the 
policy allowing troops to return to Britain and Lieutenant Bingham noted 'Lord 
Wellington is very adverse to sparing a man; and the two words "return home" puts 
him into a fury'. 670 Other than officers, however, few soldiers enjoyed the privilege of 
being allowed permission to return home to convalesce. Private Green of the 68th 
Regiment of Foot was typical of soldiers allowed to convalesce by being given light 
duties. Billeted in a makeshift prefabricated hut along with fellow convalescing 
soldiers, he spent his time sweeping the streets of Lisbon until considered able to 
return to his regiment. 671 Even more common than the light duties in which Green was 
engaged while convalescing was an immediate return to the soldier's unit. This policy 
was popular with senior officers as it released manpower but frequently troops 
returned to active duty too early, a situation which brought with it implications for 
their health. Many officers were unsympathetic to the difficulties experienced by such 
men and Major Dickson of the artillery complained that 'our sick increase again, for 
the soldiers that have been cured of agues, from the imprudence in exposing 
themselves unnecessarily to the sun, have had many relapses'. 672
Besides demonstrating a considerable lack of humanity (or, perhaps, a failure 
to understand the processes involved in recovery from an illness), Dickson's
66S J. Anderson, Recollections of a Peninsula Veteran (London, Edward Arnold, 1913), p.70. 
Ms Standing Orders, Order No. 51, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
670 Bingham to his mother Burgos, 3Ili October 1812, NAM 6807/163, p.98.
671 J. Green. The Vicissitudes of a Soldier 'slife (Cambridge, Ken Trotman, 1996), pp.201-202.
67- J. H. Leslie. The Dickson Manuscripts, vol I, (Woolwich, Royal Artillery Institution, 1905), p. 103.
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complaint demonstrates that, in addition to wounds sustained during battle, patients 
were admitted to hospital with other complaints and conditions (in this case described 
as 'agues'). It is important to appreciate that military hospitals were not only filled 
with the wounded as soldiers could find themselves requiring medical attention for a 
variety of reasons. In such instances admittance to hospital was achieved through 
presentation for a sick certificate, applications for which were made through the office 
of the Adjutant-General or, in the case of Commissariat personnel, the Commissary 
General. 673 These applications were assessed by medical boards, which met at selected 
hospitals on the fifth, twelfth and twentieth days of each month. 674
Admittance to hospital for treatment of various ailments was an advantage 
enjoyed by soldiers over civilians because, despite their failings, military 
establishments were relatively well regulated and, while not free, incurred only a 
minor cost. Despite these advantages, however, disease and rigours of service took a 
toll on many soldiers. On 31 st May 1808 Captain Jennings' of the 28th Regiment made 
his decision to retire from the army, stating that:
at this time my health having suffered considerably and finding myself no 
longer fit to encounter the hardship of actual service I resolve to retire... after 
eighteen years service chiefly foreign in which period I completed several hard 
campaigns without ever having experienced any wounds or other corporal 
injury, the usual consequence of field service. 675
During service he had suffered from an occasional liver complaint, in addition to 
'violent and alarming' bleeding from his head towards the end of his career.676 It is 
interesting to note that Jennings, despite the failing health that he attributed to military 
service, regarded himself as fortunate not to have sustained any wounds. Considering
that Jennings avoided the fiercest fighting of the Napoleonic Wars this may at first
673 Standing Orders, Order No. 51, NAM 6807/221, p. 11.
674 Cartaxo, 5th December 1810, NAM 6807/221, pp.3-4.
675 NAM 8301/102, Memoirs of Captain Peter Jennings. pp.133-4.
676 Ibid, p. 134.
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appear unremarkable, although the intensity of the fighting prior to the Peninsular War 
should not be underestimated. The significance of Jenning's case is that it 
demonstrates a soldier's health could suffer despite avoiding the trauma of injury on 
the battlefield.
Due to a combination of factors such as the limitations of nineteenth-century 
science, poor living conditions encountered by soldiers on campaign and the 
seriousness of wounds inflicted on the battlefield, death was a feature of military 
medicine during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Many soldiers doubted they 
would survive time in hospital and in such situations turned to religion for comfort. 
Clergy, however, were often notable by their absence and Private Wheeler complained 
that there was 'no minister of religion to cheer the dying sinner' while in hospital. 677 
This was despite the fact that the army had a commitment to provide clergy, and 
associated facilities, to enable religious observance amongst its troops, including those 
in hospital.
The organisation responsible for providing soldiers with access to religion was 
the Chaplain General's Department, whose personnel operated at divisional level. 571* 
Chaplains were exclusively Anglican in this period, and it was not until much later in 
the nineteenth century that those from other faiths were introduced. 679 This was a 
direct result of the relationship between the army and state in the period, and the role 
of religion in the latter. Church and state in Britain were closely linked, the monarch 
being both head of state and head of the Church of England. Ideologically the 
maintenance of Protestantism was perceived as vital to concepts of cultural identity, 
parliamentary democracy and the British way of life. 680 Non-Anglicans were viewed
677 Liddell - Hart, Tlie Letters of Private Wieeler, p. 153.
67S Adjutant General Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811, NAM
6807/221, pp.3 9-40.
679 G. Hanies-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
passim; J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, Johnathan Cape, 1973), p. 137.
6m Co\ley, Britons, p.382.
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with suspicion or hostility and Catholicism in particular was perceived as being 
particularly dangerous, with the fear of 'Popery' sometimes reaching hysteria. This 
manifested itself during the general election of 1807, described by Clive Emsley as 
being one of the most sectarian in British history, and saw Lord Grenville's 
government defeated by the Duke of Portland running on an anti-Popery ticket.6" 
Another faith singled out as the target of suspicion was Methodism, a faith seen as 
subversive as it was non-hierarchical. 6"2 The prejudices inherent in the state were 
transferred directly to the army through regulations that limited the employment of 
non-Anglicans, imposing a glass ceiling on their advancement by restricting them to 
the rank of Captain or lower. 683
Regulations limiting the advancement of non-Anglicans were based on the fear 
of subversion and rebellion, yet it is important to note that even the Anglican faith 
could at times be disruptive and not conducive to good military order. An example of 
a potentially serious conflict between the religious beliefs of an individual and 
military duty arose in 1808, when Private Philip Arthurs of the militia was 
'imprisoned in the gaol of St. Helens for refusing to attend the regimental drills and 
military reviews on Sundays, from scruples of conscience and praying belief 6M 
Arthurs was not a Dissenter but an Anglican, evidence that even adherents of the state 
religion could come into conflict with military authorities. Arthurs appealed against 
his imprisonment, stating that he would be willing to attend on a weekday. The 
military authorities stated that allowing the militia to choose their own day of drill 
would undermine discipline, although the appeal was dismissed by the Privy Council
681 Emsley, British Society, p. 129.
682 Royle, Revolutionary Britannia, p. 14.
683 Cookson, ne British Armed Nation, p. 156.
684 PRO PC 1/3 866, Petition Brought by Philip Arthurs, Private of the South West Regiment of the 
Jersey militia, 11 th April 1809.
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on the grounds that Sunday morning drill was the least disruptive for those employed 
as labourers, farmers and fishermen. 685
The case of the Philip Arthurs was a clear example of how religious beliefs 
could undermine discipline as they resulted in imprisonment. Less apparent, however, 
were the views of soldiers that, while rarely resulting in overt opposition to military 
practices, could potentially undermine discipline and morale. While serving on a court 
martial in 1813, for example, George Hennell wrote that he disproved of the system 
because 'I am accountable to a superior tribunal whose judge has said "Blessed are the 
merciful for they shall obtain mercy'". 686 Another soldier whose views were shaped by 
his religious beliefs was Quarter Master William Surtees, who served with the Rifle 
Brigade and underwent a profound religious conversion while serving in Spain, after 
which he became highly critical of his fellow officers. 687 Soldiers who sought to 
convert their comrades to their views often met with abuse and even threats of 
violence, as discovered by the anonymous author of Life in the 38!h Foot who admitted 
his constant preaching made him unpopular. 688
It is apparent that in regard to religion the army was perceived as a bulwark of 
the Protestant state, yet was itself was not excessively Protestant. 689 Regulations such 
as the Mutiny Act served to limit the role of non-Anglicans, and Catholics in 
particular, but did not prevent them from serving and pursuing a worthwhile career.690 
Not only did the ranks contain non-Anglicans but also the army co-operated with large 
numbers of such personnel. Examples include the personnel employed by the 
Commissariat in regions such as Spain and Italy, and the armies of Allied nations that
s*5 PRO PC 1/3866. Response of John de Veulle Griffith, Jersey, 16th August 1809. 
6SS Glover (ed), ,4 Gentleman Volunteer, p. 113.
687 Surtees, Twenty Five Years in the Rifle Brigade, p.314.
688 NAM 7912/21, pp.33-34.
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were predominantly Catholic. 691 Protestantism was a principle that the state was 
willing to sacrifice in the face of military necessity, whether it was overriding the 
rights of an individual to worship on a Sunday or accepting Catholics and Dissenters 
into its ranks if not the hierarchy. The latter in particular was to be significant, leading 
to reforms that had implications for society in general. 692
Despite high-minded principles such as defending the Church of England, the 
actual policy towards religion in the army can be best described as lethargic. This was 
apparent at the most basic level, specifically the allocation of chaplains. While 
divisional chaplains were, in theory at least, present in regular formations, there was 
no such provision in the auxiliary formations. This was caused by the structure of 
militia, volunteer and fencible units, formations that were often administered outside 
of a divisional structure and thus unable to benefit from the existence of associated 
personnel. In consequence chaplains were assigned to certain auxiliary formations, but 
were rarely on the active strength of such units. This was demonstrated by the case of 
Reverend Samuel Wells, who was appointed as chaplain to the Coleridge Volunteer 
Artillery in 1804. Despite the formation conducting drills and meeting on a regular 
basis, he was instructed not take up the full responsibilities of his post and 'not to take 
rank in the army except during the time of the said corps being called out into actual
service'. 693
By failing to integrate chaplains fully into the structure of auxiliary formations, 
the effectiveness of such individuals could have been undermined by lack of 
familiarity with those under their care. In part this could have been avoided due to the 
nature of auxiliary units, which tended to be drawn from a single locality, but it is
possible that such a chaplain would have known few individuals originating from
SV1 See above p.62.
Gn Cookson. The British Armed Nation, p. 156.
693 NAM 6807/405, Commission from Lord Lieutenant of Devon appointing Samuel Wells Chaplain to
the Coleridge Corps of Royal Volunteer Artillery, 24th October 1804.
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outside of his own parish. Even chaplains in regular formations, however, failed to 
make close bonds with troops in regular formations. This included even the overtly 
religious memoirists Quartermaster Surtees who evidently underwent a profound and 
painful religious conversion during his time in the army with little input from military 
clergy. 694 Above all the army's policy towards chaplains in the auxiliary forces 
demonstrated that there was relatively little concern about the religious practices of 
British soldiers, and in consequence only a limited effort was made to force the 
Anglican faith upon them.
The Duke of Wellington wrote that he believed 'the meeting of soldiers in 
their cantonments to sing psalms, or hear a sermon read... is, in the abstract, perfectly 
innocent\ 69:> This was typical of the army's policy, which sought not to instil 
Anglicanism into its troops but facilitate its practice. In consequence, chaplains on 
active service were expected to conduct church services twice per week and divine 
service each Sunday. For such services chaplains were instructed that 'more men shall 
not be assembled for that purpose [a church service] at a time, than the voice can 
reach, a precaution very necessary to ensure the attention of the soldier... [to allow 
this] the chaplain shall perform the service successively to the different corps of his 
division'. 69& The preferred location for such services was the open air as the army did 
little to provide buildings. This may be significant for understanding the attitude of 
soldiers towards religion while in the army because the decline of religious 
observance in urban areas during the period has been linked with lack of religious 
facilities. 697
There is evidence that, due to a variety of factors, services occurred
6 "4 See NAM 7912/21. Anoa Life in the 38th Foot; Surtees. Twenty Five Years in the Rifle Brigade.
pp. 300-314.
695 Gurwood (ed), Despatches and General Orders, p.429.
6y6 Adjutant General Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811. NAM
6807/22, pp.39-40.
697 Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, p.71.
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significantly less frequently than was recommended. Private Wheeler, for example, 
noted that 'in winter quarters [chaplains] once on a Sunday (weather permitting), 
perform divine service, but when the campaign opens, it is seldom, or ever, an 
opportunity offers'. 698 Thus weather and the practicalities of military life could prevent 
religious observance. Many battles - including Waterloo - were fought on Sundays, 
limiting the time available for religious observance. 699 In consequence Sundays were 
frequently perceived by soldiers on campaign to be like any other day. This was a 
significant departure from attitudes in civilian life as both pressure from ecclesiastical 
authorities and state regulations restricted the activities that could occur. Non- 
religious meetings, for example, could not be held on Sundays following the Sunday 
Observance Act (1781) and Seditious Meeting Act (1795). 70° Soldiers on campaign 
were effectively exempt from such regulations and their relaxed attitude towards 
Sunday may be evidence of the general decline in religious practice across Britain 
during the period, as noted by Anthony Harvey. 701
The lack of respect shown by many soldiers towards Sundays shocked recruits 
from staunchly religious backgrounds. Private Thomas Howell of the 71 st Regiment of 
Foot was such a soldier, although he soon adopted the practices of his colleagues, and 
admitted that he did not attend a church service while serving in Spain. 702 It may be 
that this is further evidence of a general decline in religious adherence amongst 
soldiers, reflecting trends in society itself. Through being removed from restrictive 
Sunday regulations and social pressures to conform to religious codes of conduct, it is 
possible that Howell was able to display his true feeling about religious observance 
while on campaign. There were, however, a variety of reasons why formerly devout
698 Brackets in original. Liddell - Hart (ed), 77ie Letters of Private Wheeler, p. 153.
6W Keegan, Tlie Face of Battle, p. 138.
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individuals, such as Howell, would be reluctant to attend the religious services 
provided by the army.
It is possible that the nature and content of religious services offered by the 
army may have served to deter some soldiers. A sermon preached to the Queen's 
Regiment of Volunteers in 1804, with its references to the destruction of Jerusalem, 
demonstrated that an element of 'fire and brimstone' existed in the discourse of army 
chaplains. 703 That preaching of this nature could be unsuitable was demonstrated in 
advice issued by the Adjutant-General, who recommended that services should 'close 
with a short practical sermon, suited to the habits and understanding of soldiers'. 704 
These instructions are of note not only because of the advice they contained, but also 
that they were one of the few instances in which the army as an institution acted to 
increase its troop's attendance at religious services. This occurred at a time when there 
was growing concern at the spread of Methodism in the army. Thus, John Keegan 
argues, attempts to increase the attendance of religious services directed by army 
chaplains was an attempt to combat the spread of Methodism. 70;> Such a theory 
explains the sudden interest displayed by the army in the content of sermons during 
the later phases of the Napoleonic Wars, the preceding years having been 
characterised by the army's relative indifference to the religious practices of its troops.
Fears relating to the spread of Methodism demonstrated that there existed in 
the army a significant number of troops who were not of the Anglican faith, although 
the precise numbers concerned cannot be determined as the religion of troops was not 
included on returns until 1861 (further evidence that there was little concern about the 
religious composition of the army and, perhaps, a lack of administrative efficiency). 706
" w NAM 7404/58, A Sermon Preached At The Presentation Of Colours To The Queens Royal Regiment 
of Volunteers in 1804. pp. 1-2.
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For soldiers of other faiths the Anglican religious services provided by the army 
would have had little relevance and, as a result, they either failed to attend or utilised 
local religious facilities such as convents. 707 Such practices, however, could make 
non-Anglican soldiers a visible minority and subject to the prejudices of their 
colleagues, the word Methodist being used as derogatory term to describe a reserved 
individual. 708 Interestingly non-Anglicans were not the only soldiers of overt religious 
faith to be victimised by comrades: the Anglican Lieutenant George Hennell, for 
example, complained that his comrades were profane and mocked the bible, evidence 
of a general decline in deference towards religion in the period. 709
It is apparent that there were a considerable number of reasons why soldiers 
would be reluctant or, for that matter, unable, to attend a religious service. Yet, 
despite a relatively low demand for their services, there were an inadequate number of 
chaplains available to meet this demand. Again this parallels developments in British 
society: a lack of clergy being the factor highlighted by John Foster as the reason for 
declining religious observance in British cities during the period. 710 Lieutenant 
Bingham in particular was critical of the lack of chaplains and complained that the 
small number available was barely sufficient to do more than 'remind us that we are 
Protestants'; he also noted that he believed only by allocating chaplains to brigades 
rather than divisions could this shortfall in religious provision be avoided. 711 
Bingham's belief concerning the allocation of chaplains cut to the heart of the 
problems concerning the provision and attendance of religious services in the army. 
There is evidence that otherwise regular churchgoers, such as Judge Advocate 
Larpent, Captain Browne and Private John Green, were unable to attend religious
707 Green, Tlie Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life, p.21.
7(w Hibbert (ed),A Soldier of the 71st), p.xiii.
"0* Glover (&d),A Gentleman Volunteer, p.201.
~'° Foster. Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p.29.
711 Bingham to his mother, Galispendo 6th March 1813, NAM 6807/163, p. 12.
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services as frequently as they desired, and this inability could be attributed to 
deficiencies in the number of chaplains available. 712
The limited allocation of chaplains to divisions could significantly restrict the 
practice and observance of religion in the army (and it is important to note that there is 
little evidence the army failed to recruit the number of clergy it believed to be required 
- in this case the culprit was certainly policy, not manpower shortages). No doubt 
apathy towards such activities had to be overcome but it was also the role of chaplains 
to encourage faith as well as service the needs of those who possessed it, measures to 
combat the spread of Methodism being a case in point. As result of this role, which 
was almost missionary in nature, the small numbers of chaplains available were 
overstretched, a fact demonstrated by the orders of 1811 which instructed them to 
deliver the Sunday sermon multiple times due to the size of their congregations. 713 
When units were deployed in Christian countries this pressure on chaplains was in 
part relieved through the utilisation of local facilities by the troops, just as Catholic 
soldiers in Spain had used churches of their own religion. On occasion soldiers even 
proved willing to use other denominations' places of worship, the Protestant Private 
Green, for example, stating that he attended both 'churches and dissenting chapels' 
while in Ireland. 714 This, however, was not the situation in distant colonial garrisons, 
which often lacked access to local religious facilities of any Christian denomination.
While Bingham may have been justified to complain of a shortage of chaplains 
in the European theatre, such individuals were almost non-existent in the army 
overseas. The absence of chaplains in units deployed overseas can be attributed to a 
variety of factors. As previously stated, the army had a somewhat ambivalent attitude
712 Laipent (ed), We Private Journal of FSLarpent, vol II,, pp.150-51; Buckley (ed), The Napoleonic 
War Journal of Captain 'Thomas Henry Brawne, p.257; Green, Vicissitudes, p. 185.
713 Adjutant General Harry Calvert to Duke of Wellington, Horse Guards, 8th November 1811. NAM
6807/221, pp.39-40.
7" Green, Vicissitudes, p.218.
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to towards religion and it must be noted that, while many overseas garrisons possessed 
a sound supporting infrastructure of stores, hospitals and regimental schools, the same 
could not be said of the provision of chaplains. 715 This may, however, have been a 
consequence not of a deliberate policy (if chaplains were needed anywhere, it would 
be in garrisons isolated from Christianity in darkest Africa) but rather the practice of 
allotting chaplains to divisions. The majority of divisions existed in Europe so to 
ensure these formations were at strength, chaplains were also concentrated in this 
theatre. Conversely, units deployed on colonial duties tended to be deployed as 
regiments or even smaller formations and thus did not benefit from divisional level 
organisations as the provision of chaplains to garrisons at any level would have been 
contrary to established practice.
There is a more fundamental issue when considering the army's failure to 
allocate chaplains to colonial garrisons, which in part relates to the role of such 
individuals. Chaplains were a special case amongst the personnel who helped 
maintain the British army, as they required direct and, on occasion, one-to-one contact 
with the troops. Surgeons could claim such a role but chaplains were unique as to 
function with maximum efficiency their contact had to occur on certain days of the 
week (primarily Sunday) and at certain times of the year (such as Easter and 
Christmas). Achieving this proved a difficult enough task in the European theatre, 
where troops were heavily concentrated, and would surely have been almost 
impossible to achieve amongst the isolated outposts that controlled some of the more 
inhospitable parts of the British Empire. That concerns about the inability of chaplains 
to function adequately in dispersed garrisons persisted was demonstrated by their post 
war distribution. This saw chaplains primarily deployed not to the vast regions of 
Africa or Asia, which possessed scattered garrisons, but relatively self-contained areas
715 NAM 6112/78, pp. 13-17, 115-18, 149-57.
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such as the islands of the Caribbean (see below). In such locations the density of 
troops was higher (the garrison of Jamaica, for example, had a strength of 4,600, 
compared to approximately 1,000 defending scattered British outposts in western 
Africa) making it possible for chaplains to operate with some efficiency. 716
The end of the war in Europe brought with it changes that were to have an 
impact on the deployment of chaplains overseas. The divisions that had fought their 
way through Portugal, Spain and into southern France were, with the exception of the 
army of occupation, disbanded and the army began a transition away from a European 
field force back to one optimised for policing the Empire. 717 As the concentration of 
forces shifted away from Europe to the colonies, so too did the army's chaplains (it 
appears that in this regard reductions in the size of the army were less important than 
the relative concentration offerees in deciding the deployment of chaplains).
From 1812 to 1815 the only overseas garrison to have a chaplain assigned to it 
for any length of time had been Honduras (Chaplain J. Armstrong). 711* Between 1816 
and 1820, however, there was to be a marked and steady growth in both the number of
chaplains and the overseas garrisons to which they were deployed (see figure 31).
Year Number of Chaplains Garrisons Served
1816 6 2
1817 14 8
1818 19 8
1819 18 19
1820 29 19
Figure 31: Chaplains serving in overseas garrisons, 1816 - 20. 71"
716 PRO WO17/2814, Monthly Returns of the Ann) at Home and Abroad.
717 1. Fletcher, Wellington's Regiments (StaplehursL Spellmont, 1994), passim. This work contains
extensive references to the pre-war, wartime and post-war activities of the British units that fought in
the peninsular war, including their destinations after the armistices of 1814 and 1815.
7W 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains 1817', PRO WRO 25/254, Payments by the
Commissariat 1812 - 30.
71i> 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains 1817 to 1820', PRO WRO 25/254.
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Of particular note is that besides serving an increased number of garrisons, in most 
years the number of chaplains actually exceeded the number of garrisons. This 
demonstrated chaplains were available to serve the more dispersed detachments.
While figure 31 clearly demonstrates that there was an increase in the 
availability of chaplains in overseas garrisons, it is important to note its limitations. 
First there is the question of garrisons and their definition. In this work overseas 
garrisons have generally been defined in accordance with the terminology used by the 
army to administer its forces deployed overseas. These could be somewhat arbitrary 
and of unequal size, Hanover, for example, counted as a single location, as did France, 
while Britain was divided into North (Scotland), South (including Wales and the 
Channel Islands) and Ireland. 720 In the case of the deployment of chaplains to overseas 
garrisons, however, a different system was adopted. In the general army system, for 
example, modern day Canada was divided into Canada and New Foundland, while 
returns for chaplains added New Brunswick. It is this latter system that is used in 
figure 31, rather than that used elsewhere in the work, because, as discussed below, 
the information has implications for understanding how chaplains operated outside of 
Europe. This, however, makes it difficult to compare properly the deployment of 
chaplains to troop concentration. Both of the systems described above relied on 
vaguely defined areas of land, those relating to chaplains merely having the distinction 
of being slightly less general, and, as the more detailed data relating to garrisons in 
this area is incomplete, any comparisons must to a degree rely on estimation.
Another limitation of figure 31 is that it masks a significant imbalance in the 
way in which chaplains were allocated to serve overseas. Specifically, between the 
years 1816 to 1817 the number of chaplains serving overseas doubled from six to
-° PRO WO 17/2814, Monthly Returns of the Army at Home and Abroad.
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fourteen, but of those fourteen no fewer than thirteen were deployed in the Caribbean 
region. The precise locations of these thirteen chaplains are shown in figure 32.
	Location(s) Served
Reverend A. Campbell Jamaica
J. Morris Jamaica
W. Hamilton Jamaica
E. Marshal Jamaica
J. King Windward and Leeward Islands, Barbados
A. Stragham Windward and Leeward Islands
J. MacMahon Windward and Leeward Islands
J. Guilding Windward and Leeward Islands, St. Vincents
W. Chaderton Windward and Leeward Islands, Antuiga
A. Newman Windward and Leeward Islands, Dominica
M Wilson Windward and Leeward Islands, Tobago
L. Berdhill St. Kitts
J. Armstrong Honduras
Figure 32: Chaplains serving in the Caribbean and Central America, 1817" 1 . 
Besides demonstrating the concentration of chaplains in the Caribbean, figure 32 also 
explains a piece of seemingly anomalous data in figure 31. This is the fact that in 
1819 there were eighteen chaplains serving overseas yet nineteen garrisons were 
served. The explanation for this is that chaplains were mobile. Chaplain Guilding, for 
example, was assigned to the Windward and Leeward Islands for two months (25 th 
April to 24th June), St. Vincents for another two months (25 th June to 24th August) and 
spent the remainder of the year at the Windward and Leeward Islands. Conversely, 
Chaplain Wilson began the year in Tobago, spent two months in the Windward and 
Leeward Islands and returned to Tobago that October. Others moved only once during 
the year: Chaplain Chaderton, for example, redeployed from Antigua to the Windward 
and Leeward Islands in June.
By 1819 the chaplains who were deployed abroad remained concentrated in 
the Caribbean, although deployments to Newfoundland and New Brunswick increased 
their number to sixteen. 722 The following year there was a more noticeable increase in 
the number of chaplains serving abroad, and they were to be found with garrisons
721 1817, Warrant Numbers 2777 to 2886. PRO WRO 25/254.
r- 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains in 1819', PRO WRO 25/254.
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such as those in New South Wales, Cape Colony and West Africa. A consequence of 
these and previous deployments was a dramatic increase in the wage bill for chaplains 
serving outside of Europe. In 1815 this had amounted to only 7s a month, which was 
paid to Chaplain J. Armstrong in Honduras. By 1816, however, this bill had rocketed 
by a staggering 34,000%, to £120 2s 7d. It may be that the meaning of this seemingly 
outrageous figure is engulfed by its magnitude, serving as a lesson for historians to be 
wary of statistics, and especially those derived from a single source or limited sample. 
Yet, despite its gargantuan proportions, the increase emphasises the point that there 
was a dramatic increase in the number of chaplains serving abroad following the end 
of the war in Europe. This growth was sustained, as demonstrated by the wage bill of 
1820, which stood at £416 13s 4d per month (a less impressive but still significant 
increase of 346%). 723
Wage bills alone need not be evidence of expansion, merely higher wages. It 
must be noted, however, that the 346% increase of the wage bill was exceeded by a 
500% increase in personnel during the years 1816 to 1820. This data is indicative of a 
slight decrease in the average wage of chaplains serving overseas, a conclusion 
supported by the fact that the average wage in 1816 was 7s, compared to 6s in the 
following year. It would be incorrect, however, to perceive this as evidence of 
chaplains' pay being reduced, rather it was indicative that a growing proportion of 
chaplains less-senior were present in overseas garrisons. As the number of chaplains 
deployed overseas grew, the organisational structures utilised in Europe for their 
administration were adopted.
The chaplains deployed to the Caribbean, circa 1817, are a useful case study of
how chaplains operated. The senior, and thus highest paid, chaplains were among the
723 "Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department 
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains in 1816';  Particular sums Ordered in 
Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department Abroad, on Account of the Pay of 
Officiating Chaplains in 1820', PRO WRO 25/254.
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first to arrive and were located on Jamaica and the Windward and Leeward Islands. 
New arrivals were of lesser rank and assigned to individual garrisons either in these 
island groups or elsewhere. Despite all holding the rank of major and being given the 
title of chaplain, there existed a separate hierarchy amongst chaplains, who received 
varying rates of pay according to their posting and responsibilities. In 1817 there 
existed six weekly rates of pay amongst the chaplains serving in the Caribbean region, 
as illustrated in figure 33:
Weekly Rate
s d
2 6
7 6
9 6
10 6
11 5
14 3
Number of Personnel
Receiving Rate
5
1
3
0
3
2
Total 14
Figure 3 3: Rates of pay for Chaplains in the Caribbean, June 1817. 1 -t
This pay structure remained relatively unaltered until 1819, when an additional rate of 
pay (16s per week) was introduced for the senior chaplain on Jamaica in 1819, in this 
case Chaplain B. Harold. 723 Although no chaplains received the rate of 10s 6d per 
week in June 1817, it was paid on occasion, reflecting the fact that rates varied 
according to posting or responsibility, a system that could only operate due to an 
efficient administration. While on the Windward and Leeward Islands, for example, 
Chaplain King was paid 10s 6d per week, but when serving in Barbados (where he 
was senior chaplain) he received 14s 3d. The pay of Chaplain Wilson switched 
between the 1 Is 5d and 7s 6d rate twice in 1817:
7 '4 'Particular sums Ordered in Repayment of Advances Made by the Commissariat Department 
Abroad, on Account of the Pay of Officiating Chaplains in 1817', PRO WRO 25/254. 
7-5 1819, Warrant Numbers 2802; 2804, PRO WRO 25/254.
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25 th April to 24th June (Tobago) 11 s 5d 
25th June to 30th July (Windward/Leeward) 7s 6d 
31 st July to 24th October (Windward/Leeward) 11 s 5d 
25th October to 24th December (Windward/Leeward) 7s 6d. 726
Besides highlighting the mobility of chaplains, these variations in wage also reveal 
that the hierarchy governing them was not necessarily as rigid as in other military 
organisations or, indeed, the Church of England itself. A colonel or a bishop, for 
example, remained just that even if not the senior officer or official following the 
arrival of a higher ranked individual, yet, as demonstrated by the wage variations 
experienced by chaplains this was not so regarding military clergy.
The success of the army's policies regarding the religious practices of its 
soldiers is difficult to measure. There were changes in religious practices in British 
society during the period and the army reflected these, including the growth of 
Methodism and a general decline in deference towards religion. It was inevitable that 
the army would reflect the situation in society, as the number of chaplains was too few 
to meet the needs of practicing Anglicans, let alone bring new believers to the faith. 
This was not necessary for the army to be effective, however, as the force 
demonstrated it could be a bulwark of the Protestant state without itself being 
Protestant. There were various motivations for the policies adopted in regard to 
religion in the army, these being military, political and social. Due to the status of 
non-Anglicans in Britain the army was largely dependent on state legislation to govern 
its own reliaious affairs. Whether as an institution it may have been significantly more 
tolerant is debateable, although the limited efforts made to provide chaplains and
"6 1817. Wan-ant Numbers 2777; to 2886, PRO WRO 25/254.
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opportunity for Anglicans to worship is evidence of a more relaxed attitude, with 
Protestantism a feature rather than a principle.
The motivation for medical services were more clear-cut than those of religion 
in the army, the overriding concern being the maintenance of an effective fighting 
force. The limiting and defining factors of medicine were scientific but in this field 
the state could have been more active. The military revolution had triggered a degree 
of state involvement in medicine and Prussia took a lead in this field as early as 1713, 
when the Berlin Anatomical Theatre was established by the state to train surgeons, 
and in 1723 when a College of Medicine and Surgery was set-up. Regulations were 
also passed requiring all surgeons to graduate from the institution and serve one year 
as regimental surgeons. 727 In some respects British practices, including inoculation, 
were as advanced, but still lagged behind Prussia in relation to fundamental issues 
such as amputation.
Despite such shortcomings it is necessary to note that the medical service 
provided by the army was one of the most comprehensive of its kind in the period and 
was unrivalled by that offered to many civilians in Britain. The army demonstrated a 
willingness to adopt new developments such as inoculation, utilising an integrated 
system of hospitals that were located progressively further from the frontline, and 
introducing regulations to encourage good practice such as cleanliness. These 
regulations were often inadequate but through them the army demonstrated that it 
possessed some understanding of what was required from a modern medical system.
The motivation for reforms relating to women following the army and pension 
provision were as clear cut as those for the medical services, being concerned with 
enlistment. Pensions in particular increased the appeal of the army as a career, as did
127 M. Duffy. "The Military Revolution and State', in M. Duffy (ed), Ttie Military Revolution and State, 
1500 to 1800 (Exeter University, 1980), p.5.
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the inclusion of soldiers' families in army welfare, although this was also one of the 
more altruistic policies adopted. While policies concerning religion maintained at 
least a pretence of the force as a Protestant bulwark and medicine maintained the 
army's strength, the system concerning families could have continued for several 
more years without significant reform, as did many aspects of the army in the period - 
including the medical system. Reforms relating to families reflected the influence of 
the state on soldiers' lives at its most benign, while the attempts to enforce 
Protestantism in the force (albeit half-heartedly) reflected the negative impact of the 
relationship.
The state gave the army the features that principally characterised its 
maintenance, specifically the bureaucratic systems and departments that have formed 
the core of this study. Despite this there existed a group of institutions that lay outside 
the military sphere and, to a limited degree, the state, but were to play an important 
role in maintenance of the army. These organisations form the focus of the following 
and final chapter, a chapter concerned with neither the armed forces in the field nor 
bureaucrats and administrators but rather the bodies that governed the counties of 
Britain.
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Chapter 6 
English county governance and the British army
Maintaining the British army was very much an affair of central government, 
executed through governmental and military departments such as the Ordnance Board, 
the Commissariat and Royal Wagon Train. There remained, however, a small but 
significant role for the organisations and individuals more often associated with the 
governance of counties. Parish councils, churchwardens, justices of the peace and 
Lords Lieutenant would undertake a variety of important tasks directly related to 
maintaining the army. Prior to 1802 these tasks primarily consisted of supervising the 
movement of troops and ensuring adequate numbers of recruits were raised in the 
county. The threat of French invasion would increase the importance of these tasks 
and create new responsibilities for the organisations that governed the counties. From 
1802 the role of these bodies would change from one of merely supporting the 
standing army to raising and maintaining new auxiliary forces in the form of the 
Volunteers.
Due to the efforts of the Royal Navy the invasion was not to occur but the 
contingency plans designed to counter a French landing reveal much about British 
military thinking in the period, and the difficulties that could be encountered when 
raising and maintaining armed forces. 72" More significant is that the invasion 
preparations demonstrate the criteria under which the state would be willing to 
remove the checks and balances imposed to restrict the army and safeguard civil 
liberties, issues that lay at the heart of the army's relationship with the state and thus 
the level of support it enjoyed. The army would have been raised to the status of a
7 -s Some of this research has been previously published. C. Chilcott, "English counties and defensive 
planning. 1803 to 1805', inBulletin of the Military Historical Society, vol. 54, no.215, February 2004. 
pp. 149-154.
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force that was central to policies for national survival, rather than the third placed 
pillar (behind the fleet and continental allies) of Britain's approach to strategy. Indeed, 
if the army had been called on to repel an invader, these other elements of British 
policy would have already failed. The invasion preparations were the most radical 
aspect of defence policy in the period, and it will become apparent that if the plans 
had been implemented they had the potential to alter many of the issues discussed in 
preceding chapters, not least being the relationship between the army and state.
Traditionally the principal link between county government and the army had 
been the Lord Lieutenant, whose role had been to raise and maintain the county militia 
battalions. While carrying out this task the Lords Lieutenant fulfilled many of the 
functions that in regular regiments were the responsibility of military departments, 
including annual inspections and returns that were similar to those conducted by the 
Adjutant General. 729 These annual inspections were frequently conducted when the 
militia battalions mustered for their fourteen days of annual training, occasions that 
were accompanied by some excitement in the neighbourhood and announced in the 
local press. 730 The outbreak of war in 1793 increased the importance of the Lords 
Lieutenant role in regard to the militia but his role remained confined to the mustering 
of auxiliary forces.
The county officials that most frequently came into contact with elements of 
the regular army were local magistrates, whose task included the supervision of troop 
movements through their areas. 731 This practice was one of the few through which the 
institutions of county governance became involved in the operational affairs of the 
army, although they were also to have a significant role in the administration of the
72y See PRO WO 27/92, Office of Commander in Chief and War Office: Adjutant General and Ann)
Council Inspections, 1808; WSRO A1/545, Navy Acts, 1794 to 1795: Books and Papers; WSRO.
A1/550, Army and Navy Acts, 1796 to 97: Books and Papers.
~ 30 New'recruits mustered for twenty-one days. Salisbury Journal, 17th August 1812, p.4.
731 See above p. 133
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militia ballot."2 This task involved many elements of a county's administrative 
structure, the overseers of the poor in individual parishes who paid the expenses of 
those selected by the ballot, the Lord Lieutenant who co-ordinated the county militia 
and magistrates who enforced the quotas. The involvement of county institutions in 
the ballot militia ballot was effectively a blurring between the role of the centre and 
periphery in defence policy, the periphery ultimately possessing not only the power to 
raise troops but also a role in their employment. 733 Joanna Innes describes this blurring 
as evidence of a close relationship between the centre and periphery in Britain, but 
this could also be described as resulting from an anachronism. 734 During the 
eighteenth century the militia had been viewed as a force for local defence so its 
administration at county level was logical. 73" By the end of the eighteenth century, 
however, the militia had become an instrument of national defence, with regiments 
operating outside the boundaries of the home county and, importantly, as a source of 
recruits for the regular army. 736 In these circumstances, the wisdom of administering 
the militia at county level was questionable. Clearly, the relationship between the 
periphery and centre in British politics had evolved at a slower pace than military
developments.
Despite the fact that the elevation of the militia to a national defence force 
rendered the role of the county in its administration an anachronism, other evidence 
exists supporting Innes' description of the close relationship between the centre and 
periphery. Perhaps the most significant evidence can be found in the intended role of 
the bodies associated with county government in the event of a French invasion.
1}- To see how the ballot operated at a count) level, see PRO PC 1/13/160. Militia Returns for 
Lincolnshire and PRO PC l/13/155,EastRiding of Yorkshire. See also Hall, British Strategy, p.2. 
733 See below p.252. 
~ 34 Innes, "The Domestic Face of the Fiscal-Military State', p. 118.
735 Brewer, Tlie Sinews of Power, p.33.
736 Fletcher, Wellington's Regiments, pp. 15-16; P. Karsten, Irish soldiers in the British Army. 1792 
1922: Suborned or Subordinated?', in Journal of Social History, (Autumn 1983), p.35..
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While this never occurred, the plans drawn up by the government to counter a full- 
scale invasion warrant some consideration. This is because the preparations not only 
relate to the role of county government, which was to be significant, but also reflect 
many of the themes considered elsewhere in this work, by revealing how the resisting 
forces were to be maintained and in some cases raised, while also shedding light on 
some less well-known operational procedures in the regular army. The need to educate 
civilian bakers in military procedures quickly, for example, resulted in discussions 
concerning how the army produced its own bread, the best recipes for yeast and the 
preferred size of loaf. 737 Above all the plans demonstrate the principles that the state 
was prepared to sacrifice in order to aid national defence. 73 "
During the invasion scares that haunted Britain during the first decade of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars period, plans were drawn up regarding the 
capability of each county to help maintain a defending army. A document entitled 
'Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the General Defence' 
formed the blueprint for these plans, which were disseminated to the counties via the 
Lords Lieutenant. 739 Much emphasis was to be placed on the protection of property 
during invasion and an announcement by the Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire stated the 
plans were intended to guarantee 'the particular protection and security of persons and 
property of the inhabitants of this country... and the indemnifying persons who may 
suffer in their property by such measures for that purpose'. 740 Despite such noble 
sentiments, however, the protection of property (which was arguably the cornerstone 
of the British political system) was only a minor concern. At the heart of the scheme 
lay logistics, for both the defending and invading armies, and it was envisaged that the
737 PRO WO 30/141, pp.22-30.
73S Just as the state had shown willing to disregard the rights and beliefs of Anglicans serving in the
Jersey militia, p.23 3.
73 " PRO WO 30/141, passim.
740 Salisbury Journal 11 th July 1803, p. 3.
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whole population of a county would be mobilised to defeat any invader.
The preparations for invasion required careful planning, a process that began 
in 1803 when questionnaires were distributed to each county under the Defence of the 
Realm Act. 741 The bureaucratic practices of the period - including pre-printed forms 
and tabulated data - were used with considerable effect in an attempt to determine the 
manpower resources available in each county. 742 These, and other preparations, 
utilised the structure of county government. Parishes would report to subdivisions, in 
turn these would report back to the Deputy Lords Lieutenant, with the Lord Lieutenant 
having ultimate responsibility for a county's invasion preparations. The utilisation of 
existing bodies allowed the Lords Lieutenant to use their authority to full effect, while 
also allowing a rapid implementation of the required preparations: this was a vital 
factor given that a French landing could have occurred within months or even weeks 
if conditions were favourable. Thus, the Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire was able to 
impose a tight schedule for the initial phase of preparations. On 24th June 1803 he had 
received his instructions; these were discussed at a public meeting on 8 th July at 
Winchester, meetings were held within each Parish nine days later (17th July), and the 
subdivisions met on 25 th July, with the required returns from parishes also completed 
by this date. 743 The dates selected for each meeting were not arbitrary and the selection 
of the 17th is of note as it was a Sunday. This day was selected deliberately to allow 
the parish meetings to be held immediately after morning or evening services, it being 
believed that scheduling meetings after Sunday service would ensure good
attendance. 744
The bodies responsible for governing a county did not continue unhindered by
741 Colley, Britons, pp.306-307.
42 Brewer, Tlie Sinews of Power, pp.222-225.
743 This system was effectively a military one imposed on civilians and is similar to that utilised by 
organisations such as the Commissariat, p.49.
744 Salisbury Journal, 11 th July 1803, p. 3.
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the threat of invasion. Two to three magistrates oversaw each of the subdivisions 
within a county, and such men often held commissions in the auxiliary forces. To 
limit the impact of such persons being called to active service, Lord Hawkesbury 
advised the Lords Lieutenant 'it is essential that the magistrates who are thus 
employed should if possible be persons not holding commissions as volunteer 
officers, nor liable on any other account to be called away from the county'. 745 The 
number of individuals who had roles in both the auxiliary forces and county 
government was considerable. In Wiltshire the commander of the militia, Colonel 
Henry Herbert, Earl of Caernarvon (sic), was also a Deputy Lieutenant, an office that 
entailed separate duties in the event of invasion. The following officers also held 
considerable property or responsibilities outside of Wiltshire and may have fulfilled 
roles in these counties: Lieutenant Colonel George Montagu, Captain Awdry Ambrose 
and Captain Robert Maundrell 746 . This says much about the nature of such forces, it 
being interesting to note that the situation in rural Wiltshire was similar to urban 
Oldham, where prominent local men also provided the officers of auxiliary units. 747 
For the invasion preparations, however, the significance of prominent local figures 
serving in the auxiliary forces was that the allocation of magistrates to oversee 
subdivisions in the event of invasion itself required special planning, in addition to the 
multitude of tasks already facing counties as they prepared to resist an invasion.
The preparations undertaken by each county were to be based on a series of 
reports from each parish, the most important of which were designated schedules one 
through to nine. The information recorded in these reports reveals much about the 
parishes concerned and, most importantly, the invasion preparations themselves. In
745 Circular from Lord Hawksbury, Whitehall, 20ljl August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17, Regulations for 
each county, in case of Invasion.
746 WSRO A1/75 2/19, Return of the Qualifications of Deputy Lieutenants and Commissioned Officers 
[of Wiltshire Militia], 29* January 1796.
747 Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p. 13.
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particular it is apparent that the schedules represented forward planning, in contrast to 
the reflex doctrine normally utilised to maintain the army. 748 The purpose of each 
schedule is summarised in figure 34.
Schedule 1 Available Manpower
Schedule 2 Food
Schedule 3 Overseers
Schedule 4 Men willing to arm themselves
Schedule 5 Men willing to act as labourers
Schedule 6 Men willing to carry supplies
Schedule 7 Millers willing to mill flour
Schedule 8 Bakers
Schedule 9 Waterborne transport
Figure 34: Preparations for invasion, schedules one to nine."^
Had they been fully completed, the schedules would have amounted to a miniature 
doomsday book of England during the years 1803 to 1804. Schedule 1 was concerned 
with available manpower, those unfit for service (labelled 'infirm'), the number of 
aliens and the number of Quakers. No other denomination of dissenters was singled 
out in these reports, the Quakers being singled out as a consequence of their belief in
pacifism. 7M)
Schedule 2 was a survey of available livestock and 'deadstock' (otherwise
known as crops). This encompassed the following categories: numbers of oxen, cows, 
young cattle and colts, sheep and goats, pigs, riding and draft horses, wagons and 
carts; quarters of wheat, oats, barley, beans and peas, potatoes and malt; loads of straw 
and hay; while flour 'and other meal' was given special attention with counts of both 
quarts and sacks. Schedules 7 and 8 built on this by listing millers and bakers 
respectively who promised to supply goods in the event of an invasion. Similarly
74S Compare this to the system utilised by the Commissariat. See chapter 2.
74y WSRO 1719/30, Wiltshire Lieutenancy Papers Dealing with the Parish [of Box's] Preparation to
Raise a Volunteer Force to Meet the Anticipated French Invasion, schedules 1 to 9.
750 Voluntary Contributions, Anonymous pamphlet, 1798, WSRO 1719/30.
235
schedule 6 revealed the number of wagons, categorised by the number of draught 
animals they required, that the parish would supply, in addition to associated 
personnel such as drivers. 751 Emphasis was to be placed upon four-horse wagons, 
which were vehicles seen as sufficient to carry up to either fifty hundredweight of 
flour, grain, wood or coal, or twenty hundredweight of bread, biscuit or straw. 752 The 
vehicles recorded in schedule 6 were to be supplemented by those described in 
schedule 9, which sought to determine the waterborne transport available in a 
parish. 7 " 3 Of note is that throughout these plans the role of the vehicles, whether 
wheeled or waterborne, was to be the transport of supplies rather than other tasks such 
as evacuation of wounded personnel. Indeed the lack of consideration for medical 
purposes was to be one of the most glaring deficiencies amongst the forces established 
in 1803.
Schedule 3 was particularly important as it determined who in the parish 
would be overseers for the various items outlined in other schedules. These 
individuals were to be responsible for implementing the key component of a county's 
invasion preparations, specifically the uprooting of whole communities in the path of 
an advancing enemy army. The village of Box had six such individuals appointed: 
William Brown, William Roger, John Lee, Joseph (surname illegible), Charles James 
and George Mailing. 754 On 19th November 1803 the Lord Lieutenant of Wiltshire
advised that:
the superintendents of parishes... are to convene a meeting of the inhabitants 
as soon as possible, to fix upon some place of rendezvous where all the horses, 
cattle, sheep, wagons and carriages (not wanted for the service and supply of 
the King's Troops) that can be convened away... in order to be removed... 
upon the order of the Lord Lieutenant. 7x"
751 WSRO 1719/30. schedule 6.
752 PRO WO 30/141, p.16.
753 WSRO 1719/30, schedule 9.
754 Minutes of Meeting 25* December 1803 held Parish of Box. WSRO 1719/30.
"55 Brackets in original. General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Saram, 19th November 1803. WSRO
1719/30.
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The purpose of listing the infirm in schedule 1 was to ensure means to remove them 
had been arranged prior to invasion and an overseer was also appointed for this task. 
Livestock, wagons, money and account books were all to be moved with the 
population, while bakers and millers were instructed how best to render their 
equipment unusable by an invader (by breaking crowns of ovens and upper mill stones 
respectively). 7^ Such destruction demonstrated that the policy of evacuation was 
designed to prevent resources from falling into enemy hands as much as it was a 
means of civil defence. Although a common practice in response to any invasion great 
importance was attached to denying the French invader resources because it was 
envisaged that the enemy would be forced to exist solely on supplies drawn from the 
immediate vicinity. 757
If the invader was to be so easily contained, why was a landlocked county such 
as Wiltshire included in the plan? Certainly plans had to be made for a worst-case 
scenario, i.e. an enemy breaking out of the beachhead. Wiltshire itself, however, had 
historically been considered vulnerable to invasion despite having no coastline. 7iS 
Wiltshire's borders were only 30 miles from major ports such as Bristol and 
Southampton. This demonstrates that administrative areas such as county boundaries 
were not always compatible with military realities. Yet these boundaries were to be 
the basis of the anti-invasion plan.
By its nature the plan had to prepare for a number of contingencies, a French 
advance inland being one of them. This, however, was not the sole reason for the 
continued evacuation of communities in the event of invasion. Besides denying the
756 General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30. Wiltshire 
Lieutenancy7 Papers Dealing with the Parish [of Box's] Preparation to Raise a Volunteer Force to Meet 
the Anticipated French Invasion; PRO WO 30/141, p.5n. 
~57 PRO WO 30/141, p.3. 
758 Colley, Britons, p.308.
237
invader resources, the scheme was also intended to maximise those available to 
defending forces. This aim is demonstrated in orders issued by the Lord Lieutenant of 
Wiltshire regarding livestock.
If the enemy should advance into the county... His Majesty has given express 
orders... that all horses or draft cattle, that are in evident danger of falling into 
the hands of the enemy, should be shot or hamstrung, provided they are not 
wanted for the service of th_e_army... and axle trees or wheels of all carriages 
in the same predicament, should be smashed or broken as much as possible. ;759
It is apparent that the policy was not merely a genteel version of scorched earth 
(achieved through depriving the enemy of resources by a policy that emphasised 
removal rather than destruction) because, throughout the movement of these 
communities, the overriding concern was to ensure that as much as possible was 
preserved for the defending forces, who would get first pick of items scheduled to be 
destroyed. 760 Fully implemented, the invasion preparations were to have enabled the 
army to utilise the resources not only of the counties targeted by invasion but also 
those adjacent or further from the enemy lodgement. For the duration of the invasion 
at least the army would be given free rein to requisition the resources it required to 
drive the French back into the sea. This would have undermined a notion central to the 
relationship between the British state and its population in the period, namely the 
sanctity of private property. 761 As for the resources not required by the army, some 
would have been removed but the rest sacrificed for national defence.
The rights of private ownership were seemingly protected in orders issued to 
county lieutenants, which stated that 'the first principle is an indemnification from the 
communities at large... for the value of all stock which may be removed in
7W Underlining added. Orders, General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803. 
WSRO 1719/30.
760 A similar scheme was proposed for the defence of Prussia in 1813, but in that case it was the 
intention that the population would disperse to wage a guerrilla war on the occupying army. Fuller, The 
Conduct of War, p. 58.
761 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.49.
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consequence of invasion'. 762 In this respect, it appeared that the policy was little 
different to that which already existed regarding procurement and was operated by 
organisations such as the Commissariat. 763 When the practice is considered in the 
context of the anti-invasion scheme, however, the assault on the rights of ownership 
becomes apparent. This was particularly so regarding livestock, which would have 
effectively ceased to be the property of the owner, despite instructions to brand each 
animal with the mark of the parish before moving them. In many cases such marks did 
not exist and their importance is highlighted by the fact that the design for that of Box 
(a BX contained within a capital O) was the first item on the agenda at a meeting 
convened to consider the invasion preparations of the village. 764
Livestock were to be effectively little more than a mobile source of food for 
the army under the supervision of selected citizens (specifically the overseers named 
in schedule 3). 765 These personnel were to 'remain in charge of the same [cattle], 
unless it shall be appropriated for the consumption of our own troops, or to be sold... 
at markets, in the rear of the army'. 766 Orders to the overseers of the livestock from 
each parish regarding ownership were only a fa9ade, as the livestock would have 
effectively been placed under army control at the moment of evacuation. The 
movement of cattle would have required co-operation with the army, and the generals 
commanding in each district were ordered 'to give every assistance and 
accommodation in [their] power, for the protection and subsistence of the cattle, and
of persons attending the same'. 767
Once livestock and other supplies arrived at a depot or market it would be
purchased by commissaries and receipts issued. Of note is that even if items were not
""PRO WO 30/141, p.3.
763 For this in operation see chapter 2.
764 Minutes of Meeting held on 25th December 1803,. WSRO 1719/30.
^K It is apparent that if Britain had been invaded the diet of defending soldiers may have been similar to
that in Spain and Portugal, pp.72-76.
166 Orders, General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarimx 19th November 1803. WSRO 1719/30.
767 PRO WO 30/141, p.4.
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purchased, their owners required permission from a commissary to sell them, an 
important right of ownership that would have been taken over by the military. 761* Once 
purchased by a commissary the normal procedures of the army would have been 
applied and the items would have eventually filtered through the various stages of the 
logistics system until they reached the intended recipients. While the rights of 
ownership were not to be totally suspended in the event of invasion, it is clear that 
they were to be significantly restricted. The prices at which cattle and commodities 
such as flour were to be sold to the army were to be decided by magistrates. 769 
Evidently these prices would have been regularly assessed and considered, giving rise 
to the possibility of price fluctuations and varying prices between localities. This 
would have been a new way of operating for the army in Britain as it was normally
maintained through long-term contracts that provided both low and stable prices. 770
While livestock were mobile, it was acknowledged that some items too bulky
to be moved to depots would have been required by the army. Consider the village of 
Box alone, which contained amongst other items 346 quarters of wheat, 63 quarters of 
oats and 1059 loads of hay, but only three wagons allocated to the task of moving 
these goods. 771 The result was a plan to convert the villages left vacant following their 
evacuation into supply depots themselves, from which supplies such as grain and flour 
could be distributed. Of note is that this actually contradicted a central concept in 
'Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the General 
Defence', that 'the [English] county abounds in supplies of all kinds to such a degree 
which renders the laying in of extensive magazines unnecessary'. 772 By using villages 
as distribution centres they would have effectively become magazines, with the
~M PRO WO 30/141. p.5.
" 6 * PRO WO 30/141. pp.17, 22.
770 For a consideration of the benefits of contracts see pp. 89-91.
771 WSRO 1719/30, schedules 2 and 6.
772 PRO WO 30/141, p.15.
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additional advantage that many already lay on a road and canal network.
Parishes were instructed to appoint 'several and discreet trusty persons' for the 
task of remaining behind in the village after its evacuation, until the enemy 
approached or they were surrounded (how this latter situation was to be escaped was 
not made clear). Their role was to safeguard the remaining goods and 'facilitate the 
means of supplying our army with what must otherwise be destroyed'. 773 It is likely, 
but not explicit in the orders, that a number of millers and bakers may also have 
remained in the villages. Such individuals would have co-operated closely with the 
Commissariat, which would have both purchased the goods they produced and 
arranged the delivery of necessary supplies (such as flour for bakers if none was 
available locally). 774 Furthermore commissaries may have been required to advise 
civilians about how best to bake their bread, giving an insight into how this activity 
was conducted in the military. Many civilian bakers believed that ovens could only be 
used to produce four batches of bread per day, although in the military six was 
standard practice. It was anticipated that yeast would be in particularly short supply 
and bakers were advised to produce either unleavened bread, or manufacture their 
own yeast. The latter was to be achieved through using a recipe written for the Dunbar 
garrison in 1796, rather than experimentation, as it was the belief of the authorities 
that 'it is highly necessary to caution everyman concerned in supplying an army, 
against placing any confidence in schemes not perfectly and satisfactorily tried 
himself. 775 The optimum loaf size was to be between three to four and a half pounds, 
with a thick crust, as such bread stayed fresher longer. Guidance was also to be given 
how best to stack bread on wagons (preferably when cold) and the duration of any
storage prior to its consumption. 776 This advice is notable not merely because it
773 PROWO30/14l r p.5.
774 PRO WO 30/14l.pp.22-3.
775 PRO WO 30/141, p.30.
776 PRO WO 30/141, pp.24-30.
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reveals how the army stored bread but also because similar written instructions to 
commissaries in other theatres of war do not appear to have existed.
The movement of entire populations, while envisaged as a means to aid the 
supply of the army, would have been a remarkable feat of logistics itself. The scale of 
the task facing the county authorities cannot be underestimated: the livestock that was 
to be moved from the village of Box alone would have included 242 cattle and oxen, 
298 pigs and total of 2,971 sheep and goats. 777 Preparations were required to sustain 
animals and humans alike. For livestock, orders advised that the route taken included 
'such places that afforded good water and plenty of pasture', while civilians ordered to 
leave their homes were advised to take with them 'a small quantity of salted or dried 
provisions, not being cumbersome for... temporary sustenance'. 778 Those responsible 
for livestock were not expected to fend for themselves, although no allocation was 
made for them from military stores. Instead it was recommended that 'the proprietors 
[of cattle removed] should furnish them [those overseeing the cattle] with means to 
provide themselves and the cattle under their care with necessary subsistence'. 77y Only 
wagon drivers and associated personnel were to receive supplies from stores, rations 
consisting of one and a half pounds of bread per day for each man and either ten 
pounds of oats or fourteen pounds of hay per horse. 71*0 This ration was comparable to 
that prescribed for horses in the Peninsular campaign, reflecting the importance of the 
civilians wagons to the anti-invasion plan. 781 It also highlights a particular inefficiency 
of animal drawn convoys, specifically a tendency to consume much of the supplies 
that they carried. This problem would remain until the introduction of railways, when 
railheads could be established near the front to reduce the time animals spent away
777 WSRO 1719/30, schedule 2.
"7S PRO WO 30/141. p.4; Orders, General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803,
WSRO 1719/30.
7?y Orders. General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
780 PRO WO 30/141, p. 17.
7S1 See above p.78.
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from stables. 7 " 2
The movement of large numbers of civilians and livestock would have placed 
a heavy burden on the transport infrastructure. When moving large bodies of civilians 
the Lords Lieutenant were instructed that:
proper march routes should be fixed upon for driving them away to certain 
places of security in the interior of the country, taking care to chuse [sic] bye 
roads for that purpose; that the Great Turn Pike Roads may remain entirely 
free for the marching of troops... and where it may be unavoidable to pass one 
or more of the great roads, it should be done in such a manner, that they may 
only be crossed and occupied during the shortest time possible. 783
It was further recommended that, to avoid congestion, the movement of civilians be 
approved by the general commanding that district. The large herds of sheep present on 
the South Downs were a particular source of concern in Wiltshire because, due to 
their proximity to the English Channel, it was likely they would be removed soon after 
an invasion. It was stated that 'the greater part of this county is highly favourable for 
the removal, not only of inhabitants, but of large flocks of sheep requiring space; they 
must therefore take their route over the downs'. 71*4
The evacuation of herds would have caused considerable disruption not only 
to the transport infrastructure but also to the regional economy. If the French had 
driven inland then such herds would have been lost in any case but given that the 
envisaged scenario was of an invading army being confined to the coast such 
disruption would have been unnecessary. John Brewer states that the principal object 
of any invader would probably have been to cause financial panic rather than capture 
territory. 785 Thus the policy of evacuating herds as soon as invasion occurred would in 
fact have aided the enemy. It is necessary to note that while Brewer believed an
~*2 Schechter and Sander. Delivering the Goods, p. 45.
"w PRO WO 30/141. p.4.
7S4 General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sarum, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
785 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 191.
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invasion with such objectives would have been best aimed at southeastern England, an 
invasion at any point in southern England would most likely have caused severe 
economic disruption due to the anti-invasion measures. This supports Linda Colley's 
claim that Wiltshire was a county likely to be threatened by an invasion, even though 
it was landlocked. 71*6 Wiltshire might have been affected by a French invasion 
primarily because of its wider repercussions, not actual military action or an advance 
inland.
Clearly sheep and civilians on foot could make the journey cross-country but 
this would have been more difficult for the wheeled conveyances that would have 
been used to move the infirm, food, personal possessions and those unwilling to walk. 
The village of Box had promised to supply three carts for conveying supplies to 
defending forces, each with four animals (a total of twelve). Schedule 2, however, 
reveals that the village contained no fewer than ninety-two draft horses, leaving a total 
of eighty animals available to pull the carts and wagons of the population. It is likely 
that, despite orders to the contrary, many of the population would have taken to the 
roads, particularly in a village such as Box that sat astride the London to Bristol road
(the modern day A4). 7 * 7
The wagons allocated for the transport of supplies were to be ready to move at
twenty fours notice. It was expected that they would travel twenty-five to thirty miles 
per day, depending on load but such a figure may have been excessively optimistic. 78 " 
These vehicles occupied an ambiguous position within the command structure and it 
is unclear whether they were to be given the same rights on the roads as the military. 
This was crucial because if the vehicles were to be regarded as military, civilians were 
expected to give way, but if this was not the case wagons, and the supplies on them,
m Colley, Britons, p.308.
7S? WSRO 1719/30. schedule 2.
7 >* PRO WO 30/141, p. 16.
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would have been expected to travel cross-country as much as possible. Such vehicles 
had only limited cross-country mobility and, while wagons earmarked for military 
service were instructed to be equipped with at least one tool such as a shovel in case 
of becoming stuck, movement would have been slow. 7ss>
It is likely that bureaucracy and regulations may have further slowed the 
movement of the civilian wagons impressed into military service. The rights of the 
individuals manning the wagons was made clear to them when opting for this duty, 
and it is apparent that in the anti-invasion scheme the rights of the individual were to 
be eroded less than those of private ownership. Each vehicle was to be given a 
certificate identifying the owner, driver, number of horses and, most significantly the 
date at which it was to be discharged from duty, along with the number of days spent 
marching. Drivers were to be paid for each day of service, according to rates set by 
magistrates and lieutenants in each county. Every wagon was also to have a conductor 
of stores, responsible for ensuring that receipts were received for all goods transferred 
and rations received. 790 The system was bureaucratic and had the potential to be a 
recipe for disaster if enacted, with drivers unwilling to move without the appropriate 
paperwork or because their period of service had expired. The Royal Wagon Train had 
been formed to avoid such situations and the utilisation of civilian transport for 
general military service would have thus been a step backwards for the army. 791
Living off requisitioned cattle and its advance probably slowed by columns of 
refugees and evacuees, the British army would have sought to drive back the invader. 
The regular army would have been supported in this task not only by the militia but 
also by other formations created to resist invasion. 792 A scheme to raise a corps of
7S" WSRO 1719/30. schedule 6.
™ PRO WO 30/141, pp. 16-17.
7>n See chapter 4.
:w For a consideration of how they were raised see C. Chilcott, "English counties and defensive
planning, 1803 to 1805\ mBulletin of the Military Historical Society, vol. 54, no.215 7 February 2004.
pp. 149-154.
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mounted scouts and guides from local populations was never implemented but new 
Volunteer units were to be raised. 793 Besides infantry and cavalry formations, the 
Volunteers included pioneer corps that were to be raised from each parish. Their role 
was described in 'Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental in the 
General Defence' as follows:
The duty of the pioneers will generally consist in repairing and opening such 
roads, bridges and communications as may facilitate the movement of our own 
army, and in breaking up and obstructing such as it may be necessary to render 
impassable to the enemy. 794
The inclusion of a corps of pioneers in the invasion preparations is notable for several 
reasons. Not least is the fact that it demonstrates an understanding and appreciation of 
the need for supporting arms in an army. In addition the pioneers represented a natural 
progression of the doctrine adopted in British defence plans, one that sought to both 
deprive the enemy and support British forces (in this case through opening and closing 
lines of communication as required).
The pioneers were to have operated in companies of twenty-five to fifty men, 
commanded by a lieutenant or captain respectively (schedule 5). In the event that the 
minimum number of twenty-five could not be attained companies from different 
parishes would have been combined, this was a contrast to policy in the regular army, 
in which even seriously under strength formations were rarely amalgamated. 79' 
Equipment would have varied between units as personnel were required to provide 
their own and the following was a recommended list of items for a unit of twenty-five 
men: six each of pickaxes, spades and shovels, three billhooks and four felling axes. 790 
In addition it was also noted that 'a proportion of wheelbarrows will also be very
7 "3 PRO WO 30/141, p.6.
794 pRO wo 30/141, p.6.
793 Orders. General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, Sanim, 19th November 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
7% PRO WO 30/141, p.6.
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serviceable'. 797 The fact that the pioneers had to provide their own tools was evidence 
that the state lacked the means to meet adequately the needs of defending forces itself, 
and raises doubts about their effectiveness if such tools could not be supplied.
An insight into the volunteer units formed to counter a French invasion can be 
gained by the fact that the ability of each parish to supply personnel for military 
purposes (as summarised in schedule 4) was initially based on the number of 
individuals able to arm themselves. It was anticipated that each parish would be able 
to supply contingents of both horse and foot, while the armaments each was to 
provide reveals much about the force and its potential effectiveness on the battlefield. 
Cavalry were requested to supply a pistol or a sword (preferable both), while those on 
foot would provide either a 'firelock' (musket) or pitchfork798 . The reason for this was 
laid out in a letter from the Lord Lieutenant to the parish of Box in August 1803:
There will be difficulty in issuing arms from his majesty's stores for the 
extensive training and exercise required in this period, without material injury 
to the other essential branches of the military, I am directed to resort to the 
zeal and public spirit of the inhabitants of this county for procuring a return of 
arms in their possession, in order that, with their consent, they may for a time 
be applied to the service of this country. 799
In short, there were insufficient armaments to go around and the use of civilian 
weapons alleviated the need to supply firearms to volunteer formations. 800 Of note is 
that the Lord Lieutenant stated that a ratio of one musket between four men was 
initially sufficient, to allow for adequate training and drill/ 01 There was thus a very 
real possibility that volunteer units resisting a French invader in 1803 could expect to
engage the French with a ratio of one musket to three close combat weapons (one
""PRO WO 30/14Lp.6n.
""* WSRO 1719/30, schedule 4.
"w To the Minister. Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the
County of Wilts, from the Lord Lieutenant, Wilton House, 2"d August 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
m This is further evidence that the supply of munitions to coalition partners occurred at the expense of
British forces, p. 105.
m To the Minister, Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the
County of Wilts, from the Lord Lieutenant, Wilton House, 2nd August 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
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hundred and fifty years previously, during the civil war, the ideal ratio of shot to pike 
had been approximately two to one).
Interestingly there appears to have been no attempt to emulate the tactics of 
Irish rebels in producing large numbers of pikes. Easily produced by village 
blacksmiths, these had proved to be effective weapons against cavalry in close terrain 
during the rebellion of 1798."02 This would have been of great value to the volunteer 
units given the questionable utility of their own cavalry, an arm that requires extensive 
training for both its personnel and animals."03 Furthermore, volunteer cavalry lacked 
carbines, which were weapons not generally available to private citizens, but of some 
value on the battlefield."04 This would have put them at a major disadvantage against 
other cavalry even if problems associated with insufficient training and drill could 
have been overcome. Giving the proven value of the pike in the hands of trained or 
willing civilians, as in 1798, the failure to adopt the weapons for the volunteers 
appears inexplicable. Conservative military thinking no doubt influenced the decision 
but the most likely explanation is that, fearful of unrest, the government was reluctant 
to promote the manufacture of such a weapon in the English provinces. This was 
understandable given that even a relatively quiet county in the period, such as 
Wiltshire, showed signs of growing unrest during 1802, the year in which the anti- 
invasion plans were introduced. *°- That August, for example, a Samuel Baker was 
convicted:
on a violent suspicion of having unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously 
assembled, and having feloniously by firing of arms, and using other offensive 
Weapons, attempted to destroy the dwelling-house [sic.] and mills, belonging 
to John Jones, Esq., of Staverton.*06
*°- See T. Pakenham, Tlie Year of Liberty: We History of the. Gnat Irish Rebellion of 1798 (Hodder &
Stoughton, 1992), p.77; A. T. Q. Stewait. The Summer Soldiers: Tlie 1798 Rebellion in Antrim and
Down (Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1995), passim.
m MacDonald- Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry, pp.lx-lxi.
m Haythomthwaite, Tlie Napoleonic Source Book, p. 80.
s05 Charlesworth (ed), Rural Protest, passim.
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Only four days earlier, a Thomas Hilliker and 'divers other persons not yet taken' had 
been convicted of destroying a mill, while three Trowbridge cloth workers had been 
found guilty of attempting to form an illegal combination (trade union). 807 For further 
proof that insurrection remained a concern of the government, the historian needs to 
look no further than the role of the volunteers in the event of invasion, which was to 
include suppression of disorder in rear areas. 501*
Significant difficulties would have been encountered in supplying the 
volunteer units due to the variety of firearms that would have been found in their 
ranks. As individuals were encouraged to supply their own firearms it is likely that 
everything from duelling pistols to fowling pieces, in a variety of calibres, would have 
been employed. The authorities were well aware of the potential difficulties that such 
diversity could cause and special provision was to be made for these firearms:
It is earnestly recommended to all who voluntarily offer to appear with arms, 
to provide a bullet mould for the calibre of their gun or pistol, a small bag for 
bullets, and a powder horn, lest the bore of their arms, being smaller than those 
of the army, should prevent their using the ammunition made up for the King's 
Troops, in which case a delivery of lead and powder will be made to them. 809
The request for accoutrements such as powder horns and the like, while unusual, was 
not unreasonable giving that those possessing firearms would already own some or all 
such items. Most surprising is the offer to deliver lead and powder to individuals for 
the manufacture of their own munitions. Such a decision was not taken lightly in a 
period of revolutions and demonstrates the seriousness of the French invasion threat. 
A valid question is that if the government was willing to supply shot and
806 Devizes Session, 10th January 1802, WSRO Al/125/46W , Calendar of Prisoners in the Count) Gaol 
at Fisherton Anger and Devizes and Marlborough Bridewells, 1803, p.6.
807 Devizes Session, 10th January 1802, WSRO A1/125/46W, pp.6-8.
m To the Minister, Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the 
Count) of Wilts, from the Lord Lieutenant, Wilton House, 2nd August 1803, WSRO 1719/30. 
809 WSRO 1719/30, schedule 4.
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powder, why did it not authorise the widespread manufacture of pikes? Linda Colley 
describes the decision as a calculated risk on the government's part. sl° It was also a 
limited risk, however, as those receiving the lead and powder already possessed 
firearms so the potential threat already existed, unlike a horde of rebels armed with 
pikes recently produced by a local blacksmith. In addition, allowing part-time soldiers 
to maintain possession of their firearms even when not on duty was not a new concept 
but an existing policy. This was demonstrated by the following appeal, placed in the 
Salisbury Journal by the commanding officer of the Dorset Yeomanry: 'All persons 
that formerly belonged to my regiment... and do not intend to renew their services in 
that corps, are requested to give in their arms and accoutrements to their respective 
captains'." 11 Those weapons that were not returned may well have found their way into 
the ranks of the volunteers.
Many contemporaries believed the forces raised in the counties would have 
been an effective force due to their structure, organisation and the fact that they drew 
their manpower from a single locality. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson wrote of land- 
holding officers that 'a feudal attachment [of his tenants] would, in a great degree, 
supersede the necessity for any martial control'; while the Lord Lieutenant of 
Wiltshire stated in August 1808 that 'it can scarcely require a moment's consideration 
to determine how preferable it must be for the volunteers to be formed into distinct 
corps, officered by gentlemen of respectability in their own neighbourhoods'." 12 Such 
ideas may appear to be a desperate attempt to justify the concept of the Volunteers: 
given their diverse armament and initially poor training it is difficult to imagine the 
volunteers achieving little more than being hacked down by French cavalry,
* 10 Colley. Britons, p.328.
*'' Salisbury Journal 11 * July 1803, p. 1. . 
812 Wilson An Enquiry into the state of the Forces of the British Empire, p!2; To the Minister, 
Churchwardens. Overseers of the Poor, and Principal Inhabitants of Box in the Count) of Wilts, from 
the Lord Lieutenant Wilton House, 2ml August 1803, WSRO 1719/30.
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presuming they stood to fight or even turned out at all. Despite this the Irish rebels of 
1798 proved what could be achieved and it is possible that the volunteers, fully 
integrated with the regulars, may have achieved some success on the battlefield. At 
worst they could have relieved frontline troops of tasks such as convoy or prisoner 
escort in the rear areas, or provided a means through which potentially serious 
disorder could be contained."13
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter with a brief consideration of county 
governance in the aftermath on invasion. Even though the volunteers were mobilised, 
livestock on the move and villages serving as depots, the magistrates of the county 
bench and lieutenants were to have continued to play a role in maintaining the 
defending forces. Due to the movement of the population away from their homes, 
continuing the militia ballot would not have been possible, although justices could 
have continued to supervise the passage of troops. In August 1804 regulations were 
published concerning 'the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of 
invasion, in each county in Great Britain'. If these regulations had been implemented 
it is apparent that the civil power, while officially supported by the military, would 
have effectively become subordinated to its requirements. Such a course would have 
been anathema to many libertarians in Britain, and surely would have been used as 
vindication for the views of those who had long warned of the dangers posed by the 
ever-growing power of the state. 814 It was a situation that may have been inevitable for 
national survival but one that could have lasted indefinitely as legislation existed for 
enacting the regulations but not repealing them.
The regulations required that the magistrates sit daily, along with an officer of
the volunteers and chief superintendent of constables. The primary task of these
m Regulations for the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of invasion, in each count) in
Great Britain, 12* August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17, Regulations for each county, in case of
Invasion.
814 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.63.
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bodies would have been suppressing disorder in the army's rear areas, the regulations 
stating that they were 'to receive and execute the orders of the magistrates, in 
preventing and quelling disturbances, in taking up and conveying offenders to prison, 
in supplying escorts for all military purposes... and furnishing a guard for the county 
gaol... if wanted'. 1* 1 ' It was anticipated that the 'military purposes' described above 
may have included the maintenance of supply lines:
If, contrary to expectation any impediment should occur in the regular supply 
of the different markets every assistance is to be afforded to the persons who 
are accustomed, or who offer to supply them; and escorts to be granted in 
cases where it may be necessary for the secure passage and conveyance of 
cattle and provisions. 816
Such duties could have only been fulfilled if the volunteers were present in the county. 
It is, however, questionable if such formations would have turned out at all, many 
militiamen in Ireland opting to remain with their families when called upon to act 
against Irish rebels in 1798.* 17
If deprived of a military force to deploy at the request of the army, the role of 
the magistrates would have been confined to determining the rates of pay for wagon 
drivers employed in support of the military, and the price at which items such as flour 
and bread were to be sold to commissaries.""* How long this situation existed would 
have been decided by the efforts of the British armed forces, aided in no small part by 
the invasion preparations implemented by the magistrates, Lords Lieutenant and 
parish officials of counties across Britain. In the meantime the army, providing the 
regulations had been fully enacted, would have been able to break many of the bonds
815 Regulations for the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of invasion, in each count) in 
Great Britain, 12th August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17, Regulations for each county, in case of 
Invasion.
816 Regulations for the preservation of good order, to be adopted in case of invasion, in each count) in 
Great Britain, 12th August 1804, PRO WO 55/1548/17.
817 B. Cleary, 'The Battle of Oulait Hill: Context and Strategy', in D. Keogh and N. Furlong (eds), The 
Mighty Wave: the 1798 Rebellion in Wexford (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 1996), p82.
818 PRO WO 30/141, pp.17, 22.
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that bound it within the British state, particularly regulations that governed the 
requisitioning of property. It remains to be seen, however, if the breaking of these 
bonds would have been only a temporary suspension of practices or a permanent 
fracturing of the balance between state, society and army created in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. The relationship between army and state had been 
profoundly changed by the traumatic events of the seventeenth century and invasion in 
the early nineteenth century may have been no less traumatic, having the potential to 
create political repercussions of a similar magnitude. Thus, plans to maintain the army 
in the event of invasion may have proved as damaging to Britain's economic and 
political stability as military action itself. The extent to which this would have 
benefited the army is unclear, and would to a large extent have depended on the 
degree to which it was able to break free of the constraints previously imposed upon it 
by the pre-invasion British state.
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Conclusion
The relationship between the state and the army defined how the force was to 
be maintained. Because of this it would have a significant influence upon the function, 
structure, capability and effectiveness force itself. This was to have important 
consequences, both advantageous and otherwise. It is these consequences that 
demonstrate the importance of understanding the relationship between a state and its 
armed forces, as they have implications for the effectiveness of those forces and thus 
the military affairs of states.
The consequences when an army gains dominance over a state, which occurred 
in mid-seventeenth century Britain or Nazis Germany, are well known. When the role 
is reversed, with the state the dominant half of the partnership, however, this too has 
consequences. In particular, states have a stranglehold on the resources available to its 
military. Eighteenth century Britain is acknowledged to have possessed an economic 
and industrial strength unrivalled by its competitors but, as this work demonstrates, 
those resources available to the army were barely sufficient to meet the force's needs. 
A particularly important resource for the army was manpower and it was continually 
lacking a reserve of this." 19 Traditionally historians have focused on deficiencies in the 
fighting arms. This may be because it can be inferred that, as the combat arms were 
under strength, their supporting organizations could function while themselves under 
strength. It is apparent, however, that historians are in general apathetic to the 
organizations tasked with maintaining the army, almost entirely ignoring those such as 
the Royal Wagon Train and Medical Department. More importantly, it is apparent that 
such an inference is incorrect.
Hall, British Strategy, pp.6-7.
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The consequences of the manpower shortage were apparent in regard to the 
Chaplain General's Department. This was far too small for its task and unable to 
influence the religious affairs of soldiers significantly. 820 The Royal Wagon Train also 
had to contend with a shortage of manpower and could have achieved considerably 
more had it been enlarged. 821 This could have been of significant benefit for the 
Commissariat, which was often compelled to rely upon local transport overseas. The 
employment of Spanish and Portuguese muleteers was not a major problem for the 
army but could nevertheless hinder efficiency."22 Economics was a decisive factor in 
determining the quantity of manpower available but was not the only one. Much has 
been written about Britain's economic strength and its beneficial consequences, but 
this strength could only be maintained through depriving the military of vital 
resources, the most important of which was manpower. 823 Almost as important as 
manpower was materiel, as this too cost money and was required to sustain Britain's 
economic growth. The commercialisation of industry dictated that production was 
geared towards profit rather than meeting the needs of the armed forces. The two 
could be compatible but this was not always the case.
Finance permeated every aspect of logistics. To prevent the abuse of liberty the 
army was required to pay for the supplies it required, a system that relied on cash or 
credit, the availability to the army of both being controlled by the state. Required to 
pay its way with barely sufficient means the army frequently found itself living a hand 
to mouth existence and unable to construct a significant logistical reserve. Historians 
have frequently written about the small size of the army and its inability to survive 
defeat but manpower could have been raised through conscription if the need arose.
What is overlooked is that it was a capability to arm and maintain these new forces
^ See above p.220. 
821 See above p. 175. 
*" See above p.65. 
8-3 See above pp.88-89.
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that did not exist. There was simply too little slack in the system to rectify any 
deficiencies. Manufacturers were already cutting corners to meet contracts, and even 
prior to the Peninsula War deficiencies of items such as clothing were being rectified 
through using equipment acknowledged to be substandard.*24
It would be incorrect to view the army as completely starved of resources by 
the state. Surprisingly the one organization that was clear evidence of the beneficial 
consequences of the relationship between army and state is the one most often 
overlooked by historians - the Royal Wagon Train. The organization was a bright spot 
in the system used to maintain the army. The concepts underpinning it were modern, 
perhaps even progressive, and its creation was evidence that the influence of the state 
over the army was not entirely detrimental. The organization was relatively efficient 
and flexible, utilising technology created as a result of the industrial and agricultural 
revolutions, and benefited directly through the growth, (both political and 
geographical) of the British state due to the absorption of the Irish Wagon Train. The 
Royal Wagon Train represented a new doctrine as it was relatively self-contained and 
provided a transport capability maintained through its own artificers. This allowed the 
Royal Wagon Train to exhibit a degree of structural fluidity, the organization being 
able to restructure itself in response to the strategic situation. This manifested itself 
not only in an ability to create or demobilise troops but also develop new operational 
practices, leading to the creation of the depot troops.*25
The flexibility of the Royal Wagon Train made the organization ideally suited 
to the pragmatic policies adopted towards logistics as it was created to meet the needs 
of the army at the time. The Royal Wagon Train represented a modern approach to 
warfare; by comparison the quasi-military Commissariat was an evolutionary dead-
s24 See above p. 114. 
"5 See above p. 142.
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end for the army. The Commissariat is often criticised for its failings yet historians 
have shied away from addressing this, its most fundamental difficulty.
Creveld writes that nineteenth century warfare began, and eighteenth century 
warfare ended with Napoleon's campaign of 1805, when movement replaced sieges as 
the central component of strategy."26 By establishing the Royal Wagon Train in the 
1790s, therefore, the British army was already, if inadvertently, preparing for this new 
form of warfare. Neither the Royal Wagon Train nor Commissariat would survive the 
nineteenth century, their roles ultimately being amalgamated in the Royal Army 
Service Corp.*27 As a purely military force, employing its own specialist personnel, it 
was, however, the Royal Wagon Train that most closely paralleled the R.A.S.C. and 
later organizations. Intriguingly, the relationship between the British state and its 
military in the twenty first century is again becoming heavily influenced by economic 
concerns, rather than military effectiveness, and civilian contractors have once more 
become an integral part of the army's supporting services.
The Royal Wagon Train demonstrated that despite drawbacks the relationship 
between army and state was not necessarily detrimental for the former. It is the case 
that factors that caused difficulties could also bring benefits. For example, financial 
considerations frequently ensured economy rather than military effectiveness was a 
priority but also improved efficiency. 82" Administrative practice in the army was 
significantly influenced by the state and there is a tendency to equate bureaucracy with 
inefficiency. As the army of the period demonstrated, however, this was not always
the case as regulations limited corruption in the logistics system. More importantly,
*26 Creveld, Supplying War, p.40.
827 Indeed, this was the fate of almost the entire system utilised to maintain the force in the period, the 
multitude of departments with often over lapping jurisdictions slowly being amalgamated into larger, 
more efficient organizations. The most significant of these advances was the absorption of the 
Ordnance Department by the War" Office in 1855. This united the aims of the army into one command, 
although it is necessary to note that this did not necessarily improve efficiency and improve co- 
operation between the arms. As late as the 1960s there were power snuggles within the army 
concerning the responsibilities and roles of the Royal Artillery. 
82S See above p.41.
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and frequently overlooked, is that increased regulation created standards for soldiers' 
welfare even after their period of service. Regular inspections ensured that barracks, 
schools and hospitals met the required criteria. Considering the conditions in the latter 
this is contentious but nevertheless regulations existed that defined standards in 
hospitals, and these regulations were enforced on occasion. Regulations created 
additional costs and administration for the army but it is apparent that in this period 
there was a trend towards increasing investment in soldiers' welfare, a situation seen 
to benefit the army. This was most apparent in regard to the treatment of soldiers' 
families.
The state provided the resources and impetus for many of the factors that gave 
the British army its strength but this strength was fragile. The army lacked strategic 
depth, a policy that suited a state conscious to avoid disruption and control 
expenditure but one that was also a dangerous gambit. Potentially the army could have 
been a one shot weapon, defeat in one campaign spelling the end of the force, such a 
fate effectively befalling Napoleon's Grande Armee in Russia, a debacle from which 
it never recovered. 829 There was a genuine fear amongst contemporaries that such a 
fate would befall the British army if committed on the continent, and it has been 
estimated that the loss of one brigade may have been sufficient to cause the collapse 
of the Peninsular army. 100 If such an event had occurred it may well have resulted in 
the loss of the Royal Wagon Train's most effective elements and many Commissariat 
personnel, besides the loss of equipment and frontline troops.
Considering the above scenario, how realistic was the possibility of a 
significant British military defeat? Given the nature of this study, such a question 
could be turned to that of how effectively was the army maintained. Yet, as stated by
*-9 Mackesy. British Victory m Egypt, p.4.
*30 Wilson. An Enquiry into the state of the Forces of the British Empire, p.51; Weller, Wellington in 
the Peninsula, p.372.
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Schechter and Sander, the effective maintenance of a force is not itself a sound 
indicator of that force's success. Successful maintenance may make a force more 
effective but is not a guarantee of victory. 831 The example they cite is that of 
McClellan's Peninsula Campaign of 18627 in which poorly supplied Confederate 
forces consistently beat better maintained Union formations, but examples relevant to 
this study could include Spanish victories during Napoleon's initial invasion of Spain 
and the success of Irish Rebels in 1798.
When considering the possible fallibility of British arms in the period, a 
common stumbling block is the perception of the Napoleonic Wars as a British 
victory. This ranges from the outrageously jingoistic and populist version of events 
portrayed in the work of Richard Holmes, who describes the British army as 
possessing 'a certain something that flickers out across two centuries like an electric 
current', to the Anglo-centric works of historians such as lan Fletcher, who describes 
the Peninsula War as 'Britain's greatest military contribution to the downfall of 
Napoleon Bonaparte'. s32 The former statement in particular represents a throw back to 
the views of the early to mid twentieth century, held by historians such as Charles 
Oman and Jac Weller.
Piers Mackesy writes that prior to 1800 the British army had known little but 
failure, examples including defeat in North America, a fiasco in the Low Countries 
and the devastation of garrisons in the West Indies by disease."33 Following 1800 the 
force was to emerge victorious but not unbeaten, with famous victories such as 
Salamanca and Vittoria sitting alongside fiascos and disasters such as Buenos Aires
"31 Schechter and Sander, Delivering the Goods, p.22.
"3- R Holmes. Red Coat: We British Soldier in the Age of the Horse and Musket (London, Harper
Collins, 2001), pxvi; I. Fletcher (ed), Voices from the Peninsula: Eye Witness Accounts by Soldiers of
Wellington 'sArmy, 1808-14 (London, Greenhill, 2001), p.5. As a contrast to the work of Fletcher see
Esdaile. The Peninsular War, passim.
833 Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt,, p.3. Added to this could well be the army's performance in the
Irish Rebellion of 1798.
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and Walcheren. As noted by Peter Hofschorer even the most famous victory of all, 
Waterloo, would have been a disaster had it not been for the intervention of the 
Prussians. In fact the often forgotten campaign that followed the battle was militarily 
an overwhelming Prussian victory, with only British political influence in Paris 
keeping Blucher in check, depriving Prussia of well deserved glory in the process. 834 
Perhaps Holmes' most pertinent point about the British army is that it was capable of 
victory and not immune to defeat."35
The concept of the British army as a success can to a great extent be attributed 
to a Euro-centric perception of the Napoleonic Wars. It was within the borders of 
Europe that many decisive battles were fought, while some of the greatest fiascos 
were to occur elsewhere, including the disastrous expedition to Argentina, defeat at 
New Orleans and the devastation of garrisons in the West Indies by disease (although 
the success of British arms in Europe were not universal - the Corunna campaign 
being a case in point). As David Chandler stated, no battle or indeed campaign should 
be seen in isolation but rather as the sum of many parts, so the Napoleonic Wars 
should be no exception. 836 Despite being a struggle between European powers the 
conflict was fought across the globe, to a lesser extent than that of the Seven Years 
War maybe, but it was still a global war.*37
Another important factor is that the British army was to participate in conflicts 
that were not always part of the Napoleonic Wars or had only a tenuous link to that 
conflict, against colonial enemies in Africa, Asia, the Americas and the United States 
of America. 838 Philip Haythornthwaite effectively divides the British army into two 
during this period, that part of the force engaged in colonial actions and that arrayed
834 P. Hofschroer, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign The German Victory, Volume I (London, Greenhill,
1999), pp. 116-129, 271.
** Holmes, Red Coat, p.xvi.
536 D. Chandler, Waterloo: Tlie Hundred Days (London, Osprey, 1980), p. 11.
M7 See Black, Britain as a Military Power, pp. 115-154. 241-266.
83S Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Military Machine, p. 78; P. Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, p. 5.
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against the French threat. 83" Yet, to understand the army the two spheres cannot be 
separated as one could influence the other and, as noted by Jeremy Black, conflict was 
closely linked to concepts of Empire in the period.*40 As demonstrated in this work 
garrisons in all theatres competed with each other (and allied armies) for the 
sometimes scarce resources that they needed, including uniforms, munitions and 
manpower (as demonstrated in the global distribution of chaplains in particular). The 
global deployment of the army was also one of the most subtle but significant 
consequences of its relationship with the state, creating a situation that not only 
hindered the army but also influenced its composition. 1*41 Thus, in the context of a 
force deployed around the world, the failures of the army beyond Europe cannot be 
ignored. M2
If it is accepted that the British army was not an overwhelming success, and a 
major defeat was possible, it must be asked how far the state was willing to alter its 
relationship with the army in order to aid the recovery of the force? The state 
demonstrated that certain principles would be sacrificed to aid national defence, such 
as the right of practising Anglicans to worship when they wished if in the auxiliary 
forces. More far reaching concessions may have been made in the event of a French 
invasion, a situation that had the potential to trigger the implementation of military 
control over large parts of southern Britain, not to mention massive economic and 
social disruption.
* 39 See Haythomthwaite, Tlie Napoleonic Source Book. Hie Colonial Wars Source Book (London.
Anns and Armour, 1997).
s40 Black. Sea Borne Empire, pp. 113-114.
841 In particular colonial commitments influenced the creation of light infantry tactics and formations in
the army. A. Harman, 'They decide not, nor are they chiefly relied upon in battle 1 : British Rifles and
Light Infantry in the Peninsular War', in P Griffiths (ed), A History of the Peninsular War Vol IX:
Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808 -1814 (London, Greenhill Books, 1999).
pp.265-298.
s42 Imperialism could and did continue separately from military affairs. Examples include the Mungo
Park's expeditions in West Africa (1795-97, 1805-06) and Flinder's circumnavigation of Tasmania
(1802-03), the latter in particular beign concerned with trade. Black, Sea Borne Empire, pp. 165-166.
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It must be assumed that if the invasion had occurred the scheme would have 
been implemented. Not only had the necessary (and detailed) regulations been 
introduced but the army had already demonstrated that in a war zone peacetime 
regulations governing it could be eroded. At the most basic level administrative 
practices introduced due to the relationship with the state were circumvented by 
military necessities, while more significant were the ruthless activities of 
Commissariat personnel and purchasing agents in the hunt for the items they required. 
There is no reason to believe the activities of Commissaries on the front line in 
England would have been any different to those in Spain and Portugal, particularly in 
an area already devastated by French occupation. 843 Whether this would have left the 
relationship between state and army in tatters is less certain, this being dependent on 
how long the situation lasted and the extent to which the old rules were broken. What 
is apparent was the willingness of the state to consider sacrificing central principles in 
aid of national defence, thereby redefining the relationship between army and state.
The repercussions of any change in the relationship between the state and 
army in response to an invasion might have been significant. The maintenance of an 
armed force is as much a political or economic issue as it is a military one. As a 
consideration of how the army was maintained in the period demonstrates, a state can 
both facilitate and hinder the growth and maintenance of an armed force. After 
determining how an armed force is to be used, one of the most important tasks facing 
policy makers is how it should be maintained. This will define the relationship 
between an army and state, as well as the effectiveness of the force. In turn this will 
determine the military options available to a state and the ability of an armed force to 
protect the state itself.
*43 Throughout the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars there was little difference between 
the practices of occupying and friendly armies when gathering supplies. Corvisiex, Armies and 
Societies, pp.66-67.
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